Friday, August 14, 2015

Carcass Management During a Mass Animal Health Emergency Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement—August 2015

Carcass Management During a Mass Animal Health Emergency Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement—August 2015

 

Agency Contact:

 

Lori P. Miller Senior Staff Officer National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture 4700 River Road, Unit 41 Riverdale, MD 20737–1238

 

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APHIS classifies

 

Tier 1 diseases of national concern as those posing the most significant threat to animal agriculture in the United States, including African swine fever (ASF), avian influenza (AI), classical swine fever (CSF), FMD, and virulent Newcastle disease.

 

Tier 2 diseases are transmitted primarily by pests, and include heartwater, New World screwworm, Rift Valley fever, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis.

 

Tier 3 diseases pose less risk and fewer consequences than those in Tiers 1 and 2.

 

Tier 3 diseases include African horse sickness (AHS), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, contagious caprine pleuropneumonia, glanders, melioidiosis, henipaviruses (Hendra and Nipah viruses), rinderpest, peste des petits ruminants, and tropical bont tick. APHIS excludes from its tiered lists endemic diseases already managed in this country (e.g., brucellosis, 2. Livestock Disease Issues bovine tuberculosis, and hog cholera, hydatid cysts in liver, poultry with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI), scrapie, and trichinae).

 

(what about atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, typical and atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE, and Chronic Wasting Disease CWD $$$...TSS)

 

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Internationally, a well-devised carcass management plan is viewed as a key component of a country's ability to recover from an animal disease outbreak. As a member of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the U.S. status for communicable diseases (diseases transferred from one animal to another e.g., bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP), rinderpest, and FMD) are tracked and reported (OIE, 2015a). Effective carcass management within the United States during a FAD outbreak is essential to ensure normal international trade relations.

 

B. Mass Animal Health Emergency Scenarios

 

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34 III. Affected Environment

 

Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) diseases, thought to be caused by the presence of a misfolded protein (prion) in the animal’s nervous tissue, cause slow degeneration of the nervous system, ultimately ending in death. TSE in sheep and goats is referred to as scrapie, mad cow disease or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle, chronic wasting disease (CWD) in deer and elk, and variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans. These diseases can lead to many animal deaths during an outbreak (Saunders et al., 2009a). For these TSE diseases, the safe management of the prions remains of particular concern because of their ability to remain infective in the soil and through the feed chain (Russo et al., 2009; Saunders et al., 2009b).

 

Prions will be used throughout this document as an example of a pathogen that is difficult to inactivate. Prions are highly resistant to inactivation processes that are normally effective against bacterial and viral disease agents, such as chemical and thermal means, and ionizing, ultraviolet, and microwave irradiation processes. Incineration, if done properly, is effective at deactivating prions. Although a slow process, prion adsorption onto soil particles is strongly irreversible, and the prions can remain infectious through oral consumption (Saunders et al., 2009a; Saunders et al., 2009b). Prions can survive conventional wastewater treatment systems (Hinckley et al., 2008). Consequently, carcasses infected with prions cannot be buried, rendered, or placed near healthy livestock or livestock feed or water supplies.

 

BSE became a public health issue when it was connected to vCJD in humans (APHIS, 2013c). In cattle, BSE is a fatal disease of the brain that causes a spongy degeneration in the brain and spinal cord. BSE has a long incubation period, from 2 to 8 years. Once an animal develops symptoms, the animal’s condition deteriorates, and death usually occurs within the next 6 months.

 

III. Affected Environment 35

 

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Potential risks to the public health from decomposing animal carcasses in landfills can influence an operator’s decision regarding whether to accept carcass material, even if the landfill is permitted to receive carcasses.

 

Some landfill owners refused to accept carcasses for burial during the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom (Nutsch and Spire, 2004), and in Wisconsin for the disposal of deer and elk carcasses stemming from an outbreak of CWD.

 

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d. Spread of Disease

 

Scavengers feeding on disease-infected animal carcasses may spread diseases to other wildlife species, such as from feeding on deer carcasses infected with CWD (Jennelle et al., 2009). While the management of wild deer carcasses is not within the scope of this EIS, the management of captive deer raised as livestock could fall within the scope. Scavengers could spread CWD to animals within the family Cervidae, which are susceptible to CWD. Federally listed cervids that would be susceptible include Key deer (Odocoileus virginianus clavium), Columbian white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus leucurus), and woodland caribou (Rangifer tarandus caribou).

 

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Scrapie

 

“When required, cleaning and disinfection shall be conducted under the supervision of a State or APHIS representative…To clean dry surfaces, apply a 2-percent chlorine bleach solution at room temperature….for 1 hour, or apply a 1-molar solution of sodium hydroxide…at room temperature for at least 1 hour…” 9 CFR § 54.7

 

Chronic Wasting Disease

 

“…all premises…and all other materials on any premises or conveyances used to house or transport such cervids must be cleaned and disinfected under the supervision of an APHIS employee or a State representative, using methods specified by the APHIS employee or a State representative.” 9 CFR § 55.4

 

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Environmental Impact Statement; Animal Carcass ManagementDocket Folder Summary View all documents and comments in this Docket Docket ID: APHIS-2013-0044Agency: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)Parent Agency: Department of Agriculture (USDA)Summary:

 

We are announcing to the public that the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is making available a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) to examine the potential environmental effects of animal carcass management options used throughout the United States for review and comment. more... RIN: Impacts and Effects: CFR Citation: Priority: – View Fewer Docket Details UA and Regulatory Plan Informationopen glossary dialog Legal Deadline

 

Timetable

 

Docket Detailsopen glossary dialog Related RINs: None Related Dockets: None Category: Domestic Animal Health ProgramsKeyword(s): USDA, agriculture Type: Nonrulemaking Program: Veterinary Services Primary DocumentsView All (4) No documents available. Animal Carcass Management: Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Comment Now! Due Oct 20, 2015 11:59 PM ET Other Posted: 08/14/2015ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0017

 

 Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass Management Comment Now! Comment Period Closed Jan 30, 2014 11:59 PM ET Notice Posted: 12/31/2013ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0009

 

 Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass Management Comment Now! Comment Period Closed Dec 26, 2013 11:59 PM ET Notice Posted: 10/25/2013ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0001

 

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Supporting DocumentsView All (0) No documents available.

 

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CommentsView All (13) No comments posted. See attached file(s)” View Comment Submitter Name: Paulo, Terry AnnPosted: 02/03/2014ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0016

 

 See attached file(s)” View Comment Submitter Name: Meisinger, JessicaPosted: 02/03/2014ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0015

 

 Please see attached comment letter and supporting documents.” View Comment Submitter Name: Haldeman, DavidPosted: 01/29/2014ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0014

 

 Hello, The Council for Agricultural Science and Technology has three excellent peer-reviewed research papers about this topic. The information will help...” View Comment Submitter Name: Gogerty, DanPosted: 01/14/2014ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0013

 

 It would also be beneficial to include information or procedures for the humane euthanasia and disposal of large number of animals, in the event of a natural...” View Comment Submitter Name: Howard, AmyPosted: 01/08/2014ID: APHIS-2013-0044-0010

 


 

Your comment was submitted successfully!. View all documents and comments in this Docket Success! You will now be commenting directly on:

 

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass Management

 

For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon

 

.. 3.Your Receipt.3 Your Receipt 2 Your Preview 1 Your Information ...publicly viewable Information entered will be viewable on Regulations.gov Agency Posting Guidelines: More infoView Commenter's Checklist (PDF) Alternate Ways to Comment. .Comment(Required) publicly viewable Greetings APHIS et al, and thank you kindly for allowing me to comment on Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass Management [Docket No. APHIS-2013-0044].

 

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see my full text submission with source references in attachment...TSS

 

Uploaded File(s)(Optional) No files uploaded [Docket No. APHIS-2013-0044] COMMENT SUBMISSION TERRY S. SINGELTARY SR..pdf: success

 

end...November 2013...TSS

 

 Singeltary Submission Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass Management [Docket No. APHIS-2013-0044]

 

Sunday, November 3, 2013

 

Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass Management [Docket No. APHIS-2013-0044]

 


 

Monday, May 05, 2014

 

*** Member Country details for listing OIE CWD 2013 against the criteria of Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing ***

 


 

PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FT. COLLINS CWD RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS

 

*** LATE-BREAKING ABSTRACTS PRION 2015 CONFERENCE ***

 

O18

 

Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions

 

Liuting Qing1, Ignazio Cali1,2, Jue Yuan1, Shenghai Huang3, Diane Kofskey1, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Wenquan Zou1, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 2Second University of Naples, Naples, Italy, 3Encore Health Resources, Houston, Texas, USA

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a widespread and expanding prion disease in free-ranging and captive cervid species in North America. The zoonotic potential of CWD prions is a serious public health concern. Current literature generated with in vitro methods and in vivo animal models (transgenic mice, macaques and squirrel monkeys) reports conflicting results. The susceptibility of human CNS and peripheral organs to CWD prions remains largely unresolved. In our earlier bioassay experiments using several humanized transgenic mouse lines, we detected protease-resistant PrPSc in the spleen of two out of 140 mice that were intracerebrally inoculated with natural CWD isolates, but PrPSc was not detected in the brain of the same mice. Secondary passages with such PrPSc-positive CWD-inoculated humanized mouse spleen tissues led to efficient prion transmission with clear clinical and pathological signs in both humanized and cervidized transgenic mice. Furthermore, a recent bioassay with natural CWD isolates in a new humanized transgenic mouse line led to clinical prion infection in 2 out of 20 mice. These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.

 

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***These results indicate that the CWD prion has the potential to infect human CNS and peripheral lymphoid tissues and that there might be asymptomatic human carriers of CWD infection.***

 

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P.105: RT-QuIC models trans-species prion transmission

 

Kristen Davenport, Davin Henderson, Candace Mathiason, and Edward Hoover Prion Research Center; Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA

 

The propensity for trans-species prion transmission is related to the structural characteristics of the enciphering and heterologous PrP, but the exact mechanism remains mostly mysterious. Studies of the effects of primary or tertiary prion protein structures on trans-species prion transmission have relied primarily upon animal bioassays, making the influence of prion protein structure vs. host co-factors (e.g. cellular constituents, trafficking, and innate immune interactions) difficult to dissect. As an alternative strategy, we used real-time quakinginduced conversion (RT-QuIC) to investigate trans-species prion conversion.

 

To assess trans-species conversion in the RT-QuIC system, we compared chronic wasting disease (CWD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) prions, as well as feline CWD (fCWD) and feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE). Each prion was seeded into each host recombinant PrP (full-length rPrP of white-tailed deer, bovine or feline). We demonstrated that fCWD is a more efficient seed for feline rPrP than for white-tailed deer rPrP, which suggests adaptation to the new host.

 

Conversely, FSE maintained sufficient BSE characteristics to more efficiently convert bovine rPrP than feline rPrP. Additionally, human rPrP was competent for conversion by CWD and fCWD. ***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously estimated.

 

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***This insinuates that, at the level of protein:protein interactions, the barrier preventing transmission of CWD to humans is less robust than previously estimated.***

 

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O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations

 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France

 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. *** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, ***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), ***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), ***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.

 

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***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...TSS

 

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Thursday, August 12, 2010

 

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

 

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

 

Second threat

 

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Monday, October 10, 2011

 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

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*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

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***In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type.

 

***Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

 


 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 9:29 PM

 

To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Subject: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE R. G. WILL 1984

 

THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE

 

R. G. WILL

 

1984

 

*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). (SEE LINK IN REPORT HERE...TSS) PLUS, THE CDC DID NOT PUT THIS WARNING OUT FOR THE WELL BEING OF THE DEER AND ELK ;

 

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Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

 

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

 

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The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

 


 

In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

 

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...

 


 

human cwd will NOT look like nvCJD. in fact, see ;

 

*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***

 


 

Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period

 

Emmanuel E. Comoy1 , Jacqueline Mikol1 , Sophie Luccantoni-Freire1 , Evelyne Correia1 , Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray1 , Valérie Durand1 , Capucine Dehen1 , Olivier Andreoletti2 , Cristina Casalone3 , Juergen A. Richt4 n1 , Justin J. Greenlee4 , Thierry Baron5 , Sylvie L. Benestad6 , Paul Brown1 […] & Jean-Philippe Deslys1 - Show fewer authors Scientific Reports 5, Article number: 11573 (2015) doi:10.1038/srep11573 Download Citation

 

Epidemiology | Neurological manifestations | Prion diseases Received: 16 February 2015 Accepted: 28 May 2015 Published online: 30 June 2015 ABSTRACT Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is the only animal prion disease reputed to be zoonotic, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans and having guided protective measures for animal and human health against animal prion diseases. Recently, partial transmissions to humanized mice showed that the zoonotic potential of scrapie might be similar to c-BSE. We here report the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to cynomolgus macaque, a highly relevant model for human prion diseases, after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to those reported for human cases of sporadic CJD. Scrapie is thus actually transmissible to primates with incubation periods compatible with their life expectancy, although fourfold longer than BSE. Long-term experimental transmission studies are necessary to better assess the zoonotic potential of other prion diseases with high prevalence, notably Chronic Wasting Disease of deer and elk and atypical/Nor98 scrapie.

 

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Discussion

 

We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.

 

The second possibility is a laboratory cross-contamination. Three facts make this possibility equally unlikely. First, handling of specimens in our laboratory is performed with fastidious attention to the avoidance of any such cross-contamination. Second, no laboratory cross-contamination has ever been documented in other primate laboratories, including the NIH, even between infected and uninfected animals housed in the same or adjacent cages with daily intimate contact (P. Brown, personal communication). Third, the cerebral lesion profile is different from all the other prion diseases we have studied in this model19, with a correlation between cerebellar lesions (massive spongiform change of Purkinje cells, intense PrPres staining and reactive gliosis26) and ataxia. The iron deposits present in the globus pallidus are a non specific finding that have been reported previously in neurodegenerative diseases and aging27. Conversely, the thalamic lesion was reminiscent of a metabolic disease due to thiamine deficiency28 but blood thiamine levels were within normal limits (data not shown). The preferential distribution of spongiform change in cortex associated with a limited distribution in the brainstem is reminiscent of the lesion profile in MM2c and VV1 sCJD patients29, but interspecies comparison of lesion profiles should be interpreted with caution. It is of note that the same classical scrapie isolate induced TSE in C57Bl/6 mice with similar incubation periods and lesional profiles as a sample derived from a MM1 sCJD patient30.

 

We are therefore confident that the illness in this cynomolgus macaque represents a true transmission of a sheep c-scrapie isolate directly to an old-world monkey, which taxonomically resides in the primate subdivision (parvorder of catarrhini) that includes humans. With an homology of its PrP protein with humans of 96.4%31, cynomolgus macaque constitutes a highly relevant model for assessing zoonotic risk of prion diseases. Since our initial aim was to show the absence of transmission of scrapie to macaques in the worst-case scenario, we obtained materials from a flock of naturally-infected sheep, affecting animals with different genotypes32. This c-scrapie isolate exhibited complete transmission in ARQ/ARQ sheep (332 ± 56 days) and Tg338 transgenic mice expressing ovine VRQ/VRQ prion protein (220 ± 5 days) (O. Andreoletti, personal communication). From the standpoint of zoonotic risk, it is important to note that sheep with c-scrapie (including the isolate used in our study) have demonstrable infectivity throughout their lymphoreticular system early in the incubation period of the disease (3 months-old for all the lymphoid organs, and as early as 2 months-old in gut-associated lymph nodes)33. In addition, scrapie infectivity has been identified in blood34, milk35 and skeletal muscle36 from asymptomatic but scrapie infected small ruminants which implies a potential dietary exposure for consumers.

 

Two earlier studies have reported the occurrence of clinical TSE in cynomolgus macaques after exposures to scrapie isolates. In the first study, the “Compton” scrapie isolate (derived from an English sheep) and serially propagated for 9 passages in goats did not transmit TSE in cynomolgus macaque, rhesus macaque or chimpanzee within 7 years following intracerebral challenge1; conversely, after 8 supplementary passages in conventional mice, this “Compton” isolate induced TSE in a cynomolgus macaque 5 years after intracerebral challenge, but rhesus macaques and chimpanzee remained asymptomatic 8.5 years post-exposure8. However, multiple successive passages that are classically used to select laboratory-adapted prion strains can significantly modify the initial properties of a scrapie isolate, thus questioning the relevance of zoonotic potential for the initial sheep-derived isolate. The same isolate had also induced disease into squirrel monkeys (new-world monkey)9. A second historical observation reported that a cynomolgus macaque developed TSE 6 years post-inoculation with brain homogenate from a scrapie-infected Suffolk ewe (derived from USA), whereas a rhesus macaque and a chimpanzee exposed to the same inoculum remained healthy 9 years post-exposure1. This inoculum also induced TSE in squirrel monkeys after 4 passages in mice. Other scrapie transmission attempts in macaque failed but had more shorter periods of observation in comparison to the current study. Further, it is possible that there are differences in the zoonotic potential of different scrapie strains.

 

The most striking observation in our study is the extended incubation period of scrapie in the macaque model, which has several implications. Firstly, our observations constitute experimental evidence in favor of the zoonotic potential of c-scrapie, at least for this isolate that has been extensively studied32,33,34,35,36. The cross-species zoonotic ability of this isolate should be confirmed by performing duplicate intracerebral exposures and assessing the transmissibility by the oral route (a successful transmission of prion strains through the intracerebral route may not necessarily indicate the potential for oral transmission37). However, such confirmatory experiments may require more than one decade, which is hardly compatible with current general management and support of scientific projects; thus this study should be rather considered as a case report.

 

Secondly, transmission of c-BSE to primates occurred within 8 years post exposure for the lowest doses able to transmit the disease (the survival period after inoculation is inversely proportional to the initial amount of infectious inoculum). The occurrence of scrapie 10 years after exposure to a high dose (25 mg) of scrapie-infected sheep brain suggests that the macaque has a higher species barrier for sheep c-scrapie than c-BSE, although it is notable that previous studies based on in vitro conversion of PrP suggested that BSE and scrapie prions would have a similar conversion potential for human PrP38.

 

Thirdly, prion diseases typically have longer incubation periods after oral exposure than after intracerebral inoculations: since humans can develop Kuru 47 years after oral exposure39, an incubation time of several decades after oral exposure to scrapie would therefore be expected, leading the disease to occur in older adults, i.e. the peak age for cases considered to be sporadic disease, and making a distinction between scrapie-associated and truly sporadic disease extremely difficult to appreciate.

 

Fourthly, epidemiologic evidence is necessary to confirm the zoonotic potential of an animal disease suggested by experimental studies. A relatively short incubation period and a peculiar epidemiological situation (e.g., all the first vCJD cases occurring in the country with the most important ongoing c-BSE epizootic) led to a high degree of suspicion that c-BSE was the cause of vCJD. Sporadic CJD are considered spontaneous diseases with an almost stable and constant worldwide prevalence (0.5–2 cases per million inhabitants per year), and previous epidemiological studies were unable to draw a link between sCJD and classical scrapie6,7,40,41, even though external causes were hypothesized to explain the occurrence of some sCJD clusters42,43,44. However, extended incubation periods exceeding several decades would impair the predictive values of epidemiological surveillance for prion diseases, already weakened by a limited prevalence of prion diseases and the multiplicity of isolates gathered under the phenotypes of “scrapie” and “sporadic CJD”.

 

Fifthly, considering this 10 year-long incubation period, together with both laboratory and epidemiological evidence of decade or longer intervals between infection and clinical onset of disease, no premature conclusions should be drawn from negative transmission studies in cynomolgus macaques with less than a decade of observation, as in the aforementioned historical transmission studies of scrapie to primates1,8,9. Our observations and those of others45,46 to date are unable to provide definitive evidence regarding the zoonotic potential of CWD, atypical/Nor98 scrapie or H-type BSE. The extended incubation period of the scrapie-affected macaque in the current study also underscores the limitations of rodent models expressing human PrP for assessing the zoonotic potential of some prion diseases since their lifespan remains limited to approximately two years21,47,48. This point is illustrated by the fact that the recently reported transmission of scrapie to humanized mice was not associated with clinical signs for up to 750 days and occurred in an extreme minority of mice with only a marginal increase in attack rate upon second passage13. The low attack rate in these studies is certainly linked to the limited lifespan of mice compared to the very long periods of observation necessary to demonstrate the development of scrapie. Alternatively, one could estimate that a successful second passage is the result of strain adaptation to the species barrier, thus poorly relevant of the real zoonotic potential of the original scrapie isolate of sheep origin49. The development of scrapie in this primate after an incubation period compatible with its lifespan complements the study conducted in transgenic (humanized) mice; taken together these studies suggest that some isolates of sheep scrapie can promote misfolding of the human prion protein and that scrapie can develop within the lifespan of some primate species.

 

In addition to previous studies on scrapie transmission to primate1,8,9 and the recently published study on transgenic humanized mice13, our results constitute new evidence for recommending that the potential risk of scrapie for human health should not be dismissed. Indeed, human PrP transgenic mice and primates are the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier. To what extent such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. During the past decades, many protective measures have been successfully implemented to protect cattle from the spread of c-BSE, and some of these measures have been extended to sheep and goats to protect from scrapie according to the principle of precaution. Since cases of c-BSE have greatly reduced in number, those protective measures are currently being challenged and relaxed in the absence of other known zoonotic animal prion disease. We recommend that risk managers should be aware of the long term potential risk to human health of at least certain scrapie isolates, notably for lymphotropic strains like the classical scrapie strain used in the current study. Relatively high amounts of infectivity in peripheral lymphoid organs in animals infected with these strains could lead to contamination of food products produced for human consumption. Efforts should also be maintained to further assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains in long-term studies, notably lymphotropic strains with high prevalence like CWD, which is spreading across North America, and atypical/Nor98 scrapie (Nor98)50 that was first detected in the past two decades and now represents approximately half of all reported cases of prion diseases in small ruminants worldwide, including territories previously considered as scrapie free. Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.

 


 

 98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 

EDITORIAL

 

Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen

 

Cristina Acín

 

Resistant prions in the environment have been the sword of Damocles for scrapie control and eradication. Attempts to establish which physical and chemical agents could be applied to inactivate or moderate scrapie infectivity were initiated in the 1960s and 1970s,with the first study of this type focusing on the effect of heat treatment in reducing prion infectivity (Hunter and Millson 1964). Nowadays, most of the chemical procedures that aim to inactivate the prion protein are based on the method developed by Kimberlin and collaborators (1983). This procedure consists of treatment with 20,000 parts per million free chlorine solution, for a minimum of one hour, of all surfaces that need to be sterilised (in laboratories, lambing pens, slaughterhouses, and so on). Despite this, veterinarians and farmers may still ask a range of questions, such as ‘Is there an official procedure published somewhere?’ and ‘Is there an international organisation which recommends and defines the exact method of scrapie decontamination that must be applied?’

 

From a European perspective, it is difficult to find a treatment that could be applied, especially in relation to the disinfection of surfaces in lambing pens of affected flocks. A 999/2001 EU regulation on controlling spongiform encephalopathies (European Parliament and Council 2001) did not specify a particular decontamination measure to be used when an outbreak of scrapie is diagnosed. There is only a brief recommendation in Annex VII concerning the control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE s).

 

Chapter B of the regulation explains the measures that must be applied if new caprine animals are to be introduced to a holding where a scrapie outbreak has previously been diagnosed. In that case, the statement indicates that caprine animals can be introduced ‘provided that a cleaning and disinfection of all animal housing on the premises has been carried out following destocking’.

 

Issues around cleaning and disinfection are common in prion prevention recommendations, but relevant authorities, veterinarians and farmers may have difficulties in finding the specific protocol which applies. The European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA ) published a detailed report about the efficacy of certain biocides, such as sodium hydroxide, sodium hypochlorite, guanidine and even a formulation of copper or iron metal ions in combination with hydrogen peroxide, against prions (EFSA 2009). The report was based on scientific evidence (Fichet and others 2004, Lemmer and others 2004, Gao and others 2006, Solassol and others 2006) but unfortunately the decontamination measures were not assessed under outbreak conditions.

 

The EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards recently published its conclusions on the scrapie situation in the EU after 10 years of monitoring and control of the disease in sheep and goats (EFSA 2014), and one of the most interesting findings was the Icelandic experience regarding the effect of disinfection in scrapie control. The Icelandic plan consisted of: culling scrapie-affected sheep or the whole flock in newly diagnosed outbreaks; deep cleaning and disinfection of stables, sheds, barns and equipment with high pressure washing followed by cleaning with 500 parts per million of hypochlorite; drying and treatment with 300 ppm of iodophor; and restocking was not permitted for at least two years. Even when all of these measures were implemented, scrapie recurred on several farms, indicating that the infectious agent survived for years in the environment, even as many as 16 years after restocking (Georgsson and others 2006).

 

In the rest of the countries considered in the EFSA (2014) report, recommendations for disinfection measures were not specifically defined at the government level. In the report, the only recommendation that is made for sheep is repopulation with sheep with scrapie-resistant genotypes. This reduces the risk of scrapie recurrence but it is difficult to know its effect on the infection.

 

Until the EFSA was established (in May 2003), scientific opinions about TSE s were provided by the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of the EC, whose advice regarding inactivation procedures focused on treating animal waste at high temperatures (150°C for three hours) and high pressure alkaline hydrolysis (SSC 2003). At the same time, the TSE Risk Management Subgroup of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) in the UK published guidance on safe working and the prevention of TSE infection. Annex C of the ACDP report established that sodium hypochlorite was considered to be effective, but only if 20,000 ppm of available chlorine was present for at least one hour, which has practical limitations such as the release of chlorine gas, corrosion, incompatibility with formaldehyde, alcohols and acids, rapid inactivation of its active chemicals and the stability of dilutions (ACDP 2009).

 

In an international context, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not recommend a specific disinfection protocol for prion agents in its Terrestrial Code or Manual. Chapter 4.13 of the Terrestrial Code, General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection (OIE 2014), focuses on foot-and-mouth disease virus, mycobacteria and Bacillus anthracis, but not on prion disinfection. Nevertheless, the last update published by the OIE on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (OIE 2012) indicates that few effective decontamination techniques are available to inactivate the agent on surfaces, and recommends the removal of all organic material and the use of sodium hydroxide, or a sodium hypochlorite solution containing 2 per cent available chlorine, for more than one hour at 20ºC.

 

The World Health Organization outlines guidelines for the control of TSE s, and also emphasises the importance of mechanically cleaning surfaces before disinfection with sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite for one hour (WHO 1999).

 

Finally, the relevant agencies in both Canada and the USA suggest that the best treatments for surfaces potentially contaminated with prions are sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite at 20,000 ppm. This is a 2 per cent solution, while most commercial household bleaches contain 5.25 per cent sodium hypochlorite. It is therefore recommended to dilute one part 5.25 per cent bleach with 1.5 parts water (CDC 2009, Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2013).

 

So what should we do about disinfection against prions? First, it is suggested that a single protocol be created by international authorities to homogenise inactivation procedures and enable their application in all scrapie-affected countries. Sodium hypochlorite with 20,000 ppm of available chlorine seems to be the procedure used in most countries, as noted in a paper summarised on p 99 of this issue of Veterinary Record (Hawkins and others 2015). But are we totally sure of its effectiveness as a preventive measure in a scrapie outbreak? Would an in-depth study of the recurrence of scrapie disease be needed?

 

What we can conclude is that, if we want to fight prion diseases, and specifically classical scrapie, we must focus on the accuracy of diagnosis, monitoring and surveillance; appropriate animal identification and control of movements; and, in the end, have homogeneous and suitable protocols to decontaminate and disinfect lambing barns, sheds and equipment available to veterinarians and farmers. Finally, further investigations into the resistance of prion proteins in the diversity of environmental surfaces are required.

 

References

 

snip...

 

98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 


 

Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following cleaning and decontamination

 

Steve A. C. Hawkins, MIBiol, Pathology Department1, Hugh A. Simmons, BVSc MRCVS, MBA, MA Animal Services Unit1, Kevin C. Gough, BSc, PhD2 and Ben C. Maddison, BSc, PhD3 + Author Affiliations

 

1Animal and Plant Health Agency, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK 2School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK 3ADAS UK, School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK E-mail for correspondence: ben.maddison@adas.co.uk Abstract Scrapie of sheep/goats and chronic wasting disease of deer/elk are contagious prion diseases where environmental reservoirs are directly implicated in the transmission of disease. In this study, the effectiveness of recommended scrapie farm decontamination regimens was evaluated by a sheep bioassay using buildings naturally contaminated with scrapie. Pens within a farm building were treated with either 20,000 parts per million free chorine solution for one hour or were treated with the same but were followed by painting and full re-galvanisation or replacement of metalwork within the pen. Scrapie susceptible lambs of the PRNP genotype VRQ/VRQ were reared within these pens and their scrapie status was monitored by recto-anal mucosa-associated lymphoid tissue. All animals became infected over an 18-month period, even in the pen that had been subject to the most stringent decontamination process. These data suggest that recommended current guidelines for the decontamination of farm buildings following outbreaks of scrapie do little to reduce the titre of infectious scrapie material and that environmental recontamination could also be an issue associated with these premises.

 

SNIP...

 

Discussion

 

Thorough pressure washing of a pen had no effect on the amount of bioavailable scrapie infectivity (pen B). The routine removal of prions from surfaces within a laboratory setting is treatment for a minimum of one hour with 20,000 ppm free chlorine, a method originally based on the use of brain macerates from infected rodents to evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination (Kimberlin and others 1983). Further studies have also investigated the effectiveness of hypochlorite disinfection of metal surfaces to simulate the decontamination of surgical devices within a hospital setting. Such treatments with hypochlorite solution were able to reduce infectivity by 5.5 logs to lower than the sensitivity of the bioassay used (Lemmer and others 2004). Analogous treatment of the pen surfaces did not effectively remove the levels of scrapie infectivity over that of the control pens, indicating that this method of decontamination is not effective within a farm setting. This may be due to the high level of biological matrix that is present upon surfaces within the farm environment, which may reduce the amount of free chlorine available to inactivate any infectious prion. Remarkably 1/5 sheep introduced into pen D had also became scrapie positive within nine months, with all animals in this pen being RAMALT positive by 18 months of age. Pen D was no further away from the control pen (pen A) than any of the other pens within this barn. Localised hot spots of infectivity may be present within scrapie-contaminated environments, but it is unlikely that pen D area had an amount of scrapie contamination that was significantly different than the other areas within this building. Similarly, there were no differences in how the biosecurity of pen D was maintained, or how this pen was ventilated compared with the other pens. This observation, perhaps, indicates the slower kinetics of disease uptake within this pen and is consistent with a more thorough prion removal and recontamination. These observations may also account for the presence of inadvertent scrapie cases within other studies, where despite stringent biosecurity, control animals have become scrapie positive during challenge studies using barns that also housed scrapie-affected animals (Ryder and others 2009). The bioassay data indicate that the exposure of the sheep to a farm environment after decontamination efforts thought to be effective in removing scrapie is sufficient for the animals to become infected with scrapie. The main exposure routes within this scenario are likely to be via the oral route, during feeding and drinking, and respiratory and conjunctival routes. It has been demonstrated that scrapie infectivity can be efficiently transmitted via the nasal route in sheep (Hamir and others 2008), as is the case for CWD in both murine models and in white-tailed deer (Denkers and others 2010, 2013). Recently, it has also been demonstrated that CWD prions presented as dust when bound to the soil mineral montmorillonite can be infectious via the nasal route (Nichols and others 2013). When considering pens C and D, the actual source of the infectious agent in the pens is not known, it is possible that biologically relevant levels of prion survive on surfaces during the decontamination regimen (pen C). With the use of galvanising and painting (pen D) covering and sealing the surface of the pen, it is possible that scrapie material recontaminated the pens by the movement of infectious prions contained within dusts originating from other parts of the barn that were not decontaminated or from other areas of the farm.

 

Given that scrapie prions are widespread on the surfaces of affected farms (Maddison and others 2010a), irrespective of the source of the infectious prions in the pens, this study clearly highlights the difficulties that are faced with the effective removal of environmentally associated scrapie infectivity. This is likely to be paralleled in CWD which shows strong similarities to scrapie in terms of both the dissemination of prions into the environment and the facile mode of disease transmission. These data further contribute to the understanding that prion diseases can be highly transmissible between susceptible individuals not just by direct contact but through highly stable environmental reservoirs that are refractory to decontamination.

 

The presence of these environmentally associated prions in farm buildings make the control of these diseases a considerable challenge, especially in animal species such as goats where there is lack of genetic resistance to scrapie and, therefore, no scope to re-stock farms with animals that are resistant to scrapie.

 

Scrapie Sheep Goats Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) Accepted October 12, 2014. Published Online First 31 October 2014

 


 

PPo3-22:

 

Detection of Environmentally Associated PrPSc on a Farm with Endemic Scrapie

 

Ben C. Maddison,1 Claire A. Baker,1 Helen C. Rees,1 Linda A. Terry,2 Leigh Thorne,2 Susan J. Belworthy2 and Kevin C. Gough3 1ADAS-UK LTD; Department of Biology; University of Leicester; Leicester, UK; 2Veterinary Laboratories Agency; Surry, KT UK; 3Department of Veterinary Medicine and Science; University of Nottingham; Sutton Bonington, Loughborough UK

 

Key words: scrapie, evironmental persistence, sPMCA

 

Ovine scrapie shows considerable horizontal transmission, yet the routes of transmission and specifically the role of fomites in transmission remain poorly defined. Here we present biochemical data demonstrating that on a scrapie-affected sheep farm, scrapie prion contamination is widespread. It was anticipated at the outset that if prions contaminate the environment that they would be there at extremely low levels, as such the most sensitive method available for the detection of PrPSc, serial Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (sPMCA), was used in this study. We investigated the distribution of environmental scrapie prions by applying ovine sPMCA to samples taken from a range of surfaces that were accessible to animals and could be collected by use of a wetted foam swab. Prion was amplified by sPMCA from a number of these environmental swab samples including those taken from metal, plastic and wooden surfaces, both in the indoor and outdoor environment. At the time of sampling there had been no sheep contact with these areas for at least 20 days prior to sampling indicating that prions persist for at least this duration in the environment. These data implicate inanimate objects as environmental reservoirs of prion infectivity which are likely to contribute to disease transmission.

 


 

*** Approximately 4,200 fawns, defined as deer under 1 year of age, were sampled from the eradication zone over the last year. The majority of fawns sampled were between the ages of 5 to 9 months, though some were as young as 1 month. Two of the six fawns with CWD detected were 5 to 6 months old. All six of the positive fawns were taken from the core area of the CWD eradication zone where the highest numbers of positive deer have been identified.

 

"This is the first intensive sampling for CWD in fawns anywhere," said Dr. Julie Langenberg, Department of Natural Resources wildlife veterinarian, "and we are trying to learn as much as we can from these data".

 


 

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

 

Texas CWD Medina County Herd Investigation Update July 16, 2015

 

• 66 Texas sites, 2 Mexico sites

 


 

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

 

Texas Certified Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Sample Collector, like the Wolf Guarding the Henhouse

 


 

Thursday, July 23, 2015

 

*** Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) 101 Drs. Walter Cook & Donald S. Davis

 


 

Sunday, July 26, 2015

 

*** TEXAS IN MELT DOWN MODE OVER CAPTIVE CWD AND THEY ARE PUTTING LIPSTICK ON THAT PIG AND TAKING HER TO THE DANCE LIKE MAD COW DISEASE ***

 


 

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

 

TEXAS Kills 35 Deer at Medina County Ranch (Texas Captive CWD)

 


 

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

 

Why Has the Federal Government Cut Funding for Chronic Wasting Disease Research?

 


 

Wisconsin doing what it does best, procrastinating about CWD yet again thanks to Governor Walker

 


 

IF the state of Texas does not get serious real fast with CWD, and test all those deer, that 5 year plan is a ticking time bomb waiting to happen.

 

all cervid tested after slaughter, and test results must be released to the public.

 

the tse prion aka mad cow type disease is not your normal pathogen.

 

The TSE prion disease survives ashing to 600 degrees celsius, that’s around 1112 degrees farenheit.

 

you cannot cook the TSE prion disease out of meat.

 

you can take the ash and mix it with saline and inject that ash into a mouse, and the mouse will go down with TSE.

 

Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production as well.

 

the TSE prion agent also survives Simulated Wastewater Treatment Processes.

 

IN fact, you should also know that the TSE Prion agent will survive in the environment for years, if not decades.

 

you can bury it and it will not go away.

 

The TSE agent is capable of infected your water table i.e. Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area.

 

it’s not your ordinary pathogen you can just cook it out and be done with. that’s what’s so worrisome about Iatrogenic mode of transmission, a simple autoclave will not kill this TSE prion agent.

 

New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication

 


 

Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production

 


 

Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area

 


 

*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years***

 

Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3

 


 

Longitudinal Detection of Prion Shedding in Saliva and Urine by CWD-Infected Deer by RT-QuIC

 

Davin M. Henderson1, Nathaniel D. Denkers1, Clare E. Hoover1, Nina Garbino1, Candace K. Mathiason1 and Edward A. Hoover1# + Author Affiliations

 

1Prion Research Center, Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pathology, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523

 

ABSTRACT Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) is an emergent, rapidly spreading prion disease of cervids. Shedding of infectious prions in saliva and urine is thought to be an important factor in CWD transmission. To help elucidate this issue, we applied an in vitro amplification assay to determine the onset, duration, and magnitude of prion shedding in longitudinally collected saliva and urine samples from CWD-exposed white-tailed deer. We detected prion shedding as early as 3 months after CWD exposure and sustained shedding throughout the disease course. We estimated that a 50% lethal dose (LD50) for cervidized transgenic mice would be contained in 1 ml of infected deer saliva or 10 ml or urine. Given the average course of infection and daily production of these body fluids, an infected deer would shed thousands of prion infectious doses over the course of CWD infection. The direct and indirect environmental impact of this magnitude of prion shedding for cervid and non-cervid species is surely significant.

 

Importance: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an emerging and uniformly fatal prion disease affecting free ranging deer and elk and now recognized in 22 United States and 2 C anadian Provinces. It is unique among prion diseases in that it is transmitted naturally though wild populations. A major hypothesis for CWD's florid spread is that prions are shed in excreta and transmitted via direct or indirect environmental contact. Here we use a rapid in vitro assay to show that infectious doses of CWD prions are in fact shed throughout the multi-year disease course in deer. This finding is an important advance in assessing the risks posed by shed CWD prions to animals as well as humans.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

↵#To whom correspondence should be addressed: Edward A. Hoover, Prion Research Center, Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, US Email: edward.hoover@colostate.edu

 


 

Friday, December 14, 2012

 

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

 

snip...

 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

 

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

 

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

 

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

 

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

 

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

 

snip...

 

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

 

snip...

 

The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

 

snip...

 

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

 

snip...

 

In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

 

snip...

 

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

 

snip...

 


 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION, how much does it pay to find CWD $$$

 

CWD, spreading it around...

 

for the game farm industry, and their constituents, to continue to believe that they are _NOT_, and or insinuate that they have _NEVER_ been part of the problem, will only continue to help spread cwd. the game farming industry, from the shooting pens, to the urine mills, the antler mills, the sperm mills, velvet mills, shooting pens, to large ranches, are not the only problem, but it is painfully obvious that they have been part of the problem for decades and decades, just spreading it around, as with transportation and or exportation and or importation of cervids from game farming industry, and have been proven to spread cwd. no one need to look any further than South Korea blunder ;

 

===========================================

 

spreading cwd around...

 

Between 1996 and 2002, chronic wasting disease was diagnosed in 39 herds of farmed elk in Saskatchewan in a single epidemic. All of these herds were depopulated as part of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s (CFIA) disease eradication program. Animals, primarily over 12 mo of age, were tested for the presence CWD prions following euthanasia. Twenty-one of the herds were linked through movements of live animals with latent CWD from a single infected source herd in Saskatchewan, 17 through movements of animals from 7 of the secondarily infected herds.

 

***The source herd is believed to have become infected via importation of animals from a game farm in South Dakota where CWD was subsequently diagnosed (7,4). A wide range in herd prevalence of CWD at the time of herd depopulation of these herds was observed. Within-herd transmission was observed on some farms, while the disease remained confined to the introduced animals on other farms.

 


 

spreading cwd around...

 

Friday, May 13, 2011

 

Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) outbreaks and surveillance program in the Republic of Korea

 

Hyun-Joo Sohn, Yoon-Hee Lee, Min-jeong Kim, Eun-Im Yun, Hyo-Jin Kim, Won-Yong Lee, Dong-Seob Tark, In- Soo Cho, Foreign Animal Disease Research Division, National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, Republic of Korea

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has been recognized as an important prion disease in native North America deer and Rocky mountain elks. The disease is a unique member of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), which naturally affects only a few species. CWD had been limited to USA and Canada until 2000.

 

On 28 December 2000, information from the Canadian government showed that a total of 95 elk had been exported from farms with CWD to Korea. These consisted of 23 elk in 1994 originating from the so-called “source farm” in Canada, and 72 elk in 1997, which had been held in pre export quarantine at the “source farm”.Based on export information of CWD suspected elk from Canada to Korea, CWD surveillance program was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) in 2001.

 

All elks imported in 1997 were traced back, however elks imported in 1994 were impossible to identify. CWD control measures included stamping out of all animals in the affected farm, and thorough cleaning and disinfection of the premises. In addition, nationwide clinical surveillance of Korean native cervids, and improved measures to ensure reporting of CWD suspect cases were implemented.

 

Total of 9 elks were found to be affected. CWD was designated as a notifiable disease under the Act for Prevention of Livestock Epidemics in 2002.

 

Additional CWD cases - 12 elks and 2 elks - were diagnosed in 2004 and 2005.

 

Since February of 2005, when slaughtered elks were found to be positive, all slaughtered cervid for human consumption at abattoirs were designated as target of the CWD surveillance program. Currently, CWD laboratory testing is only conducted by National Reference Laboratory on CWD, which is the Foreign Animal Disease Division (FADD) of National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service (NVRQS).

 

In July 2010, one out of 3 elks from Farm 1 which were slaughtered for the human consumption was confirmed as positive. Consequently, all cervid – 54 elks, 41 Sika deer and 5 Albino deer – were culled and one elk was found to be positive. Epidemiological investigations were conducted by Veterinary Epidemiology Division (VED) of NVRQS in collaboration with provincial veterinary services.

 

Epidemiologically related farms were found as 3 farms and all cervid at these farms were culled and subjected to CWD diagnosis. Three elks and 5 crossbreeds (Red deer and Sika deer) were confirmed as positive at farm 2.

 

All cervids at Farm 3 and Farm 4 – 15 elks and 47 elks – were culled and confirmed as negative.

 

Further epidemiological investigations showed that these CWD outbreaks were linked to the importation of elks from Canada in 1994 based on circumstantial evidences.

 

In December 2010, one elk was confirmed as positive at Farm 5. Consequently, all cervid – 3 elks, 11 Manchurian Sika deer and 20 Sika deer – were culled and one Manchurian Sika deer and seven Sika deer were found to be positive. This is the first report of CWD in these sub-species of deer. Epidemiological investigations found that the owner of the Farm 2 in CWD outbreaks in July 2010 had co-owned the Farm 5.

 

In addition, it was newly revealed that one positive elk was introduced from Farm 6 of Jinju-si Gyeongsang Namdo. All cervid – 19 elks, 15 crossbreed (species unknown) and 64 Sika deer – of Farm 6 were culled, but all confirmed as negative.

 


 


 


 


 

Friday, August 07, 2015

 

Texas CWD Captive, and then there were 4 ?

 


 

Thursday, August 06, 2015

 

WE HAVE LOST TEXAS TO CWD TASK FORCE CATERING TO INDUSTRY

 


 

HAVE YOU BEEN THUNDERSTRUCK ?

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

Friday, August 14, 2015

 

*** Susceptibility of cattle to the agent of chronic wasting disease from elk after intracranial inoculation ***

 


 

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

 

*** Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed?

 


 

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Further characterisation of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy phenotypes after inoculation of cattle with two temporally separated sources of sheep scrapie from Great Britain

 


 

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Porcine Prion Protein Amyloid or mad pig disease PSE

 


 

Monday, August 10, 2015

 

Detection and Quantification of beta-Amyloid, Pyroglutamyl A beta, and Tau in Aged Canines

 


 

Friday, August 7, 2015

 

Transgenic Mouse Bioassay: Evidence That Rabbits Are Susceptible to a Variety of Prion Isolates

 


 

Thursday, August 13, 2015

 

Iatrogenic CJD due to pituitary-derived growth hormone with genetically determined incubation times of up to 40 years

 


 

Thursday, January 15, 2015

 

41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE Prion: Case Report

 


 

Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type disease

 

what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.

 

why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping everything the USDA inc says.

 

sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.

 

My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.

 

with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how many bodies is this market worth?

 

Saturday, January 17, 2015

 

*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

 


 

*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report ***

 


 

 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Friday, August 7, 2015

Transgenic Mouse Bioassay: Evidence That Rabbits Are Susceptible to a Variety of Prion Isolates

Research Article

 

Transgenic Mouse Bioassay: Evidence That Rabbits Are Susceptible to a Variety of Prion Isolates

 

Enric Vidal , Natalia Fernández-Borges , Belén Pintado, Hasier Eraña, Montserrat Ordóñez, Mercedes Márquez, Francesca Chianini, Dolors Fondevila, Manuel A. Sánchez-Martín, Olivier Andreoletti, Mark P. Dagleish, Martí Pumarola, Joaquín Castilla

 

PLOS

 

Published: August 6, 2015 •DOI: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1004977

 

Abstract

 

Interspecies transmission of prions is a well-established phenomenon, both experimentally and under field conditions. Upon passage through new hosts, prion strains have proven their capacity to change their properties and this is a source of strain diversity which needs to be considered when assessing the potential risks associated with consumption of prion contaminated protein sources. Rabbits were considered for decades to be a prion resistant species until proven otherwise recently. To determine the extent of rabbit susceptibility to prions and to assess the effects of passage of different prion strains through this species a transgenic mouse model overexpressing rabbit PrPC was developed (TgRab). Intracerebral challenges with prion strains originating from a variety of species including field isolates (ovine SSBP/1 scrapie, Nor98- scrapie; cattle BSE, BSE-L and cervid CWD), experimental murine strains (ME7 and RML) and experimentally obtained ruminant (sheepBSE) and rabbit (de novo NZW) strains were performed. On first passage TgRab were susceptible to the majority of prions (Cattle BSE, SheepBSE, BSE-L, de novo NZW, ME7 and RML) tested with the exception of SSBP/1 scrapie, CWD and Nor98 scrapie. Furthermore, TgRab were capable of propagating strain-specific features such as differences in incubation periods, histological brain lesions, abnormal prion (PrPd) deposition profiles and proteinase-K (PK) resistant western blotting band patterns. Our results confirm previous studies proving that rabbits are not resistant to prion infection and show for the first time that rabbits are susceptible to PrPd originating in a number of other species. This should be taken into account when choosing protein sources to feed rabbits.

 

Author Summary

 

Prions, the infectious agents responsible for causing mad cow disease, amongst other diseases, can transmit from one species to another. For example, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy can transmit to humans resulting in invariably fatal variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. We wanted to study the susceptibility of rabbits as, until recently, they were considered a prion resistant species. Once proven otherwise, we wanted to know which particular prions rabbits were susceptible to. With this aim, a transgenic mouse was designed expressing the rabbit prion protein gene instead of the corresponding mouse gene to model the transmission barrier between rabbits and other species. The resultant mice where challenged with several field prion isolates including classical and atypical strains of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, sheep Scrapie and cervid Chronic Wasting disease. The transgenic mice were susceptible to classical and atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy prions and also to mouse-adapted Scrapie prions. This information must be taken into account when assessing the risk of using ruminant derived protein as a protein source to feed rabbits.

 

snip...

 

Discussion

 

This is the first report of in vivo evidence suggesting that TgRab mice are susceptible to cross species transmission of prion strains. This not only reinforces that rabbits can no longer be considered TSE resistant, but also that there is a possibility they could act as a reservoir for other prion strains. As such, rabbits must be taken into account when determining the epidemiology of several TSE both in relation to the species of origin, especially sympatric ones, but also to potential zoonotic transmission.

 

In previous studies we demonstrated that rabbits were able to propagate abnormal prions and that these were transmissible to other rabbits. However, this was only one prion strain which was generated de novo in an in vitro PMCA assay in rabbit brain homogenate (a spontaneous rabbit prion strain) and on first passage it had only a very limited attack rate [23]. This new mouse model, which responded in a comparable manner to rabbits when challenged with the same in vitro generated rabbit derived inoculum, has allowed us to evaluate the TgRab’s susceptibility to a number of actual field prions strains from a variety of different species. Although the use of rabbits would have been the most appropriate model there are strong, particularly budgetary, limitations due to the longer lifespan of rabbits and the need to use level 3 biosafety facilities. Thus, a transgenic mouse model overexpressing rabbit PrPC was designed to overcome these limitations and allow us to determine its susceptibility to different prion strains.

 

No polymorphisms have been described in the PRNP rabbit gene, therefore several mouse transgenic lines were generated expressing rabbit PrPC at different expression levels. The line with the highest possible PrPC expression levels was selected to allow for easier prion propagation capacity but the overexpression was not so high as to generate a spontaneous phenotype at an early age which would preclude the attainment of infectivity/susceptibility data. The hemizygous TgRab line met these criteria with levels of PrPC between 5 to 6 times those present in rabbits. The use of transgenic mice overexpressing ovine PrPC to obtain the infectivity titer of specific prion isolates has been shown to be equivalent to titrations obtained through bioassay in the natural host [50]. Phenotyping of the newly developed prion transgenic model was essential, especially as the levels of PrPc expression present have not been shown to be problematic in other models [41,46]. Eighty percent of the TgRab mice presented with a late onset spontaneous neurological disease phenotype (S3 Fig and S4 Fig) which, fortunately, did not interfere in the interpretation of prion susceptibility results. This allowed us to work with a model that faithfully reproduced the behavior in rabbits with respect to their capability to propagate different prion strains. One cannot exclude the possibility that the presence of spontaneous disease might create a toxic environment in the brain which artificially enhances the transmission of certain strains. Therefore a thorough knowledge of the PrPC overexpression-related changes in uninfected controls was essential to identify the true prion disease status and validity of susceptibility.

 

Lesion morphology and profiling within the brain and identification of specific PrPd deposition-types allowed unequivocal identification of infected animals (either spontaneous or as a result of an inoculation). Further biochemical detection of the presence of PrPres by western blotting confirmed the ability of morphological techniques to identify an infected animal. Additionally, as PrPC overexpression may mask an incipient infection, second passages are required to confirm if rabbits are totally resistant to those prion isolates to which they initially appeared to be, such as SSBP/1, atypical scrapie or CWD, and these experiments are ongoing.

 

Once validated the TgRab model was used to evaluate which TSE strains were able to infect the model (Table 2). Previous attempts in rabbits had concluded they were resistant, probably due to incomplete studies and the strong barrier of rabbits to propagate prions [34]. Initially classical cattle BSE, the most relevant field strain, was tested and found to be infectious on first passage with a low attack rate (4/9) and relatively long incubation period (551dpi±10). The strain properties observed in the infected TgRab mice (western blotting, brain lesion and PrPd deposition profiles) were typical of BSE and indistinguishable from those obtained in other BSE murine models [36]. Parallel bioassay studies were conducted with the BSE isolate previously amplified in vitro using rabbit normal brain homogenate as a substrate (BSE-RaPrPres, this inoculum was characterised previously in a TgBov mouse model by our group [36]). These animals showed a 100% (12/12) attack rate and a shortened incubation period (396dpi ±12 vs 551dpi ±10) compared to the cattle BSE inoculated TgRab mice. This reduction already indicated that a transmission barrier between species had been overcome thanks to the in vitro adaptation of the cattle BSE-C to rabbit PrPC, a second passage was performed from that isolate which also showed a 100% attack rate (3/3). Its incubation period was reduced to 322dpi ±12 (mean ± s.e.m.) indicating further host adaptation (S5 Fig).

 

SheepBSE, derived from BSE-C, infected TgRab mice with a 100% attack rate (9/9), a relatively short incubation time (368±10 dpi) and with lesion and PrPd brain profiles identical to those of BSE-C inoculated mice, suggesting that the same strain was being propagated through both isolates. This enhanced virulence of sheepBSE compared to BSE-C has been previously demonstrated in other experimental scenarios [29,51]. The results obtained with sheep scrapie differed completely as, in agreement with early experiments in rabbits [34], none of the TgRab mice inoculated with SSBP/1 showed any evidence of a prion disease on first passage. However, this result does not preclude that, if further in vivo SSBP/1 passages were to be performed, the transmission barrier would be crossed. As in the case of BSE in the bank vole (Myodes glareolus), where after an initial resistance a bank vole adapted BSE strain was obtained which was highly transmissible [52,53]. Conversely, ME7 and RML scrapie, both murine adapted sheep scrapie strains, infected TgRab mice on first passage and their incubation times, PrPres biochemical profiles, lesion profiles and PrPd deposition patterns were clearly distinguishable from cattle derived strains. Together these data are the first evidence that TgRab mice are not only able to propagate prions but they do it maintaining clearly the different distinguishing strain features (Figs 1, 3 and 4) which strongly suggests that rabbits may also.

 

It is noteworthy that both ME7 and RML, which originated from serial passages of SSBP/1 in different rodents [54,55], directly propagated in TgRab mice on first passage. Conversely, SSBP/1 did not infect TgRab mice on first passage. The murine adapted prion strains behaved differently to their parent strain, possibly because passage through rodents had selected for a strain capable of crossing the rodent species barriers. The situation is analogous to CWD which will infect hamsters after initial passage through ferrets [9]. In the present work, previous adaptation of scrapie to rodents, possibly resulting in a higher sequence identity in some specific and crucial PrP regions with rabbits compared to sheep, allowed rodent adapted scrapie prions to misfold rabbit PrPC. In previous studies ME7 did not infect rabbits after 4–5 years of incubation, with the exception of a single inconclusive case [23,34]. This result is difficult to extrapolate since we are discussing different species, of differing lifespans and with a species barrier between them. The PrPC overexpression in TgRab may have allowed ME7 to propagate more efficiently than in rabbits which suggests that if the original rabbit experiments had been performed over the maximum lifespan of rabbits ME7 may have propagated on first passage also.

 

Once BSE in cattle has been virtually controlled, CWD in cervids is the animal prion disease with the most repercussions, at least in the North American continent. The uncertainty of its transmissibility to humans [56] and its unique ability to spread through the free ranging cervid population make its study highly relevant with respect to transmissibility to other species. Moreover CWD prions are known to be shed and are highly persistent in the environment. Rabbits are a sympatric species with cervids. Even though CWD has been shown to transmit on first passage to many species including sheep, cattle [57], squirrel monkeys [58], cats [59], hamsters [60], ferrets [9], mink [61], bank voles and deer mice (Genus Peromyscus) [62] its transmissibility efficiency is relatively low with very long incubation periods and low attack rates. For instance, wild type mice could not be readily infected, so tga20 mice overexpressing murine PrPC were required to prove susceptibility to CWD [63] or required a second passage [64]. Another example is the transmission of CWD to cats, which required an incubation period of longer than 4 years [59]. The present study showed CWD was not able to infect TgRab on first passage (0/12). Further experiments are required to confirm the resistance of rabbits to CWD including a blind second passage and bioassays with CWD previously passaged in other species, especially rodents [9]. This will rule out an analogous situation as the one observed in this paper with sheep scrapie whereby SSBP/1 does not transmit to TgRab but murine passaged counterparts, ME7 and RML, do.

 

With respect to the atypical prion strains of purported spontaneous origin [18,65,66], BSE-L infected TgRab mice on first passage and, although the attack rate was low (3/11), they had the shortest incubation period observed in this model so far (221dpi for the first animal to die, mean 280±26dpi). The lesion and PrPd deposition brain profiles differed considerably from those of BSE-C. None of the TgRab mice inoculated with atypical scrapie showed evidence of a TSE with the exception of one animal, euthanized at 742 dpi which, even though no histological lesions nor PrPd deposits were present suggestive of infection, it was positive by PrPd ELISA. This result could not be confirmed by western blotting. However, this ELISA detects PrPd through its affinity to an anionic ligand not due to its resistance to protease K so we cannot rule out this single mouse was positive. A second passage is ongoing which will determine the result.

 

Initial in vitro experiments predicted that BSE as well as SSBP/1 and CWD isolates were able to missfold rabbit PrPC. However, a discrepancy was found with the bioassay results since neither SSBP/1 nor CWD infected TgRab mice on first passage. Several saPMCA rounds were needed in order to amplify the different isolates, varying in number depending of each strain. Thus, it is not surprising that on first passage some of the isolates do not transmit.

 

Besides the PRNP sequence, another component of the transmission barrier is the genetic background in which each PrPC is contained. This has been demonstrated by infectivity studies showing BSE propagated more efficiently in RIII mice than C57/Black mice, two mice strains of the same species with the same PRNP gene [67]. Or when the genetic background (i.e. passage through different inbred mouse lines) determined not only the incubation period but also the propagation of two biochemically different BSE-derived strains [68]. For these reasons the belief that rabbits were resistant to prion infection was not only attributed to the rabbit PrPC sequence but also to its genetic background. To study whether the genetic background of rabbits was responsible for the apparent prion resistance, Houdebine’s group generated transgenic rabbits expressing an ovine PrPC which was known to easily misfold. Upon inoculation with ovine prion strains these rabbits succumbed to prion disease further proving that rabbits are not resistant to prions (results published paired with this article) and that the genetic background is not a limiting factor [37].

 

The differential susceptibility observed between actual rabbits and the transgenic model presented here can be explained by the higher PrPC expression levels of TgRab mice. Lower expression mouse lines would probably only be susceptible on first passage to strains previously adapted to rabbit PrPC as occurs with rabbits. It has taken more than three decades to finally dismiss the rabbit as a prion resistant species. We believe that the studies presented here confirm that in vitro studies are of great help in interpreting in vivo results, leave no room for misinterpretation, and that it can be ascertained that rabbits, and probably all other mammal species [21], are susceptible to infection by specific prion strains. The prion strain and its species of origin determine the extent of susceptibility, but neither rabbit PRNP nor their genetic background suggest they are resistant to prion propagation. Unfortunately, as with other mammals, the exact molecular mechanisms governing the capricious choice of strains that can be propagated in a certain species is still unknown.

 

In light of our results, especially susceptibility to spontaneous cattle prions (BSE-L), the restrictions on rabbits being fed ruminant protein should be maintained sine die to minimize the chances of any prion strain transmitting to rabbits.

 

Supporting Information

 

Figures

 

Fig 2 Fig 3 Fig 4 Fig 1 Table 1 Table 2 Fig 2 Fig 3 Fig 4 Fig 1 Table 1 Table 2

 

Citation: Vidal E, Fernández-Borges N, Pintado B, Eraña H, Ordóñez M, Márquez M, et al. (2015) Transgenic Mouse Bioassay: Evidence That Rabbits Are Susceptible to a Variety of Prion Isolates. PLoS Pathog 11(8): e1004977. doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1004977

 

Editor: Surachai Supattapone, Dartmouth Medical School, USA, UNITED STATES

 

Received: February 11, 2015; Accepted: May 26, 2015; Published: August 6, 2015

 

Copyright: © 2015 Vidal et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited

 

Data Availability: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.

 

Funding: This work was financially supported by 3 national grants from Spain [AGL2009-11553-C02-01 (JC), AGL2012-37988-C04-01 (JC) and AGL2008-05296-C02 (EV)], a Basque government grant (PI2010-18) (JC), two CTP grants (CTP11-P04 and CTP2013-P05) (JC), 3 InterReg grants [EFA205/11 and EFA218/11) (JC); EFA282/13—Transprion (MP, DF, EV)], Etortek Research Programs 2011/2013 (JC) and by Agència de Salut pública de Catalunya, Departament de Salut, Generalitat de Catalunya (EV). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

 

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

 


 

I remember ;

 

> Despite rabbits no longer being able to be classified as resistant to TSEs, an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease” is unlikely.

 

Rabbits are not resistant to prion infection

Francesca Chianinia,1, Natalia Fernández-Borgesb,c,1, Enric Vidald, Louise Gibbarda, Belén Pintadoe, Jorge de Castroc, Suzette A. Priolaf, Scott Hamiltona, Samantha L. Eatona, Jeanie Finlaysona, Yvonne Panga, Philip Steelea, Hugh W. Reida, Mark P. Dagleisha, and Joaquín Castillab,c,g,2 Author Affiliations

 

aMoredun Research Institute, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, Scotland, United Kingdom; bCIC bioGUNE, Derio 48160, Bizkaia, Spain; gIKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao 48011, Bizkaia, Spain; cDepartment of Infectology, Scripps Florida, Jupiter, FL 33458; fLaboratory of Persistent Viral Diseases, Rocky Mountain Laboratories, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Hamilton, MT 59840; dCentre de Recerca en Sanitat Animal (CReSA), UAB-IRTA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain; and eCentro Nacional de Biotecnología (CNB), 28049 Cantoblanco, Madrid, Spain Edited by Reed B. Wickner, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, and approved February 16, 2012 (received for review December 6, 2011)

 

Abstract Full Text Authors & Info Figures SI Metrics Related Content PDF PDF + SI Abstract The ability of prions to infect some species and not others is determined by the transmission barrier. This unexplained phenomenon has led to the belief that certain species were not susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and therefore represented negligible risk to human health if consumed. Using the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) technique, we were able to overcome the species barrier in rabbits, which have been classified as TSE resistant for four decades. Rabbit brain homogenate, either unseeded or seeded in vitro with disease-related prions obtained from different species, was subjected to serial rounds of PMCA. De novo rabbit prions produced in vitro from unseeded material were tested for infectivity in rabbits, with one of three intracerebrally challenged animals succumbing to disease at 766 d and displaying all of the characteristics of a TSE, thereby demonstrating that leporids are not resistant to prion infection. Material from the brain of the clinically affected rabbit containing abnormal prion protein resulted in a 100% attack rate after its inoculation in transgenic mice overexpressing rabbit PrP. Transmissibility to rabbits (>470 d) has been confirmed in 2 of 10 rabbits after intracerebral challenge. Despite rabbits no longer being able to be classified as resistant to TSEs, an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease” is unlikely.

 

in vitro replication scrapie transmissible spongiform encephalopathy Footnotes ↵1F.C. and N.F.-B. contributed equally to this work.

 

↵2To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: castilla@joaquincastilla.com Author contributions: F.C., N.F.-B., S.A.P., and J.d.C. designed research; F.C., N.F.-B., E.V., L.G., B.P., J.d.C., S.A.P., S.H., S.L.E., J.F., Y.P., P.S., H.W.R., M.P.D., and J.C. performed research; F.C., N.F.-B., E.V., S.A.P., and J.C. contributed new reagents/analytic tools; F.C., N.F.-B., E.V., S.A.P., and J.C. analyzed data; and F.C., N.F.-B., S.A.P., H.W.R., M.P.D., and J.C. wrote the paper.

 

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

 

This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.

 

This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1120076109/-/DCSupplemental.

 


 

 >>> Despite rabbits no longer being able to be classified as resistant to TSEs, an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease” is unlikely.

 

seems to be more concern with the latest paper. we went from ‘’Despite rabbits no longer being able to be classified as resistant to TSEs, an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease” is unlikely’’, in 2012, to ‘’This information must be taken into account when assessing the risk of using ruminant derived protein as a protein source to feed rabbits.’’ ‘’In light of our results, especially susceptibility to spontaneous cattle prions (BSE-L), the restrictions on rabbits being fed ruminant protein should be maintained sine die to minimize the chances of any prion strain transmitting to rabbits.’’

 

never say never with the tse prion aka mad cow type disease, just to correct something, atypical L-type BASE BSE has never been proven to be spontaneous under natural conditions in the wild. ...just saying...terry

 

P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE

 

Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada

 

Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to disease as adults.

 

Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with 100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to neurological disease.

 

At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

 

Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. We are further examining explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged animal.

 

========================

 

***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. ***

 

P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification

 

Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan

 

To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA).

 

Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.

 

Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, ***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.

 

================

 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. ***

 


 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations

 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Val erie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France

 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. *** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, ***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), ***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), ***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.

 

===============

 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases...TSS

 

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QUANTITY: 2,790 tons of ruminant feed products and 14,000 tons of non-ruminant feed products. REASON: The animal feed products may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues.

 

 RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETMED -- CLASS IIPRODUCT & CODES: Animal feed products, packaged in 5, 25, 50, and 55 pound bags, and in bulk, intended for both ruminant and non-ruminant animals. The products are as follows: Recall # V-195-1 through V-350-1.

 

RUMINANT FEED PRODUCTS:

 

RECALL NO. PRODUCT NO. PRODUCT NAME

 

V-195-1 40150 B. 30% Calf Pellet V-196-1 40250 B. 16% Calf Pellet V-197-1 40350 B. 16% Calf Ration V-198-1 40450 B. 18% Calf Starter V-199-1 40600 B. 38% Dairy Pellet V-200-1 40650 B. 38% Dairy Pellet V-201-1 40750 B. 16% Dairy Feed V-202-1 40950 B. 40% Beef Pellet V-203-1 41150 B. 18% Lamb Starter Pellet V-204-1 41250 B. 39% Lamb Conc. Pellet V-205-1 41350 B. 14% Lamb & Beef Pellet V-206-1 41450 B. 16% Goat Feed V-207-1 42150 B. 32% Expectation Pellet V-208-1 42250 B. Llama & Alpaca Pellet V-209-1 42350 B. 32% Calf Grower Pellet V-210-1 42650 B. Llama & Alpaca Crums V-211-1 42750 B. 38% Hay Booster 2 V-212-1 42850 B. 25% Pasture Booster V-213-1 43100 B. 16% Grower/Dev Pellet V-214-1 43150 B. 16% Grower/Dev Pellet V-215-1 43700 WH 32% Calf Gro Pellet V-216-1 43750 WH 32% Calf Gro Pellet V-217-1 43850 B. 38% Dairy Mix V-218-1 44250 B. 17% Doe Pellet V-219-1 44350 B. 21% Buck Pellet V-220-1 44450 Legends Ranch Pellet V-221-1 44500 Legends 17% Breeder Pellet V-222-1 1652 B. Vitamin E-20 V-223-1 1614 B. Vitamin A-30 V-224-1 44550 Legends 17% Breeder Pellet V-225-1 44650 Legends 13.5% Rut Pellet V-226-1 44750 Deer Starter (J) V-227-1 44940 Llama Premix (J) FSC V-228-1 45150 Empire 25% Calf Pellet V-229-1 45450 Berry Llama Pellet V-230-1 45950 50% Beef Conc. (Meal) V-231-1 46250 B. 12% Sweet Livestock V-232-1 46350 B. 1440 Bovatec Pellet V-233-1 46400 Liberty 38% Dairy Pellet V-234-1 46450 Liberty 38% Dairy Pellet V-235-1 47150 B. 14% Gold-n-Grower V-236-1 47250 B. 12% Gold-n-Conditioner V-237-1 47450 B. 18% Gold-n-Lamb V-238-1 47800 Homeworth Dairy Pellet V-239-1 47850 Homeworth Dairy Pellet V-240-1 47900 B. 36% Hi Fat Dairy Pellet V-241-1 47950 B. 36% Hi Fat Dairy Pellet V-242-1 48550 B. 16% Calf Pellet CA V-243-1 49200 Mastead Dairy Base V-244-1 49300 KLEJKA Dairy Base V-245-1 49650 Deer Premix (J) HFB V-246-1 49750 39% Lamb Premix (J) HFB V-247-1 49850 Lamb Starter Premix (J) HFB V-248-1 120850 Brood Cow Deluxe Mineral V-249-1 152850 B. A-D-E Mix

 

NON-RUMINANT FEED PRODUCTS:

 

V-250-1 10150 B. Miracle Starter V-251-1 10350 B. 21% Broiler Starter V-252-1 10450 B. Pullet Grower & Developer V-253-1 10550 B. 18% Layer Breeder Pellets V-254-1 10750 B. 20% Gold Std. Laying Crum V-255-1 10950 B. 17% Complete Laying Crums V-256-1 11050 B. 16% Prosperity Layer Crums V-257-1 11100 B. 40% Poultry Concentrate V-258-1 11150 B. 40% Poultry Concentrate V-259-1 11250 B. 28% Turkey Starter Crums V-260-1 11350 20% Gig "4" Pellets V-261-1 11450 B. 16% Prosperity Layer Pellets V-262-1 11550 18% Game Bird Breeder Pellets V-263-1 11650 B. 19% Ratite Grower Diet V-264-1 11750 B. 23% Ratite Breeder Diet V-265-1 12100 B. 40% Poultry Concentrate Crums V-266-1 12550 B. 32% Base Poultry Mix V-267-1 13250 B. 28% Turkey Starter V-268-1 13450 B. 20% Poultry Grower V-269-1 14325 B. Game Bird Mix - Coarse V-270-1 20150 B. 18% Pig Starter Pellets V-271-1 20250 B. 16% Pig Grower Pellets V-272-1 20450 B. 14% Porkmaker 100 Pellets V-273-1 20550 B. 40% Gro 'Em Lean V-274-1 21850 B. 27% Hi-Fat Swine Base V-275-1 23000 Mt. Hope Hevy Hog V-276-1 30050 12% Pleasure Horse - Sweet V-277-1 30150 Alfa + Performer 10 Sweet V-278-1 30250 14% Grass + Perf Sweet V-279-1 30450 12% Wrangler - Complete V-280-1 30550 B. 12% Pleasure Horse Pellets V-281-1 30650 B. 32% Gro' N Win Pellets V-282-1 30750 12% Wrangler Cubes V-283-1 30950 18% Foal Starter V-284-1 31050 B. 14% Alfa + Dev Pellets V-285-1 31150 B. Alfa + Performer 10 Pel V-286-1 31200 Grass +Performer 14 Pel V-287-1 31250 Grass +Performer 14 Pel V-288-1 31350 12% Mustang V-289-1 31450 Endurance - 101 Extruded V-290-1 31550 B. Equine Energy - UK V-291-1 31650 B. 16% Grass + Dev Pellets V-292-1 31750 16% Grass + Dev Cubes V-293-1 31850 16% Grass + Dev Sweet V-294-1 31950 B. 11% Alfa Gro 'N Win Pel V-295-1 32050 B. Sho' Win Pellets V-296-1 32250 B. Senior Formula V-297-1 32350 Oscar Horse Mix V-298-1 32450 B. Ultimate Finish V-299-1 32550 Crossfire Horse Feed V-300-1 32650 B. Equine 16% Growth V-301-1 32750 B. Reduced Energy Formula V-302-1 32850 B. Training Formula V-303-1 32950 B. Cadence Formula V-304-1 33150 B. Track 12 Horse Feed V-305-1 33350 Spears 16% GR + Dev Cubes V-306-1 33400 B. 14% Supreme Horse Pellets V-307-1 33450 B. 14% Supreme Horse Pellets V-308-1 33650 B. Race'N Win V-309-1 33750 B. 14% Prominent Horse Feed V-310-1 33850 B. Unbeetable Horse Feed V-311-1 34750 Cargill Senior Horse V-312-1 34850 Cargill Vitality Gold V-313-1 35150 Chagrin 12% Sweet Fd V-314-1 35250 Smith Pure Pleasure V-315-1 35750 Roundup 10% Horse Pellets V-316-1 35850 12% Summerglo Horse V-317-1 36255 B. Grass +Min&VitBase - Mexico V-318-1 36850 Miller's 12% Horse Feed V-319-1 37155 B. Gro'Win Base Mix - Mexico V-320-1 38000 B. 32% Premium Mixer Pellets V-321-1 38050 B. 32% Premium Mixer Pellets V-322-1 38100 36% Maintenance Mixer Pellets V-323-1 38150 36% Maintenance Mixer Pellets V-324-1 50150 Terramycin Crumbles

 

=========================

 

V-325-1 60105 16% Rabbit Pellets V-326-1 60125 16% Rabbit Pellets V-327-1 60150 B. 16% Rabbit Pellets V-328-1 60205 18% Rabbit Developer V-329-1 60250 B. 18% Rabbit Developer V-330-1 60450 B. 16% Rabbit Maintenance

 

=========================

 

V-331-1 90150 B. Buckeye Scratch V-332-1 90225 Gold Standard Scratch V-333-1 90250 Gold Standard Scratch V-334-1 90350 Intermediate Scratch V-335-1 90450 B. Chick Grains V-336-1 90525 B. Shelled Corn V-337-1 90550 B. Shelled Corn V-338-1 90650 B. Cracked Corn V-339-1 90825 B. Fine Cracked Corn V-340-1 90850 B. Fine Cracked Corn V-341-1 91000 Steam Flaked Corn V-342-1 91050 Steam Flaked Corn V-343-1 91750 Oats - HP Crimped V-344-1 91850 B. HP Sweet Crimped Oats V-345-1 95550 Land O' Lakes Shelled Corn V-346-1 95650 Land O' Cracked Corn V-347-1 95850 Land O' Lakes Chick Crack V-348-1 100850 B. Alfalfa Pellets V-349-1 101850 Cooked Full Fat Soybean V-350-1 122200 Magnatone M-4-B Pels Bulk MANUFACTURER: Buckeye Feed Mills, Dalton, Ohio. RECALLED BY: Manufacturer visited local customers on April 17, 2001. On April 18 and 19, 2001, manufacturer mailed and faxed recall notices. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

DISTRIBUTION: Al, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MO, MN, MS, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, TN, VA, WV, and WI.

 

QUANTITY: 2,790 tons of ruminant feed products and 14,000 tons of non-ruminant feed products.

 

REASON: The animal feed products may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues.

 


 

 10 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

 

CODE

 

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

42,090 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

WI

 

___________________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

 

CODE

 

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

2013

 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997

 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

Sunday, June 14, 2015

 

Larry’s Custom Meats Inc. Recalls Beef Tongue Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials BSE TSE Prion

 


 

DR. DEHAVEN:

 

snip...

 

*** As far as spontaneous cases, that is a very difficult issue.

 

***There is no evidence to prove that spontaneous BSE occurs in cattle; but here again it's an issue of proving a negative.

 

*** We do know that CJD, the human version of the disease, does occur spontaneously in humans at the rate of about 1 in 1 million.

 

*** We don't have enough data to definitively say that spontaneous cases of BSE in cattle occur or do not occur.

 

“Again, it's a very difficult situation to prove a negative.

 

“So a lot of research is ongoing. Certainly if we do come up with any positive samples in the course of this surveillance we will be looking at that question in evaluating those samples but no scientifically hard evidence to confirm or refute whether or not spontaneous cases of BSE occur.

 

snip...

 


 


 

What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.

 

The USDA’s conclusion is a gross oversimplification, said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the worlds experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health.

 

"(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.

 

We can’t say it’s not feed related, agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi State.

 

In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. No one knows the origins of atypical cases of BSE, she said

 

Few scientists would argue that the one California cow which never was headed to the U.S. food supply represents a health hazard.

 

But many maintain that the current surveillance is insufficient.

 

Dr. Kurt Giles, an expert in neurogenerative diseases now at the University of California, San Francisco, was at Oxford during the British outbreak.

 

He told me USDA’s assurances about safety today remind him of British statements during the 1980s.

 

It is so reminiscent of that absolute certainty, he said.

 

Robert Bazell is NBC's chief science and medical correspondent. Follow him on Facebook and on Twitter @RobertBazellNBC

 


 


 


 

THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;

 

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

 

In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:

 

Analysis: What that mad cow means

 

By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent

 

WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

 

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

 

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

 

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

 

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

 

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

 

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.

 

SNIP...

 

UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.

 

SNIP...

 

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.

 

"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.

 

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved

 


 


 

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

 


 

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

 

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

 

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS

 


 

FRANCE HAVE AN EPIDEMIC OF SPONTANEOUS ATYPICAL BSE ‘’LOL’’

 

spontaneous atypical BSE ???

 

if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$

 

As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.

 


 

so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

 

Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

spontaneous TSE prion, that's wishful thinking. on the other hand, if spontaneous did ever happen (never once documented in the field), it would be our worst nightmare, due to feed. just saying.

 

*** We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. ***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

 

>>> Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility. <<<

 


 


 

2014

 

***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.

 

***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.

 

*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].

 

snip...

 


 

All the cases of BSE identified during the major outbreak in the UK were of the same strain type [19]. However, an atypical form of BSE, Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE), was discovered in Italy in 2004 in two old (11 and 15 year old) asymptomatic cows post mortem [19]. Other atypical forms of BSE were subsequently reported in France, Germany and Japan [19-22]. The frequency of atypical BSE may be similar to the occurrence of sporadic CJD, which is about 1 per million individuals [23]. BASE can be biochemically differentiated from BSE by the different mobility of PrP fragments on gel electrophoresis. BASE can also be distinguished from BSE histo-pathologically based on differences in the distribution of vacuoles in the brain. ***BASE shares molecular and histopathological features with the MV2 sub-type of human sporadic

 


 

 

Acquired transmissibility of sheep-passaged L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion to wild-type mice

 

Short report Acquired transmissibility of sheep-passaged L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion to wild-type mice Hiroyuki Okada*, Kentaro Masujin*, Kohtaro Miyazawa and Takashi Yokoyama

 

* Corresponding authors: Hiroyuki Okada okadahi@affrc.go.jp - Kentaro Masujin masujin@affrc.go.jp

 

Author Affiliations

 

National Institute of Animal Health, National Agriculture and Food Research Organization (NARO), Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan

 

For all author emails, please log on.

 

Veterinary Research 2015, 46:81 doi:10.1186/s13567-015-0211-2

 

The electronic version of this article is the complete one and can be found online at: http://www.veterinaryresearch.org/content/46/1/81

 

Received: 3 February 2015 Accepted: 8 June 2015 Published: 13 July 2015

 

© 2015 Okada et al.

 

 

The transmission experiment reported here shows that the host range of L-BSE prions can be extended by inter-species transmission. Further experimental transmission of L-BSE/sheep along with L-BSE into humanized PrP mice will be necessary to evaluate the potential risk for humans.

 

see full text ;

 


 

 

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Acquired transmissibility of sheep-passaged L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion to wild-type mice

 


 

IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure

 

Posted by flounder on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

 


 

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

 

*** Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed?

 


 

 

Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease

 

Cristina Casalone*†, Gianluigi Zanusso†‡, Pierluigi Acutis*, Sergio Ferrari‡, Lorenzo Capucci§, Fabrizio Tagliavini¶, Salvatore Monaco‡ , and Maria Caramelli* *Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d’Aosta, Via Bologna, 148, 10195 Turin, Italy; ‡Department of Neurological and Visual Science, Section of Clinical Neurology, Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Piazzale L.A. Scuro, 10, 37134 Verona, Italy; §Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia ed Emilia Romagna, Via Bianchi, 9, 25124 Brescia, Italy; and ¶Istituto Nazionale Neurologico ‘‘Carlo Besta,’’ Via Celoria 11, 20133 Milan, Italy Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved December 23, 2003 (received for review September 9, 2003)

 

Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are mammalian neurodegenerative disorders characterized by a posttranslational conversion and brain accumulation of an insoluble, protease-resistant isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). Human and animal TSE agents exist as different phenotypes that can be biochemically differentiated on the basis of the molecular mass of the protease-resistant PrPSc fragments and the degree of glycosylation. Epidemiological, molecular, and transmission studies strongly suggest that the single strain of agent responsible for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has infected humans, causing variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease. The unprecedented biological properties of the BSE agent, which circumvents the so-called ‘‘species barrier’’ between cattle and humans and adapts to different mammalian species, has raised considerable concern for human health. To date, it is unknown whether more than one strain might be responsible for cattle TSE or whether the BSE agent undergoes phenotypic variation after natural transmission. Here we provide evidence of a second cattle TSE. The disorder was pathologically characterized by the presence of PrP-immunopositive amyloid plaques, as opposed to the lack of amyloid deposition in typical BSE cases, and by a different pattern of regional distribution and topology of brain PrPSc accumulation. In addition, Western blot analysis showed a PrPSc type with predominance of the low molecular mass glycoform and a protease- resistant fragment of lower molecular mass than BSE-PrPSc. Strikingly, the molecular signature of this previously undescribed bovine PrPSc was similar to that encountered in a distinct subtype of sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease.

 

SNIP...

 

Discussion

 

In natural and experimental TSEs, PrPSc deposition represents an early event that occurs weeks to months before the development of spongiform changes (20, 21). As a consequence, the detection of PrPSc by Western immunoblot provides a unique opportunity in the diagnosis of BSE early in the incubation period and, therefore, in presymptomatic animals. The identification of the present cattle by postmortem biochemical tests, in the absence of clear neurological involvement, suggests that the disorder was detected at early stages, and this may also explain the lack of widespread vacuolar changes.

 

Previous pathological studies in clinically suspect cases of BSE in Great Britain have provided evidence for a uniform pattern in the severity and distribution of vacuolar lesions in affected animals, with medulla oblongata nuclei being the most involved (22). While confirming that the BSE epidemic has been sustained by a single agent, these studies have assessed the validity of statutory criteria for the diagnosis of BSE, which is currently based on both histopathological and immunobiochemical exam- ination of the medulla. However, the prevailing involvement of cortical regions in the cattle with amyloid deposition suggests that postmortem brain sampling should not be limited to the obex. In addition, a careful analysis of PrPSc glycoform profiles at the confirmatory Western immunoblot may provide a molecular means of identifying atypical cases of bovine TSE.

 

Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE): A Second Bovine TSE. The present findings show that a previously undescribed pathological and immunohistochemical phenotype, associated with cattle TSE, is related to the presence of a PrPSc type with biochemical properties, including the gel mobility of the protease-resistant fragment and glycoform ratios, different from those encountered in cattle BSE. Brain deposition of this pathological isoform of cattle PrP correlates with the formation of PrP-amyloid plaques, as opposed to typical BSE cases. Although in several natural and experimental recipients of the BSE agent, including humans (13), neuropathological changes are characterized by the presence of PrP-positive amyloid deposits with surrounding vacuolation, cattle BSE is not associated with PrP-amyloid plaque formation. On the basis of the above features, we propose to name the disease described here BASE. Although observed in only two cattle, the BASE phenotype could be more common than expected. In previous studies, amyloid congophilic plaques were found in 1 of 20 BSE cases examined systematically for amyloid (23), and it was reported that focal cerebral amyloidosis is present in a small proportion of BSE cases (24). Although no biochemical analysis of PrPSc glycotype is available for these animals with ‘‘atypical BSE phenotype,’’ our present results underscore the importance of performing a strain-typing in bovine TSE with amyloid deposition.

 

In sCJD, the neuropathological phenotype largely correlates with the molecular type of PrPSc and distinct polymorphic sites of PRNP (9, 19). This is in contrast with the situation in cattle, where different genotypes have been reported based on the variable numbers of octapeptide repeats in each allele, but no evidence for single-codon polymorphisms in the PrP gene has been established (25, 26). Because the present animals shared a similar genetic background and breed, differences in disease phenotypes between cattle with BSE and BASE can be tentatively related only to distinct PrPSc types or alternative routes of infection and spread of prion pathology. Accordingly, the lack of involvement of the motor dorsal nucleus of the vagus and the slight involvement of the brainstem in BASE, suggests a route for spreading of the agent other than the alimentary tract. Therefore, unless the BASE agent propagates throughout the olfactory pathway or other peripheral routes, it is possible that this disorder represents a sporadic form of cattle TSE, which would also explain the difference in ages between the two groups of affected animals.

 

Phenotypic Similarities Between BASE and sCJD. The transmissibility of CJD brains was initially demonstrated in primates (27), and classification of atypical cases as CJD was based on this property (28). To date, no systematic studies of strain typing in sCJD have been provided, and classification of different subtypes is based on clinical, neuropathological, and molecular features (the polymorphic PRNP codon 129 and the PrPSc glycotype) (8, 9, 15, 19).

 

The importance of molecular PrPSc characterization in assessing the identity of TSE strains is underscored by several studies, showing that the stability of given disease-specific PrPSc types is maintained upon experimental propagation of sCJD, familial CJD, and vCJD isolates in transgenic PrP-humanized mice (8, 29). Similarly, biochemical properties of BSE- and vCJDassociated PrPSc molecules remain stable after passage to mice expressing bovine PrP (30). Recently, however, it has been reported that PrP-humanized mice inoculated with BSE tissues may also propagate a distinctive PrPSc type, with a ‘‘monoglycosylated- dominant’’ pattern and electrophoretic mobility of the unglycosylated fragment slower than that of vCJD and BSE (31). Strikingly, this PrPSc type shares its molecular properties with the a PrPSc molecule found in classical sCJD. This observation is at variance with the PrPSc type found in M V2 sCJD cases and in cattle BASE, showing a monoglycosylated-dominant pattern but faster electrophoretic mobility of the protease-resistant fragment as compared with BSE. In addition to molecular properties of PrPSc, BASE and M V2 sCJD share a distinctive pattern of intracerebral PrP deposition, which occurs as plaque-like and amyloid-kuru plaques. Differences were, however, observed in the regional distribution of PrPSc. While inM V2 sCJD cases the largest amounts of PrPSc were detected in the cerebellum, brainstem, and striatum, in cattle BASE these areas were less involved and the highest levels of PrPSc were recovered from the thalamus and olfactory regions.

 

In conclusion, decoding the biochemical PrPSc signature of individual human and animal TSE strains may allow the identification of potential risk factors for human disorders with unknown etiology, such as sCJD. However, although BASE and sCJD share several characteristics, caution is dictated in assessing a link between conditions affecting two different mammalian species, based on convergent biochemical properties of diseaseassociated PrPSc types. Strains of TSE agents may be better characterized upon passage to transgenic mice. In the interim until this is accomplished, our present findings suggest a strict epidemiological surveillance of cattle TSE and sCJD based on molecular criteria.

 


 

***In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

 


 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 


 

 

 SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY CASE INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 (ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE)

 

Summary Report BSE 2012

 

Executive Summary

 


 

Saturday, August 4, 2012

 

*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 ***

 


 

Saturday, August 4, 2012

 

Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE Epidemiological Investigation

 


 

Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate

 

Conclusion/Significance Our results point to a possibly higher degree of pathogenicity of BASE than classical BSE in primates and also raise a question about a possible link to one uncommon subset of cases of apparently sporadic CJD. Thus, despite the waning epidemic of classical BSE, the occurrence of atypical strains should temper the urge to relax measures currently in place to protect public health from accidental contamination by BSE-contaminated products.

 


 

Sunday, September 1, 2013

 

*** Evaluation of the Zoonotic Potential of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy

 

We previously described the biochemical similarities between PrPres derived from L-BSE infected macaque and cortical MM2 sporadic CJD: those observations suggest a link between these two uncommon prion phenotypes in a primate model (it is to note that such a link has not been observed in other models less relevant from the human situation as hamsters or transgenic mice overexpressing ovine PrP [28]). We speculate that a group of related animal prion strains (L-BSE, c-BSE and TME) would have a zoonotic potential and lead to prion diseases in humans with a type 2 PrPres molecular signature (and more specifically type 2B for vCJD)

 

snip...

 

Together with previous experiments performed in ovinized and bovinized transgenic mice and hamsters [8,9] indicating similarities between TME and L-BSE, the data support the hypothesis that L-BSE could be the origin of the TME outbreaks in North America and Europe during the mid-1900s.

 


 

TEXAS ATYPICAL H-BSE MAD COW CASE

 

On June 24, 2005, the USDA announced receipt of final results from The Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, confirming BSE in a cow that had conflicting test results in 2004. This cow was from Texas, died at approximately 12 years of age, and represented the first endemic case of BSE in the United States. (see Texas BSE Investigation, Final Epidemiology Report, August 2005 External Web Site Policy PDF Document Icon (PDF – 83 KB))

 

ALABAMA ATYPICAL H-TYPE GENETIC BSE

 

On March 15, 2006, the USDA announced the confirmation of BSE in a cow in Alabama. The case was identified in a non-ambulatory (downer) cow on a farm in Alabama. The animal was euthanized by a local veterinarian and buried on the farm. The age of the cow was estimated by examination of the dentition as 10-years-old. It had no ear tags or distinctive marks; the herd of origin could not be identified despite an intense investigation (see second featured item above and Alabama BSE Investigation, Final Epidemiology Report, May 2006 External Web Site PolicyPDF Document Icon (PDF – 104 KB)).

 

In August 2008, several ARS investigators reported that a rare, genetic abnormality that may persist within the cattle population "is considered to have caused" BSE in this atypical (H-type) BSE animal from Alabama. (See Identification of a Heritable Polymorphism in Bovine PRNP Associated with Genetic Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy: Evidence of Heritable BSE External Web Site Policy. Also see BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation External Web Site Policy.)

 

On December 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced a presumptive diagnosis of the first known case of BSE in the United States. It was in an adult Holstein cow from Washington State. This diagnosis was confirmed by an international reference laboratory in Weybridge, England, on December 25. Trace-back based on an ear-tag identification number and subsequent genetic testing confirmed that the BSE-infected cow was imported into the United States from Canada in August 2001. Because the animal was non-ambulatory (a "downer cow") at slaughter, brain tissue samples were taken by USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service as part of its targeted surveillance for BSE. However the animal's condition was attributed to complications from calving. After the animal was examined by a USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) veterinary medical officer both before and after slaughter, the carcass was released for use as food for human consumption. During slaughter, the tissues considered to be at high risk for the transmission of the BSE agent were removed. On December 24, 2003, FSIS recalled beef from cattle slaughtered in the same plant on the same day as the BSE positive cow. (see Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Dairy Cow - Washington State, 2003.)

 


 

Tuesday, August 22, 2006

 

BSE ATYPICAL TEXAS AND ALABAMA UPDATE JANUARY 20, 2007

 


 

LAST MAD COW IN USA, IN CALIFORNIA, WAS ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE TSE PRION DISEASE Thursday, February 20, 2014

 

Unnecessary precautions BSE MAD COW DISEASE Dr. William James FSIS VS Dr. Linda Detwiler 2014

 


 

IF, spontaneous BSE was ever to be proven, it would be the industry, and consumer’s worst nightmare. you could never ever eradicate mad cow disease, no matter how hard you try...terry

 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

 

Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service

 

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

 

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

 

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

 


 

ALSO, PLEASE SEE ;

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 


 

LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow. This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$ ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

 


 


 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 


 

her healthy calf also carried the mutation

 

(J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).

 

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.

 

Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

 Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 


 

PLOS Singeltary Comment ;

 

*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT

 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

 

*** ATYPICAL BSE AND POTENTIAL FOR ANIMAL PROTEIN FEED TO BE A LINK THERE FROM ***

 

 

P.9.21 Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

 

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

 

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle. Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.

 

Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

 

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. * It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

 

 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary Comment

 


 


 

Thursday, February 20, 2014

 

***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model

 


 

***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle

 


 

***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 


 

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

 


 

full text ;

 

atypical L-type BASE BSE

 


 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons

 


 

Saturday, January 31, 2015

 

RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to BSE

 


 

Conclusion/Significance: Our results point to a possibly higher degree of pathogenicity of BASE than classical BSE in primates and also raise a question about a possible link to one uncommon subset of cases of apparently sporadic CJD. Thus, despite the waning epidemic of classical BSE, the occurrence of atypical strains should temper the urge to relax measures currently in place to protect public health from accidental contamination by BSE-contaminated products.

 


 


 


 

1. The BSE epidemic

 

1.1. The origin of the BSE epidemic will probably never be determined with certainty.

 

1.2. We do not know whether or not some of the BARB cases represent truly sporadic classical BSE. If there are spontaneous cases then BSE will never be eradicated although reducing surveillance could make it appear that BSE has been eradicated.

 

snip...

 

5.3. It was stated that the number of sporadic CJD cases was rising. Participants were invited to discuss the reason for this. It was suggested that this was likely to be due to improved surveillance with more cases of sporadic CJD being detected (i.e. through MRI scans). There had been a similar increase in sporadic CJD in countries which did not have a BSE epidemic but improved their surveillance. This supported this theory and suggested that the increase in sporadic CJD was not related to the BSE outbreak.

 


 

Atypical BSE: Transmissibility

 

Linda Detwiller, 5/10/2011

 

 BASE (L) transmitted to:  cattle (IC) - inc < 20 mos and oral?)

 

 Cynomolgus macaques (IC)

 

 Mouse lemurs (IC and oral)

 

 wild-type mice (IC)

 

 bovinized transgenic mice (IC and IP)

 

 humanized transgenic mice (IC)

 

 H cases transmitted to:

 

 cattle – IC incubations < 20 months

 

 bovinized transgenic mice (IC)

 

 ovinized transgenic mice (IC)

 

 C57BL mice (IC)

 

 One study did not transmit to humanized PrP Met 129 mice

 

Evaluation of Possibility of Atypical

 

BSE Transmitting to Humans

 

 Possble interpretation:

 

 L type seems to transmit to nonhuman primates with greater ease than classical BSE

 

 L type also transmitted to humanized transgenic mice with higher attack rate and shorter incubation period than classical?

 

 H type did not transmit to Tg Hu transgenic mice

 

Linda Detwiller, 5/10/2011

 


 

I ask Professor Kong ;

 

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM

 

Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

 

IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....

 

Professor Kong reply ;

 

.....snip

 

As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.

 

Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

 

BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

 

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.

 


 


 

P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models

 

Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA

 

Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely undefined.

 

Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.

 

Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.

 

Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.

 

Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

 

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.

 


 


 


 

14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

 

18.173 page 189

 

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

 

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

 

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

 

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions. At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

 

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathoge esis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types.

 

Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

 


 

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Further characterisation of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy phenotypes after inoculation of cattle with two temporally separated sources of sheep scrapie from Great Britain

 


 

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Progressive accumulation of the abnormal conformer of the prion protein and spongiform encephalopathy in the obex of nonsymptomatic and symptomatic Rocky Mountain elk (Cervus elaphus nelsoni) with chronic wasting disease

 


 

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Porcine Prion Protein Amyloid or mad pig disease PSE

 


 

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Acquired transmissibility of sheep-passaged L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion to wild-type mice

 


 

IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure

 

Posted by flounder on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

 


 

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

 

*** Additional BSE TSE prion testing detects pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc by PMCA only, how many cases have we missed?

 


 

2015 FDA UPDATE BSE

 

Tuesday, August 4, 2015

 

*** FDA U.S. Measures to Protect Against BSE ***

 


 


 

BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

 

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

 

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

 

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

 

CODE

 

None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

477.72 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6;

 

b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6.

 

CODE

 

None. Bulk product

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.

 

Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

1,484 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

TN and WV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 2006

 

###

 


 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6

 

CODE

 

None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

Approximately 2,223 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6

 

CODE

 

None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

1,220 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

KY

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6

 

CODE

 

None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

40 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

LA and MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6

 

CODE

 

None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

7,150 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6

 

CODE

 

None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

87 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6

 

CODE

 

None

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

350 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL and MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,

 

50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;

 

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,

 

50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;

 

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,

 

50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;

 

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;

 

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;

 

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;

 

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

 

CODE

 

All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.

 

Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

7,541-50 lb bags

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL, GA, MS, and TN

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

 

###

 


 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT

 

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

 

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

 

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

 

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

 

*** e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

 

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

 

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

 

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

 

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

 

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

 

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

 

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

 

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE

 

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

 

###

 


 

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;

 

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;

 

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

 

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE

 

a) Bulk

 

b) None

 

c) Bulk

 

d) Bulk

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

 

###

 


 

what about that ALABAMA MAD COW, AND MAD COW FEED THERE FROM IN THAT STATE ???

 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

 

*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 

BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA

 

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT

 

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

 

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

 

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

 

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

 

CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION AL

 

______________________________

 

 


 

 

Saturday, March 21, 2015

 

Canada and United States Creutzfeldt Jakob TSE Prion Disease Incidence Rates Increasing

 


 

 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.