Thursday, January 29, 2015

OIE REPORT Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Prion (atypical BSE type H), Norway Information received on 29/01/2015

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy ,Norway Information received on 29/01/2015

 

from Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief Veterinary Officer, Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Brumunddal, Norway

 

Summary Report type Immediate notification Date of start of the event 16/01/2015 Date of pre-confirmation of the event 20/01/2015 Report date 29/01/2015 Date submitted to OIE 29/01/2015 Reason for notification First occurrence of a listed disease Manifestation of disease Sub-clinical infection Causal agent Prion (atypical BSE type H) Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced) This event pertains to the whole country

 

New outbreaks Summary of outbreaks Total outbreaks: 1 Outbreak Location NORD-TRONDELAG ( Verran, Tua, District office Innherred og Fosen, Region office Trøndelag og Møre og Romdal ) Total animals affected Species Susceptible Cases Deaths Destroyed Slaughtered Cattle 27 1 0 1 0 Outbreak statistics Species Apparent morbidity rate Apparent mortality rate Apparent case fatality rate Proportion susceptible animals lost* Cattle 3.70% 0.00% 0.00% 3.70%

 

* Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter;

 

Epidemiology Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive Epidemiological comments Based on status on 29 January 2015: On 20 January 2015, the Norwegian Veterinary Institute reported suspicion of BSE on a cow in Norway, based on initial test done on CNS material. Part of this material was sent to European Union Reference Laboratory in Weybridge (21 January 2015) for verification of diagnosis. The affected cow was a 15-year-old and born in Norway. The dam was imported from Sweden. The cow did not show clinical signs of neurological disease before she was killed (12 January 2015) due to old age and injuries. The BSE test was taken as part of the BSE surveillance program. The Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA) has put restrictions on movement on the farm, and performed epidemiological investigations. The NFSA has identified four risk animals, according to relevant legislation. These animals are also placed under official movement restrictions. The four identified risk animals will be killed and disposed by incineration according to European Union legislation. The epidemiological investigation including tracing of risk animals from the holding of origin as well as the present holding has identified 2 offspring borne within two years prior to the incident in addition to 2 cattle belonging either to (1) the cohort of animals born in the same herd as the affected animal within 12 months preceding or following the date of birth of the affected cow or (2) the cohort of animals which at any time during the first year of their lives were reared together with the affected cow during her first year of life. Progeny borne within two years prior to the incident and the cohort of risk animals are put under movement restrictions and the killing and destruction of these animals will be carried into effect as soon as possible. The affected cow’s carcass has been completely destroyed. The NFSA ensures that the cow’s carcass has been processed by pressure sterilisation in a Category 1 processing plant and that the resulting material has been sent for incineration/co-incineration in accordance with the By-Products Regulation.

 

Control measures Measures applied Movement control inside the country Screening No vaccination No treatment of affected animals Measures to be applied Modified stamping out

 

Diagnostic test results Laboratory name and type Norwegian Veterinary Institute ( National laboratory ) Tests and results Species Test Test date Result Cattle enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) 20/01/2015 Positive Cattle western blot 20/01/2015 Positive Laboratory name and type EU Reference Laboratory, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge (United Kingdom) ( OIE’s Reference Laboratory ) Tests and results Species Test Test date Result Cattle immunohistochemical test 28/01/2015 Positive Cattle western blot 28/01/2015 Positive

 

Future Reporting The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.

 


 

Encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine ,Norvège Information reçue le 29/01/2015 de Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief Veterinary Officer, Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Brumunddal, Norvège

 

Résumé Type de rapport Notification immédiate Date de début de l’événement 16/01/2015 Date de pré-confirmation de l´événement 20/01/2015 Date du rapport 29/01/2015 Date d'envoi à l'OIE 29/01/2015 Raison de notification Apparition pour la première fois d’une maladie listée par l'OIE Manifestation de la maladie Infection sub-clinique Agent causal Prion (EEB atypique, type H) Nature du diagnostic Tests approfondis en laboratoire (i.e. virologie, microscopie électronique, biologie moléculaire, immunologie) Cet événement se rapporte à tout le pays

 

Nouveaux foyers Récapitulatif des foyers Nombre total de foyers : 1 Localisation du foyer NORD-TRONDELAG ( Verran, Tua, District office Innherred og Fosen, Region office Trøndelag og Møre og Romdal ) Nombre total d'animaux atteints Espèce(s) Sensibles Cas Morts Détruits Abattus Bovins 27 1 0 1 0 Statistiques sur le foyer Espèce(s) Taux de morbidité apparent Taux de mortalité apparent Taux de fatalité apparent Proportion d'animaux sensibles perdus* Bovins 3.70% 0.00% 0.00% 3.70%

 

* Soustraits de la population sensible suite à la mort, à l´abattage et/ou à la destruction;

 

Epidémiologie Source du/des foyer(s) ou origine de l´infection Inconnue ou incertaine Autres renseignements épidémiologiques / Commentaires Situation au 29 janvier 2015 : Le 20 janvier 2015, l'Institut vétérinaire norvégien a informé d’une suspicion d’EEB chez une vache en Norvège en se basant sur un test initial effectué sur du matériel du SNC. Une partie de ce matériel a été envoyé au Laboratoire de référence de l'Union européenne à Weybridge (21 janvier 2015) pour vérification du diagnostic. La vache atteinte était âgée de 15 ans et était née en Norvège. La mère avait été importée de Suède. La vache n'a pas montré de signes cliniques de maladie neurologique avant d'être abattue en raison de son âge et de lésions (12 janvier 2015). Le test pour l’EEB a été effectué dans le cadre du programme de surveillance de l’EEB. L'Autorité norvégienne de sécurité alimentaire (NFSA) a mis en œuvre des restrictions aux déplacements dans l’élevage et a effectué des enquêtes épidémiologiques. La NFSA a identifié quatre animaux à risque, conformément à la législation pertinente. Les déplacements de ces animaux sont également soumis à des restrictions officielles. Les quatre animaux à risque identifiés seront abattus et éliminés par incinération conformément à la législation de l'Union européenne. Lors de l'enquête épidémiologique y compris l’enquête en amont des animaux à risque de l'exploitation d'origine ainsi que de l’exploitation actuelle ont été identifiés 2 descendants nés dans les deux ans précédant l'incident en plus de 2 bovins appartenant soit à (1) la cohorte d’animaux nés dans le même troupeau que l'animal atteint dans les 12 mois précédant ou suivant la date de naissance de la vache atteinte soit à (2) la cohorte d’animaux qui au cours de la première année de leur vies ont été élevés avec la vache atteinte au cours de sa première année de vie. Les déplacements de la descendance née dans les deux années qui ont précédé l'incident et de la cohorte d’animaux à risque sont soumis à des restrictions et l’abattage et la destruction de ces animaux seront effectués dès que possible. La carcasse de la vache atteinte a été complètement détruite. La NFSA s’assure que la carcasse de la vache a été traitée par stérilisation sous pression dans une usine de transformation de catégorie 1 et que le matériau résultant a été envoyé à l'incinération / co-incinération conformément aux dispositions du règlement sur les sous-produits animaux.

 

Mesures de lutte Mesure de lutte appliquées Restriction des déplacements à l'intérieur du pays Dépistage Pas de vaccination Aucun traitement des animaux atteints Mesures à appliquer Abattage sanitaire partiel

 

Résultats des tests de diagnostics Nom du laboratoire et type Laboratoire de référence de l'Union européenne, Agence de la santé animale et végétale (APHA), Weybridge (Royaume-Uni) ( Laboratoire de référence de l’OIE ) Tests et résultats Espèce(s) Test Date du test Résultat Bovins examen immunohistochimique 28/01/2015 Positif Bovins western blot 28/01/2015 Positif Nom du laboratoire et type Institut vétérinaire norvégien ( Laboratoire national ) Tests et résultats Espèce(s) Test Date du test Résultat Bovins méthode de dosage immuno-enzymatique (ELISA) 20/01/2015 Positif Nom du laboratoire et type Institut vétérinaire norvégien ( Laboratoire national ) Tests et résultats Espèce(s) Test Date du test Résultat Bovins western blot 20/01/2015 Positif

 

Rapports futurs Cet événement se poursuit. Des rapports de suivi hebdomadaires devront être envoyés.

 


 

Encefalopatía espongiforme bovina ,Noruega Información recibida el 29/01/2015 desde Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief Veterinary Officer, Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Brumunddal, Noruega

 

Resumen Tipo de informe Notificación inmediata Fecha del inicio del evento 16/01/2015 Fecha de pre-confirmación del evento 20/01/2015 Fecha del informe 29/01/2015 Fecha de envio del informe a la OIE 29/01/2015 Motivo de la notificación Aparición por primera vez de una enfermedad de la Lista de la OIE Manifestación de la enfermedad Infección sub-clínica Agente causal Prion (EEB atípica, tipo H) Naturaleza del diagnóstico Pruebas de diagnóstico de laboratorio avanzadas (ej. virología, microscopía electrónica, biología molecular e inmunología) Este evento concierne todo el país

 

Nuevos focos Resumen de los focos Número total de focos: 1 Localización del foco NORD-TRONDELAG ( Verran, Tua, District office Innherred og Fosen, Region office Trøndelag og Møre og Romdal ) Número total de animales afectados Especies Susceptibles Casos Muertos Destruidos Sacrificados Bovinos 27 1 0 1 0 Estadística del foco Especies Tasa de morbilidad aparente Tasa de mortalidad aparente Tasa de fatalidad aparente Proporción de animales susceptibles perdidos* Bovinos 3.70% 0.00% 0.00% 3.70%

 

* Descontados de la población susceptible a raíz de su muerte, destrucción o sacrificio;

 

Epidemiología Fuente del o de los focos u origen de la infección Desconocida o no concluyente Otros detalles epidemiológicos / comentarios Situación al 29 de enero de 2015: El 20 de enero de 2015, el Instituto de veterinaria noruego informó de una sospecha de EEB en una vaca en Noruega basada en una prueba inicial realizada con material del SNC. Parte de este material se envió al Laboratorio de referencia de la Unión Europea en Weybridge (21 de enero de 2015) para verificar el diagnóstico. La vaca afectada tenía 15 años y nació en Noruega. La madre fue importada de Suecia. La vaca no mostró signos clínicos de enfermedad neurológica antes de ser eliminada por su edad avanzada y lesiones (12 de enero de 2015). La prueba para la EEB fue realizada en el marco del programa de vigilancia para la EEB. La Autoridad noruega de seguridad alimentaria (NFSA) ha impuesto restricciones a los desplazamientos en la explotación y ha realizado las investigaciones epidemiológicas. La NFSA ha identificado cuatro animales de riesgo, de acuerdo con la legislación pertinente. Los desplazamientos de estos animales también son sometidos a las restricciones oficiales. Los cuatro animales de riesgo identificados serán eliminados y destruidos por incineración de acuerdo con la legislación de la Unión Europea. En la investigación epidemiológica incluido el rastreo de los animales de riesgo de la explotación de origen así como de la explotación actual se han identificado 2 descendientes nacidos en los dos años anteriores al incidente además de 2 bovinos pertenecientes a (1) la cohorte de animales nacidos en el mismo rebaño que el animal afectado en los 12 meses anteriores o posteriores a la fecha de nacimiento de la vaca afectada o a (2) la cohorte de animales que en cualquier momento durante el primer año de vida fueron criados con la vaca afectada durante su primer año de vida. Los desplazamientos de la descendencia nacida en los dos años anteriores al incidente y de la cohorte de animales de riesgo están sometidos a restricciones y la matanza y la destrucción de estos animales se llevará a cabo lo antes posible. La canal de la vaca afectada ha sido completamente destruida. La NFSA se asegura de que la canal de la vaca ha sido procesada por esterilización a presión en una planta de transformación de la categoría 1 y de que el material resultante ha sido enviado para su incineración/co-incineración de conformidad con el reglamento relativo a los subproductos de origen animal.

 

Medidas de Control Medidas implementadas Restricción de los movimientos en el interior del país Tamizaje Vacunación: no Ningún tratamiento de los animales afectados Medidas para implementar Sacrificio sanitario parcial

 

Resultados de las pruebas diagnósticas Nombre y tipo de laboratorio Laboratorio de referencia de la Unión Europea, Agencia de sanidad animal y vegetal (APHA), Weybridge (Reino Unido) ( Laboratorio de referencia de la OIE ) Pruebas y resultados Especies Prueba Fecha de la prueba Resultados Bovinos examen inmunohistoquímico 28/01/2015 Positivo Bovinos western blot 28/01/2015 Positivo Nombre y tipo de laboratorio Instituto de veterinaria noruego ( Laboratorio nacional ) Pruebas y resultados Especies Prueba Fecha de la prueba Resultados Bovinos prueba inmunoenzimática (ELISA) 20/01/2015 Positivo Bovinos western blot 20/01/2015 Positivo

 

Informes futuros El episodio continúa. Informes de seguimiento semanales serán enviados

 

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Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of NORWAY

 

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083

 

Adopted July 2004

 


 

Thursday, January 29, 2015

 

Atypical H-TYPE BSE Case Confirmed in Norway

 


 

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

 

Norway detects "probable" case of mad cow disease

 




UPDATE...FINAL REPORT...TSS


Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Norway

 

Information received on 20/02/2015 from Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief Veterinary Officer, Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Brumunddal, Norway

 

Summary

 

Report type Follow-up report No. 2 (Final report) Date of start of the event 16/01/2015 Date of pre-confirmation of the event 20/01/2015 Report date 20/02/2015 Date submitted to OIE 20/02/2015 Date event resolved 03/02/2015 Reason for notification First occurrence of a listed disease Manifestation of disease Sub-clinical infection Causal agent Prion (atypical BSE type H) Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced) This event pertains to the whole country Related reports Immediate notification (29/01/2015) Follow-up report No. 1 (06/02/2015) Follow-up report No. 2 (20/02/2015)

 

Outbreaks There are no new outbreaks in this report

 

Epidemiology

 

Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive Probably spontaneous Epidemiological comments Based on status on 20 February 2015: The four risk animals are killed and all of them tested negative for BSE. The four risk animals are all incinerated (with reference to NFSA [Norwegian Food Safety Authority] inspection-system Mats).

 

Control measures

 

Measures applied Movement control inside the country Screening Modified stamping out No vaccination No treatment of affected animals Measures to be applied No other measures

 

 Future Reporting

 

The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.

 


 

 > Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive Probably spontaneous

 

Discussion:

 

The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan.

 

*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

 

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

 


 

*** PLOS Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

PLOS Singeltary Comment ;

 

*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

Saturday, January 24, 2015

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons

 


 

Saturday, January 31, 2015

 

RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to BSE

 


 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

 

CODE

 

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

42,090 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

WI

 

___________________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

 

CODE

 

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

2013

 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA

 


 

Saturday, June 12, 2010

 

PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse

 


 

Sunday, December 28, 2014

 

Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFOIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE PRION aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014

 


 

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

 

MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST 2014

 


 

Thursday, October 02, 2014

 

[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 


 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

 


 

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

 


 

snip...see full text ;

 

Monday, February 23, 2015

 

20th BSE Case Raises New Concerns about Canada's Feeding Practices and Voluntary Testing Program; Highlights Importance of COOL

 


 

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

 

Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President

 


 


 


 


 

 

TSS

 
 
 

American Association of Zoo Veterinarians Infectious Disease Committee Manual 2013

 

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)

 

Little is known about atypical BSE. The origin and natural routes of transmission, if any, have yet to be determined. Almost all cases have been in older cattle (usually > 8 years of age) that have shown little resemblance to the clinic-pathological picture seen in classical disease. It has been suggested that the disease may be sporadic or be caused by a genetic mutation, but no convincing evidence has been found to support either of these ideas. The correct answer will probably only come by study of the future annual incidence curves of both types of disease. Regardless of the origin of atypical BSE, the possibility of recycling the disease in cattle and other ruminants, as well as the potential for transmission to humans, mandate a continuation of feed and specified-risk materials (SRM) bans, together with diagnostic testing programs for some time to come.

 

snip...

 

Naturally occurring cases of BSE in species other than cattle have been very limited and have been linked to exposure to contaminated feed or infected carcasses. The majority of cases originated in the UK and like BSE in cattle, have declined with the implementation of feed controls. None of the exotic animals were infected in the wild.

 

Experts who may be consulted: Linda A. Detwiler, DVM Clinical Professor Department of Pathobiology and Population Medicine

 

College of Veterinary Medicine Mississippi State University 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 ldetwiler@belle-terre.com

 


 

Atypical BSE: Transmissibility

 

 BASE (L) transmitted to:  cattle (IC) - inc < 20 mos and oral?)

 

 Cynomolgus macaques (IC)

 

 Mouse lemurs (IC and oral)

 

 wild-type mice (IC)

 

 bovinized transgenic mice (IC and IP)

 

 humanized transgenic mice (IC)

 

 H cases transmitted to:

 

 cattle – IC incubations < 20 months

 

 bovinized transgenic mice (IC)

 

 ovinized transgenic mice (IC)

 

 C57BL mice (IC)

 

 One study did not transmit to humanized PrP Met 129 mice

 

Evaluation of Possibility of Atypical

 

BSE Transmitting to Humans

 

 Possble interpretation:

 

 L type seems to transmit to nonhuman primates with greater ease than classical BSE

 

 L type also transmitted to humanized transgenic mice with higher attack rate and shorter incubation period than classical?

 

 H type did not transmit to Tg Hu transgenic mice

 

Linda Detwiller, 5/10/2011

 


 

I ask Professor Kong ;

 

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM

 

Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

 

IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....

 

Professor Kong reply ;

 

.....snip

 

As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.

 

Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

 

BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

 

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.

 


 


 

P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models

 

Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA

 

Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely undefined.

 

Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.

 

Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.

 

Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.

 

Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

 

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.

 


 


 


 

14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

 

18.173 page 189

 

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

 

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

 

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

 

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions. At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

 

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathoge esis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types.

 

Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

 


 

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure - Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

 

Session: International Scientific Exchange

 

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

 

T. Singeltary Bacliff, TX, USA

 

Background: An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

 

Methods: 12 years independent research of available data

 

Results: I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

 

Conclusion: I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

 


 

snip... see more breaches in the BSE aka mad cow Triple Firewall, that never was here ;

 

Friday, January 23, 2015

 

*** Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $

 


 

Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products

 

For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon

 

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Comment View document:Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;

 

I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

 

North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

 

typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$

 

the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.

 

for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

 

lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.

 

Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

 

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

 

Country/Year

 

snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS No documents available. AttachmentsView All (1) Empty Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:

 


 

Sunday, January 11, 2015

 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 


 


 

Friday, January 23, 2015

 

*** Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $

 


 

Saturday, January 24, 2015

 

*** Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons

 


 

Monday, December 1, 2014

 

Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review December 1, 2014

 


 

Thursday, January 29, 2015

 

Identification of H-type BSE in Portugal

 


 

TSS

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