Emmanuel Comoy,1,† Nina Jaffre,1 Jacqueline Mikol,1 Valérie Durand,1 Sophie Freire,1 Evelyne Correia,1 Maurizio Pocchiari,2 Bob Hills,3 Paul Brown1 and Jean-Philippe Deslys1
1 Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France; 2 Istituto Superiore di Sanita; Roma, Italy; 3 Health Canada; Ottawa, ON Canada†Presenting author; Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
On the basis of 200,000 clinical BSE cases recorded in UK, it has been estimated that nearly 2,000,000 infected but undiagnosed cattle would have entered the human food chain. To date, only 171 clinical cases of vCJD have been reported, suggesting a high species barrier between cattle and humans. However, transmission experiments in primates would instead suggest a low cattle-to-primate species barrier.
This apparent paradox could be partly explained by a very heterogeneous exposure of consumers; either a low number of people exposed to a high amount of infectivity, or a high number of people (10,000- to 100,000-fold more) exposed to a very low amount of infectivity. The existence of subclinical or preclinical cases with extended periods of incubation in individuals exposed to low doses of infectivity remains to be answered, and bears heavily on the issue of potential secondary exposures through surgical procedures and blood (and tissue) donations
We inoculated cynomolgus macaques with serial dilutions of BSE-infected material. High dose-inoculated animals developed typical clinical disease with all the pathognomonic hallmarks, and incubation periods ranging from 3–8 years. Among low-dosed animals, some developed clinical signs with atypical patterns after extensive incubation periods, exhibiting lesion and biochemical profiles that differed sharply from the typical disease picture. Despite the presence of neurological signs and neuronal lesions, classical lesions of spongiosis and presence of cerebral PrPres were inconstant, or even absent. These observations suggest that low-dose exposure, which would have been the most frequent occurrence during the period of risk, could induce a non-typical pathology that may not be recognized as "prion disease."
link url not available, please see PRION 2011 ;
please see September 29, 2000 ;
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Friday, September 29, 2000 9:15 AM
Subject: vCJD (aka madcow disease) or vaccineCJD???
just speaking of human TSE's; "different strains (of same disease), different routes of infection (of same disease), different infectivity levels (dose rate) of the (same disease) = different symptoms, different lengths of illness from 1st onset of illness to death, (of the same disease) + different cultures = different geographical locations = different strains (of same disease)...TSS"
p.s. (on the old lyman links, remove the word lyman in the url link, and add the word madcow, the link should then work... tss)
January 08,200l 3:03 PM
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [email@example.com]
Sent: Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM
Subject: CJD/BSE (aka madcow) Human/Animal TSE’s--U.S.--Submission To Scientific Advisors and Consultants Staff January 2001 Meeting (short version)
AND PLEASE FOR GODS SAKE, STOP saying vCJD victims are the only ones tied to this environmental death sentence. "PROVE IT". It's just not true. The 'CHOSEN ONES' are not the only ones dying because of this man-made death sentence. When making regulations for human health from human/animal TSEs, you had better include ALL human TSE's, not just vCJD. Do NOT underestimate sporadic CJD with the 'prehistoric' testing available to date. This could be a deadly mistake. Remember, sCJD kills much faster from 1st onset.of symptoms to death, and hvCJD is the fastest. Could it just be a higher titre of infectivity, or route or source, or all three?
Last, but not least. The illegal/legal harvesting of body parts and tissues will come back to haunt you. Maybe not morally, but due to NO background checks and human TSEs, again it i will continue to spread. Stupidity, Ignorance and Greed is what fuels this disease. You must stop all of this, and ACT AT ONCE...
"so my quesion is, how low is 'low' in quantifing the infectious dose in vCJD, comparing to _all_ sporadic CJDs, from the different potential routes, sources, and infectivity dose?"
Greetings List Members,
This is _very_ disturbing to me:
The distribution of PrPSc in the body is different in sporadic and variant CJD, reflecting the different pathogenesis of the two forms. In the case ot sporadic CJD, prion infectivity is largely limited to the CNS (including the retina) and only operations involving the brain and eye have resulted in iatrogenic transmission of the disease. Gastro-intestinal endoscopy is unlikely to be a vector for the transmission of sporadic CJD as infected tissue is not encountered during the procedure. No special precautions are necessary during or after the procedure and the endoscope should be cleaned and disinfected in the normal thorough way.4
i personally believe it is irresponsible for anyone to state in this day and time, that sporadic CJDs (now at 6 variants) will not transmit the disease by this route. considering infective dose cannot be quantified, only speculated, such a statement is thus, irresponsible. to hypothosize that sporadic CJD just happens spontaneously (with no scientific proof), that the PrPSc distribution in tissues of all sporadic CJDs is entirely different than that of vCJD, without being able to quantify the titre of infection, or even confirm all the different variants yet, again is _not_ based on all scientific data, then it's only a hypothosis. who is to say that some of these variants of sporadic CJD were not obtained _orally_?
Although thorough cleaning of flexible endoscopes ensures patient safety for ''normal'' pathogens, the same process may not be adequate for the PrPSc.
The sporadic form of CJD affects approximately one person per mil-lion per annum in the population on a worldwide basis.
who is to say how much infectivity are in some of these variants of sporadic CJDs, without confirming this? if we look at the 6 different variants of sporadic CJDs, has the infective dose for all 6 _documented_ variants been quantified, and documented as being 'measurable'?
will there be more variants of sporadic CJDs, and what of the ramifications from them?
what of other strains/variants of TSE in cattle, BSE in sheep, CWD in cattle, or any of the 20+ strains of Scrapies in deer/elk? i get dizzy thinking of the different scenerio's. what would the human TSEs from these species look like and how can anyone quantify any tissue infectivity from these potential TSE transmissions to humans, and the risk scenerio described here from this potential route? could not some of these sporadic CJDs have derived directly or indirectly from one of these species, and if so, pose a risk by the route described here?
something else to consider, in the recent finding of the incubation period of 38 years from a _small_ dose of human growth hormone;
We describe the second patient with hGH related CJD in the Netherlands. The patient developed the disease 38 years after hGH injections. To our knowledge, this is the longest incubation period described for any form of iatrogentic CJD. Furthermore, our patient was _not_ treated with hGH, but only received a _low_ dose as part of a diagnostic procedure. (see full text below).
so my quesion is, how low is 'low' in quantifing the infectious dose in vCJD, comparing to _all_ sporadic CJDs, from the different potential routes, sources, and infectivity dose?
will the titre of infectivity in every tissue and organ of all sporadic CJDs stay exact or constant, no matter what the infective dose, route and species may be? this is considering you don't buy the fact that sporadic CJDs 85%+ of _all_ CJDs, are a happen stance of bad luck, happen spontaneously without cause, and are one-in-a-million world wide, with no substantial surveillance to confirm this.
see gut link bramble et al on blogspot...tss
Could it just be a higher titre of infectivity, or route or source, or all three? ...
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque
"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"
Sunday, May 01, 2011
STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE 2010 Annual Report May 2011
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report
Saturday, December 01, 2007
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model
Volume 13, Number 12–December 2007 Research
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor
What is the potential cost of pre- and post-slaughter testing? The estimated cost of post-mortem testing is $40 per head. This amount is comprised almost entirely of the cost of the test kit and sample analysis. It is expected that ante-mortem tests (live animal), if a test is developed, will reduce BSE testing costs to approximately $15 per head.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee
The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government’s decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010
2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo—has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50
Monday, May 23, 2011
Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011
Top Curr Chem (2011)
# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011
Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Bacliff, TX, USA
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
12 years independent research of available data
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Clinical research in CJD at a U.S. clinical prion research center: CJD Quinacrine Study results and improved diagnosis of prion disease
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE
TSE & HOUNDS
GAH WELLS (very important statement here...TSS)
AS implied in the Inset 25 we must not _ASSUME_ that transmission of BSE to other species will invariably present pathology typical of a scrapie-like disease.
PLEASE NOTE *
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...