Tuesday, August 6, 2013

Can a test tube hamburger have prions aka mad cow disease BSE ?

Test Tube Hamburger: £250,000 Stem Cell Patty Cooked And Eaten

 

(And Google's Sergey Brin Picked Up The Bill) Huffington Post UK/PA | Posted: 05/08/2013 14:30 BST | Updated: 05/08/2013 15:52 BST

 

 

The world's first test-tube burger, made from lab-grown meat, was today cooked and served in London - thanks to a very well-known benefactor from the world of tech.

 

Google's resident 'mad scientist' (an co-founder) Sergey Brin reportedly invested £215,000 in the project, and was on hand (via video) to explain the mission.

 

In a video shown before the burger was cooked in butter by chef Richard McGeown - wearing a pair of Google Glasses, naturally - Brin said he was backing the technology because it could be "transformative for the world".

 

He said: "There are basically three things that can happen going forward - one is that we can all become vegetarian. I don't think that's really likely."

 

Brin went on:

 

"The second is we ignore the issues and that leads to continued environmental harm and the third option is we do something new. "Some people think this is science fiction - it's not real, it's somewhere out there. I actually think that's a good thing.

 

"If what you're doing is not seen by some people as science fiction it's probably not transformative enough. It's really just proof of concept right now.

 

"We're trying to create the first cultured beef hamburger. From there I'm optimistic we can really scale by leaps and bounds."

 

 The 5oz (142g) patty, which cost £250,000 to produce, was dished up before an invited audience.

 

Scientist-turned-chef Professor Mark Post produced the burger from 20,000 tiny strips of meat grown from cow stem cells.

 

After trying his own creation for the first time today, he said: "I think it's a very good start, it proved that we can do this, that we can make it and to provide a start to build upon - I am very pleased with it."

 

 Chicago author Josh Schonwald and Austrian food researcher Hanni Rutzler gave the meat's taste a mixed review after becoming the first to try it.

 

After taking a bite, Ms Rutzler said there was "intense taste" but that she had expected a softer texture.

 

"It's close to meat, it's not that juicy, but the consistence is perfect," she said.

 

"The absence is the fat, it's a leanness to it, but the bite feels like a conventional hamburger," Schonwald said.

 

"This is kind of an unnatural experience in that I can't tell you over the past 20 years how many times I have had a burger without ketchup or onions or jalapenos or bacon."

 

Prof Post believes the new burger could herald a food revolution, with artificial meat products appearing in supermarkets in as little as 10 years.

 

The raw ingredients which went into creating the burger sound distinctly unappetising - 0.02in (0.5mm) thick strips of pinkish yellow lab-grown tissue.

 

A multi-step process is used to turn a dish of stem cells into a burger that can be grilled or fried:

 

First the stem cells are cultivated in a nutrient broth, allowing them to proliferate 30-fold.

 

Next they are combined with an elastic collagen and attached to Velcro "anchor points" in a culture dish. Between the anchor points, the cells self-organise into chunks of muscle.

 

Electrical stimulation is then used to make the muscle strips contract and "bulk up" - the laboratory equivalent of working out in a gym.

 

Finally the thousands of beef strips are minced up, together with 200 pieces of lab-grown animal fat, and moulded into a patty. Around 20,000 meat strands are needed to make one 5oz (142g) burger.

 

Other non-meat ingredients include salt, egg powder, and breadcrumbs. Red beetroot juice and saffron are added to provide authentic beef colouring.

 

A major advantage of test-tube meat is that it can be customised for health, for instance by boosting levels of polyunsaturated fats, Prof Post has said.

 

Manufacturing steaks instead of minced meat presents a much greater technical challenge, requiring some kind of blood vessel system to carry nutrients and oxygen to the centre of the tissue. Making artificial chicken or fish from stem cells might be easier.

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

stem cells offer hope, but at the same time, stem cells offer potential risk factors with the TSE prion disease, _especially_ with the atypical TSE strains that as in the L-type BASE BSE, extremely more virulent. just my opinion...

 

 

 

risk factors from the TSE prion on the stem cell burger

 

 

 

bovine fetal cells

 

prion risk bovine fetal cells

 

 

 

WHO Tables on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2010

 

snip...

 

Blood has not been shown to transmit disease from humans with any form of ‘classical’ TSE [Dorsey et al., 2009], or from cattle with BSE (including fetal calf blood).

 

***A number of laboratories using new, highly sensitive methods to detect PrPTSE are reporting success in a variety of animal and human TSEs. However, several have experienced difficulty obtaining reproducible results in plasma, and it is not yet clear that positive results imply a potential for disease transmissibility, either because of false positives, or of ‘true’ positives that are due to sub-transmissible concentrations of PrPTSE. Because of these considerations (and the fact that no data are yet available on blinded testing of specimens from naturally infected humans or animals) the expert group felt that it was still too early to evaluate the validity of these tests with sufficient confidence to permit either a negative or positive conclusion.

 

 


 


 

 

 

Human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies: A Critical scientific Investment Final Report of the National Prion Research Program

 

Cultures for Bioassay of Prion Infectivity and for the Study of

 

Prion Replication and Disease Susceptibility

 

Few cell lines can be infected with prions, precluding in vitro analysis of the mechanisms underlying genetic differences in susceptibility to infection. Similarly, some of these cell lines, mouse N2a cells for example, are resistant to prion strains that can readily transmit disease to mice. With one exception, sensitive bioassay of prions requires inoculation of mice with incubation times ranging from months to over a year. Neurosphere lines grow as aggregates and contain CNS stem cell activity;

 

***we now report that these cultures can be infected with prions.

 

Using a defined, serum-free medium, cell lines were isolated from brains dissected from fetuses at embryonic day 12 to 15. In addition to expressing the stem cell-associated marker nestin, most cells from PrP transgenic or from wild-type mice express the normal isoform of PrP (PrPC), which is essential for prion replication. RML scrapie brain homogenate was added to neurosphere cultures from FVB, FVB transgenic mice that overexpress mouse PrP (Tg4053), and FVB mice with a targeted null mutation in the PrP gene (Prnp). Presence of the proteinase Kresistant, misfolded PrPSc isoform was measured at each passage by Western, dot, or cell blots. A dramatic rise in PrPSc with time was observed in the Tg4053 cells while the level PrPSc decayed to undetectable levels in the cultures of cells lacking PrP; levels of PrPSc in FVB cultures persisted and then increased over several passages. Prions produced in culture were transmissible to mice and produced typical scrapie pathology. Intracellular aggregates of PrP were seen in infected cultures. To date, infection of Tg4053 neurospheres by prion isolate diluted 1 to 50,000 has been demonstrated. Neurosphere lines from transgenic mice overexpressing PrP may provide a sensitive in vitro bioassay not only for mouse prions but also for those from other species, including humans.

 

 

 


 

 

 

PLEASE SEE PAGE 140 HERE ;

 

EMERGENCE OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, EBOLA VIRUS, MARBURG, SARS, ANTHRAX, WEST NILE VIRUS, PRION DISEASE, MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT TUBERCULOSIS (MDR-TB), AND SCORES OF OTHER ‘’NEW’’ DISEASES REMIND CLINICIANS AND PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS TO REMAIN VIGILANT FOR OUTBREAKS OF NOVEL OR UNEXPLAINED DISEASE. THESE EMERGINING INFECTIONS HAVE A POTENTIAL TO BECOME FUTURE BIOLOGICAL THREATS. NATURAL EMERGING DISEASE OUTBREAKS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM INTENTIONAL INTRODUCTION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES FOR NEFARIOUS PURPOSES; HENCE, CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THIS POSSIBILITY BEFORE ANY QUESTION OF ETIOLOGY IS CONSIDERED SETTLED. ...

 

 


 

 

 

INDEED, see my submission below of potential ‘’suitcase bombs’’ full of prions ;

 

 

 

3002100040

 

Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS)

 

KG

 

24

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

Source: World Trade Atlas

 

 

 

Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] - TSS 1/27/03 (0)

 

Docket Management

 

Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

 

Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 –0600

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: [log in to unmask] Docket No: 02-088-1

 

Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins

 


 

 

Greetings,

 

i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA.

 

please be warned;

 

Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 –0800

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee

 

Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth

 

[Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]

 

snip...

 

Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine, including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.

 

snip...

 

From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been in Greece is prohibited.

 

snip...

 


 

========================

 

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the country?

 

Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

 

Sources: World Trade Atlas

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

 

Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights.

 

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.

 

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

 

 

Greetings list members,

 

i just cannot accept this;

 

23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)

 

The data do not provide a species of origin code for these

 

products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

 

what kind of statement is this?

 

how stupid do they think we are?

 

it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?

 

There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.

 

APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US.

 

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

 

A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.

 

As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US.

 

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria?

 

Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species.

 

Source: World Trade Atlas

 

snip...

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?

 

A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights.

 

Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

 

Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ

 


 

Greetings FDA and public,

 

if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.

 

[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]

 

if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.

 

[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]

 

more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?

 

snip...

 

A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.

 

Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.

 


 

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?

 

Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.

 

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

 

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

 

A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.

 

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;

 


 

more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';

 

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Subject:

 

Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again

 

References:< [log in to unmask]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean

 

Greetings again List Members,

 

let me kick a madcow around here a bit.

 

on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system.

 

the USDA/APHIS states;

 

During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from Poland included non-species specific animal products used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant material.

 

NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;

 

ANNEX 1

 

Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001

 

EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY

 

The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards.

 

This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time.

 

The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.

 

Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance.

 

Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.

 

BSE surveillance:

 

Not sufficient before 2001.

 

Cross-contamination:

 

Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.

 

see full text and ANNEX 1 at;

 


 

so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke indeed.

 

* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT

 


 

BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$

 

Subject: BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$ Date: November 1, 2002 at 8:03 am PST

 

[Federal Register: November 1, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 212)]

 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

 

9 CFR Part 94

 

[Docket No. 02-072-2]

 

Change in Disease Status of Israel Because of BSE

 

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

 

ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as final rule.

 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

 

SUMMARY: We are adopting as a final rule, without change, an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where bovine spongiform encephalopathy exists because the disease had been detected in a native-born animal in that region. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy into the United States.

 

EFFECTIVE DATE: The interim rule became effective on June 4, 2002.

 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Gary Colgrove, Chief Staff Veterinarian, Sanitary Trade Issues Team, National Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737- 1231; (301) 734-4356.

 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

 

Background

 

The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to below as the regulations) govern the importation of certain animals, birds, poultry, meat, other animal products and byproducts, hay, and straw into the United States in order to prevent the introduction of various animal diseases, including bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). In an interim rule effective June 4, 2002, and published in the Federal Register on July 18, 2002 (67 FR 47243-47244, Docket No. 02- 072-1), we amended the regulations in Sec. 94.18 (a)(1) by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists due to the detection of BSE in a native-born animal in that region. Comments on the interim rule were required to be received on or before September 16, 2002. We did not receive any comments. Therefore, for the reasons given in the interim rule, we are adopting the interim rule as a final rule. This action also affirms the information contained in the interim rule concerning Executive Orders 12866 and 12988 and the Paperwork Reduction Act. Further, for this action, the Office of Management and Budget has waived its review under Executive Order 12866.

 

Regulatory Flexibility Act

 

This action affirms an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of BSE into the United States. The following analysis addresses the economic effects of the interim rule on small entities, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The interim rule's restrictions on the importation of ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel are not expected to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities due to the fact that the restricted items are either not imported from Israel or are imported in very small amounts. There are three categories of imports that may be affected, but Israel's share of U.S. imports is small in each case. The first category of affected imported commodities is ``Meat and edible meat offal, salted in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal.'' Average total yearly imports of these products by the United States over the 3-year period 1999-2001 were valued at $24.6 million. Imports from Israel in 1999 were valued at $26,000. No imports of these products from Israel were reported for 2000 or 2001. The second category of affected commodities is ``Preparations of a kind used in animal feeding.'' Average total yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $93.5 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $76,000. The final category of affected commodities is ``Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood.'' Average yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $101.2 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $2.7 million. It is apparent that Israel is a minor supplier to the United States of the ruminant products and byproducts affected by the BSE-related restrictions resulting from the interim rule. Therefore, we do not expect that the interim rule's restrictions on ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel will substantially affect any U.S. importers, large or small, of those commodities. Under these circumstances, the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

 

List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 94

 

Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Meat and meat products, Milk, Poultry and poultry products, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

 

PART 94--RINDERPEST, FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE, FOWL PEST (FOWL PLAGUE), EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE, AFRICAN SWINE FEVER, HOG CHOLERA, AND BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS

 

Accordingly, we are adopting as a final rule, without change, the interim rule that amended 9 CFR part 94 and that was published at 67 FR 47243-47244 on July 18, 2002.

 

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7711-7714, 7751, 7754, 8303, 8306, 8308, 8310, 8311, and 8315; 21 U.S.C 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 4331 and 4332; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.

 

Done in Washington, DC, this 28th day of October, 2002. Bobby R. Acord, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. [FR Doc. 02-27812 Filed 10-31-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3410-34-P

 


 

greetings List members,

 

MORE OF THE INFAMOUS USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM.

 

as long as the exporting country and the importing country know not what they are exporting (play dumb/stupid), this non-species coding system allows potential BSE/TSE materials to be imported and exported freely and legally...

 

TSS

 

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from Israel ?

 

The U.S. imported no live ruminants or ruminant meat from Israel since 1999. In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE. Other imports from Israel during the period 1998-2001 included non-species specific preparations used in animal feeds and other non-food products of unspecified animals. For the category "preparations used in animal feeding, NESOI" that was imported into the U.S., it is possible that bovine meat or bovine byproducts could have been included in this category. However, the US Food and Drug Administration prohibits feeding of meat-and-bone meal to ruminants in the U.S.

 

HS Code

 

Description

 

Unit

 

1998

 

1999

 

2000

 

2001

 

Feed - non species specific

 

Total

 

45,030

 

48,000

 

50,649

 

43,000

 

2309909500

 

Preparations Used in Animal Feedings, NESOI

 

KG

 

45,030

 

48,000

 

50,649

 

43,000

 

Meat & offal- non species specific

 

Total

 

5

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

300110

 

Dried Organs

 

KG

 

5

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

Other animal products - ruminants

 

Total

 

24

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

3002100040

 

Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS)

 

KG

 

24

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

Source: World Trade Atlas

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Israel?

 

A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.

 

Under APHIS-PPQ?s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.

 

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.

 


 

TSS

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC -254 Accepted - Volume 11

 


 


 

 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 


 


 

 

 

The role of prion protein in stem cell regulation

 

A Miranda, P Ramos-Ibeas, E Pericuesta, M A Ramirez and A Gutierrez-Adan + Author Affiliations

 

Departamento de Reproducción Animal, INIA, Avenida Puerta de Hierro no. 12, Local 10, Madrid 28040, Spain Correspondence should be addressed to A Gutierrez-Adan; Email: agutierr@inia.es

 

Published online before print June 5, 2013, doi: 10.1530/REP-13-0100 Reproduction September 1, 2013 146 R91-R99

 


 

 

 

One RCT reported on prion disease over a five-year follow-up period and found none in the 16 participants given MSCs. No other studies monitored or reported on prion disease.

 

Second, the use of fetal bovine serum for culturing MSCs has been criticized for potentially introducing zoonotic contamination to the cell product (e.g. prion disease), and also potentially increasing the immunogenicity of the cells. [52], [53] Although the majority of included studies used fetal bovine serum, only one study specifically monitored for potential adverse events associated with its use.

 


 

 

Prion-like disorders: blurring the divide between transmissibility and infectivity

 

Mimi Cushman1,*, Brian S. Johnson2,*, Oliver D. King3, Aaron D. Gitler2,‡ and James Shorter1,‡ 1Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, 805b Stellar-Chance Laboratories, 422 Curie Boulevard, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA and 2Department of Cell and Developmental Biology, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, 1109 BRB II/III, 421 Curie Boulevard, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA 3Boston Biomedical Research Institute, 64 Grove St., Watertown, MA 02472, USA *These authors contributed equally to this work ‡Authors for correspondence (gitler@mail.med.upenn.edu; jshorter@mail.med.upenn.edu) Journal of Cell Science 123, 1191-1201 © 2010. Published by The Company

 

Implications for neuronal-graft and stem-cellbased therapies

 

Whether the amyloid templates involved in AD, PD and HD are prions or not, their transmissibility within the brain of an individual has important repercussions for potential therapies...

 


 

 

 

J Transl Med. 2011; 9: 29. Published online 2011 March 22. doi: 10.1186/1479-5876-9-29 PMCID: PMC3070641

 

Risk factors in the development of stem cell therapy Carla A Herberts,corresponding author1 Marcel SG Kwa,2 and Harm PH Hermsen1

 

snip...

 

Adventitious agents Manufacturing of cell based medicinal products inevitably does not include terminal sterilization, purification, viral removal and inactivation. Therefore, viral and microbial safety is a pivotal risk factor associated with the use of non-autologous and/or cultured cells, including stem cells. These risk factors are not unique to stem cells and apply to all cell based medicinal products. Donor history is of particular importance for stem cell lines which were initially intended for research purposes, rather than to be used in clinical application. The risk of donor-to-recipient transmission of bacterial, viral, fungal or prion pathogens may lead to life-threatening and even fatal reactions. Disease transmission has been reported after allograft transplantation [94,95]. Only limited information is available on disease transmission via adult somatic stem cells other than those routinely used HCS. It has been shown that MSC are susceptible to both CMV and HSV-1 infection in vitro. However, using sensitive PCR techniques no CMV DNA could be detected in ex vivo expanded MSC derived from healthy CMV positive individuals [96]. No information on the susceptibility for adventitious agents of pluripotent stem cells has been reported in the scientific literature.

 

Although progress has been made in tissue culturing techniques, both serum and feeder layers are occasionally still needed for the in vitro isolation and propagation of (pluripotent and somatic) stem cells [91], The use of animal products in tissue culture (e.g. foetal bovine serum (FBS), or non-human feeder cells) also may introduce a risk of transmission of disease (e.g. prion) as well as activation of host immune system by biomolecules [97] (e.g. non-human sialic acid) [69]. Expansion of stem cells in medium supplemented with FBS has a potential risk of transmitting viral and prion diseases and causing immunological rejection. Autologous or donor-derived plasma may be a safer substitute for FBS and may still allow proper cell proliferation and differentiation. In fact, changing FBS to human platelet lysate has been described to result in accelerated/enhanced proliferation, without genetic abnormalities [69]. However, the use of autologous patient serum may be less favourable because serum derived from aged individuals has been reported to interfere with MSC proliferation and differentiation capacity [69]. When possible, cell feeder free isolation and culturing or the use of a membrane between feeder cell and stem cell culture will enhance the viral safety of the stem cell based medicinal product. ...

 

 


 

 

 

Diagnostic approaches for viruses and prions in stem cell banks Fernando CoboCorresponding author contact informationCorresponding author 
contact informationhttp://origin-cdn.els-cdn.com/sd/entities/REcor.gif"
>, E-mail the corresponding authorhttp://origin-cdn.els-cdn.com/sd/entities/REemail.gif" alt="E-mail the corresponding author">, Paloma Talavera, Ángel Concha Stem Cell Bank of Andalucía (Spanish Central Node), Hospital Universitario Virgen de las Nieves, Avda Fuerzas Armadas, 2, 18014 Granada, Spain Received 2 October 2005 Revised 7 November 2005 Accepted 17 November 2005 Available online 27 December 2005 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.virol.2005.11.026, How to Cite or Link Using DOI Permissions & Reprints
 

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Abstract Some stem cell lines may contain an endogenous virus or can be contaminated with exogenous viruses (even of animal origin) and may secrete viral particles or express viral antigens on their surface. Moreover, certain biotechnological products (e.g. bovine fetal serum, murine feeder cells) may contain prion particles. Viral and prion contamination of cell cultures and “feeder” cells, which is a common risk in all biotechnological products derived from the cell lines, is the most challenging and potentially serious outcome to address, due to the difficulty involved in virus and prion detection and the potential to cause serious disease in recipients of these cell products.

 

Stem cell banks should introduce adequate quality assurance programs like the microbiological control program and can provide researchers with valuable support in the standardization and safety of procedures and protocols used for the viral and prion testing and in validation programs to assure the quality and safety of the cells.

 

Keywords Stem cell banks; Endogenous viruses; Exogenous viruses; Prion particle; Cell therapy; Diagnostic methods

 


 

 

Animal cell cultures : Risk assessment and biosafety recommendations (Author: K.Pauwels) (Last revised: February 28, 2006 )

 

Prions Though a limited number of cultured cell lines (e.g. mouse neuroblastoma cell lines Sc N2a) have been shown to promote, upon subpassaging, stable and persistent replication of PrP(Sc) as well as infectivity (Solassal J, et al., 2003), most cell lines are resistant to prion infection (Butler, et al., 1888). However, in contrast to most of the infectious agents, prions are particularly difficult to inactivate. In fact no method can guarantee total inactivation of these agents. So, one should bear these considerations in mind when using growth media of bovine origin.

 


 

 

Animal Cell Cultures: Risk Assessment and Biosafety Recommendations

 

Katia Pauwels1, Philippe Herman1, Bernadette Van Vaerenbergh1, Chuong Dai Do thi1, Laura Berghmans1, Geneviève Waeterloos1, Dirk Van Bockstaele2, Karoline Dorsch-Häsler3, and Myriam Sneyers1

 

1Scientific Institute of Public Health, Brussels, Belgium, 2Esoterix, Clinical Trials Services, Mechelen, Belgium, and 3Swiss Expert Committee for Biosafety, Bern, Switzerland

 

Adventitious Contamination of Cell Cultures Adventitious contamination of cell cultures is a major drawback for any activity that involves cell culturing (for a review see Langdon, 2004). In addition, one of the main biosafety concerns when manipulating animal cell cultures is the fact that animal cell cultures may provide a support for contaminating agents that cause harm to human health. Causative agents of cell contamination include bacteria, fungi, mycoplasms, parasites, viruses, prions and even other animal cells.

 

Finally, another class of agents that may contaminate cell cultures include unconventional agents that cause transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), the socalled prions (Solassol et al., 2003; Cronier et al., 2004; Vorberg et al., 2004). Neuroblastoma cell lines and primary cultured neurons and astrocytes have been shown to serve as hosts (Butler et al., 1988). Many studies have suggested that the risk of propagation of TSE agents in tissue culture cells, cultivated in the presence of bovine serum potentially contaminated with TSE, was restricted to neurons or brain-derived cell cultures. However, most recently, non-neuronal cells have been demonstrated to support TSE infection, suggesting that any cell line expressing normal host prion protein could have the potential to support propagation of TSE agents (Vilette et al., 2001; Vorberg et al., 2004). Contrary to most of the infectious agents, TSE agents are resistant to most of the physical and chemical methods commonly used for decontamination of infectious agents and may form a matter of concern in case bovine-derived products are used as tissue culture supplements.

 


 

 

Stem cell cosmetics

 

Microbial contaminants such as bacteria or fungi, etc can achieve high densities altering the growth and characteristics of the cultures. But viral or prion contamination will not be any altering of the cultures. Due to their extremely small size, viruses or prions are the most difficult cell culture contaminants to detect in culture, requiring methods that are impractical for most research laboratories. Their small size also makes them very difficult to remove from media, sera, and other solutions of biological origin. If the use of contaminated stem cells or their extracts in cosmetics, it will be very harmful.

 


 

 

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

 

*** Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics; Reopening of the Comment Period FDA-2004-N-0188-0051 (TSS SUBMISSION)

 

FDA believes current regulation protects the public from BSE but reopens comment period due to new studies

 


 

 

 

PLEASE do not forget the infamous 'Louping-ill vaccine' incident;

 

 

 

Subject: Louping-ill vaccine documents from November 23rd, 1946

 

Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2000 17:44:57 –0700

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

 

THE VETERINARY RECORD

 

516 No 47. Vol. 58

 

November 23rd, 1946

 

NATIONAL VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

 

ANNUAL CONGRESS, 1946

 

The annual Congress, 1946, was held at the Royal Veterinary College, Royal College Street, London, N.W.I. from September 22nd to September 27th.

 

Opening Meeting

 

[skip to scrapie vaccine issue...tss]

 

Papers Presented to Congress

 

The papers presented to this year's Congress had as their general theme the progressive work of the profession during the war years. Their appeal was clearly demonstrated by the large and remarkably uniform attendance in the Grand Hall of the Royal Veterinary College throughout the series; between 200 and 250 members were present and they showed a keen interest in every paper, which was reflected in the expression of some disappointment that the time available for discussion did not permit of the participation of more than a small proportion of would-be contributors.

 

In this issue we publish (below) the first to be read and discussed, that by Dr. W. S. Gordon, M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E., "Advances in Veterinary Research." Next week's issue will contain the paper on "Some Recent Advances in Veterinary Medicine and Surgery in Large-Animal Practice" by Mr. T. Norman Gold, M.R.C.V.S. In succeeding numbers of the Record will be reproduced, also with reports of discussions, that by Mr. W. L. Weipers, M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., on the same subject as relating to small-animal practice, and the papers by Mr. J. N. Ritchie, B.SC., M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., and Mr. H.W. Steele-Bodger, M.R.C.V.S., on "War-time Achievements of the British Home Veterinary Services."

 

The first scientific paper of Congress was read by Dr. W. S. Gordon, M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E. on Monday, September 23rd, 1946, when Professor J. Basil Buxton, M.A., F.R.C.V.S, D.V.H., Prinicipal of the Royal Veterinary College, presided.

 

Advances in Veterinary Research

 

by

 

W.S. GORDON, PH.D., M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E.

 

Agriculteral Research Council, Field Station, Compton, Berks.

 

Louping-ill, Tick-borne Fever and Scrapie

 

In 1930 Pool, Browniee & Wilson recorded that louping-ill was a transmissible disease. Greig et al, (1931) showed that the infective agent was a filter-passing virus with neurotropic characters and Browniee & Wilson (1932) that the essential pathology was that of an encephalomyelitis. Gordon, Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod (1932) and MacLeod & Gordon (1932) confirmed and extended this work. It was shown that on louping-ill farms the virus was present in the blood of many sheep which did not show clinical symptoms indicating involvement of the central nervous system and that for the perpetuation and spread of the disease these subclinical cases were probably of greater importance that the frank clinical cases because, in Nature, the disease was spread by the tick, lxodes ricinus L. More recently Wilson (1945, 1946) has described the cultivation of the virus in a chick embryo medium, the pathogenic properties of this culture virus and the preparation of louping-ill antiserum.

 

Between 1931 and 1934 I carried out experiments which resulted in the development of an effective vaccine for the prevention of louping-ill.* This vaccine has been in general use since 1935 and in his annual report to the Animal Diseases Research Association this year, Dr. Greig stated that about 227,000 doses of vaccine had been issued from Moredun alone.

 

Dr. Gordon illustrated this portion of his paper by means of graphs and diagrams projected by the epidiascope.

 

This investigation, however, did not begin and end with the study of louping-ill; it had, by good fortune, a more romantic turn and less fortunately a final dramtic twist which led almost to catastrope. After it had been established that a solid immunity to louping-ill could be induced in sheep, a group of immunized and a group of susceptible animals were placed together on the tick-infected pasture of a louping-ill farm. Each day all the animals were gathered and their temperatures were recorded. It was anticipated that febrile reactions with some fatalities would develop in the controls while the louping-ill immunes would remain normal. Contrary to expectation, however, every sheep, both immune and control, developed a febrile reaction. This unexpected result made neccessary further investigation which showed that the febrile reaction in the louping-ill immunes was due to a hitherto undescribed infective agent, a Rickettsia-like organism which could be observed in the cytoplasm of the grannular leucocytes, especially the neutrophil polymorphs (MacLeod (1932), Gordon, Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod. MacLeod & Gordon (1933). MacLeod (1936). MacLeod collected ticks over many widely separated parts of Scotland and all were found to harbour the infective agent of tick-borne fever, and it is probable that all sheep on tick-infested farms develop this disease, at least on the first occasion that they become infested with ticks. When the infection is passed in series through susceptible adult sheep it causes a sever, febrile reaction, dullness and loss of bodily condition but it rarely, if ever, proves fatal. It is clear, however, that it aggravates the harmful effects of a louping-ill infection and it is a serious additional complication to such infections as pyaemia and the anacrobic infections which beset lambs on the hill farms of Northern Britain.

 

Studying the epidemiology of louping-ill on hill farms it became obvious that the pyaemic condition of lambs described by M'Fadyean (1894) was very prevalent on tick infested farms Pyaemia is a crippling condition of lambs associated with tick-bite and is often confused with louping-ill. It is caused by infection with Staphylococcus aureus and affected animals may show abscess formation on the skin, in the joints, viscera, meninges and elsewhere in the body. It was thought that tick-borne fever might have ben a predisposing factor in this disease and unsuccessful attempts were made by Taylor, Holman & Gordon (1941) to reproduce the condition by infecting lambs subcutaneously with the staphylococcus and concurrently produceing infections with tickborne fever and louping-ill in the same lambs. Work on pyaemia was then continued by McDiarmid (1946a, 1946b, 1946c), who succeeded in reproducing a pyaemic disease in mice, guinea-pigs and lambs similar to the naturally occuring condition by intravenous inoculation of Staphylococcus aureus. He also found a bacteraemic form of the disease in which no gross pyaemic lesions were observed. The prevention or treatment of this condition presents a formidable problem. It is unlikely that staphylococcal ???oid will provide an effective immunity and even if penicillin proved to be a successful treatment, the difficulty of applying it in adequate and sustained dosage to young lambs on hill farms would be almost insurmountable.

 

>From 1931 to 1934 field trials to test the immunizing value and harmlessness of the loup-ill vaccine were carried out on a gradually increasing scale. Many thousands of sheep were vaccinated and similar numbers, living under identical conditions were left as controls. The end result showed that an average mortability of about 9 percent in the controls was reduced to less than 1 percent in the vaccinated animals. While the efficiency of the vaccine was obvious after the second year of work, previous bitter experience had shown the wisdom of withholding a biological product from widespread use until it had been successfully produced in bulk, as opposed to small-scale experimental production and until it had been thoroughly tested for immunizing efficiency and freedom from harmful effects. It was thought that after four years testing this stage had been reached in 1935, and in the spring of that year the vaccine was issued for general use. It comprised a 10 percent saline suspension of brain, spinal cord and spleen tissues taken from sheep five days after infection with louping-ill virus by intracerebral inoculation. To this suspension 0-35 percent of formalin was added to inactivate the virus and its safety for use as a vaccine was checked by intracerbral inoculation of mice and sheep and by the inoculation of culture medium. Its protective power was proved by vaccination sheep and later subjecting them, along with controls, to a test dose of living virus.

 

Vaccine for issue had to be free from detectable, living virus and capable of protecting sheep against a test dose of virus applied subcutaneously. The 1935 vaccine conformed to these standards and was issued for inoculation in March as three separate batches labelled 1, 2, and 3. The tissues of 140 sheep were employed to make batch 1 of which 22,270 doses were used; 114 to make batch 2 of which 18,000 doses were used and 44 to make batch 3 of which 4,360 doses were used. All the sheep tissues incorporated in the vaccine were obtained from yearling sheep. During 1935 and 1936 the vaccine proved highly efficient in the prevention of loup-ill and no user observed an ill-effect in the inoculated animals. In September, 1937, two and a half years after vaccinating the sheep, two owners complained that scrapie, a disease which had not before been observed in the Blackface breed, was appearing in their stock of Blackface sheep and further that it was confined to animals vaccinated with louping-ill vaccine in 1935. At that stage it was difficult to conceive that the occurrence could be associated with the injection of the vaccine but in view of the implications, I visited most of the farms on which sheep had been vaccinated in 1935. It was at this point that the investigation reached its dramatic phase; I shall not forget the profound effect on my emotions when I visited these farms and was warmly welcomed because of the great benefits resulting from the application of louping-ill vaccine, wheras the chief purpose of my visit was to determine if scrapie was appearing in the inoculated sheep. The enquiry made the position clear. Scrapie was developing in the sheep vaccinated in 1935 and it was only in a few instances that the owner was associating the occurrence with louping-ill vaccination. The disease was affecting all breeds and it was confined to the animals vaccinated with batch 2. This was clearly demonstrated on a number of farms on which batch 1 had been used to inoculate the hoggs in 1935 and batch 2 to inoculate the ewes. None of the hoggs, which at this time were three- year-old ewes. At this time it was difficult to forecast whether all of the 18,000 sheep which had received batch 2 vaccine would develop scrapie. It was fortunate, however, that the majority of the sheep vaccinated with batch 2 were ewes and therfore all that were four years old and upwards at the time of vaccination had already been disposed of and there only remained the ewes which had been two to three years old at the time of vaccination, consequently no accurate assessment of the incidence of scrapie could be made. On a few farms, however, where vaccination was confined to hoggs, the incidence ranged from 1 percent, to 35 percent, with an average of about 5 percent. Since batch 2 vaccine had been incriminated as a probable source of scrapie infection, an attempt was made to trace the origin of the 112 sheep whose tissues had been included in the vaccine. It was found that they had been supplied by three owners and that all were of the Blackface or Greyface breed with the exception of eight which were Cheviot lambs born in 1935 from ewes which had been in contact with scrapie infection. Some of these contact ewes developed scrapie in 1936-37 and three surviving fellow lambs to the eight included in the batch 2 vaccine of 1935 developed scrapie, one in September, 1936, one in February, 1937, and one in November, 1937. There was, therefore, strong presumptive evidence that the eight Cheviot lambs included in the vaccine althought apparently healthy were, in fact, in the incubative stage of a scrapie infection and that in their tissues there was an infective agent which had contaminated the batch 2 vaccine, rendering it liable to set up scrapie. If that assumption was correct then the evidence indicated that:-

 

(1) the infective agent of scrapie was present in the brain, spinal cord and or spleen of infected sheep: (2) it could withstand a concentration of formalin of 0-35 percent, which inactivated the virus of louping-ill: (3) it could be transmitted by subcutaneous inoculation; (4) it had an incubative period of two years and longer.

 

Two Frenchmen, Cuille & Chelle (1939) as the result of experiments commenced in 1932, reported the successful infection of sheep by inoculation of emulsions of spinal cord or brain material by the intracerebral, epidural, intraocular and subcutaneous routes The incubation period varied according to the route employed, being one year intracerebrally, 15 months intraocularly and 20 months subcutaneously. They failed to infect rabbits but succeeded in infecting goats. Another important part of their work showed that the infective agent could pass throught a chamberland 1.3 filter, thus demonstrating that the infective agent was a filtrable virus. It was a curious coincidence that while they were doing their transmission experiments their work was being confirmed by the unforeseeable infectivity of a formalinized tissue vaccine.

 

As a result of this experience a large-scale transmision experiment involving the ue of 788 sheep was commenced in 1938 on a farm specially taken for the purpose by the Animal Diseases Research Association with funds provided by the Agricultural Research Council. The experiment was designed to determine the nature of the infective agent and the pathogenesis of the disease. It is only possible here to give a summary of the result which showed that (1) saline suspensions of brain and spinal cord tissue of sheep affected with scrapie were infective to normal sheep when inoculatted intracerebrally or subcutaneously; (2) the incubation period after intracerebral inoculation was seven months and upwards and only 60 percent of the inoculated sheep developed scrapie during a period of four and a half years; (3) the incubation period after subcutaneous inoculation was 15 months and upwards and only about 30 percent of the inoculated sheep developed the disease during the four and a half years: (4) the infective agent was of small size and probably a filtrable virus.

 

The prolonged incubative period of the disease and the remarkable resistance of the causal agent to formalin are features of distinct interest. It still remains to determine if a biological test can be devised to detect infected animals so that they can be killed for food before they develop clinical symptoms and to explore the possibilities of producing an immunity to the disease.

 

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Greetings List Members,

 

pretty disturbing document. now, what would stop this from happening with the vaccineCJD in children???

 

kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

 

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Sunday, May 18, 2008

 

MAD COW DISEASE BSE CJD CHILDREN VACCINES

 


 

==============================================================================

 

Saturday, February 11, 2012

 

PrPSc Detection and Infectivity in Semen from Scrapie-Infected Sheep

 


 

 

 

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 

 

 


 

 

 


 

 

 

 

kind regards,

terry

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