OIE UPDATE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MAY 
15, 2012
Information received on 15/05/2012 from Dr John Clifford, Deputy 
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Washington, United States of America
Summary
Report type Follow-up report No. 1 Start date 19/04/2012 Date of first 
confirmation of the event 23/04/2012 Report date 15/05/2012 Date submitted to 
OIE 15/05/2012 Reason for notification Reoccurrence of a listed disease Date of 
previous occurrence 2006 Manifestation of disease Sub-clinical infection Causal 
agent Prion (atypical BSE) Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced) This event 
pertains to the whole country Related reports Immediate notification 
(26/04/2012) Follow-up report No. 1 (15/05/2012) Outbreaks There are no new 
outbreaks in this report 
Epidemiology Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or 
inconclusive Random mutation Epidemiological comments As part of the United 
States targeted bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) surveillance system a 
case of BSE classified as atypical was identified in a dead dairy cow that was 
to be rendered. The dead animal’s carcass was placed in a secure hazardous waste 
disposal site. • The cow was culled due to lameness. • The identified animal was 
never presented for slaughter for human consumption, did not enter food supply 
channels, and at no time presented any risk to human health. • A comprehensive 
epidemiological investigation into the incident continues to be conducted. 
Further epidemiological investigation of the incident has shown that: - The cow 
was born on the index premises. - Two progeny have been identified – one born in 
the last 2 years, was stillborn, and another, still living, was humanely 
euthanized, and tested and found to be negative for BSE. - Investigation of the 
feed records at the index dairy premises has found no anomalies, and audits of 
all the feed suppliers to the index premises have shown them to be in compliance 
with the regulations. 
Control measures Measures applied Quarantine Screening No vaccination No 
treatment of affected animals Measures to be applied No other measures 
Future Reporting The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be 
submitted. 
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 
09:22 71.248.128.67 
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________ 
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, 
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), 
Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, 
Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, 
by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm 
initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone 
meal. 
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons 
 DISTRIBUTION Nationwide 
 END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006 
### 
-------- Original Message -------- 
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTERS JULY 20, 2004 USA Date: Tue, 20 
Jul 2004 09:14:11 -0500 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de 
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### 
USA BSE/TSE TRIPLE FIREWALLS SEEPING IN 2004...TSS 
Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration 
San Francisco District 1431 Harbor Bay Parkway Alameda, CA 94502-7070 
Telephone: 510/337-6700 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
Our Reference No. 1000123954 
June 23, 2004 
Ronald M. Foster, Manager Randall C. Boyce, Manager Trevor O. Foster, 
Manager George P. Foster, Manager Fresno Farming LLC P.O. Box 457 1000 Davis 
Street Livingston, California 
WARNING LETTER 
Dear Mssrs. Foster, Boyce, Foster, and Foster: 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) conducted an inspection of your 
medicated animal feed mill operation, Fresco Farming LLC, located in Traver, 
California from April 14, 2004 through May 6, 2004, and found significant 
deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal 
Regulations, Section 589.2000 (21 C.F.R. 589.2000) - Animal Proteins Prohibited 
in Ruminant Feed. The regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and 
amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Because you failed to 
follow this rule, products you manufactured and distributed are adulterated 
within the meaning of Section 402(a)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (the Act) because they were prepared, packed, or held under insanitary 
conditions whereby they may have been rendered injurious to health. 
Our inspection found the following violations of 21 C.F.R. 589.2000: 
1. Failure to provide for measures to avoid commingling or 
cross-contamination of products that contain or may contain protein derived from 
mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants to 
comply with 21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(iii). 
* Your firm uses a vacuum system to clean up spilled product in the tunnel 
area. This tunnel area houses the two receiving conveyor systems and the 
elevators for the two conveyor systems. When product, including ruminant meat 
and bone meal, is spilled onto the floor of this area, the spilled product is 
vacuumed up by the vacuum system and, via a discharge hose, was placed into a 
conveyor system that your firm had designated as free of ruminant meat and bone 
meal. Your firm admitted that it was unaware of the vacuum system discharging 
into the conveyor systems designated as free of ruminant meat and bone meal and 
that this had been in place since April 2003. Your firm remedied this problem 
during FDA s April/May 2004 inspection by removing the discharge hose connection 
to the conveyer system that your firm had designated as free of ruminant meat 
and bone meal . 
* Your firm uses a dust collection system that pulls dust from systems that 
receive both ruminant meat and bone meal and feed ingredients intended for 
ruminants. This dust system then discharged collected product back into the two 
conveyor systems via a cross connection, thereby making it likely that ruminant 
meat and bone meal became commingled with ruminant feed ingredients. Your firm 
admitted that it was unaware of the cross connection and that it had been in 
place since April 2003. Your firm removed the cross connection during FDA s 
April/May 2004 inspection. 
2. Failure to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out 
procedure or other means, and specifying the procedures for separating products 
that contain or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissue from all other 
protein products from the time of receipt until the time of shipment, to comply 
with 21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(iv). This observation was also noted during FDA s 
July/August 2003 inspection of your firm. 
* There are no written procedures for separating products that contain 
prohibited material from ingredients used in ruminant feeds from the time of 
receipt until the time of shipment. 
* The written procedure for cleaning out or flushing equipment after mixing 
feeds containing prohibited material was not adequate to prevent contamination 
of ruminant feed with prohibited material. 
3. Failure to maintain records sufficient to track materials that contain 
protein derived from mammalian tissues throughout their receipt, processing, and 
distribution to comply with 21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(i). This observation was 
also noted during FDA s July/August 2003 inspection of your firm. 
* Specifically, your firm has failed to develop and implement complete 
written procedures to separate ruminant meat and bone meal from feed ingredients 
intended for ruminants from the time of receipt until the time of distribution. 
The written procedures that do exist fail to address the use of equipment common 
to ruminant meat and bone meal and ruminant feed ingredients. 
The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of deficiencies at 
your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for use as animal feed, 
you are responsible for assuring that your overall operation and the products 
you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take 
prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system 
whereby such violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these 
violations may result in regulatory action without further notice, such as 
seizure and/or injunction. 
You should notify this office in writing within fifteen (15) working days 
of receiving this letter of the steps you have taken to bring your firm into 
compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each 
step being taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If 
corrective actions cannot be completed in fifteen (15) working days, state the 
reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. 
Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating that corrections 
have been made. 
Please send your reply to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Attention: 
Ms. Harumi Kishida, Compliance Officer, 1431 Harbor Bay Parkway, Alameda, 
California 94502-7070. If you have questions regarding this letter, please 
contact Ms. Kishida at (510) 337-6824. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ 
CD Moss, Acting DD for Barbara J. Cassens District Director San Francisco 
District 
cc: 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED C. Michael Blasco, Feed Mill 
Manager Fresno Farming LLC P.O. Box 430 Traver, California 93673 
 Surveillance for BSE in California
Surveillance for BSE began in 1990. California collected 560 samples in 
2001 and approximately 2,000 in 2002 and in 2003. The US sampled 20,543 cattle 
in 2003 - a sample size designed to detect BSE if it occurred in 1 animal per 
million adult cattle with a 95% confidence rate. This sample size is more that 
47 times the international standard for countries with a “low risk” of 
BSE.
California is working with the USDA and the cattle industry to determine 
the best way to enhance BSE surveillance and test as many “high-risk” cattle as 
possible for 12-18 months. Brain samples will be collected from cattle over 30 
months of age that are:
Non-ambulatory (cannot rise or cannot walk)
Showing neurological signs
Condemned, euthanized or died following signs that may be associated with 
BSE
Dead from unknown cause.
In addition, a random sample of apparently healthy aged cattle will be 
sampled at California slaughter facilities.
Sample Tests
There are no tests that detect BSE in live animals. Current tests look for 
the abnormal prion protein in the brain. Two rapid screening tests have recently 
been licensed for use in the US; Bio-Rad Laboratories rapid TeSeE® test and 
Idexx HerdChek(R) BSE Antigen Test Kit.
Sensitive screening tests may give false positive results - samples 
positive to these BSE screening tests will be sent for further confirmatory 
testing at the national reference laboratory. 
 P.4.23 
Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models 
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw 
Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 
1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 
Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research 
Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal 
Disease Center), USA 
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the 
classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human 
infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three 
continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, 
and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP 
(termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were largely 
undefined. 
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their 
transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. Methods: Transgenic mice 
expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and 
atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation 
time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology 
were or will be examined and compared. 
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected 
with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas 
only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more 
than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse 
brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also 
detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those 
infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to 
a small reduction in incubation time.*** The atypical BSE-H strain is also 
transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M 
transmission has been observed so far. 
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than 
classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission 
barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg 
mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed. 
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774. 
MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...
***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate 
Model 
 ***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle 
 ***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE 
in these countries. 
 ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently 
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. 
 full text ; 
atypical L-type BASE BSE 
 Tuesday, May 1, 2012
BSE MAD COW LETTERS TO USDA (Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture) and FDA 
(Magaret Hamburg, Commissioner of FDA) May 1, 2012 
 Wednesday, May 2, 2012
ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND 
ANIMAL HEALTH
 Friday, May 4, 2012 
May 2, 2012: Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States 
 Sunday, March 11, 2012
APHIS Proposes New Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Import Regulations in 
Line with International Animal Health Standards Proposal Aims to Ensure Health 
of the U.S. Beef Herd, Assist in Negotiations 
 Wednesday, April 4, 2012
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine 
Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68 
 Sunday, May 6, 2012
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease, BSE May 2, 2012 IOWA 
State University OIE 
SPONTANEOUS ??? NOT... 
How the California cow got the disease remains unknown. Government 
officials expressed confidence that contaminated food was not the source, saying 
the animal had atypical L-type BSE, a rare variant not generally associated with 
an animal consuming infected feed.
However, a BSE expert said that consumption of infected material is the 
only known way that cattle get the disease under natural conditons.
“In view of what we know about BSE after almost 20 years experience, 
contaminated feed has been the source of the epidemic,” said Paul Brown, a 
scientist retired from the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and 
Stroke.
BSE is not caused by a microbe. It is caused by the misfolding of the 
so-called “prion protein” that is a normal constituent of brain and other 
tissues. If a diseased version of the protein enters the brain somehow, it can 
slowly cause all the normal versions to become misfolded.
It is possible the disease could arise spontaneously, though such an event 
has never been recorded, Brown said. 
 Friday, May 11, 2012
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by 
plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits 
In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some 
peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE. 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012 
Independent experts should be kept from undue suspicion as well as undue 
influence 
IN REPLY TO ; 
TSS 
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