Test Tube Hamburger: £250,000 Stem Cell Patty Cooked And Eaten
(And Google's Sergey Brin Picked Up The Bill) Huffington Post UK/PA |
Posted: 05/08/2013 14:30 BST | Updated: 05/08/2013 15:52 BST
The world's first test-tube burger, made from lab-grown meat, was today
cooked and served in London - thanks to a very well-known benefactor from the
world of tech.
Google's resident 'mad scientist' (an co-founder) Sergey Brin reportedly
invested £215,000 in the project, and was on hand (via video) to explain the
mission.
In a video shown before the burger was cooked in butter by chef Richard
McGeown - wearing a pair of Google Glasses, naturally - Brin said he was backing
the technology because it could be "transformative for the world".
He said: "There are basically three things that can happen going forward -
one is that we can all become vegetarian. I don't think that's really
likely."
Brin went on:
"The second is we ignore the issues and that leads to continued
environmental harm and the third option is we do something new. "Some people
think this is science fiction - it's not real, it's somewhere out there. I
actually think that's a good thing.
"If what you're doing is not seen by some people as science fiction it's
probably not transformative enough. It's really just proof of concept right
now.
"We're trying to create the first cultured beef hamburger. From there I'm
optimistic we can really scale by leaps and bounds."
The 5oz (142g) patty, which cost £250,000 to produce, was dished up before
an invited audience.
Scientist-turned-chef Professor Mark Post produced the burger from 20,000
tiny strips of meat grown from cow stem cells.
After trying his own creation for the first time today, he said: "I think
it's a very good start, it proved that we can do this, that we can make it and
to provide a start to build upon - I am very pleased with it."
Chicago author Josh Schonwald and Austrian food researcher Hanni Rutzler
gave the meat's taste a mixed review after becoming the first to try it.
After taking a bite, Ms Rutzler said there was "intense taste" but that she
had expected a softer texture.
"It's close to meat, it's not that juicy, but the consistence is perfect,"
she said.
"The absence is the fat, it's a leanness to it, but the bite feels like a
conventional hamburger," Schonwald said.
"This is kind of an unnatural experience in that I can't tell you over the
past 20 years how many times I have had a burger without ketchup or onions or
jalapenos or bacon."
Prof Post believes the new burger could herald a food revolution, with
artificial meat products appearing in supermarkets in as little as 10
years.
The raw ingredients which went into creating the burger sound distinctly
unappetising - 0.02in (0.5mm) thick strips of pinkish yellow lab-grown
tissue.
A multi-step process is used to turn a dish of stem cells into a burger
that can be grilled or fried:
First the stem cells are cultivated in a nutrient broth, allowing them to
proliferate 30-fold.
Next they are combined with an elastic collagen and attached to Velcro
"anchor points" in a culture dish. Between the anchor points, the cells
self-organise into chunks of muscle.
Electrical stimulation is then used to make the muscle strips contract and
"bulk up" - the laboratory equivalent of working out in a gym.
Finally the thousands of beef strips are minced up, together with 200
pieces of lab-grown animal fat, and moulded into a patty. Around 20,000 meat
strands are needed to make one 5oz (142g) burger.
Other non-meat ingredients include salt, egg powder, and breadcrumbs. Red
beetroot juice and saffron are added to provide authentic beef colouring.
A major advantage of test-tube meat is that it can be customised for
health, for instance by boosting levels of polyunsaturated fats, Prof Post has
said.
Manufacturing steaks instead of minced meat presents a much greater
technical challenge, requiring some kind of blood vessel system to carry
nutrients and oxygen to the centre of the tissue. Making artificial chicken or
fish from stem cells might be easier.
stem cells offer hope, but at the same time, stem cells offer potential
risk factors with the TSE prion disease, _especially_ with the atypical TSE
strains that as in the L-type BASE BSE, extremely more virulent. just my
opinion...
risk factors from the TSE prion on the stem cell burger
bovine fetal cells
prion risk bovine fetal cells
WHO Tables on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in Transmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathies 2010
snip...
Blood has not been shown to transmit disease from humans with any form of
‘classical’ TSE [Dorsey et al., 2009], or from cattle with BSE (including fetal
calf blood).
***A number of laboratories using new, highly sensitive methods to detect
PrPTSE are reporting success in a variety of animal and human TSEs. However,
several have experienced difficulty obtaining reproducible results in plasma,
and it is not yet clear that positive results imply a potential for disease
transmissibility, either because of false positives, or of ‘true’ positives that
are due to sub-transmissible concentrations of PrPTSE. Because of these
considerations (and the fact that no data are yet available on blinded testing
of specimens from naturally infected humans or animals) the expert group felt
that it was still too early to evaluate the validity of these tests with
sufficient confidence to permit either a negative or positive conclusion.
Human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies: A Critical scientific
Investment Final Report of the National Prion Research Program
Cultures for Bioassay of Prion Infectivity and for the Study of
Prion Replication and Disease Susceptibility
Few cell lines can be infected with prions, precluding in vitro analysis of
the mechanisms underlying genetic differences in susceptibility to infection.
Similarly, some of these cell lines, mouse N2a cells for example, are resistant
to prion strains that can readily transmit disease to mice. With one exception,
sensitive bioassay of prions requires inoculation of mice with incubation times
ranging from months to over a year. Neurosphere lines grow as aggregates and
contain CNS stem cell activity;
***we now report that these cultures can be infected with prions.
Using a defined, serum-free medium, cell lines were isolated from brains
dissected from fetuses at embryonic day 12 to 15. In addition to expressing the
stem cell-associated marker nestin, most cells from PrP transgenic or from
wild-type mice express the normal isoform of PrP (PrPC), which is essential for
prion replication. RML scrapie brain homogenate was added to neurosphere
cultures from FVB, FVB transgenic mice that overexpress mouse PrP (Tg4053), and
FVB mice with a targeted null mutation in the PrP gene (Prnp). Presence of the
proteinase Kresistant, misfolded PrPSc isoform was measured at each passage by
Western, dot, or cell blots. A dramatic rise in PrPSc with time was observed in
the Tg4053 cells while the level PrPSc decayed to undetectable levels in the
cultures of cells lacking PrP; levels of PrPSc in FVB cultures persisted and
then increased over several passages. Prions produced in culture were
transmissible to mice and produced typical scrapie pathology. Intracellular
aggregates of PrP were seen in infected cultures. To date, infection of Tg4053
neurospheres by prion isolate diluted 1 to 50,000 has been demonstrated.
Neurosphere lines from transgenic mice overexpressing PrP may provide a
sensitive in vitro bioassay not only for mouse prions but also for those from
other species, including humans.
PLEASE SEE PAGE 140 HERE ;
EMERGENCE OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, EBOLA VIRUS, MARBURG, SARS, ANTHRAX, WEST
NILE VIRUS, PRION DISEASE, MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT TUBERCULOSIS (MDR-TB), AND SCORES
OF OTHER ‘’NEW’’ DISEASES REMIND CLINICIANS AND PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS TO
REMAIN VIGILANT FOR OUTBREAKS OF NOVEL OR UNEXPLAINED DISEASE. THESE EMERGINING
INFECTIONS HAVE A POTENTIAL TO BECOME FUTURE BIOLOGICAL THREATS. NATURAL
EMERGING DISEASE OUTBREAKS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM INTENTIONAL
INTRODUCTION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES FOR NEFARIOUS PURPOSES; HENCE, CONSIDERATION
MUST BE GIVEN TO THIS POSSIBILITY BEFORE ANY QUESTION OF ETIOLOGY IS CONSIDERED
SETTLED. ...
INDEED, see my submission below of potential ‘’suitcase bombs’’ full of
prions ;
3002100040
Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS)
KG
24
0
0
0
Source: World Trade Atlas
Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
[TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] - TSS
1/27/03 (0)
Docket Management
Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food
Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]
Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002; Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 –0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: [log in to unmask] Docket No: 02-088-1
Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use,
and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
Greetings,
i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for
biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known
BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA.
please be warned;
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 –0800
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE
''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee
Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth
[Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]
snip...
Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine,
including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or
animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance
with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.
snip...
From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no
impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the
proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the
importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from
those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform
encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants
and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been
in Greece is prohibited.
snip...
========================
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the
country?
Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were
imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to
the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from
ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece
during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and
prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use
were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
Sources: World Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in
fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via
indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air
passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one
to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried
23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the
reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat
items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
Greetings list members,
i just cannot accept this;
23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)
The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
what kind of statement is this?
how stupid do they think we are?
it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Slovenia?
There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.
APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air
passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could
potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to
Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or
ranch in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the
Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers
originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.
As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238
air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural
interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a
total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of
the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch
while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from
Austria?
Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat,
animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified
species.
Source: World Trade Atlas
snip...
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Austria?
A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US
airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria
arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air
passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in
fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total
of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s)
that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated
reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.
Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ
Greetings FDA and public,
if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check
out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low
number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much
for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.
[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of
meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of
these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit
or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]
if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers
with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i
am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers
as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid
me.
[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was
imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS
is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]
more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of
these species are capable of carrying a TSE?
snip...
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from
Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived
in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of
meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of
these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit
or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base.
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Japan?
Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan
arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers
from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air
passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an
average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items
were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their
visit to the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from
Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in
Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring,
8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural
interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of
items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the
passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while
in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE,
FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;
more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';
To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Subject:
Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species
coding system strikes again
References:< [log in to unmask]> Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean
Greetings again List Members,
let me kick a madcow around here a bit.
on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding
system.
the USDA/APHIS states;
During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from Poland included
non-species specific animal products used in animal feeds and non-species
specific sausage and offal products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant
product imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant material.
NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially
_cross-contamination_, it states;
ANNEX 1
Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001
EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND
STABILITY
The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable
system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from
1987 onwards.
This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and
increased over time.
The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.
Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat
treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence
provided on compliance.
Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.
BSE surveillance:
Not sufficient before 2001.
Cross-contamination:
Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in
time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and
growing.
see full text and ANNEX 1 at;
so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US
imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke
indeed.
* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT
BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM
$$$
Subject: BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES
CODING SYSTEM $$$ Date: November 1, 2002 at 8:03 am PST
[Federal Register: November 1, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 212)]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
9 CFR Part 94
[Docket No. 02-072-2]
Change in Disease Status of Israel Because of BSE
AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.
ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting as a final rule, without change, an interim rule
that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where
bovine spongiform encephalopathy exists because the disease had been detected in
a native-born animal in that region. The effect of the interim rule was a
restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain
other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was
necessary to help prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
into the United States.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The interim rule became effective on June 4, 2002.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Gary Colgrove, Chief Staff
Veterinarian, Sanitary Trade Issues Team, National Center for Import and Export,
VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737- 1231; (301) 734-4356.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to below as the
regulations) govern the importation of certain animals, birds, poultry, meat,
other animal products and byproducts, hay, and straw into the United States in
order to prevent the introduction of various animal diseases, including bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). In an interim rule effective June 4, 2002, and
published in the Federal Register on July 18, 2002 (67 FR 47243-47244, Docket
No. 02- 072-1), we amended the regulations in Sec. 94.18 (a)(1) by adding Israel
to the list of regions where BSE exists due to the detection of BSE in a
native-born animal in that region. Comments on the interim rule were required to
be received on or before September 16, 2002. We did not receive any comments.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the interim rule, we are adopting the
interim rule as a final rule. This action also affirms the information contained
in the interim rule concerning Executive Orders 12866 and 12988 and the
Paperwork Reduction Act. Further, for this action, the Office of Management and
Budget has waived its review under Executive Order 12866.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
This action affirms an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding
Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists. The effect of the interim rule
was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and
certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule
was necessary to help prevent the introduction of BSE into the United States.
The following analysis addresses the economic effects of the interim rule on
small entities, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The interim
rule's restrictions on the importation of ruminants and ruminant products and
byproducts from Israel are not expected to have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities due to the fact that the restricted items
are either not imported from Israel or are imported in very small amounts. There
are three categories of imports that may be affected, but Israel's share of U.S.
imports is small in each case. The first category of affected imported
commodities is ``Meat and edible meat offal, salted in brine, dried or smoked;
edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal.'' Average total yearly imports of
these products by the United States over the 3-year period 1999-2001 were valued
at $24.6 million. Imports from Israel in 1999 were valued at $26,000. No imports
of these products from Israel were reported for 2000 or 2001. The second
category of affected commodities is ``Preparations of a kind used in animal
feeding.'' Average total yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were
valued at $93.5 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over
this period of about $76,000. The final category of affected commodities is
``Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood.'' Average yearly
imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $101.2 million. Imports
from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $2.7 million.
It is apparent that Israel is a minor supplier to the United States of the
ruminant products and byproducts affected by the BSE-related restrictions
resulting from the interim rule. Therefore, we do not expect that the interim
rule's restrictions on ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from
Israel will substantially affect any U.S. importers, large or small, of those
commodities. Under these circumstances, the Administrator of the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 94
Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Meat and meat products, Milk, Poultry
and poultry products, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
PART 94--RINDERPEST, FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE, FOWL PEST (FOWL PLAGUE),
EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE, AFRICAN SWINE FEVER, HOG CHOLERA, AND BOVINE
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS
Accordingly, we are adopting as a final rule, without change, the interim
rule that amended 9 CFR part 94 and that was published at 67 FR 47243-47244 on
July 18, 2002.
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7711-7714, 7751, 7754, 8303, 8306, 8308, 8310,
8311, and 8315; 21 U.S.C 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 4331 and 4332;
7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.
Done in Washington, DC, this 28th day of October, 2002. Bobby R. Acord,
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. [FR Doc. 02-27812
Filed 10-31-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3410-34-P
greetings List members,
MORE OF THE INFAMOUS USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM.
as long as the exporting country and the importing country know not what
they are exporting (play dumb/stupid), this non-species coding system allows
potential BSE/TSE materials to be imported and exported freely and legally...
TSS
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from
Israel ?
The U.S. imported no live ruminants or ruminant meat from Israel since
1999. In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported
and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is
considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE. Other imports from
Israel during the period 1998-2001 included non-species specific preparations
used in animal feeds and other non-food products of unspecified animals. For the
category "preparations used in animal feeding, NESOI" that was imported into the
U.S., it is possible that bovine meat or bovine byproducts could have been
included in this category. However, the US Food and Drug Administration
prohibits feeding of meat-and-bone meal to ruminants in the U.S.
HS Code
Description
Unit
1998
1999
2000
2001
Feed - non species specific
Total
45,030
48,000
50,649
43,000
2309909500
Preparations Used in Animal Feedings, NESOI
KG
45,030
48,000
50,649
43,000
Meat & offal- non species specific
Total
5
0
0
0
300110
Dried Organs
KG
5
0
0
0
Other animal products - ruminants
Total
24
0
0
0
3002100040
Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS)
KG
24
0
0
0
Source: World Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Israel?
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from
Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived
in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ?s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of
meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of
these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit
or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base.
TSS
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness;
Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC -254 Accepted -
Volume 11
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
The role of prion protein in stem cell regulation
A Miranda, P Ramos-Ibeas, E Pericuesta, M A Ramirez and A Gutierrez-Adan +
Author Affiliations
Departamento de Reproducción Animal, INIA, Avenida Puerta de Hierro no. 12,
Local 10, Madrid 28040, Spain Correspondence should be addressed to A
Gutierrez-Adan; Email: agutierr@inia.es
Published online before print June 5, 2013, doi: 10.1530/REP-13-0100
Reproduction September 1, 2013 146 R91-R99
One RCT reported on prion disease over a five-year follow-up period and
found none in the 16 participants given MSCs. No other studies monitored or
reported on prion disease.
Second, the use of fetal bovine serum for culturing MSCs has been
criticized for potentially introducing zoonotic contamination to the cell
product (e.g. prion disease), and also potentially increasing the immunogenicity
of the cells. [52], [53] Although the majority of included studies used fetal
bovine serum, only one study specifically monitored for potential adverse events
associated with its use.
Prion-like disorders: blurring the divide between transmissibility and
infectivity
Mimi Cushman1,*, Brian S. Johnson2,*, Oliver D. King3, Aaron D. Gitler2,‡
and James Shorter1,‡ 1Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics, University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine, 805b Stellar-Chance Laboratories, 422 Curie
Boulevard, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA and 2Department of Cell and Developmental
Biology, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, 1109 BRB II/III, 421
Curie Boulevard, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA 3Boston Biomedical Research
Institute, 64 Grove St., Watertown, MA 02472, USA *These authors contributed
equally to this work ‡Authors for correspondence (gitler@mail.med.upenn.edu;
jshorter@mail.med.upenn.edu) Journal of Cell Science 123, 1191-1201 © 2010.
Published by The Company
Implications for neuronal-graft and stem-cellbased therapies
Whether the amyloid templates involved in AD, PD and HD are prions or not,
their transmissibility within the brain of an individual has important
repercussions for potential therapies...
J Transl Med. 2011; 9: 29. Published online 2011 March 22. doi:
10.1186/1479-5876-9-29 PMCID: PMC3070641
Risk factors in the development of stem cell therapy Carla A
Herberts,corresponding author1 Marcel SG Kwa,2 and Harm PH Hermsen1
snip...
Adventitious agents Manufacturing of cell based medicinal products
inevitably does not include terminal sterilization, purification, viral removal
and inactivation. Therefore, viral and microbial safety is a pivotal risk factor
associated with the use of non-autologous and/or cultured cells, including stem
cells. These risk factors are not unique to stem cells and apply to all cell
based medicinal products. Donor history is of particular importance for stem
cell lines which were initially intended for research purposes, rather than to
be used in clinical application. The risk of donor-to-recipient transmission of
bacterial, viral, fungal or prion pathogens may lead to life-threatening and
even fatal reactions. Disease transmission has been reported after allograft
transplantation [94,95]. Only limited information is available on disease
transmission via adult somatic stem cells other than those routinely used HCS.
It has been shown that MSC are susceptible to both CMV and HSV-1 infection in
vitro. However, using sensitive PCR techniques no CMV DNA could be detected in
ex vivo expanded MSC derived from healthy CMV positive individuals [96]. No
information on the susceptibility for adventitious agents of pluripotent stem
cells has been reported in the scientific literature.
Although progress has been made in tissue culturing techniques, both serum
and feeder layers are occasionally still needed for the in vitro isolation and
propagation of (pluripotent and somatic) stem cells [91], The use of animal
products in tissue culture (e.g. foetal bovine serum (FBS), or non-human feeder
cells) also may introduce a risk of transmission of disease (e.g. prion) as well
as activation of host immune system by biomolecules [97] (e.g. non-human sialic
acid) [69]. Expansion of stem cells in medium supplemented with FBS has a
potential risk of transmitting viral and prion diseases and causing
immunological rejection. Autologous or donor-derived plasma may be a safer
substitute for FBS and may still allow proper cell proliferation and
differentiation. In fact, changing FBS to human platelet lysate has been
described to result in accelerated/enhanced proliferation, without genetic
abnormalities [69]. However, the use of autologous patient serum may be less
favourable because serum derived from aged individuals has been reported to
interfere with MSC proliferation and differentiation capacity [69]. When
possible, cell feeder free isolation and culturing or the use of a membrane
between feeder cell and stem cell culture will enhance the viral safety of the
stem cell based medicinal product. ...
Diagnostic approaches for viruses and prions in stem cell banks Fernando
CoboCorresponding author contact information
http://origin-cdn.els-cdn.com/sd/entities/REcor.gif"
>,
E-mail the corresponding author
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract Some stem cell lines may contain an endogenous virus or can be
contaminated with exogenous viruses (even of animal origin) and may secrete
viral particles or express viral antigens on their surface. Moreover, certain
biotechnological products (e.g. bovine fetal serum, murine feeder cells) may
contain prion particles. Viral and prion contamination of cell cultures and
“feeder” cells, which is a common risk in all biotechnological products derived
from the cell lines, is the most challenging and potentially serious outcome to
address, due to the difficulty involved in virus and prion detection and the
potential to cause serious disease in recipients of these cell products.
Stem cell banks should introduce adequate quality assurance programs like
the microbiological control program and can provide researchers with valuable
support in the standardization and safety of procedures and protocols used for
the viral and prion testing and in validation programs to assure the quality and
safety of the cells.
Keywords Stem cell banks; Endogenous viruses; Exogenous viruses; Prion
particle; Cell therapy; Diagnostic methods
Animal cell cultures : Risk assessment and biosafety recommendations
(Author: K.Pauwels) (Last revised: February 28, 2006 )
Prions Though a limited number of cultured cell lines (e.g. mouse
neuroblastoma cell lines Sc N2a) have been shown to promote, upon subpassaging,
stable and persistent replication of PrP(Sc) as well as infectivity (Solassal J,
et al., 2003), most cell lines are resistant to prion infection (Butler, et al.,
1888). However, in contrast to most of the infectious agents, prions are
particularly difficult to inactivate. In fact no method can guarantee total
inactivation of these agents. So, one should bear these considerations in mind
when using growth media of bovine origin.
Animal Cell Cultures: Risk Assessment and Biosafety Recommendations
Katia Pauwels1, Philippe Herman1, Bernadette Van Vaerenbergh1, Chuong Dai
Do thi1, Laura Berghmans1, Geneviève Waeterloos1, Dirk Van Bockstaele2, Karoline
Dorsch-Häsler3, and Myriam Sneyers1
1Scientific Institute of Public Health, Brussels, Belgium, 2Esoterix,
Clinical Trials Services, Mechelen, Belgium, and 3Swiss Expert Committee for
Biosafety, Bern, Switzerland
Adventitious Contamination of Cell Cultures Adventitious contamination of
cell cultures is a major drawback for any activity that involves cell culturing
(for a review see Langdon, 2004). In addition, one of the main biosafety
concerns when manipulating animal cell cultures is the fact that animal cell
cultures may provide a support for contaminating agents that cause harm to human
health. Causative agents of cell contamination include bacteria, fungi,
mycoplasms, parasites, viruses, prions and even other animal cells.
Finally, another class of agents that may contaminate cell cultures include
unconventional agents that cause transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
(TSE), the socalled prions (Solassol et al., 2003; Cronier et al., 2004; Vorberg
et al., 2004). Neuroblastoma cell lines and primary cultured neurons and
astrocytes have been shown to serve as hosts (Butler et al., 1988). Many studies
have suggested that the risk of propagation of TSE agents in tissue culture
cells, cultivated in the presence of bovine serum potentially contaminated with
TSE, was restricted to neurons or brain-derived cell cultures. However, most
recently, non-neuronal cells have been demonstrated to support TSE infection,
suggesting that any cell line expressing normal host prion protein could have
the potential to support propagation of TSE agents (Vilette et al., 2001;
Vorberg et al., 2004). Contrary to most of the infectious agents, TSE agents are
resistant to most of the physical and chemical methods commonly used for
decontamination of infectious agents and may form a matter of concern in case
bovine-derived products are used as tissue culture supplements.
Stem cell cosmetics
Microbial contaminants such as bacteria or fungi, etc can achieve high
densities altering the growth and characteristics of the cultures. But viral or
prion contamination will not be any altering of the cultures. Due to their
extremely small size, viruses or prions are the most difficult cell culture
contaminants to detect in culture, requiring methods that are impractical for
most research laboratories. Their small size also makes them very difficult to
remove from media, sera, and other solutions of biological origin. If the use of
contaminated stem cells or their extracts in cosmetics, it will be very harmful.
Tuesday, March 5, 2013
*** Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics;
Reopening of the Comment Period FDA-2004-N-0188-0051 (TSS SUBMISSION)
FDA believes current regulation protects the public from BSE but reopens
comment period due to new studies
PLEASE do not forget the infamous 'Louping-ill vaccine' incident;
Subject: Louping-ill vaccine documents from November 23rd, 1946
Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2000 17:44:57 –0700
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
THE VETERINARY RECORD
516 No 47. Vol. 58
November 23rd, 1946
NATIONAL VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
ANNUAL CONGRESS, 1946
The annual Congress, 1946, was held at the Royal Veterinary College, Royal
College Street, London, N.W.I. from September 22nd to September 27th.
Opening Meeting
[skip to scrapie vaccine issue...tss]
Papers Presented to Congress
The papers presented to this year's Congress had as their general theme the
progressive work of the profession during the war years. Their appeal was
clearly demonstrated by the large and remarkably uniform attendance in the Grand
Hall of the Royal Veterinary College throughout the series; between 200 and 250
members were present and they showed a keen interest in every paper, which was
reflected in the expression of some disappointment that the time available for
discussion did not permit of the participation of more than a small proportion
of would-be contributors.
In this issue we publish (below) the first to be read and discussed, that
by Dr. W. S. Gordon, M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E., "Advances in Veterinary Research."
Next week's issue will contain the paper on "Some Recent Advances in Veterinary
Medicine and Surgery in Large-Animal Practice" by Mr. T. Norman Gold, M.R.C.V.S.
In succeeding numbers of the Record will be reproduced, also with reports of
discussions, that by Mr. W. L. Weipers, M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., on the same
subject as relating to small-animal practice, and the papers by Mr. J. N.
Ritchie, B.SC., M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., and Mr. H.W. Steele-Bodger, M.R.C.V.S., on
"War-time Achievements of the British Home Veterinary Services."
The first scientific paper of Congress was read by Dr. W. S. Gordon,
M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E. on Monday, September 23rd, 1946, when Professor J. Basil
Buxton, M.A., F.R.C.V.S, D.V.H., Prinicipal of the Royal Veterinary College,
presided.
Advances in Veterinary Research
by
W.S. GORDON, PH.D., M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E.
Agriculteral Research Council, Field Station, Compton, Berks.
Louping-ill, Tick-borne Fever and Scrapie
In 1930 Pool, Browniee & Wilson recorded that louping-ill was a
transmissible disease. Greig et al, (1931) showed that the infective agent was a
filter-passing virus with neurotropic characters and Browniee & Wilson
(1932) that the essential pathology was that of an encephalomyelitis. Gordon,
Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod (1932) and MacLeod & Gordon (1932) confirmed
and extended this work. It was shown that on louping-ill farms the virus was
present in the blood of many sheep which did not show clinical symptoms
indicating involvement of the central nervous system and that for the
perpetuation and spread of the disease these subclinical cases were probably of
greater importance that the frank clinical cases because, in Nature, the disease
was spread by the tick, lxodes ricinus L. More recently Wilson (1945, 1946) has
described the cultivation of the virus in a chick embryo medium, the pathogenic
properties of this culture virus and the preparation of louping-ill antiserum.
Between 1931 and 1934 I carried out experiments which resulted in the
development of an effective vaccine for the prevention of louping-ill.* This
vaccine has been in general use since 1935 and in his annual report to the
Animal Diseases Research Association this year, Dr. Greig stated that about
227,000 doses of vaccine had been issued from Moredun alone.
Dr. Gordon illustrated this portion of his paper by means of graphs and
diagrams projected by the epidiascope.
This investigation, however, did not begin and end with the study of
louping-ill; it had, by good fortune, a more romantic turn and less fortunately
a final dramtic twist which led almost to catastrope. After it had been
established that a solid immunity to louping-ill could be induced in sheep, a
group of immunized and a group of susceptible animals were placed together on
the tick-infected pasture of a louping-ill farm. Each day all the animals were
gathered and their temperatures were recorded. It was anticipated that febrile
reactions with some fatalities would develop in the controls while the
louping-ill immunes would remain normal. Contrary to expectation, however, every
sheep, both immune and control, developed a febrile reaction. This unexpected
result made neccessary further investigation which showed that the febrile
reaction in the louping-ill immunes was due to a hitherto undescribed infective
agent, a Rickettsia-like organism which could be observed in the cytoplasm of
the grannular leucocytes, especially the neutrophil polymorphs (MacLeod (1932),
Gordon, Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod. MacLeod & Gordon (1933). MacLeod
(1936). MacLeod collected ticks over many widely separated parts of Scotland and
all were found to harbour the infective agent of tick-borne fever, and it is
probable that all sheep on tick-infested farms develop this disease, at least on
the first occasion that they become infested with ticks. When the infection is
passed in series through susceptible adult sheep it causes a sever, febrile
reaction, dullness and loss of bodily condition but it rarely, if ever, proves
fatal. It is clear, however, that it aggravates the harmful effects of a
louping-ill infection and it is a serious additional complication to such
infections as pyaemia and the anacrobic infections which beset lambs on the hill
farms of Northern Britain.
Studying the epidemiology of louping-ill on hill farms it became obvious
that the pyaemic condition of lambs described by M'Fadyean (1894) was very
prevalent on tick infested farms Pyaemia is a crippling condition of lambs
associated with tick-bite and is often confused with louping-ill. It is caused
by infection with Staphylococcus aureus and affected animals may show abscess
formation on the skin, in the joints, viscera, meninges and elsewhere in the
body. It was thought that tick-borne fever might have ben a predisposing factor
in this disease and unsuccessful attempts were made by Taylor, Holman &
Gordon (1941) to reproduce the condition by infecting lambs subcutaneously with
the staphylococcus and concurrently produceing infections with tickborne fever
and louping-ill in the same lambs. Work on pyaemia was then continued by
McDiarmid (1946a, 1946b, 1946c), who succeeded in reproducing a pyaemic disease
in mice, guinea-pigs and lambs similar to the naturally occuring condition by
intravenous inoculation of Staphylococcus aureus. He also found a bacteraemic
form of the disease in which no gross pyaemic lesions were observed. The
prevention or treatment of this condition presents a formidable problem. It is
unlikely that staphylococcal ???oid will provide an effective immunity and even
if penicillin proved to be a successful treatment, the difficulty of applying it
in adequate and sustained dosage to young lambs on hill farms would be almost
insurmountable.
>From 1931 to 1934 field trials to test the immunizing value and
harmlessness of the loup-ill vaccine were carried out on a gradually increasing
scale. Many thousands of sheep were vaccinated and similar numbers, living under
identical conditions were left as controls. The end result showed that an
average mortability of about 9 percent in the controls was reduced to less than
1 percent in the vaccinated animals. While the efficiency of the vaccine was
obvious after the second year of work, previous bitter experience had shown the
wisdom of withholding a biological product from widespread use until it had been
successfully produced in bulk, as opposed to small-scale experimental production
and until it had been thoroughly tested for immunizing efficiency and freedom
from harmful effects. It was thought that after four years testing this stage
had been reached in 1935, and in the spring of that year the vaccine was issued
for general use. It comprised a 10 percent saline suspension of brain, spinal
cord and spleen tissues taken from sheep five days after infection with
louping-ill virus by intracerebral inoculation. To this suspension 0-35 percent
of formalin was added to inactivate the virus and its safety for use as a
vaccine was checked by intracerbral inoculation of mice and sheep and by the
inoculation of culture medium. Its protective power was proved by vaccination
sheep and later subjecting them, along with controls, to a test dose of living
virus.
Vaccine for issue had to be free from detectable, living virus and capable
of protecting sheep against a test dose of virus applied subcutaneously. The
1935 vaccine conformed to these standards and was issued for inoculation in
March as three separate batches labelled 1, 2, and 3. The tissues of 140 sheep
were employed to make batch 1 of which 22,270 doses were used; 114 to make batch
2 of which 18,000 doses were used and 44 to make batch 3 of which 4,360 doses
were used. All the sheep tissues incorporated in the vaccine were obtained from
yearling sheep. During 1935 and 1936 the vaccine proved highly efficient in the
prevention of loup-ill and no user observed an ill-effect in the inoculated
animals. In September, 1937, two and a half years after vaccinating the sheep,
two owners complained that scrapie, a disease which had not before been observed
in the Blackface breed, was appearing in their stock of Blackface sheep and
further that it was confined to animals vaccinated with louping-ill vaccine in
1935. At that stage it was difficult to conceive that the occurrence could be
associated with the injection of the vaccine but in view of the implications, I
visited most of the farms on which sheep had been vaccinated in 1935. It was at
this point that the investigation reached its dramatic phase; I shall not forget
the profound effect on my emotions when I visited these farms and was warmly
welcomed because of the great benefits resulting from the application of
louping-ill vaccine, wheras the chief purpose of my visit was to determine if
scrapie was appearing in the inoculated sheep. The enquiry made the position
clear. Scrapie was developing in the sheep vaccinated in 1935 and it was only in
a few instances that the owner was associating the occurrence with louping-ill
vaccination. The disease was affecting all breeds and it was confined to the
animals vaccinated with batch 2. This was clearly demonstrated on a number of
farms on which batch 1 had been used to inoculate the hoggs in 1935 and batch 2
to inoculate the ewes. None of the hoggs, which at this time were three-
year-old ewes. At this time it was difficult to forecast whether all of the
18,000 sheep which had received batch 2 vaccine would develop scrapie. It was
fortunate, however, that the majority of the sheep vaccinated with batch 2 were
ewes and therfore all that were four years old and upwards at the time of
vaccination had already been disposed of and there only remained the ewes which
had been two to three years old at the time of vaccination, consequently no
accurate assessment of the incidence of scrapie could be made. On a few farms,
however, where vaccination was confined to hoggs, the incidence ranged from 1
percent, to 35 percent, with an average of about 5 percent. Since batch 2
vaccine had been incriminated as a probable source of scrapie infection, an
attempt was made to trace the origin of the 112 sheep whose tissues had been
included in the vaccine. It was found that they had been supplied by three
owners and that all were of the Blackface or Greyface breed with the exception
of eight which were Cheviot lambs born in 1935 from ewes which had been in
contact with scrapie infection. Some of these contact ewes developed scrapie in
1936-37 and three surviving fellow lambs to the eight included in the batch 2
vaccine of 1935 developed scrapie, one in September, 1936, one in February,
1937, and one in November, 1937. There was, therefore, strong presumptive
evidence that the eight Cheviot lambs included in the vaccine althought
apparently healthy were, in fact, in the incubative stage of a scrapie infection
and that in their tissues there was an infective agent which had contaminated
the batch 2 vaccine, rendering it liable to set up scrapie. If that assumption
was correct then the evidence indicated that:-
(1) the infective agent of scrapie was present in the brain, spinal cord
and or spleen of infected sheep: (2) it could withstand a concentration of
formalin of 0-35 percent, which inactivated the virus of louping-ill: (3) it
could be transmitted by subcutaneous inoculation; (4) it had an incubative
period of two years and longer.
Two Frenchmen, Cuille & Chelle (1939) as the result of experiments
commenced in 1932, reported the successful infection of sheep by inoculation of
emulsions of spinal cord or brain material by the intracerebral, epidural,
intraocular and subcutaneous routes The incubation period varied according to
the route employed, being one year intracerebrally, 15 months intraocularly and
20 months subcutaneously. They failed to infect rabbits but succeeded in
infecting goats. Another important part of their work showed that the infective
agent could pass throught a chamberland 1.3 filter, thus demonstrating that the
infective agent was a filtrable virus. It was a curious coincidence that while
they were doing their transmission experiments their work was being confirmed by
the unforeseeable infectivity of a formalinized tissue vaccine.
As a result of this experience a large-scale transmision experiment
involving the ue of 788 sheep was commenced in 1938 on a farm specially taken
for the purpose by the Animal Diseases Research Association with funds provided
by the Agricultural Research Council. The experiment was designed to determine
the nature of the infective agent and the pathogenesis of the disease. It is
only possible here to give a summary of the result which showed that (1) saline
suspensions of brain and spinal cord tissue of sheep affected with scrapie were
infective to normal sheep when inoculatted intracerebrally or subcutaneously;
(2) the incubation period after intracerebral inoculation was seven months and
upwards and only 60 percent of the inoculated sheep developed scrapie during a
period of four and a half years; (3) the incubation period after subcutaneous
inoculation was 15 months and upwards and only about 30 percent of the
inoculated sheep developed the disease during the four and a half years: (4) the
infective agent was of small size and probably a filtrable virus.
The prolonged incubative period of the disease and the remarkable
resistance of the causal agent to formalin are features of distinct interest. It
still remains to determine if a biological test can be devised to detect
infected animals so that they can be killed for food before they develop
clinical symptoms and to explore the possibilities of producing an immunity to
the disease.
==================================================================
Greetings List Members,
pretty disturbing document. now, what would stop this from happening with
the vaccineCJD in children???
kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
===========================================================================
Sunday, May 18, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE BSE CJD CHILDREN VACCINES
==============================================================================
Saturday, February 11, 2012
PrPSc Detection and Infectivity in Semen from Scrapie-Infected Sheep
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
kind regards,
terry
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