Thursday, December 26, 2013

Mad cow disease warning for Australian beef

Thursday, December 26, 2013

Mad cow disease warning for Australian beef

Commodities

Mad cow disease warning for Australian beef

James Wagstaff • The Weekly Times • December 26, 2013 12:00AM

A lot to lose: Mad cow disease would hurt Aussie producers more than those in the US.

Picture: Zoe Phillips

AUSTRALIAN beef producers stand to lose more from an outbreak of mad cow disease than their American cousins. That's according to Meat and Livestock Australia trade and economic services general manager Peter Barnard. His assessment comes 10 years after the disease was is covered in the US, which cost the local beef industry an estimated $16 billion.

On December 23, 2003, a Washington state dairy cow tested positive for the brain-wasting bovine spongiform encephalopathy or mad cow disease. It was the first case of BSE in the US and prompted high-value export markets such as Japan and Korea to close their borders to US product overnight.

Australia stepped up to fill the void with beef exports to Japan alone jumping from 280,000 tonnes to 400,000 tonnes within a year.

Dr Barnard said the cost to the US beef industry in the first few years after the discovery was estimated at $1.5-$2.7 billion annually.

"Our costs (in Australia) would be much greater than that because the US industry only exports 10 per cent of production, whereas we export about two thirds of our beef production," he said.

Dr Barnard pointed to a recent ABARES report that said an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Australia would cost an estimated $55 billion.

"Yes, you can pick up some tonnages to these markets, but it's not all good news," he said. "The major lesson to draw from it is the enormous cost of a significant disease outbreak."

Dr Barnard said beef consumption in Japan was well down on 2000 levels when Japan had its BSE case.

"In Korea, we definitely picked up tonnages and unlike Japan exports have continued there at much higher levels."

http://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/commodities/cattle/mad-cow-disease-warning/story-fnkeqfz1-1226788871777



MADCOW TSE PRION USDA OIE END OF YEAR REPORT 2013


NOW, for the rest of this madcow nightmare, spreading it around the globe, by the USDA INC and OIE $$$


*** Hence, the data presented here are important for a risk- based SRM definition. ...DECEMBER 2013 ***


Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

http://www.veterinaryresearch.org/content/pdf/1297-9716-44-123.pdf



see much more here ;


Saturday, December 21, 2013

*** Complementary studies detecting classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy infectivity in jejunum, ileum and ileocaecal junction in incubating cattle

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/12/complementary-studies-detecting.html




FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE


OAI 2012-2013

OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.


ATL-DO 1035703 Newberry Feed & Farm Ctr, Inc. 2431 Vincent St. Newberry SC 29108-0714 OPR DR, FL, FR, TH HP 9/9/2013 OAI Y

DET-DO 1824979 Hubbard Feeds, Inc. 135 Main, P.O. Box 156 Shipshewana IN 46565-0156 OPR DR, FL, OF DP 8/29/2013 OAI Y

ATL-DO 3001460882 Talley Farms Feed Mill Inc 6309 Talley Rd Stanfield NC 28163-7617 OPR FL, TH NP 7/17/2013 OAI N

NYK-DO 3010260624 Sherry Sammons 612 Stoner Trail Rd Fonda NY 12068-5007 OPR FR, OF NP 7/16/2013 OAI Y

DEN-DO 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO 81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N

CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL 61044-9605 OPR FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y

*** DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley CO 80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N

Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)


http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/ComplianceEnforcement/BovineSpongiformEncephalopathy/ucm114507.htm




PLEASE NOTE, the VAI violations were so numerous, and unorganized in dates posted, as in numerical order, you will have to sift through them for yourselves. ...tss



Tuesday, June 11, 2013

*** Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 6/1/12 significant deviations from requirements in FDA regulations that are intended to reduce the risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) within the United States

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2013/06/weld-county-bi-products-dba-fort-morgan.html



Thursday, June 6, 2013

BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013

Greetings,

since our fine federal friends have decided not to give out any more reports on the USA breaches of the feed ban and surveillance etc. for the BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease in the USDA livestock, I thought I might attempt it. I swear, I just don’t understand the logic of the SSS policy, and that includes all of it. I assure you, it would be much easier, and probably better for the FDA and the USDA INC., if they would simply put some kind of report out for Pete’s sake, instead of me doing it after I get mad, because I am going to put it all out there. the truth.

PLEASE BE ADVISED, any breach of any of the above classifications OAI, VAI, RTS, CAN lead to breaches into the feed BSE TSE prion protocols, and CAN lead to the eventual suspect tainted feed reaching livestock. please, if any USDA official out there disputes this, please explain then how they could not. paperwork errors can eventually lead to breaches of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban reaching livestock, or contamination and exposure there from, as well.

I would sure like to see the full reports of just these ;

4018 CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL 61044-9605 OPR FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y

9367 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO 81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N

9446 DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley CO 80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N

9447 DEN-DO 3002857110 Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 13553 County Road 19 Fort Morgan CO 80701-7506 OPR RE HP 12/7/2011 OAI N

see full list of the fda mad cow bse feed follies, toward the bottom, after a short brief update on the mad cow bse follies, and our good friend Lester Crawford that was at the FDA.

ALSO, I would kindly like to comment on this FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)4 format, for reporting these breaches of BSE TSE prion protocols, from the extensive mad cow feed ban warning letters the fda use to put out for each violations. simply put, this excel format sucks, and the FDA et al intentionally made it this difficult to follow the usda fda mad cow follies. this is an intentional format to make it as difficult as possible to follow these breaches of the mad cow TSE prion safety feed protocols. to have absolutely no chronological or numerical order, and to format such violations in a way that they are almost impossible to find, says a lot about just how far the FDA and our fine federal friends will go through to hide these continued violations of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, and any breaches of protocols there from. once again, the wolf guarding the henhouse $$$

NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED

OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED

VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED

RTS = REFERRED TO STATE

Inspections conducted by State and FDA investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection, based upon whether objectionable conditions were documented. Based on the conditions found, inspection results are recorded in one of three classifications:

OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.

VAI (Voluntary Action Indicated) when inspectors find objectionable conditions or practices that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but warrant an advisory to inform the establishment that inspectors found conditions or practices that should be voluntarily corrected. VAI violations are typically technical violations of the 1997 BSE Feed Rule. These violations include minor recordkeeping lapses or conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.

NAI (No Action Indicated) when inspectors find no objectionable conditions or practices or, if they find objectionable conditions, those conditions are of a minor nature and do not justify further actions.

http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/ucm093810.htm



when sound science was bought off by junk science, in regards to the BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease, by the USDA, CFIA, WHO, OIE, et al. $$$

when the infamous, and fraudulently USDA, FSIS, APHIS, FDA, gold card was taken away that infamous day in December of 2003, all cards were off the table, it was time to change the science, and change they did. ...tss

snip. ...please see full text ;


Thursday, June 6, 2013

BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2013/06/bse-tse-prion-usda-fda-mad-cow-feed.html



IN A NUT SHELL ;

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,

http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



Sunday, December 15, 2013

*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/12/fda-part-589-substances-prohibited-from.html



Wednesday, December 4, 2013

*** Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December 4, 2013

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/12/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy.html




Saturday, November 2, 2013

*** APHIS Finalizes Bovine Import Regulations in Line with International Animal Health Standards while enhancing the spread of BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease around the Globe

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/11/aphis-finalizes-bovine-import.html




Thursday, December 05, 2013

National Scrapie Eradication Program October 2013 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2014 TSE PRION REPORT

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2013/12/national-scrapie-eradication-program.html



Friday, November 22, 2013

*** Wasting disease is threat to the entire UK deer population CWD TSE prion Singeltary submission

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2013/11/wasting-disease-is-threat-to-entire-uk.html



Tuesday, October 29, 2013

VARIANT CJD PRESENTS DIFFERENTLY IN OLDER PATIENTS

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/10/variant-cjd-presents-differently-in.html



Wednesday, October 09, 2013

*** WHY THE UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY IS SO POPULAR IN IT'S FALLACY, £41,078,281 in compensation REVISED

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/10/why-ukbsenvcjd-only-theory-is-so.html



Thursday, October 10, 2013

CJD REPORT 1994 increased risk for consumption of veal and venison and lamb

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/10/cjd-report-1994-increased-risk-for.html



Friday, August 16, 2013

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update August 2013 U.K. and Contaminated blood products induce a highly atypical prion disease devoid of PrPres in primates

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-biannual.html



WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$


Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/08/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-cases.html



Sunday, October 13, 2013

*** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/10/cjd-tse-prion-disease-cases-in-texas-by.html



From: noreply@parliament.uk

Sent:

Tuesday, December 03, 2013 4:49 AM

To: Terry Singeltary Sr

Subject: Written submission to House of Commons Science and Technology Committee inquiry

Parliament UK

Thank you for your written submission to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee inquiry on Blood, tissue and organ screening.

We will be in touch if we have any further questions.

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Sent: Monday, December 02, 2013 9:18 PM

To: CJDVOICE CJDVOICE Cc: bloodcjd bloodcjd

Subject: [BLOODCJD] A parliamentary inquiry has been launched today into the safety of blood, tissue and organ screening following fears that vCJD – the human form of ‘mad cow’ disease – may be being spread by medical procedures


Monday, December 02, 2013

*** A parliamentary inquiry has been launched today into the safety of blood, tissue and organ screening following fears that vCJD – the human form of ‘mad cow’ disease – may be being spread by medical procedures

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/12/a-parliamentary-inquiry-has-been.html




Saturday, November 09, 2013

*** Surveillance for creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in Australia: update to December 2012 ***

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/11/surveillance-for-creutzfeldt-jakob.html




kind regards, terry

layperson

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

Thursday, December 5, 2013

UK FSA Cleveland Meat Company prosecution on failure to remove specified risk material (SRM) per TSE prion regulation

Last updated on 5 December 2013

 

Cleveland Meat Company prosecution

 

The FSA has welcomed the successful prosecution of the Cleveland Meat Company Ltd for breaches of food safety regulations. The company has been ordered to pay more than £27,000 in fines and prosecution costs after being found guilty on 12 charges. It entered a guilty plea on a 13th charge during the course of the hearing.

 

The FSA brought the prosecution against the Cleveland Meat Company after FSA staff identified breaches of the regulations, which are in place to prevent potential consumer exposure to BSE. These breaches included the failure to remove specified risk material (SRM) from a sheep carcass. SRM are the parts of the animal most likely to carry infectivity.

 

Andrew Rhodes, Chief Operating Officer of the FSA, said: 'We are pleased with the successful conclusion of this prosecution. These regulations are in place to keep the public safe and the FSA’s job is to ensure they are enforced properly across the country. Where companies are not meeting their responsibilities we will take action.'

 

 


 

 

THAT AIN’T BAD, only $27,000 fine for exposing the consumers to a disease that is 100% fatal, once clinical, and really, no way to trace the potential iatrogenic TSE there from to humans. all iatrogenic CJD is, is sporadic CJD, until the iatrogenic event that took place is identified, confirmed, and then put in the academic domain, and that rarely ever happens $$$...TSS

 

 

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

 

*** 5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

 

snip...

 

R. BRADLEY

 


 

 

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

 

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

 

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

 

snip...

 

*** The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

 

PMID: 6997404

 


 

 

Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

 

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

 

snip...

 

76/10.12/4.6

 


 

 

Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

 

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).

 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

 

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

 

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

 

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

 

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

 

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).

 


 


 

 

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

 

IN CONFIDENCE

 

SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

 

IN CONFIDENCE

 


 

 

Monday, December 02, 2013

 

A parliamentary inquiry has been launched today into the safety of blood, tissue and organ screening following fears that vCJD – the human form of ‘mad cow’ disease – may be being spread by medical procedures

 


 

 

Tuesday, November 5, 2013

 

Food Standards Agency FSA 13/11/05 Open Board – 05 November 2013 BSE

 


 

 

Thursday, June 6, 2013

 

FSA MORE BSE MAD COW CONTROL BREACHES JUNE 2013

 


 

 

Friday, October 25, 2013

 

UK FSA TSE BSE Board meeting agenda: 5 November 2013

 


 

 

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

 

U-turn considered on European PAP animal feed ban 27 Mar 2013 News

 


 

 

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

 

FSA notified of BSE control breaches again and again 5 March 2013

 


 

 

Thursday, January 17, 2013

 

FSA notified of two breaches of BSE testing regulations 14 January 2013

 


 

 

Food Standards Agency FSA 13/01/01 Open Board – 22 January 2013

 

 

PROPOSED DECISION TO STOP BSE TESTING OF HEALTHY CATTLE SLAUGHTERED FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (FSA 12/12/04)

 

snip...

 

12. The Deputy Chair declared an interest as an owner of a small farm, but had no livestock. The Chair agreed that this would not improperly influence the Deputy Chair’s contributions to the discussion.

 

13. The Chair welcomed Alison Gleadle, FSA Director of Food Safety, David Carruthers, FSA Head of Meat Hygiene and TSE Policy Branch and Alick Simmons, Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Defra to the meeting. Alison Gleadle explained that the critical controls to protect human health and prevent a recurrence of BSE were those associated with the removal of Specified Risk Material (SRM) from carcases and the control of feed stuffs. The current proposal to stop BSE testing healthy slaughter cattle was based on European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) advice and relates to surveillance rather than consumer protection. This advice was consistent with previous advice from the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) that any change in BSE incidence is most likely to be detected in at risk cattle. The letter from the Chief Medical Officer also agreed with this assessment. No change was proposed to the SRM or feed ban controls. Alison Gleadle assured the Board that if there were any unexpected changes in BSE levels or deterioration in the epidemiological situation, the Board would be informed.

 

14. Alick Simmons said Defra, as the Department responsible for overseeing the surveillance system, was committed to managing the risk to public health on a proportionate basis.

 

15. A Board member agreed the science supported the recommendation in the paper but wanted assurance that sufficient testing would remain in place to spot any re-emergence of BSE and wanted to know if it would take longer to detect an increase. Alick Simmons said this would not be the beginning of the end of monitoring. Internationally the UK has controlled risk status. It would take 11 years after the birth of the last BSE case before the UK achieved negligible risk status and could

 

Food Standards Agency FSA 13/01/01 Open Board – 22 January 2013 4

 

reduce the controls. The current sensitive controls made predictions of re-emergence easier and would remain in place. There could be a change in the speed with which a re-emergence of the disease could be detected but as long as the SRM and feed controls remained in place the effects of any delay would be significantly mitigated.

 

16. The Chair of the Scottish Food Advisory Committee (SFAC) said the Committee agreed with the recommendation but it was crucial that the two controls (feed ban and SRM) remained in place. He asked if the FSA would have to wait 17 years to detect a re-emergence or if the continued testing of at-risk cattle would detect it before then. Alick Simmons said he would expect to see any re-emergence in at-risk cattle. The results of the monitoring undertaken by Defra were published. AHVLA run a model every year on the data so any change in the level of BSE detected would come to the FSA’s attention as soon as that data was reported.

 

17. The Chair of the Welsh Food Advisory Committee (WFAC) said the Committee supported moving to the modified regime but it was a pre-requisite that the controls (feed ban and SRM) remained in place and regular reports on the effectiveness of the monitoring system were provided. These reports would be expected to include information on the feed ban although the enforcement of it is not part of the FSA’s remit.

 

18. On behalf of the Chair of the Northern Ireland Food Advisory Committee (NIFAC), the Chair said NIFAC also sought reassurance on the integrity of the surveillance of fallen and at-risk cattle.

 

19. The Deputy Chair said that while the FSA would be involved in any changes to the TSE Road map, it would not be involved in any changes to animal health surveillance and stressed that communication between Defra and the FSA on this latter point would be crucial. The Chief Executive drew the Board’s attention to the letter from Peter Unwin, Director General of Policy Delivery at Defra, which states that the FSA’s advice will be sought on the food safety implications of any proposals to change the BSE testing requirements.

 

20. The Deputy Chair said Bulgaria and Romania were high risk countries and asked if traceability systems existed to cope with a two tier system. Alick Simmons said that Romania and Bulgaria were not necessarily higher risk but as their controls had been in place for a shorter period, they could not yet move to a lower level of surveillance. He said there were statutory requirements on surveillance of foreign stock, on diseases other than BSE and additional tests for new and emerging diseases. Defra expected to start a consultation on 13 December 2012 to reconfigure the surveillance system for new and emerging diseases in England and Wales. Alick Simmons invited Board members to attend the AHVLA meetings as part of their consultation on changes to wider surveillance systems for new and emerging diseases.

 

Action: Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer Food Standards Agency FSA 13/01/01 Open Board – 22 January 2013

 

5 21. A Board member suggested adding the following wording to the FSA advice to Ministers: “while continuing to test all “risk cattle” aged over 48 months and subject to maintaining the ban on feeding animal protein to farmed animals and the removal of specified risk material (SRM).”

 

22. The Chair said the risk to consumers of stopping BSE testing of all healthy cattle aged over 72 months was negligible and the food supply chain would continue to be protected with the ban on animal protein in animal feed and the removal of specified risk material (SRM). With no case of BSE in healthy

 

snip...

 

 


 

 

 

11Dec12/O/22

 

Director of Food Safety

 

The Board should review a report on the results of the BSE monitoring system and the effectiveness of enforcement of the feed and SRM controls six months after current levels of BSE testing are reduced; a second report after another six months; and then a report annually.

 

Nov 2013

 

This has been noted and placed on the future agenda plan.

 

 


 

 

Citizens Forums are the main mechanism for direct engagement with consumers across the UK. Forums can either be a longer deliberative process where more information is required and consumers need time to think more widely about the issues. For other policy issues a shorter one-session discussion is used e.g. changes to BSE testing.

 

Locations are chosen to ensure ethnic diversity and consumers with non-English cultures are included. This involves selecting locations with rich ethnic diversity e.g. Birmingham, Bradford, Leicester and London. On some policy issues the closeness to agriculture or farming has made a difference to how consumers view particular challenges. Recent examples of this include Processed Animal Protein (PAP), EU Proposals on BSE Regulation and Consumer Attitudes to Raw Drinking Milk. Therefore ensuring consumers from areas that are more rurally located and not just cities or large towns has ensured the engagement does not become one dimensional.

 


 

 

breaches (UK)

 

In the period 1 April 2012 to 30 September 2012, 1,277,136 bovines were slaughtered for human consumption, with 5 breaches of BSE controls reported in the period. During Quarter 2 (July – September 2012) there were 4 breaches and 643,732 bovines were slaughtered for human consumption. None of these breaches were for bovines included in FSA checks. All specified risk material would have been removed from the animals at the time of processing (specified risk material is the parts of an animal likely to contain any infectivity in the unlikely event that the animal should have BSE).

 

 


 

 

 

> This has been noted and placed on the future agenda plan.

 

?

 

 TSS

 

 

TO STOP TESTING HEALTHY CATTLE FOR BSE TSE PRION DISEASE, all strains, it just seems so counter productive to me, and further risk spreading the BSE TSE prion agent even further, thus risking more humans...tss

 

 

“This research raises the possibility, which has been mentioned before, that apparently healthy cattle could harbour, but never show signs of, BSE.”

 

SUB CLINICAL PRION INFECTION

 

MRC-43-00 Issued: Monday, 28 August 2000

 

NEW EVIDENCE OF SUB-CLINICAL PRION INFECTION: IMPORTANT RESEARCH FINDINGS RELEVANT TO CJD AND BSE

 

A team of researchers led by Professor John Collinge at the Medical Research Council Prion Unit1 report today in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, on new evidence for the existence of a ?sub-clinical? form of BSE in mice which was unknown until now.

 

 

"This is a timely and unexpected result, increasing what we know about prion disease. These new findings have important implications for those researching prion disease, those responsible for preventing infected material getting into the food chain and for those considering how best to safeguard health and reduce the risk that theoretically, prion disease could be contracted through medical and surgical procedures."

 

ISSUED FRIDAY 25 AUGUST UNDER EMBARGO. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE EMBARGO IS SET BY THE JOURNAL

 

see full text ;

 


 

 

Neurobiology of Disease

 

Subclinical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Infection in Transgenic Mice Expressing Porcine Prion Protein

 


 

 

Friday, December 21, 2012

 

Four BSE cases with an L-BSE molecular profile in cattle from Great Britain

 

Veterinary Record doi:10.1136/vr.101158 Paper

 


 

 

Monday, October 14, 2013

 

Researchers estimate one in 2,000 people in the UK carry variant CJD proteins

 


 

 

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

 

VARIANT CJD PRESENTS DIFFERENTLY IN OLDER PATIENTS

 


 

 

Wednesday, October 09, 2013

 

*** WHY THE UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY IS SO POPULAR IN IT'S FALLACY, £41,078,281 in compensation REVISED

 


 

 

Thursday, October 10, 2013

 

CJD REPORT 1994 increased risk for consumption of veal and venison and lamb

 


 

 

Friday, August 16, 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update August 2013 U.K. and Contaminated blood products induce a highly atypical prion disease devoid of PrPres in primates

 


 

 

WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

 

 

WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$

 

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***

 


 

 

Sunday, October 13, 2013

 

CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

 


 

 

Monday, September 02, 2013

 

Lessons from the response to the threat of transfusion-transmitted vCJD in Ireland

 


 

 

Saturday, November 2, 2013

 

Recommendation of the Swiss Expert Committee for Biosafety on the classification of activities using prion genes and prion protein January 2013

 


 

 

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on paper $$$

 

full text ;

 


 

 

Thursday, December 05, 2013

 

National Scrapie Eradication Program October 2013 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2014 TSE PRION REPORT

 


 

 

 

TSS

Friday, November 29, 2013

Identification of Misfolded Proteins in Body Fluids for the Diagnosis of Prion Diseases

International Journal of Cell Biology

 

Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 839329, 10 pageshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/839329

 

Review Article

 

Identification of Misfolded Proteins in Body Fluids for the Diagnosis of Prion Diseases

 

Francesca Properzi and Maurizio Pocchiari Department of Cell Biology and Neurosciences, Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Viale Regina Elena 299, 00161 Rome, Italy

 

Received 21 May 2013; Revised 10 July 2013; Accepted 11 July 2013

 

Academic Editor: Alessio Cardinale

 

Copyright © 2013 Francesca Properzi and Maurizio Pocchiari. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

Abstract Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) or prion diseases are fatal rare neurodegenerative disorders affecting man and animals and caused by a transmissible infectious agent. TSE diseases are characterized by spongiform brain lesions with neuronal loss and the abnormal deposition in the CNS, and to less extent in other tissues, of an insoluble and protease resistant form of the cellular prion protein ( ), named . In man, TSE diseases affect usually people over 60 years of age with no evident disease-associated risk factors. In some cases, however, TSE diseases are unequivocally linked to infectious episodes related to the use of prion-contaminated medicines, medical devices, or meat products as in the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). Clinical signs occur months or years after infection, and during this silent period , the only reliable marker of infection, is not easily measurable in blood or other accessible tissues or body fluids causing public health concerns. To overcome the limit of detection, several highly sensitive assays have been developed, but attempts to apply these techniques to blood of infected hosts have been unsuccessful or not yet validated. An update on the latest advances for the detection of misfolded prion protein in body fluids is provided.

 

1. Introduction There are several forms of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) diseases or prion diseases affecting humans and different species of farm and wild animals (i.e., sheep, cattle, and cervids). Some of them have an apparently spontaneous occurrence (i.e., sporadic and genetic TSEs; some forms of atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy or scrapie), while others are linked to the consumption of prion-contaminated food as in the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) [1], feedstuff in bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) [2], or medical and surgical devices in iatrogenic CJD [3]. Transmission of variant CJD via blood transfusion and possibly plasma-derived factor VIII from asymptomatic donors [4] indicates that prion infectivity is present in blood months or years before clinical onset. Thus, the occurrence of epidemics in farm animals and episodes of human cases linked to prion infection pose serious public health issues that are often difficult to solve [5]. An eloquent example is given by the yet unexplained discrepancy between mortality (176 death from 1995 to June 2013) [6] and estimated prevalence data (1 in 4,000 to 1 in 10,000 people) of variant CJD in the British population [7]. This incongruity is causing great concerns because healthy and infected donors who are not promptly identified might transmit disease by blood transfusion, surgical instruments, or plasma-derived products.

 

The only validated surrogate marker of infection is the abnormally misfolded isoform of the cellular prion protein (PrPC) despite intensive but disappointing search for the identification of other disease-specific biomarkers in easily accessible tissues or body fluids [8, 9]. Misfolded PrP (PrPTSE) accumulates in the CNS and other tissues of infected hosts assuming different conformations that are related to the strain of prions [10]. PrPTSE is easily detected by western blot or immunohistochemistry methods after removing the cellular isoform (PrPC). Most anti-PrP antibodies, in fact, do not distinguish between PrPTSE and PrPC requiring the removal of the cellular isoform for achieving disease-specific signals. This is usually realised by pretreating samples with proteases (usually proteinase K) that partially digest PrPTSE but completely remove PrPC. The use of proteinase K (PK), however, removes fractions of poorly aggregated misfolded PrPTSE that is usually present in blood [11] and likely other body fluids decreasing the chance of detection. Finally, it is still debated whether PrPTSE is unequivocally associated with prion infectivity as there are occasions in which PrPTSE is either not associated with infectivity [12] or absent in infected hosts [13]. Despite these limits, PrPTSE remains the best available choice for confirming the diagnosis of prion diseases and for the identification of prion-associated infectivity in tissues and body fluids. Moreover, the profile that assumes PrPTSE in western blot, reflecting different pathological conformations, is of great help for making a correct molecular diagnosis of sporadic CJD and for differentiating sporadic from variant CJD [14].

 

In the last 15 years several methods have been developed for increasing the sensitivity of PrPTSE detection with the aim of finding a reliable assay for an early diagnosis of prion diseases in easily accessible tissues or body fluids. An overview of these developments is the objective of this work.

 

2. Protein-Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) In 2001, Saborio and colleagues [15] developed a novel protocol for the in vitro amplification of the misfolded prion protein based on the principle that disaggregated PrPTSE incubated in the presence of a large excess of PrPC produces novel PrPTSE. Disaggregation of fibrils requires a sonication step, which can be repeated several times, in a cyclic process, to allow sensitive detection of the misfolded PrP of the original seed. The protein-misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) was originally developed using hamster brain homogenate and has since been shown to be an efficient method for the amplification of brain PrPTSE of other species including mouse, sheep, cattle, bank voles, cervids, and humans [16–23]. In human samples, the amplification of PrPTSE is strongly influenced by the correct matching of methionine/valine in the 129 residue of PrP, suggesting that this polymorphic site of the protein is important for the amplification of PrP misfolding by the PMCA assay [24–26].

 

Ten cycles of sonication are sufficient to increase the sensitivity of standard western blots from 6–12 picograms to 0.3–0.5 picograms of brain PrPTSE and, with an improved automated protocol which enables a substantial increase in the number of amplification cycles, up to femtogram levels [27]. PMCA is therefore a promising platform for prion diagnosis in body fluids (blood, urine, and CSF) where the level of PrPTSE is estimated in the range of picograms per mL.

 

The group led by Soto reported the first successful identification of PrPTSE in blood (buffy coat) of scrapie affected hamsters with 89% sensitivity and 100% specificity [27] and positive signals in 50% of samples taken in the preclinical stage of disease as early as 20 days after intraperitoneal 263K scrapie injection [28]. The detection of PrPTSE in blood of preclinical scrapie-infected hamsters is consistent with data on infectivity detection in blood [8].

 

Since then, automated PMCA revealed the presence of PrPTSE in plasma fractions [29], urine [29–31], and cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) [32] of scrapie-diseased hamsters with sensitivity ranging from 50 (plasma) to 100 percent (CSF) (Table 1). In the CSF samples from scrapie-infected hamsters, PMCA was performed by using a further improved protocol (rPrP-PMCA) in which PrPC was replaced by recombinant PrP (recPrP), allowing a sensitivity greater than that observed with previous PMCA protocols [32].

 

Table 1: Detection of misfolded PrP in body fluids.

 

Other than in hamster models, PrPTSE was amplified from blood leukocytes of both naturally [20, 34] and experimentally scrapie-infected sheep [33] where PrPTSE bands were detected as early as 90 days postinoculation and correlated with infectivity titres [33]. On leukocytes of naturally scrapie-infected sheep, PrPTSE was detected in all tested animals with 100% specificity by using an enhanced (i.e., addition of poly-A PMCA) protocol [20].

 

Attempts to detect PrPTSE in blood of other species such as cattle with BSE and cervids with CWD produced negative or controversial results [34, 37, 58]. In patients with various forms of prion diseases, the detection of PrPTSE by PMCA was not attempted (or results were not published) in sample of blood, blood derivatives, plasma, urine, or CSF despite amplification of PrPTSE was successfully reported in human brain samples taken from both sporadic and variant CJDs [16, 24–26].

 

Finally, PMCA amplification of PrPTSE in samples from body fluids, other than blood, taken from prion-infected hosts was successfully achieved in a variety of species and included saliva and urine in sheep with scrapie [36, 36]; saliva, urine, and CSF in cervids with CWD [38, 58]; and CSF and saliva in cattle with BSE [37]. A list of prion-infected body fluids analysed by PMCA with the obtained sensitivity and specificity is shown in Table 1.

 

In conclusion, PMCA has certainly been a breakthrough for detection of minute amount of PrPTSE that are likely present in body fluids and therefore is a candidate method for developing sensitive tests for the diagnosis of prion diseases in animals and humans. Moreover, the amplified product of PMCA retains the PrPTSE signature of the original seed allowing the molecular diagnosis of CJD in humans and scrapie in sheep with important public health implications. In the last 10 years, PMCA has frequently been modified by addition of poly-A [20] or sulfated dextrans [37], by the use of recombinant PrP instead of brain PrPC [32], or by coupling with sensitive immunoassays [34] that have on one side improved the sensitivity of PrPTSE detection but, on the other hand, made the comparison of data produced by different laboratories difficult. PMCA coamplifies infectivity together with PrPTSE [59, 60] mimicking the disease-specific pathogenic event but requiring safety precautions in diagnostic laboratories. Finally, PrPTSE bands may appear in control preparations after several PMCA cycles [61]. This finding, whether related to de novo formation of PrPTSE [20, 60, 61] or cross-contamination of samples [22], raised concern for the reliability of PMCA in diagnostic applications. This inconvenience, however, is easily settled by using low PMCA cycles and appropriate technical tips to avoid possible prion contamination [22].

 

3. Quacking Induced Conversion (QuIC) A spin-off of the PMCA method was obtained by substituting sonication with automated tube shaking for the conversion of recPrP substrates [62]. The novel “quacking induced conversion” (QuIC) protocol enables the amplification of 1 femtogram of PrPTSE of scrapie hamster brain homogenate within one day, reducing the complexity and timing of misfolding amplification. Hamster recPrP promotes the conversion of brain misfolded proteins of other species such as sheep with scrapie and humans with sporadic and variant CJDs, regardless of the primary sequence of the PrPTSE seed [41]. Some spontaneous PK-resistant fragments of less than 12 kD are occasionally observed in unseeded control samples [32], but they wane out by reducing the incubation time of the reaction [41].

 

One of the most significant improvements of misfolding amplification methods was achieved when western blots were replaced by a real-time fluorescent colour reaction (real-time QuIC) [40, 42]. This novel read-out system, based on a fluorescent amyloid-sensitive thioflavin dye (ThT) [63], allowed the implementation of the whole QuIC procedure to a high-throughput 96-well format. The real-time QuIC (RT-QuIC) is an efficient quantitative method for the detection of minute amount of PrPTSE with estimates of the 50% seeding dose (SD50) of hamster scrapie brain in the same order of magnitude of infectious doses (LD50) [40].

 

RT-QuIC protocol has been adapted to the detection of brain PrPTSE of other species such as CWD-infected deer, scrapie-infected sheep, and sporadic CJD patients by using species-specific recPrP [40, 42, 64]. Full-length human recPrP and both truncated and full-length hamster recPrPs are efficient substrates for the amplification of PrPTSE in sporadic CJD brain irrespective of the 129 codon phenotypes [43, 64]. A note of disappointment is that the efficacy of variant CJD brain in seeding RT-QuIC reaction is consistently lower than sporadic CJD samples [64].

 

The presence of PrPTSE in the CSF by the QuIC assay was initially revealed by Atarashi and colleagues [62] in 263K-scrapie infected hamsters and Orrú and colleagues [41] in scrapie-infected sheep. In 2010, Wilham and colleagues [40] revealed the presence of PrPTSE in the CSF of 263K scrapie-infected hamsters by RT-QuIC and estimated a titre of about 10−2 SD50 per µL. CSF samples from control animals did not revealed any presence of PrPTSE indicating a high specificity of the assay. These encouraging results on the CSF of scrapie-infected host promoted further studies in patients with various forms of prion diseases. A blinded experiment was initially performed on 30 CSF samples of definite sporadic CJD patients provided by the Australian National CJD Registry and 155 controls (25 suspected CJD cases and 130 neurological controls) achieving 87.5% specificity and 100% sensitivity. CJD cases were positive irrespectively of 129 codon genotypes [42]. Similarly, McGuire and colleagues [43] screened CSF samples from sporadic CJD patients provided by the National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Research & Surveillance Unit, Edinburgh, UK, including all three 129-codon genotype and obtaining 99% specificity and 94% sensitivity. In the same study, the specificity and sensitivity of the 14-3-3 protein, a surrogate marker currently used for the diagnosis of sporadic CJD, were 65% and 94%, respectively. An example of the RT-QuIC output in the CSF of a sporadic CJD patient is given in Figure 1.

 

Figure 1: RT-QuIC reactions seeded with 15 µL of human CSF samples from one Italian sporadic CJD patient (12076) and one non-CJD control (13004). 100 fg of 263K prion-infected hamster brain homogenate were used to seed positive control reactions. Each sample was processed in duplicate. Finally, Sano and colleagues [44] reported that the RT-QuIC assay on the CSF of patients with genetic prion diseases has 78% sensitivity in GSS, 100% in FFI, 87% in E200K genetic CJD, and 100% in V203I genetic CJD, suggesting that the RT-QuIC assay for the detection of PrPTSE in the CSF might become a valid method for improving the diagnosis of patients with a clinical suspicion of human prion disease.

 

Besides CSF, the RT-QuIC assay revealed PrPTSE in nasal lavages from hamsters infected with the transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) hyper strain [40] and, by using immunoaffinity beads coupled with the conformational 15B3 anti- PrPTSE antibody (enhanced QuIC), in plasma of scrapie-infected hamsters [39]. The assay showed 100% sensitivity and specificity and was able to detect a positive signal long before the appearance of clinical signs of scrapie.

 

Finally, the application of 15B3-conjugated beads to the QuIC protocol and the use of a hamster-sheep chimeric recPrP as substrate in the reaction increased the sensitivity (up to attogram levels) and the speed of detection (28 hrs) of variant CJD brain misfolded proteins spiked into human blood [39]. Despite this good achievement there is still no report on the use of the enhanced QuIC assay in human blood.

 

Overall, RT-QuIC methodology is a powerful platform for the detection and large-scale screening of misfolded PrP in both human and animals. Up to attogram levels of misfolded PrP can be detected and properly quantified within few hours by using high-throughput 96-well formats. The high levels of specificity obtained in a variety of tissues and species by using flexible recombinant substrates demonstrates the versatility of the novel method. It is of note that RT-QuIC PK-resistant products are reported to be noninfectious (quoted by [43]) and therefore likely more secure in large-scale screening diagnostic procedures. The two disadvantages of this assay are the relatively poor performance in amplifying PrPTSE from variant CJD tissues [64] and the failure to reproduce the original PrPTSE signature impeding the molecular diagnosis of sporadic CJD and the distinction between sporadic and variant CJDs.

 

4. Other Potential Assays for the Detection of Misfolded PrP in Blood 4.1. Immunocapillary Electrophoresis (ICE) The assay, originally developed by Schmerr and colleagues [65] and based on a competitive immunoassay with PrP fluorescent peptides, was soon proven efficient for the detection of PrPTSE in blood of scrapie-infected sheep and elks with CWD [66]. However, these results were not confirmed in other laboratories using blood samples from CJD-infected chimpanzees or sporadic, iatrogenic, genetic, and variant CJD patients [45, 67]. It is therefore unlikely that this assay will be of any use for the diagnosis of human prion diseases.

 

4.2. Surface Fluorescence Intensity Distribution Analysis (Surface-FIDA) This assay consists in the immobilization of single PrP aggregates on a capture antibody coated surface that are then visualized by the concomitant binding with two anti-PrP fluorescent antibodies and a double-laser beam scanning system (surface-FIDA). The method discriminates aggregated PrP forms from monomeric PrP without the use of the proteinase K (PK) digestion step and therefore recognizes both PK-resistant and PK-sensitive PrPTSE. Surface-FIDA enabled the counting of bovine and hamster PrP aggregates in brain homogenates and in bovine cerebrospinal fluid [47]. PrP aggregates were also blind-detected in blood of scrapie-infected sheep ( ) with high specificity and sensitivity [46], although it remains unsettle whether the detection of PrP aggregates correlates with infectivity. It is of note that spiking of blood plasma with PrPTSE from brain was unsuccessful suggesting that the properties of PrPTSE from brain are different from endogenous blood misfolded PrP [46].

 

4.3. Ligand-Based Immunoassay Terry and colleagues [48] reported the detection of PrPTSE in 55% of blood mononuclear cells (PBMC) obtained from scrapie-affected sheep ( ) and 71% of experimentally BSE-affected sheep by a modified polyanionic ligand assay of the IDEXX HerdCheck methodology [68]. The assay resulted positive also in a subset of scrapie-infected sheep several months before the onset of clinical signs suggesting that PrPTSE can be detected in asymptomatic prion-infected hosts. However, the relatively low sensitivity observed in prion-infected sheep, the long timings of sample preparations, and the amount of blood volumes required for the purification of PBMC foretell that this assay would not be easily applicable to large-scale diagnostic scopes.

 

4.4. Solid-State Binding Matrix The assay, based on the affinity that PrPTSE has for stainless steel particles [69, 70], was adapted for the detection of misfolded PrP in blood of patients with various forms of CJDs [49]. The selective absorption of PrPTSE on the metal matrix concentrates misfolded protein up to the point that the signal can be detected by an ELISA assay. Because of the selectivity of the metal matrix in binding only misfolded PrP, there is no need to pretreat samples with PK that likely removes a conspicuous fraction of PrPTSE in blood. This method was initially tested on human blood spiked with vCJD brain homogenate where misfolded particles in up to the 10−10 brain dilution were detected. Subsequently, blood of variant and sporadic CJD patients was analysed on a blinded experiment including samples from patients with other neurological diseases and controls. Only samples that were reactive in two separate assays were scored as positive. About two-third of blood samples from variant CJD but none from sporadic CJD patients and neurological or nonneurological controls yield positive signals in both assays resulting in 100% specificity for variant CJD [49].

 

4.5. EP-vCJD Blood Screening Assay In 2003, Paramithiotis and colleagues [71] reported the manufacture of an antibody directed against PrP epitopes that are exposed only upon protein misfolding and therefore specific to PrPTSE. This conformational anti-PrPTSE antibody was then used for the epitope-protection (EP) vCJD-screening assay, which was later implemented by Amorfix. The high-throughput assay achieved 100% sensitivity and specificity on 1,000 blinded human plasma samples, which included samples that were spiked with variant CJD-infected and normal brains [50]. In 2009, the specificity of the method was ascertained on a large-scale screening initiated in France in over 20,000 human blood samples [51]. Results showed that on the first run 486 samples were positive (97.6% specificity), 20 of which were then confirmed positive on a second screening [51]. The repeat-reactive samples were finally considered negative on a third screening [51]. Subsequently, Amorfix tested three variant CJD blood samples provided by the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC, UK) that resulted negative [52]. The sensitivity of the test was therefore further improved for the detection of 1 : 5,000,000 dilution of variant CJD-infected brain spiked into blood [52]. However, despite this enhanced sensitivity, the test was still unable to detect prions in blood of variant CJD patients, and it was finally concluded that more research is required before the reevaluation of the assay [53].

 

4.6. Conformation-Dependent Immunoassay (CDI) In 1998, Safar and colleagues [10] developed an ELISA-formatted, dissociation-enhanced time-resolved fluorescence detection system based on specific antibody binding to epitopes that are accessible in PrPC but that are unmasked only in denatured PrPTSE. This method does not require PK treatment and is able to recognize both sensitive and resistant PK misfolded proteins and different PrPTSE conformations. The assay, improved by incorporating a capture antibody, was able to discriminate PrPTSE signature in different molecular forms of sporadic CJDs, iatrogenic CJDs and genetic TSEs [72] and detect up to a 10−5 dilution of PrPTSE from variant CJD brain used for spiking human normal plasma [54, 73]. However, endogenous PrPTSE was undetectable in white blood cells of sporadic patients by CDI [55], but we are not aware of its use in variant CJD blood.

 

4.7. Misfolded Protein Diagnostic Assay (MPD) This technique is based on a pyrene-labeled palindromic sequence of prion peptides that converts to β-sheets in the presence of PrPTSE [56, 74]. This process induces an excimeric signal from the conjugated pyrenes that propagates to other peptides with the final goal to amplify the PrPTSE signal. MPD assay detects PrPTSE in brain of 263K scrapie-infected hamsters during the preclinical and clinical stages of disease [74] and in small volumes of plasma from prion-infected mice and sheep with sensitivity up to 1 infectious dose per mL [56]. The same assay discriminated in blinded small-scale experiments control plasma from that of patients with sporadic CJD and squirrel monkeys with experimental CJD with 100% specificity and sensitivity [56].

 

4.8. Multimer Detection System (MDS) This technique is a modified ELISA assay that recognizes only multimeric forms of PrPTSE without using any pretreatment with proteinases, which might remove PrPTSE forms likely present in body fluids [57]. This assay uses the same principle previously described by Pan and colleagues [75] and is based on the use of two monoclonal antibodies that share overlapping epitopes. Monomers (PrPC) are captured by an antibody attached to the surface of a plate and are not detected by the second antibody due to the absence of any exposed epitopes. On the other hand, multimers (PrPTSE) are easily recognized by the second antibody because they expose more copies of the same epitope. The assay was tested on plasma samples of nine scrapie-infected and nine control hamsters resulting in 100% specificity and sensitivity [57]. This simple assay, however, requires validation in other laboratories and more basic work for determining whether the multimeric forms detected by the MDS assay are related to infectivity.

 

5. Final Remarks It is unquestionable that in the last 15 years there has been an outstanding progress in improving the detection of PrPTSE for developing sensitive and specific diagnostic assays. These sophisticated and highly sensitive methods successfully detect up to attogram levels of PrPTSE in body fluids of different species (Table 1). A major breakthrough is the development of the RT-QuIC technology for the detection of PrPTSE in the CSF of patients with sporadic [43, 64] and genetic [44] TSEs that as soon as is validated by other groups will change the diagnostic criteria of human prion diseases.

 

Endogenous PrPTSE has been identified in blood of scrapie-infected hamster by PMCA [27, 28] and RT-QuIC [39] assays and of patients with variant CJD by the solid-state binding matrix assay [49]. Despite these successful observations, however, there are no published reports on the application of either PMCA or enhanced RT-QuIC on blood samples of patients with any form of prion diseases suggesting that both assays still need substantial improvement before their use in the diagnostic setting. Although the development of the RT-QuIC technology for the detection of PrPTSE in blood samples is more recent than PMCA, an extra impediment of the RT-QuIC assay might come from the interference of blood molecules with the ThT reading. On the other hand, the solid-state binding matrix assay might be a valid alternative for the development of a blood test for variant CJD, but the relative low sensitivity (71%) and the finding that some control samples resulted positive in one of the two runs [49] make the use of this assay a remote ambition.

 

What remains elusive is the reproducible detection of endogenous PrPTSE in blood despite the successful identification of minute amounts of spiked brain PrPTSE into healthy blood. It becomes more and more evident that the properties of PrPTSE in brain are different from those in blood and that some components of blood both inhibit and interfere with PrPTSE detection causing false positive and negative results and compromising the reproducibility of the assay [46, 51, 76]. A clear example is given by the failure of the EP-vCJD assay that had excellent and reproducible performances on spiked blood but then completely failed to identify positive and negative human blood samples [50–53].

 

These findings pose the question on whether the criteria delineated by the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC, UK) [77] for prion diagnostic assay validation in terms of satisfactory sensitivity and specificity on spiked blood and for the request of variant CJD blood samples are still relevant for defining the best condition of success of potential prion test in blood.

 

We think that the principles for assay validation and accessibility to variant CJD blood samples should rather focus on reproducible and large scale blinded studies on blood taken from animal models of prion diseases, such as scrapie or BSE in sheep followed by a large scale screening of healthy blood donors to ascertain a sufficient level of specificity.

 

Finally, our impression is that the research on prion detection in blood does not really need further sensitive assays but rather requires further work aiming to the identification of interfering blood components and understanding prion metabolism in blood.

 

Acknowledgments The authors thank Anna Ladogana, Anna Poleggi, and Michele Equestre for kindling provide them data on the detection of PrPTSE in the CSF of a patient with sporadic CJD by the RT-QuIC assay. Part of this work was supported by the Joint Program of Neurodegenerative Disease (JPND) research on “Optimisation, harmonisation and standardisation of CSF RT-QuIC analysis for the diagnosis of sporadic CJD”.

 

References

 

 

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Letter

 

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Nature Medicine 11, 982 - 985 (2005) Published online: 28 August 2005 | doi:10.1038/nm1286

 

 Detection of prions in blood Joaquín Castilla1, Paula Saá1,2 & Claudio Soto1

 

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Abstract

 

Prion diseases are caused by an unconventional infectious agent termed prion, composed mainly of the misfolded prion protein (PrPSc)1. The development of highly sensitive assays for biochemical detection of PrPSc in blood is a top priority for minimizing the spread of the disease2. Here we show that the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) technology3 can be automated and optimized for high-efficiency amplification of PrPSc. We show that 140 PMCA cycles leads to a 6,600-fold increase in sensitivity over standard detection methods. Two successive rounds of PMCA cycles resulted in a 10 million–fold increase in sensitivity and a capability to detect as little as 8,000 equivalent molecules of PrPSc. Notably, serial PMCA enables detection of PrPSc in blood samples of scrapie-afflicted hamsters with 89% sensitivity and 100% specificity. These findings represent the first time that PrPSc has been detected biochemically in blood, offering promise for developing a noninvasive method for early diagnosis of prion diseases.

 

 


 

 

also see ;

 

 


 

 

From: TSS

 

Subject: Detection of prions in blood

 

Joaquín Castilla1, Paula Saá1, 2 & Claudio Soto1

 

Date: August 28, 2005 at 3:53 pm PST

 

Public release date: 28-Aug-2005 Contact: Jim Kelly jpkelly@utmb.edu 409-772-8791 Media Hotline: 409-772-6397 University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston

 

 

'Mad cow' proteins successfully detected in blood

 

 

Biochemical technique expected to yield new, more effective test for disease-causing prions in cattle and humans

 

 

GALVESTON, Texas -- Researchers at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (UTMB) have found a way to detect in blood the malformed proteins that cause "mad cow disease," the first time such "prions" have been detected biochemically in blood. The discovery, reported in an article scheduled to appear online in Nature Medicine Aug. 28, is expected to lead to a much more effective detection method for the infectious proteins responsible for brain-destroying disorders, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans. The blood test would make it much easier to keep BSE-infected beef out of the human food supply, ensure that blood transfusions and organ transplants do not transmit vCJD, and give researchers their first chance to figure out how many people may be incubating the disease. "The concentration of infectious prion protein in blood is far too small to be detected by the methods used to detect it in the brain, but we know it's still enough to spread the disease," said UTMB neurology professor Claudio Soto, senior author of the Nature Medicine paper. "The key to our success was developing a technique that would amplify the quantity of this protein more than 10 million-fold, raising it to a detectable level." Soto and the paper's other authors, UTMB assistant professor of neurology Joaquin Castilla and research assistant Paula Saá, applied a method they call protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) to blood samples taken from 18 prion-infected hamsters that had developed clinical symptoms of prion disease. PMCA uses sound waves to vastly accelerate the process that prions use to convert normal proteins to misshapen infectious forms. Successive rounds of PMCA led to the discovery of prions in the blood of 16 of the 18 infected hamsters. No prions were found in blood samples that were taken from 12 healthy control hamsters and subjected to the same treatment. "Since the original publication of a paper on our PMCA technology, we've spent four years optimizing and automating this process to get to this point," Soto said. "The next step, which we're currently working on, will be detecting prions in the blood of animals before they develop clinical symptoms and applying the technology to human blood samples." Tests for infectious prions in cattle and human blood are badly needed. Because current tests require post-slaughter brain tissue for analysis, in the United States only cattle already showing clinical symptoms of BSE (so-called "downer cows") are tested for the disorder. This is true even though vCJD potentially can be transmitted by animals not yet showing symptoms of the disease. (Only two cases of BSE have been found in American cows so far.) And although British BSE cases have been in decline since 1992, scientists believe the British BSE epidemic of the 1980s could have exposed millions of people in the UK and Europe to infectious prions. The extent of the vCJD epidemic is yet unknown. So far the disease has killed around 180 people worldwide, but numbers could reach thousands or even hundreds of thousands in the coming decades. Prions have also been shown to be transmissible through blood transfusions and organ transplants. "Who knows what the real situation is in cattle in the United States? And with people, we could be sitting on a time bomb, because the incubation period of this disease in humans can be up to 40 years," Soto said. "That's why a blood test is so important. We need to know the extent of the problem, we need to make sure that beef and the human blood supply are safe, and we need early diagnosis so that when scientists develop a therapy we can intervene before clinical symptoms appear--by then, it's too late."

 

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FC5.1.1

 

Transmission Results in Squirrel Monkeys Inoculated with Human sCJD, vCJD, and GSS Blood Specimens: the Baxter Study

 

Brown, P1; Gibson, S2; Williams, L3; Ironside, J4; Will, R4; Kreil, T5; Abee, C3 1Fondation Alliance BioSecure, France; 2University of South Alabama, USA; 3University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, USA; 4Western General Hospital, UK; 5Baxter BioSience, Austria

 

Background: Rodent and sheep models of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) have documented blood infectivity in both the pre-clinical and clinical phases of disease. Results in a (presumably more appropriate) non-human primate model have not been reported.

 

Objective: To determine if blood components (red cells, white cells, platelets, and plasma) from various forms of human TSE are infectious.

 

Methods: Blood components were inoculated intra-cerebrally (0.1 ml) and intravenously (0.5 ml) into squirrel monkeys from 2 patients with sporadic Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease (sCJD) and 3 patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Additional monkeys were inoculated with buffy coat or plasma samples from chimpanzees infected with either sCJD or Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease (GSS). Animals were monitored for a period of 5 years, and all dying or sacrificed animals had post-mortem neuropathological examinations and Western blots to determine the presence or absence of the misfolded prion protein (PrPTSE).

 

Results: No transmissions occurred in any of the animals inoculated with blood components from patients with sporadic or variant CJD. All donor chimpanzees (sCJD and GSS) became symptomatic within 6 weeks of their pre-clinical phase plasmapheresis, several months earlier than the expected onset of illness. One monkey inoculated with purified leukocytes from a pre-clinical GSS chimpanzee developed disease after 36 months.

 

Conclusion: No infectivity was found in small volumes of blood components from 4 patients with sporadic CJD and 3 patients with variant CJD. ***However, a single transmission from a chimpanzee-passaged strain of GSS shows that infectivity may be present in leukocytes, and the shock of general anaesthesia and plasmspheresis appears to have triggered the onset of illness in pre-clinical donor chimpanzees.

 

 

Saturday, September 5, 2009

 

TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS

 

snip...

 


 

 

Saturday, September 5, 2009

 

TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS

 

snip...see full text ;

 

 

Monday, May 6, 2013

 

Warning of mad cow disease threat to blood transfusions

 


 

 

 

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY

 

COMMITTEE

 

MEETING

 

THURSDAY,

 

FEBRUARY 12, 2004

 

This transcript has not been edited

 

Or corrected, but appears as received

 

From the commerical transcribing

 

Service. Accordingly, the Food and

 

Drug Administration makes no

 

Representation as to its accuracy.

 

SNIP...

 

DR. GAMBETTI: Yes, much more MM. I just wanted to point out that actually it looks like the differences that are still conspicuous between variant CJD and sporadic CJD seem to kind of decrease, after a report from Switzerland, in which I'm sure you know, the scrapie prion protein was found in the spleen and muscle of about 20 to 30 percent of the cases with sporadic CJD, indicating that there must be, sometime during the course of the disease or during the entire course of the disease, some scrapie prion protein in the blood also of sporadic CJD patients, or at least a portion of sporadic CJD patients.

 

SNIP...

 

So in summary for the entire presentation here, from the animal models of blood-borne infectivity, I think we can say that we've had unequivocal demonstrations of blood-borne infectivity in rodents, sheep, and possibly now in monkeys. We've had diverse strains of agent that have been looked at, and this effect has been seen with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the Fukuoka strain, variant CJD ?- this is Larisa Cervenakova's work ?- BSE, our work, and scrapie.

 

We've seen it in natural TSE infections, as well as experimental infections, and this is the Institute for Animal Health work with the sheep transfusions.

 

Next.

 

SNIP...

 

Next.

 

So if we take the presumption, and the FDA has just told us that they will presume that this was a transfusion transmission, then it fills in most of the missing gaps in this story. There can be TSE infectivity in human blood. It is present preclinically, and it is transmissible by transfusion. It may even have a virulence greater than might be expected from the incubation time in rodents, based on the incubation time in this particular case.

 

Next.

 

The only thing that's inconsistent with this story, and it is a major inconsistency, is why we haven't seen transfusion transmissions from classical cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. That has been discussed by a number of people already today. I can't really add much to that. Is it that we?re missing them, our surveillance isn't right? Is there something really truly different? We just don't know.

 

snip...

 

DR. BROWN: Thank you, Chairman Priola. I feel a little bit like I'm coming home, maybe for the last time, but it's a nice feeling.

 

I was asked by David Asher to present the results of the study which several years ago was undertaken by us with the funding of the Baxter Pharmaceutical Company, and it has henceforth become known as the Baxter study.

 

Before I do that, assuming I have my full complement of 15 minutes and I'm not down to six and a half, I wanted just to make a comment or two about one or two of the interesting questions that have been raised in the course of the morning.

 

The difficulty of proving that sporadic CJD could be transfusion-linked I think is probably only going to be solved by exactly the reverse of the situation that is so compelling as evidence for variant CJD transmission; and that is, instead of having a young, typical variant CJD donating blood to a person who is elderly -- when I say "elderly,? that's my age -- you're going to have to have a classic sporadic elderly patient transmitting blood to an unusually young patient, and then you'll have the same kind of certainty which is not totally certain, but you'll have some confidence that that has happened. And that's not going to be easy to find.

 

snip...

 

I was asked by David -- and with the kind permission of Corinne Lasmezas ? to also give you a summary of her studies, the studies of her group, directed by her now on what the French are up to with respect to primates.

 

But the first thing is our own study, and as I mentioned, it's a Baxter primate study, and those are the major participants. And the goal was twofold, and here is the first one: to see whether CJD, either sporadic or familial -- actually it turns out to be the familial CJD is incorrect. It really should be the Fukuoka strain of Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker disease. So it's really GSS instead of familial CJD -- when passaged through chimps into squirrel monkeys using purified blood components, very pure blood components.

 

So this addresses the question that was raised just recently about whether or not red cell infectivity that's been found in rodents is really in the red cells or is it contaminated.

 

We prepared these samples with exquisite care, and they are ultra-ultra-ultra purified. There's virtually no contamination of any of the components that we looked at ? platelets, red cells, plasma, white cells -- with any other component.

 

These are a sort of new set of slides, and what I've tried to do is make them less complicated and more clear, but I'm afraid I haven't included the build. So you'll just have to try and follow what I explain with this little red pointer.

 

There were three initial patients. Two of them had sporadic CJD. One of them had Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome. Brain tissue from each individual patient was inoculated intracerebrally into a pair of chimpanzees. All right?

 

From those chimps, either plasma or ultra purified -- in fact, everything is ultra-purified. I'll just talk about purified plasma, purified white cells -- were inoculated intracerebrally and intravenously to get the maximum amount of infective load into a pair of squirrel monkeys.

 

The same thing was done for each of these three sets. This monkey died from non-CJD causes at 34 months post inoculation.

 

Let me go back for a second. I didn't point out the fact that these were not sacrificed at this point. These chimpanzees were apheresed at 27 weeks when they were still asymptomatic. In this instance, we apheresed them terminally when they were symptomatic.

 

And before I forget, I want to mention just a little sidelight of this. Chimpanzees in our experience -- and I think we may be the only people that have ever inoculated chimpanzees, and that's no longer a possibility, so this was 20, 30 years ago -- the shortest incubation period of any chimpanzee that we have ever seen with direct intracerebral inoculation is 13 months.

 

So we chose 27 weeks, which is about seven months, and incidentally typically the incubation period is more like 16 or 18 months. The shortest was 13 months. We chose the 27th week, which is about six and a half months, thinking that this would be about halfway through the incubation period, which we wanted to check for the presence or absence of infectivity.

 

But within four weeks after the apheresis, which was conducted under general anesthesia for three or four hours apiece, every single one of the six chimpanzees became symptomatic. That is another experiment that I would love to conclude, perhaps because this is simply not heard of, and it very much smells like we triggered clinical illness. We didn't trigger the disease, but it certainly looks like we triggered symptomatic disease at a point that was much earlier than one would have possibly expected.

 

Maybe it will never be done because it would probably open the floodgates of litigation. There's no end of little things that you can find out from CJD patients after the fact. For example, the neighbor's dog comes over, barks at a patient, makes him fall down, and three weeks later he gets CJD. So you have a lawsuit against the neighbor.

 

I mean, this is not an unheard of matter, but I do think that physical stress in the form of anesthesia and four hours of whatever goes on with anesthesia, low blood pressure, sometimes a little hypoxemia looks like it's a bad thing.

 

So here we have the 31st week. All of the chimps are symptomatic, and here what we did was in order to make the most use of the fewest monkeys, which is always a problem in primate research, we took these same three patients and these six chimps. Only now we pooled these components; that is to say, we pooled the plasma from all six chimps. We pooled ultra-purified white cells from all six chimps because here we wanted to see whether or not we could distinguish a difference between intracerebral route of infection and intravenous route of infection.

 

With respect to platelets and red blood cells, we did not follow that. We inoculated both intracerebral and intravenously, as we had done earlier because nobody has any information on whether or not platelets and red cells are infectious, and so we wanted again to get the maximum.

 

This is an IV versus IC goal. This one, again, is just getting the maximum load in to see whether there is, in fact, any infectivity in pure platelets, in pure red cells.

 

And of all of the above, the only transmission of disease related to the inoculation was in a squirrel monkey that received pure leukocytes from the presymptomatic apheresis. So that goes some way to address the question as to whether or not it's a matter of contamination. To date the red cells have not been -- the monkeys that receive red cells have not been observed for more than a year because that was a later experiment.

 

So we still can't say about red cells, but we're about four and a half years down the road now, and we have a single transmission from purified leukocytes, nothing from plasma and nothing from platelets.

 

That was the first part of the experiment. The second part was undertaken with the cooperation of Bob Will and others supplying material to us. These were a couple of human, sporadic cases of CJD and three variant cases of CJD from which we obtained buffy coat and plasma separated in a normal way. That is, these are not purified components.

 

The two cases of sporadic CJD, the plasma was pooled from both patients. The buffy coat was pooled from both patients, and then inoculated intracerebrally and intravenously into three squirrel monkeys each. This is a non-CJD death five years after inoculation. The other animals are still alive.

 

For variant CJD we decided not to pool. It was more important to eliminate the possibility that there was just a little bit of infectivity in one patient that would have been diluted to extinction, if you like, by mixing them if it were to so occur with two patients, for example, who did not have infectivity. So each one of these was done individually, but the principle was the same: plasma and buffy coat for each patient was inoculated into either two or three squirrel monkeys. This is, again, a non-CJD related death.

 

In addition to that, we inoculated rain as a positive control from the two sporadic disease cases of human -- from the two human sporadic cases at ten to the minus one and ten to the minus three dilutions. We have done this many, many times in the past with other sporadic patients. So we knew what to expect, and we got exactly what we did expect, namely, after an incubation period not quite two years, all four monkeys developed disease at this dilution and at the minus three dilution, not a whole lot of difference between the two.

 

Now, these are the crucial monkeys because each one of these monkeys every three to four months was bled and the blood transfused into a new healthy monkey, but the same monkey all the time. So this monkey, for example, would have received in the course of 21 months about six different transfusions of blood from this monkey into this monkey, similarly with this pair, this pair, and this pair. So you can call these buddies. This is sort of the term that was used. These monkeys are still alive.

 

In the same way, the three human variant CJD specimens, brain, were inoculated into four monkeys, and again, each one of these monkeys has been repeatedly bled at three to four month intervals and that blood transfused into a squirrel monkey, the same one each time. Ideally we would love to have taken bleeding at three months and inoculated a monkey and then let him go, watch him, and then done the same thing at six months. It would have increased the number of monkeys eightfold and just unacceptably expensive. So we did the best we could.

 

That, again, is a non-CJD death, as is this.

 

This was of interest mainly to show that the titer of infectivity in brain from variant CJD is just about the same as it from sporadic. We didn't do a minus five and a minus seven in sporadic because we have an enormous experience already with sporadic disease in squirrel monkeys, and we know that this is exactly what happens. It disappears at about ten to the minus five. So the brain titer in monkeys receiving human vCJD is identical to the brain titer in monkeys that have been inoculated with sporadic CJD.

 

That's the experiment. All of the monkeys in aqua are still alive. They are approaching a five-year observation period, and I think the termination of this experiment will now need to be discussed very seriously in view of a probable six-year incubation period in the U.K. case. The original plan was to terminate the experiment after five years of observation with the understanding that ideally you would keep these animals for their entire life span, which is what we used to do when had unlimited space, money, and facilities. We can't do that anymore.

 

It's not cheap, but I think in view of the U.K. case, it will be very important to think very seriously about allowing at least these buddies and the buddies from the sporadic CJD to go on for several more years because although you might think that the U.K. case has made experimental work redundant, in point of fact, anything that bears on the risk of this disease in humans is worthwhile knowing, and one of the things we don't know is frequency of infection. We don't know whether this case in the U.K. is going to be unique and never happen again or whether all 13 or 14 patients have received blood components are ultimately going to die. Let's hope not.

 

The French primate study is primarily directed now by Corinne Lasmezas. As you know, the late Dominique Dromont was the original, originally initiated this work, and they have very active primate laboratory in France, and I'm only going to show two very simple slides to summarize what they did.

 

The first one is simply to show you the basis of their statement that the IV route of infection looks to be pretty efficient because we all know that the intracerebral route of infection is the most efficient, and if you look at this where they inoculated the same infective load either intracerebrally or intravenously, the incubation periods were not substantially different, which suggests but doesn't prove, but doesn't prove that the route of infection is pretty efficient.

 

Lower doses of brain material given IV did extend the incubation period and presumably it's because of the usual dose response phenomenon that you see in any infectious disease.

 

With a whopping dose of brain orally, the incubation period was even lower. Again, just one more example of inefficiency of the route of infection and the necessity to use more infective material to get transmissions.

 

And they also have blood inoculated IV which is on test, and the final slide or at least the penultimate slide shows you what they have on test and the time of observation, that taken human vCJD and like us inoculated buffy coat, they've also inoculated whole blood which we did not do.

 

So to a great extent their studies are complementary to ours and makes it all worthwhile.

 

We have about -- oh, I don't know -- a one to two-year lead time on the French, but they're still getting into pretty good observation periods. Here's three-plus years.

 

They have variant CJD adapted to the macaque. That is to say this one was passaged in macaque monkeys, the cynomolgus, and they did the same thing. Again, we're talking about a study here in which like ours there are no transmissions. I mean, we have that one transmission from leukocytes, and that's it.

 

Here is a BSE adapted to the macaque. Whole blood, and then they chose to inoculate leukodepleted whole blood, in both instances IV. Here they are out to five years without a transmission.

 

And then finally oral dosing of the macaque, which had been infected with -- which was infected with BSE, but a macaque passaged BSE, whole blood buffy coat and plasma, all by the IC route, and they're out to three years.

 

So with the single exception of the leukocyte transmission from our chimp that was inoculated with a sporadic case of CJD or -- excuse me -- with a GSS, Gerstmann-Straussler, in neither our study nor the French study, which are not yet completed have we yet seen a transmission.

 

And I will just close with a little cartoon that appeared in the Washington Post that I modified slightly lest you get too wound up with these questions of the risk from blood. This should be a "corrective."

 

(Laughter.)

 

DR. BROWN: Thanks.

 

Questions?

 

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Yes. Any questions for Dr. Brown? Dr. Linden.

 

DR. LINDEN: I just want to make sure I understand your study design correctly. When you mention the monkeys that have the IV and IC inoculations, the individual monkeys had both or --

 

DR. BROWN: Yes, yes, yes. That's exactly right.

 

DR. LINDEN: So an individual monkey had both of those as opposed to some monkeys had one and some had the other?

 

DR. BROWN: Correct, correct. Where IC and IV are put down together was IC plus IV into a given monkey.

 

DR. LINDEN: Into a given monkey. Okay.

 

And the IC inoculations, where were those given?

 

DR. BROWN: Right parietal cortex, Southern Alabama.

 

(Laughter.)

 

DR. BROWN: Oh, it can't be that clear. Yeah, here, Pierluigi.

 

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. Epstein.

 

DR. BROWN: Pierluigi always damns me with feint praise. He always says that's a very interesting study, but. I'm waiting for that, Pierluigi.

 

I think Jay Epstein --

 

DR. GAMBETTI: I will say that there's an interesting study and will say, but I just --

 

(Laughter.)

 

DR. GAMBETTI: -- I just point of review. You talk about a point of information. You say that -- you mention GSS, I guess, and the what, Fukuowa (phonetic) --

 

DR. BROWN: Yes, Fukuoka 1.

 

DR. GAMBETTI: Fukuowa, and is that from the 102, if I remember correctly, of the --

 

DR. BROWN: Yes, that is correct.

 

DR. GAMBETTI: Because that is the only one that also --

 

DR. BROWN: No, it's not 102. It's 101. It's the standard. It's a classical GSS. Oh, excuse me. You're right. One, oh, two is classical GSS. It's been so long since I've done genetics. You're right.

 

DR. GAMBETTI: Because that is the only one I know, I think, that I can remember that has both the seven kv fragment that is characteristic of GSS, but also the PrPsc 2730. So in a sense, it can be stretching a little bit compared to the sporadic CJD.

 

DR. BROWN: Yeah, I think that's right. That's why I want to be sure that I made you aware on the very first slide that that was not accurate, that it truly was GSS.

 

There's a GSS strain that has been adapted to mice, and it's a hot strain, and therefore, it may not be translatable to sporadic disease, correct. All we can say for sure is that it is a human TSE, and it is not variant. I think that's about it.

 

DR. GAMBETTI: I agree, but this is also not perhaps the best --

 

DR. BROWN: No, it is not the best. We understand --

 

DR. GAMBETTI: -- of GSS either.

 

DR. BROWN: Yeah. If we had to do it over again, we'd look around for a -- well, I don't know. We'd probably do it the same way because we have two sporadics already on test they haven't transmitted, and so you can take your pick of what you want to pay attention to.

 

Jay?

 

DR. EPSTEIN: Yes, Paul. Could you just comment? If I understood you correctly, when you did the pooled apheresis plasma from the six chimps when they were symptomatic at 31 weeks, you also put leukocytes into squirrel monkeys in that case separately IV and IC, but in that instance you have not seen an infection come down in squirrel monkey, and the question is whether it's puzzling that you got transmission from the 27-week asymptomatic sampling, whereas you did not see transmission from the 31-week sampling in symptomatic animals.

 

DR. BROWN: Yes, I think there are two or three possible explanations, and I don't know if any of them are important. The pre-symptomatic animal was almost symptomatic as it turned out so that we were pretty close to the period at which symptoms would being, and whether you can, you know, make much money on saying one was incubation period and the other was symptomatic in this particular case because both bleedings were so close together. That's one possibility.

 

The other possibility is we're dealing with a very irregular phenomenon and you're not surprised at all by surprises, so to speak so that a single animal, you could see it almost anywhere.

 

The third is that we, in fact, did just what I suggested we didn't want to do for the preclinical, namely, by pooling we got under the threshold. See?

 

You can again take that for what it's worth. It is a possible explanation, and again, until we know what the levels of infectivity are and whether by pooling we get under the threshold of transmission, we simply cannot make pronouncements.

 

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. DeArmond.

 

DR. DeARMOND: Yeah, it was very interesting data, but the --

 

(Laughter.)

 

DR. BROWN: I just love it. Go ahead.

 

DR. DeARMOND: Two comments. The first one was that the GSS cases, as I remember from reading your publications -- I think Gibbs was involved with them -- when you transmitted the GSS into animals, into monkeys, perhaps I think it was chimps, the transmission was more typical of CJD rather than GSS. There were no amyloid plaques. It was vacuolar degeneration so that you may be transmitting a peculiar form, as I criticized once in Bali and then you jumped all over me about.

 

DR. BROWN: I may do it again.

 

DR. DeARMOND: Calling me a bigot and some other few things like that.

 

(Laughter.)

 

DR. BROWN: Surely not. I wouldn't have said that.

 

DR. DeARMOND: So there could be something strange about that particular --

 

DR. BROWN: Yeah. I think you and Pierluigi are on the same page here. This may be an unusual strain from a number of points of view.

 

DR. DeARMOND: The other question though has to do with species barrier because the data you're showing is kind of very reassuring to us that it's hard to transmit from blood, but the data from the sheep and from the hamsters and some of the work, I think, that has been done by others, that it's easy in some other animals to transmit, hamster to hamster, mouse to mouse.

 

Could you comment on the --

 

DR. BROWN: That's exactly why we went to primates. That's exactly it, because a primate is closer to a human than a mouse is, and that's just common sense.

 

And so to try and get a little closer to the human situation and not totally depend on rodents for transferrable data, that is why you would use a primate. Otherwise you wouldn't use them. They're too expensive and they cause grief to animal care study people and protocol makers and the whole thing.

 

Primate studies are a real pain.

 

DR. DeARMOND: But right now it's inconclusive and you need more time on it.

 

DR. BROWN: I believe that's true. I think if we cut it off at six years you could still say it was inconclusive, and cutting it off at all will be to some degree inconclusive, and that's just the way it is.

 

DR. DeARMOND: So what has to be done? Who do you have to convince, or who do we all have to convince to keep that going?

 

DR. BROWN: Thomas?

 

Without trying to be flip at all, the people that would be the first people to try to convince would be the funders of the original study. If that fails, and it might for purely practical reasons of finance, then we will have to look elsewhere because I really don't want to see those animals sacrificed, not those eight buddies. Those are crucial animals, and they don't cost a whole lot to maintain. You can maintain eight -- well, they cost a lot from my point of view, but 15 to $20,000 a year would keep them going year after year.

 

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. Johnson.

 

DR. JOHNSON: Yeah, Paul, I'm intrigued as you are by the shortening of the incubation period. Have you in all of the other years of handling these animals when they were transfused, when they were flown out to Louisiana at night -- a lot of the stressful things have happened to some of these chimps. Have you ever noticed that before or is this a new observation?

 

DR. BROWN: Brand new.

 

MR. JOHNSON: Brand new. Okay.

 

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Bob, did you want to say something? Dr. Rohwer.

 

DR. ROHWER: The Frederick fire, wasn't that correlated with a lot of --

 

DR. BROWN: Not that I k now of, but you may --

 

DR. ROHWER: Well, that occurred shortly after I came to NIH, and what I remember is that there were a whole bunch of conversions that occurred within the few months following the fire. That was fire that occurred adjacent to the NINDS facility, but in order to protect it, they moved the monkeys out onto the tarmac because they weren't sure it wouldn't burn as well.

 

DR. BROWN: Well, if you're right, then it's not brand new, but I mean, I'm not sure how we'll ever know because if I call Carlton and ask him, I'm not sure but what I would trust the answer that he gives me, short of records.

 

You know, Carlot is a very enthusiastic person, and he might say, "Oh, yeah, my God, the whole floor died within three days," but I would want to verify that.

 

On the other hand, it may be verifiable. There possibly are records that are still extant.

 

DR. ROHWER: Actually I thought I heard the story from you.

 

(Laughter.)

 

DR. BROWN: You didn't because it's brand new for me. I mean, either that or I'm on the way

 

(Laughter.)

 

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. Bracey.

 

DR. BRACEY: I was wondering if some of the variability in terms of the intravenous infection route may be related to intraspecies barriers, that is, the genetic differences, the way the cells, the white leukocytes are processed, whether or not microchimerism is established, et cetera.

 

DR. BROWN: I don't think that processing is at fault, but the question, the point that you raise is a very good one, and needless to say, we have material with which we can analyze genetically all of the animals, and should it turn out that we get, for example, -- I don't know -- a transmission in one variant monkey and no transmissions in another and a transmission in three sporadic monkeys, we will at that point genetically analyze every single animal that has been used in this study, but we wanted to wait until we could see what would be most useful to analyze.

 

but the material is there, and if need be, we'll do it.

 

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Okay. Thank you very much, Dr. Brown.

 

I think we'll move on to the open public hearing section of the morning.

 

snip...

 


 

 

FC5.1.1 Transmission Results in Squirrel Monkeys Inoculated with Human sCJD, vCJD, and GSS Blood Specimens: the Baxter Study

 

Brown, P1; Gibson, S2; Williams, L3; Ironside, J4; Will, R4; Kreil, T5; Abee, C3 1Fondation Alliance BioSecure, France; 2University of South Alabama, USA; 3University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, USA; 4Western General Hospital, UK; 5Baxter BioSience, Austria

 

Background: Rodent and sheep models of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) have documented blood infectivity in both the pre-clinical and clinical phases of disease. Results in a (presumably more appropriate) non-human primate model have not been reported. Objective: To determine if blood components (red cells, white cells, platelets, and plasma) from various forms of human TSE are infectious. Methods: Blood components were inoculated intra-cerebrally (0.1 ml) and intravenously (0.5 ml) into squirrel monkeys from 2 patients with sporadic Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease (sCJD) and 3 patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Additional monkeys were inoculated with buffy coat or plasma samples from chimpanzees infected with either sCJD or Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease (GSS). Animals were monitored for a period of 5 years, and all dying or sacrificed animals had post-mortem neuropathological examinations and Western blots to determine the presence or absence of the misfolded ‘prion’ protein (PrPTSE). Results: No transmissions occurred in any of the animals inoculated with blood components from patients with sporadic or variant CJD. All donor chimpanzees (sCJD and GSS) became symptomatic within 6 weeks of their pre-clinical phase plasmapheresis, several months earlier than the expected onset of illness. One monkey inoculated with purified leukocytes from a pre-clinical GSS chimpanzee developed disease after 36 months. Conclusion: No infectivity was found in small volumes of blood components from 4 patients with sporadic CJD and 3 patients with variant CJD.

 

***However, a single transmission from a chimpanzee-passaged strain of GSS shows that infectivity may be present in leukocytes, and the ‘shock’ of general anaesthesia and plasmspheresis appears to have triggered the onset of illness in pre-clinical donor chimpanzees.

 

 

FC5.1.2 Interim Transmission Results in Cynomolgus Macaques Inoculated with BSE and

 

vCJD Blood Specimens

 

Lasmezas, C1; Lescoutra, N2; Comoy, E2; Holznagel, E3; Loewer, J3; Motzkus, D4; Hunsmann, G4; Ingrosso, L5; Bierke, P6; Pocchiari, M5; Ironside, J7; Will, R7; Deslys, JP2 1Scripps Florida, Infectology, USA; 2CEA, France; 3PEI, Germany; 4DPZ, Germany; 5Istituto Superiore di Sanita, Italy; 6SMI, Sweden; 7CJD Surveillance Unit, UK

 

BSE and vCJD transmitted to cynomolgus macaques reproduce many features of human vCJD, including clinical symptoms, neuropathological hallmarks of vCJD, PrPres electrophoretical pattern and, most importantly, the wide distribution of infectivity in peripheral organs. The latter characteristic distinguishes vCJD from sCJD in both humans and cynomolgus macaques, and prompted us to use this non-human primate model for further investigations of vCJD and its risk for human health. The occurrence of four vCJD infections in humans transfused with blood from patients who later developed vCJD has raised concern about blood transfusion safety in countries with vCJD. In this collaborative European study, we investigated the infectivity of blood components and whole blood administered by intracerebral (ic) and intravenous (iv) routes. Buffy-coat and whole blood was inoculated by ic and iv route, respectively, from two vCJD patients and from two clinical vCJD-inoculated macaques. Transfusions were also performed from whole blood and blood leucodepleted according to hospital practice standards from two clinical BSE inoculated macaques. Blood infectivity during the preclinical phase is being examined in orally infected macaques. Whole blood was collected and transfused from one such animal two years after oral challenge, whereas buffy-coat and plasma from two animals at 2 and 4.5 years post-challenge, respectively, have been inoculated by the ic route. This is an ongoing study in which recipient animals continue to be observed at various times post-inoculation. So far, we have had one positive transmission in one animal transfused 65 months earlier with 40 ml of whole blood from a vCJD macaque (the characteristics of the disease in this animal will be shown in a separate poster by E. Comoy). This positive transmission reproduces transfusion transmission of vCJD in humans, with an incubation of 5.5 years compatible with incubation periods observed in humans.

 


 


 

 

 

Prion2013

 

 

Oral.05:

 

Contaminated blood products induce a highly atypical prion disease devoid of PrPres in primates

 

 

Emmanuel Corney,1 Nina Jaffre,1 Jacqueline Mikol,1 Valerie Durand,1 Christelle Jas-Duval,1,2 Sophie Luccantoni-Freire,1 Evelyne Correia,1 Nathalie Lescoutra-Etcheqaray,3 Nathalie Streichenberqer,4 Stephane Haik,5 Chryslain Sumian,3 Paul Brown1 and Jean-Philippe Deslys1

 

1Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique; Institute of Emerging Diseases and Innovative Therapies (iMETI); Division of Prions and Related Diseases (SEPIA); Fontenay-aux- Roses, France; 2EFS·Nord de France; Lille, France; 3MacoPharm; Tourcoing, France; 4Hospices Civils de Lyon; Prion Unit; Neurobiology Department; Bron, France; 5Inserm; U 975·CNRS; UMR 7225 - Universite Pierre et Marie Curie; Paris, France

 

 

Background, Concerns about the blood-borne risk of prion infection have been confirmed by the occurrence in the UK of four transfusion-related infections of vCJD and an apparently silent infection in an hemophiliac patient. Asymptomatic incubation periods in prion diseases can extend over decades in humans. We present here unexpected results of experiments evaluating blood transmission risk in a non-human primate model.

 

 

Material and Methods, Cynomolgus macaques were inoculated with brain or blood specimens from vCJD infected humans or monkeys. Neuropathological and biochemical findings were obtained using current methods used for human patients.

 

 

Results, Thirteen out of 23 primates exposed to various human or macaque blood products exhibited a previously undescribed myelopathic syndrome, devoid of the classical features of prion disease, notably abnormal prion protein (PrPres) deposition, whereas the 14 corresponding brain-inoculated donor animals and 1 transfused animal exhibited the classical vCJD pattern. In passage experiments, plasma transfusion induced the same atypical phenotype after two years (again, with no detectable PrPres), whereas the intracerebral inoculation of spinal cord led to a typical prion disease with cerebral spongiosis and PrPres accumulation in the brain of the primate recipient. Interestingly, passage experiments in transgenic mice were largely unsuccessful.

 

 

In another experiment designed to test the efficacy of antiprion filters, three recipients of filtered red blood cells suspended in plasma are still healthy 4.5 y after transfusion whereas the recipients of unfiltered inocula died after 2.5 y with the atypical neurological profile.

 

 

Conclusion. We describe a new fatal neurological myelopathic syndrome in monkeys exposed to various vCJD/BSE-infected blood components.

 

 

Secondary transmission in primates confirms

 

 

(I) the transmissibility of this myelopathy, and

 

 

(2) its prion origin which could not be diagnosed as such in the first recipients.

 

 

This myelopathy might be compared in some respects to certain forms of human lower motor neuron disease, including neuromyelitis optica, the flail arm syndrome of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), and the recently described FOSMN (facial onset sensory and motor neuronopathy) syndrome.

 

 

snip...

 

 

 

Oral.12:

 

Preclinical detection of variant CJD and BSE prions in blood

 

 

Caroline Lacroux,1 Jean Yves Douet,1 Emmanuel Corney,2 Hugh Simmons,3 Vincent Beringue,4 Jean Philippe Deslys,2 Didier Vilette1 and Olivier Andreoletti1 1INRA; Toulouse, France; 2CEA; Fontenay aux roses, France; 3AHVLA; Weybridge, UK; 4INRA VIM; Jouy en Josas, France

 

 

The emergence of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD) is considered a likely consequence of human dietary exposure to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) agent. More recently, secondary vCJD cases were identified in patients transfused with blood products prepared from apparently healthy donors who later went on to develop the disease. As there is no validated assay for detection of vCJD/BSE infected individuals the prevalence of the disease in the population remains uncertain. In that context the risk of vCJD blood borne transmission is considered as a serious concern by health authorities.

 

 

In this study, appropriate conditions and substrates for highly efficient and specific in vitro amplification of vCJD/BSE agent using Protein Misfolding Cyclic Assay (PMCA) were first identified. This showed that whatever the origin (species) of vCJD/BSE agent, the ovine Q171 PrP substrates provided the best amplification performances. These results indicate that the homology of PrP amino-acid sequence between the seed and the substrate is not the crucial determinant of the vCJD agent in vitro propagation.

 

 

The ability of this method to detect endogenous vCJD/BSE agent in the blood was then defined. In both sheep and primate models of the disease, the assay enabled the identification of infected individuals in the early preclinical stage of the incubation period. Finally, blood from two vCJD affected patients and 135 healthy controls were tested. The assay detected the presence of the vCJD case within a pool of several dozens of human blood samples. The equivalent 0.05 uL of whole blood from the vCJD affected patient was sufficient for amplifying PrPres. These results open new possibilities for vCJD screening and prevention of its iatrogenic transmission.

 

 

snip...

 

 

 

AD.06:

 

Detecting prions in the brain and blood of TSE-infected deer and hamsters Alan Elder,1 Davin Henderson,1 Anca Selariu,1 Amy Nalls,1 Byron Caughey,2 Richard Bessen,1 Jason Bartz3 and Candace Mathiason1 1Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA; 2NIH Rocky Mountain Laboratories; Hamilton, MT USA; 3Creighton University; Omaha, NE USA While large quantities of protease resistant prion protein (PrPres) can be demonstrated by western blot or IHC in lymphoid biopsies or post-mortem brain tissues harvested from prion-infected animals, these conventional assays are less reliable as means to detect the small quantities of prions thought to be present in bodily fluids or associated with early and asymptomatic phases of TSE disease. The Real Time-Quaking Induced Conversion (RT-QuIC) assay is capable of detecting prions at concentrations below the level of sensitivity of conventional assays and provides a real-time fluorescent readout negating the use of proteases. We have made modifications to the RT-QuIC assay to utilize it for the detection of PrPres in brain and blood harvested from various species infected with prions. In this study, we analyzed CWD-infected deer and CWD/TME-infected hamster whole blood to determine the effect of: (1) various anticoagulants, (2) freezing and (3) NaPTA precipitation. Brain tissue and blood collected from naive deer and hamsters served as negative controls. We were able to demonstrate amplifiable prions in (1) brain and blood samples harvested from CWD/TME-infected animals, (2) heparinized blood, (3) frozen vs. fresh blood and (4) NaPTA treated samples. The RT-QuIC assay is able to detect PrPres in various species of animals and shows promise as an antemortem diagnostic tool for blood-borne TSEs. http://www.prion2013.ca/tiny_uploads/forms/Scientific-Program.pdf

 


 

 


 

 

Sunday, June 9, 2013

 

TSEAC March 14, 2013: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Webcast

 


 

 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

 

CJD, TSE, PRION, BLOOD Abstracts of the 23rd Regional Congress of the International Society of Blood Transfusion, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 2-5, 2013

 


 

 

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

 

Transmission of multiple system atrophy prions to transgenic mice

 


 

 

Saturday, May 25, 2013

 

Brain homogenates from human tauopathies induce tau inclusions in mouse brain

 


 

 

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

 

Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics; Reopening of the Comment Period FDA-2004-N-0188-0051 (TSS SUBMISSION)

 

FDA believes current regulation protects the public from BSE but reopens comment period due to new studies

 


 

 

Sunday, June 9, 2013

 

TSEAC March 14, 2013: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Webcast

 


 

 

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

 

TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products

 


 

 

Wednesday, June 29, 2011 TSEAC JUNE 2, 1999 Welcome to the FDA traveling road show

 

From: TSS

 

Subject: TSEAC JUNE 2, 1999 Welcome to the FDA traveling road show

 

Date: October 15, 2007 at 3:18 pm PST

 

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING Thursday, June 2, 1999

 


 

 

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011 Posted: 3/2/2011

 

October 28, 2010

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011

 


 

 

Monday, February 7, 2011

 

FDA’s Currently-Recommended Policies to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of CJD and vCJD by Blood and Blood Products 2011 ???

 


 

 

October 29, 2010

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011

 


 

 

Monday, October 18, 2010

 

TSEAC Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Draft Agenda and Meeting Materials,

 

Posted: 10/18/2010

 

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Center Date Time Location

 


 

 

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)

 


 

 

Saturday, September 5, 2009

 

TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS

 


 

 

Sunday, May 10, 2009

 

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)

 

TO : william.freas@fda.hhs.gov

 

May 8, 2009

 

Greetings again Dr. Freas, TSEAC et al,

 

I would kindly, once again, wish to comment at this meeting about the urgent actions that need to be taken asap, to the Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009. Due to my disability from my neck injury, I will not be attending this meeting either, however I hope for my submission to be read and submitted. ...

 

IN reply to ;

 


 

 

snip...see full text ;

 

 

Sunday, May 10, 2009

 

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)

 

TO : william.freas@fda.hhs.gov

 


 

 

Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website:

 


 

 

Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:

 


 

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV

 

Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov

 

Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM

 

Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS SUBMISSION

 

snip...

 

ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)

 

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.

 

These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. ...

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 

 

snip... 48 pages...

 


 

 

Wednesday, October 17, 2007 TSEAC MEETINGS ----- Original Message -----

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV

 

Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov

 

Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 1:24 PM

 

Subject: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSSSUBMISSION]November 29, 2006

 

Greetings FDA, DHH, Dr. Freas, and Dr. Harvey et al,

 

a kind and warm Holiday Greetings to you all.i kindly wish to submit the following to the TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006, about the assessment for potential exposure to vCJD in human plasma-derivedantihemophilic factor (FVIII) productsmanufactured from U.S. plasma donors and related communication material ;

 


 

 

i see the media picked up on this as a 'low risk', from what the gov. agency perceived to be to them;

 


 

 

however, i seem to disagree. from my primitive ciphering, i see it another way. this is a huge catastrophic risk. 3 in 160 is 1.9%. so call that 2% which is 1 in 50 or twenty per thousand or 20,000 per million. also, wha tabout the mixed genotypes/mixed susceptibility?

 

what about the silent carriers that donated tainted blood?

 

what about the sporadic CJDs of UNKNOWN strain or phenotype?

 

this risk assessment is just more BSe to me. just another in a long line of industry fed crap. i pray that my assessment is the one that is wrong. but it is THEY who roll the dice with your life. it is THEY who refuse to regulate an industry that has run amok. just from are call aspect of potentially tainted blood, and these are just recent recalls ;

 

PRODUCT

 

Source Plasma, Recall # B-0054-7CODEUnits: 03MMNC5465, 03MMNC6361, 03MMNC6801, 03MMNC7510, 03MMNC7891,03MMNC8252, 03MMNC8801, 03MMNC9144, 03MMND1122, 03MMND1478, 03MMND1969,03MMND2350, 03MMND2825, 03MMND3211, 03MMND3708, 03MMND4072, 03MMND4588,03MMND4831, 03MMND5320, 03MMND5719, 03MMND6268, 03MMND6683, 03MMND7228,03MMND7656, 03MMND8211, 03MMND8652, 03MMND9195, 03MMND9618, 03MMNE0628,03MMNE0884, 03MMNE1597, 03MMNE1979, 03MMNE2644, 03MMNE3064, 03MMNE3707,03MMNE4122, 03MMNE4750, 03MMNE5080, 03MMNE5876, 03MMNE6218, 03MMNE7189,03MMNE7587, 03MMNE8027, 03MMNE8645, 03MMNE9029, 03MMNE9641, 03MMNE9979,03MMNF0491, 03MMNF0685, 03MMNF0937, 03MMNF1260, 04MMNA0351, 04MMNA0707,04MMNA1241, 04MMNA1650, 04MMNA2291, 04MMNA2646, 04MMNA3340, 04MMNA3719,04MMNA4312, 04MMNA4683, 04MMNA5298, 04MMNA5750, 04MMNA6407, 04MMNA6816,04MMNA7482, 04MMNA7915, 04MMNA8632, 04MMNA9076, 04MMNA9723, 04MMNB0063,04MMNB0696, 04MMNB1100, 04MMNB1845, 04MMNB2285, 04MMNB3035, 04MMNB3485,04MMNB4213, 04MMNB4672, 04MMNB5841, 04MMNB6652, 04MMNB7162, 04MMNB7930,04MMNB8453, 04MMNB9239, 04MMNB9747, 04MMNC0456, 04MMNC0931, 04MMNC1578

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

BioLife Plasma Services, L.P., Mankato, MN, by facsimile on June 4, 2004.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, collected from a donor who was at increased risk for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

89 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

CA and Austria

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR October 25, 2006

 

###

 


 

 

USA FDA MAD COW BLOOD HUMANS RECALL (these are dime a dozen)RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: BIOLOGICS -- CLASS II

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCTSource Plasma, Recall # B-1708-6CODEUnits: MI180733, MI180927, MI181625, MI181780, MI182337, MI182519, MI183140,MI183311, MI183955, MI185006, MI185278, MI185822, MI186081, MI186855,MI187183, MI187903, MI188273, MI188695, MI189257, MI189553, MI190136,MI190473, MI191073, MI191395, MI191972, MI192303, MI193473, MI194343,04MINA0377, 04MINA0801, 05MINA7147, 05MINA7451, 05MINA8094, 05MINA8504,05MINA9548, 05MINA9883, 05MINB0489, 05MINB0875, 05MINB1469, 05MINB1874,05MINB3116, 05MINB7192, 05MINB7529, 05MINB8246, 05MINB8612, 05MINB9236,05MINB9366, 05MINB9475, 05MINB9641, 05MINC0031, 05MINC0237, 05MINC0336,05MINC0894, 05MINC0964, 05MINC1138, 05MINC1619, 05MINC1750, 05MINC1907,05MINC1977, 05MINC2375, 05MINC2774, 05MINC3113, 05MINC3484, 05MINC4277,05MINC4623, 05MINC5623, 05MINC5914, 05MINC7545, 05MINC7870, 05MINC8355,05MINC8689, 05MINC9437, 05MINC9775, 05MIND0067, 05MIND0393, 05MIND0892,05MIND0951, 05MIND1836, 05MIND2183 and 05MIND2962

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

BioLife Plasma Services L.P., Muncie, IN, by facsimile on November 22, 2005.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, collected from unsuitable donors based on risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

80 units

 

DISTRIBUTION CA, NC, and MD

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells, Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1714-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1715-6;c) Platelets, Recall # B-1716-6CODEa),

 

b), and c) Unit: 2443732RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by letters dated November 11, 2003 and December 18, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, collected from a donor who was at increased risk for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

3 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX and WI

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 2006

 

###

 


 

PRODUCT

 

Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1751-6

 

CODE

 

Unit: 4936623

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center, Houston, TX, by facsimile dated September 16, 2005.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood product, which was collected from an unsuitable donor based on risk factors for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

1 unit

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 2006

 

###

 


 

 

Mon Aug 7, 2006 10:2471.248.132.189

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells, Recall # B-1587-6;b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1588-6;c) Recovered Plasma, Recal # B-1589-6

 

CODE

 

a), b) and c)

 

Unit: 2016719

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Walter Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by facsimile on March 13, 2003.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

3 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

GA and Germany

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1590-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1591-6

 

CODE

 

a) and b)

 

Unit: 2443595

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on June30, 2004.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1592-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1593-6

 

CODEa) and b)

 

Unit: 2545596

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on December 14, 2004 and January 3, 2005.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX

 

______________________________

 


 

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1550-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1551-6

 

CODEa) and b)

 

Unit 2395371

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on August 20,2003.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1552-6;b) Platelets, Recall # B-1553-6;c) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1554-6

 

CODE

 

a), b) and c)

 

Unit 2438702

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on May 29,2003.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increasedrisk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

3 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1555-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1556-6

 

CODEa) and b)

 

Unit 2454970

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on July 23 and December 11. 2003.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells, Recall # B-1494-6b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1495-6

 

CODEa) and b)

 

Unit 5013100

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Walter L. Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by fax on May17, 2005. Firm initiated recall is complete.REASONBlood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

GA

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Source Plasma, Recall # B-1450-6

 

CODE

 

Unit numbers ST0824313 and ST0824764

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Stillwater Plasma Center LLC, Stillwater, OK, by fax on November 21, 2003.

 

Firm initiated recall is complete.REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor whose suitability pertaining to risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) was not adequately determined, were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

UK

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Plasma Frozen, Recall # B-1422-6;Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1423-6

 

CODE

 

a) Unit 03E42218;

 

b) Unit 03E38153

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

American Red Cross Blood Services, Atlanta, GA, by telephone, e-mail orletter on February 20 or 21, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

GA and Switzerland

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1374-6;

 

b) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1375-6CODEa) and b) unit 2453906

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on October 31 and November 5, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX and Austria

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Source Plasma.

 

Recall # B-1295-6

 

CODE

 

Units: NG0046551, NG0045950

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERD

 

CI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002, Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, collected from a donor who did not answer the questions on the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (nvCJD) questionnaire appropriately, were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Source Plasma. Recall # B-1296-6

 

CODE

 

Unit: NG 0044520 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 12, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood product, collected from a donor who did not answer the questions on the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (nvCJD) questionnaire, was distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

1 unit

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Source Plasma. Recall # B-1297-6

 

CODE

 

Units: NG0042874, NG0043139, NG0043312, NG0043618, NG0043797, NG0044020,NG0044209, NG0044507, NG0044718, NG0044977, NG0045161, NG0045412, NG0045555RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

13 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Source Plasma, Recall # B-1298-6

 

CODE

 

Units: NG 0046823, NG 0046671, NG 0045205, NG 0044635, NG 0043095, NG0042525, NG 0042341RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, collected from a donor who answered questions on the variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD) questionnaire inappropriately, were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

7 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1299-6 CODE Unit: 4357117

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Department of the Navy, Naval Medical Center, San Diego, CA, by fax and letter on September 25, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at risk of exposure to Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD), was distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

1 unit

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

Germany

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

 

###

 


 

 

CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD

 

TSS

 

FDA mad cow nvCJD 'only' blood recalls 1ST WEEK JULY Fri Jul 7, 2006 09:3770.110.83.160

 

FDA mad cow nvCJD 'only' blood recalls 1ST WEEK JULY

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1379-6;

 

b) Platelets, Recall # B-1380-6;

 

c) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # 1381-6;

 

d) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1382-6

 

CODE

 

a) Unit numbers: 2343106, 2377779, and 2403533;

 

b) and c) Unit numbers: 2377779;

 

d) Unit numbers: 2343106 and 2403533

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on June12, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

7 units

 

DISTRIBUTION TX and Austria

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1467-6;

 

b) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1468-6

 

CODE

 

a) and b)

 

Unit numbers: 2329380

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on May 8,2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTIONTX and Switzerland

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1479-6;

 

b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1480-6;

 

c) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1481-6

 

CODE

 

a), b), and c)

 

Unit numbers: 2383280

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on July23 and 29, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASONBlood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

3 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX and Switzerland

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1482-6;

 

b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1483-6

 

CODE

 

a) and b)

 

Unit number: 2501452

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile onOctober 5, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

2 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX and NY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1484-6;

 

b) Plasma Cryoprecipitated Reduced, Recall # B-1485-6;

 

c) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1486-6

 

CODE

 

a) and c)

 

Unit number: 2554077;

 

b) Unit number: 2415708

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on August13, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

3 units

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TX and Austria

 

_____________________________________

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 5, 2006

 

###

 


 

 

Greetings again Dr. Freas et al at FDA,

 

WITH new atypical TSE in the bovine, in the sheep, goat, and humans, and the fact that the new BASE TSE in cattle being very very similar to sporadic CJD, rather than the nvCJD, the fact that now science showing the TSE agent of the atypical cattle in Japan showing infectivity other than CNS tissue, the fact that the latest Texas mad cow and the recent Alabama mad cow both being of the atypical strain, it would seem prudent to include all human TSE in the blood ban, in my opinion. with sporadic CJD, you have many strains and or phenotypes, some of which are 'UNKNOWN', so we do not know how this will transmit, what tissues are infectious and or if blood transmits. that's the bottomline, however it has been reported that the BASE is more virulent to humans.With this, and the fact that sporadic CJD has tripled in the past few years or so, i see itas being prudent to take serious and immediate action ;

 

snip...see full text ;

 

 

Wednesday, October 17, 2007 TSEAC MEETINGS

 

----- Original Message -----

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV

 

Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov

 

Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 1:24 PM

 

Subject: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSSSUBMISSION]November 29, 2006

 

Greetings FDA, DHH, Dr. Freas, and Dr. Harvey et al,

 

a kind and warm Holiday Greetings to you all.i kindly wish to submit the following to the TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006, about the assessment for potential exposure to vCJD in human plasma-derivedantihemophilic factor (FVIII) products manufactured from U.S. plasma donors and related communication material ;

 

 


 

 


 

 

 

PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

 

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

 

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

 

Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

 


 

 

 

Thursday, February 24, 2011

 

The risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease among UK patients with bleeding disorders, known to have received potentially contaminated plasma products

 


 

 

 

 Monday, October 14, 2013 Researchers estimate one in 2,000 people in the UK carry variant CJD proteins http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2013/10/researchers-estimate-one-in-2000-people.html

 

 Sunday, September 29, 2013

 

Recalls raise questions on safety practices for donated blood CJD TSE PRION

 


 

 

 

Wednesday, October 09, 2013

 

*** WHY THE UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY IS SO POPULAR IN IT'S FALLACY, £41,078,281 in compensation REVISED

 


 

 

 

Thursday, October 10, 2013

 

CJD REPORT 1994 increased risk for consumption of veal and venison and lamb

 


 

 

 

Friday, August 16, 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update August 2013 U.K.

 

and

 

***Contaminated blood products induce a highly atypical prion disease devoid of PrPres in primates

 


 

 

 

Monday, May 6, 2013

 

Warning of mad cow disease threat to blood transfusions

 


 

 

 

WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

 

WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$

 

snip...see full text and more here ;

 

 

Sunday, August 11, 2013

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010

 


 

 

Sunday, October 13, 2013

 

CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

 


 

 

Saturday, November 2, 2013

 

Recommendation of the Swiss Expert Committee for Biosafety on the classification of activities using prion genes and prion protein January 2013

 


 

 

Saturday, November 16, 2013

 

Management of neurosurgical instruments and patients exposed to creutzfeldt-jakob disease 2013 December

 

Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol.

 


 

 

Thursday, November 28, 2013

 

Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows

 


 

 

Saturday, November 2, 2013

 

Exploring the risks of a putative transmission of BSE to new species

 


 

 

 

***Together with previous experiments performed in ovinized and bovinized transgenic mice and hamsters [8,9] indicating similarities between TME and L-BSE, the data support the hypothesis that L-BSE could be the origin of the TME outbreaks in North America and Europe during the mid-1900s.

 


 

 

 

Saturday, November 2, 2013

 

APHIS Finalizes Bovine Import Regulations in Line with International Animal Health Standards while enhancing the spread of BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease around the Globe

 


 

 

 

I AGREE WITH MR. BULLARD, it’s all about trade and money, BSE TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease and sound science there from, was thrown out the window by the USDA et al that fateful day in December 23, 2003, when the USDA lost it’s ‘gold card’ of supposedly being BSE FREE, (that was and still is a sad joke though), that’s when mad cow junk science was adopted by the USDA...

 

see why below...kind regards, terry

 

Monday, November 4, 2013

 

*** R-CALF Bullard new BSE rule represents the abrogation of USDA’s responsibility to protect U.S. consumers and the U.S. cattle herd from the introduction of foreign animal disease

 


 

 

 

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

 

SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL (SRM) CONTROL VERIFICATION TASK FSIS NOTICE 70-13 10/30/13

 


 

 

 

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 

 


 

 


 

 

 

TSS