Friday, January 6, 2012

OIE 2012 Training Manual on Wildlife Diseases and Surveillance and TSE Prion disease

Greetings,


Once again I must disclose my sincere disgust with the O.I.E.




ONCE again the OIE has proven itself to be nothing more than a National Brokerage Organization for all strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. A failed organization, one that’s only purpose is to protect trade.


OIE SEEMS TO HAVE nothing to do with protecting human or animal health, in my opinion.


OIE has proven this time and time with relations to animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease typical and atypical.


By the time the OIE recognizes a disease such as TSE as a threat to humans or animals, it’s years, decades too late.


THIS is the exact same thing that happened with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE prion disease. Because of the OIE and it’s BSE regulations and testing, BSE spread around the globe.


This will happen with CWD in cervids, as it did with BSE in cattle and Scrapie in sheep, especially and so foolishly for exempting the atypical TSE prion disease, all because of trade and the almighty dollar.


The OIE is nothing more than a ship of fools in my opinion, who’s absolute purpose is to protect trade, and the almighty dollar, to hell with human and animal health.


IN terms of BSE TSE prion disease and the OIE, there never was no ‘prevention’, it was simply never test enough to find.


This manual proves once again just this, in my opinion. ...




OIE Training Manual on Wildlife Diseases and Surveillance






TO REDUCE TESTING OF BSE IN THE USA TO ONLY 40,000 A YEAR, is simply not scientific regardless of what the OIE BSE testing protocol calls for. ALL one has to do is look at the countries above that all went down with BSE, that all went by the infamous OIE BSE testing protocols. THEN and only then, after the USA finally fumbled the 'BSE FREE' golden egg and accidently had to document a case or two of mad cow, low and behold, what next? yep, you guessed it, time to move the goal post in the middle of the football game, GWs and his sleeping partners at the OIE, gave birth to the BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally was born. ...


SNIP...


9/13/2005


Page 12 of 17


SEE SLIDES IN PDF FILE;








4. WHAT does USDA/FDA ET AL intend to do about the risks of atypical BSE/TSE in cattle now that infectivity shows in tissue samples other than CNS in Japan, the fact now that the last Texas mad cow and that last mad cow in Alabama were indeed of the atypical strain, the fact that the studies long ago in Mission, Texas of USA sheep scrapie transmission to the USA bovine, which proved an 'atypical tse' in the USA bovine, the fact also that USDA/FDA are still floundering on the last SRM regulations, but with the BASE strain now in cattle that is not similar to nvCJD, but very similar to the sporadic CJD, and sporadic CJD has tripled in the last few years in the USA. WHAT do you plan to do to protect human health from these atypical strains of TSE, in relations to SRMs ?


5. THE 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance program, that tested all those cows, but then we found just how terribly flawed the program was, from testing protocols, to testing the most likely to have BSE i.e. high risk, to the geographical distribution of the testing and high risk areas, to letting the tissue samples of one mad cow sit on a shelf for 7+ months and then having to have an act of Congress to ever get that cow finally confirmed, to that other Texas mad cow they decided to not even bother testing at all, just rendered that very suspect cow, to suspect to test evidently, back to that Alabama mad cow that they could only give a guess as to age with dentition where we all know that the age of that cow was so close to 10 years it could have been 9 years 7 months to 10 years 3 months, thus possibly being an BAPB i.e. USA 'born after partial ban', to all those rabies suspect cows that did not have rabies, and DID NOT get tested for BSE/TSE in that June 2004 enhanced surveillance program, even though the common lay person knows the suspect rabies negative cows are suppose to be BSE/TSE tested, how does one correct all these blatant failures and will they be corrected?


IT never was about human/animal health, but all about commodities and futures. ... MISSION ACCOMPLISHED $$$


ENFAMOUS NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM BY FDA ET AL, another handy tool for importing/exporting all strains of TSE ;


Docket Management


Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305


Comment Number: EC –254


Accepted - Volume 11


Page 94 of 98


8/3/2006






ONE FINAL THOUGHT ;


OPINION






> > > New methodology, under the auspices of the OIE, is under construction within the EU and EFSA and the Panel recommended that once these classifications had been finalised they should harmonised with those used in the EFSA BSE QRA guidance document. The Panel anticipated that this harmonisation may have a knock-on impact on the QRA calculations, conclusions and recommendations and that, again, future Panel members should review this, and other, inputs of the QRA and address this impact using their “self-tasking mandate” option. < < <




GOD HELP US!


sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle, if i am not mistaken. MOST countries that went by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. ...TSS






THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...


Page 95 of 98


8/3/2006


WHAT ABOUT RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS FROM ALL OTHER TSEs, WITH RELATIONS TO SRMs ???


a.. BSE OIE


SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;






Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy and the O.I.E.


OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission / September 2010


The EU takes note of the fact that atypical scrapie is not an OIE listed disease. Nevertheless, it will remain notifiable in the EU. Moreover it must be stressed that any emergence of this disease should be notified to the OIE by Members and that scientific data should continue to be gathered.


snip...


Zoonotic Potential


Has transmission to humans been proven? (with the exception of artificial circumstances) AND


Is human infection associated with severe consequences? (death or prolonged illness)







P.4.23


Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models


Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA


Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were largely undefined.


Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.


Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time.*** The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.


Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.


Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.






P26 TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS


Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1 1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA


Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown. We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C.*** The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.


III International Symposium on THE NEW PRION BIOLOGY: BASIC SCIENCE, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2 - 4 APRIL 2009, VENEZIA (ITALY)






I ask Professor Kong ;


Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM


Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment ''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''


Professor Kong reply ;


.....snip


''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.''


Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA


END...TSS


Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM


"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."


personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS




BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice.


The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.


Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.









=====================


"The origin of atypical BSE is not yet determined. According to EFSA's scientific opinion published in 2008, all the cases of atypical BSE were reported with birth dates before the real feed ban in January 2001 in Europe. Therefore, the possibility of those atypical cases attributing to the contaminated feeds, just as in classical BSE, cannot be completely denied."


=====================



atypical BSE TSE cases have been around for a long long time, so yes indeed MBM or SRM could very well and most likely did contain atypical TSE of all strains in the USA, and the typical strains as well, of all species. the North America and the USA has typical and atypical BSE, typical and atypical Scrapie, and two strains now of Chronic Wasting Disease, call them typical and atypical, or call them what you want, all this has been rendered and fed to food producing livestock for humans and animals for years in the USA. these are the facts, like them or not. please see ;


1992


IN CONFIDENCE


BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367)





1992


NEW BRAIN DISORDER


3. WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF NEW FORM OF BSE ?


THE VETERINARY RECORD HAS PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ON A NEW BRAIN DISORDER OF CATTLE DISCOVERED THROUGH OUR CONTROL MEASURES FOR BSE. ALTHOUGH IT PRESENTS SIMILAR CLINICAL SIGNS TO BSE THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN HISTOPATHOLOGY AND INCUBATION PERIODS BETWEEN THE TWO. MUST EMPHASISE THAT THIS IS _NOT_ BSE.


4. IS THIS NEW BRAIN DISORDER A THREAT ?


WE DO NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER THE AGENT OF THIS DISEASE IS TRANSMISSIBLE. IN ANY CASE, CASES SO FAR IDENTIFIED HAD SHOWN SIMILAR SYMPTOMS TO THOSE OF BSE, AND THEREFORE HAVE BEEN SLAUGHTERED AND INCINERATED, SO THAT IF A TRANSMISSIBLE AGENT WERE INVOLVED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. ...





Tuesday, November 17, 2009


SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1





NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS


"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP"


2009







''THE LINE TO TAKE'' ON IBNC $$$ 1995 $$$


1995


page 9 of 14 ;


30. The Committee noted that the results were unusual. the questioned whether there could be coincidental BSE infection or contamination with scrapie. Dr. Tyrell noted that the feeling of the committee was that this did not represent a new agent but it was important to be prepared to say something publicly about these findings. A suggested line to take was that these were scientifically unpublishable results but in line with the policy of openness they would be made publicly available and further work done to test their validity. Since the BSE precautions were applied to IBNC cases, human health was protected. Further investigations should be carried out on isolations from brains of IBNC cases with removal of the brain and subsequent handling under strict conditions to avoid the risk of any contamination.


31. Mr. Bradley informed the Committee that the CVO had informed the CMO about the IBNC results and the transmission from retina and he, like the Committee was satisfied that the controls already in place or proposed were adequate. ... snip... see full text









Wednesday, July 28, 2010


Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report






Tuesday, November 02, 2010


BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992






Wednesday, February 16, 2011


IN CONFIDENCE


SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES


IN CONFIDENCE






Sunday, April 18, 2010


SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010






Monday, April 25, 2011


Experimental Oral Transmission of Atypical Scrapie to Sheep


Volume 17, Number 5-May 2011






Thursday, June 2, 2011


USDA scrapie report for April 2011 NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASES Pennsylvania AND California






Monday, June 20, 2011 2011


Annual Conference of the National Institute for Animal Agriculture ATYPICAL NOR-98 LIKE SCRAPIE UPDATE USA






Thursday, July 14, 2011


Histopathological Studies of "CH1641-Like" Scrapie Sources Versus Classical Scrapie and BSE Transmitted to Ovine Transgenic Mice (TgOvPrP4)






Wednesday, October 12, 2011


White-tailed deer are susceptible to the agent of sheep scrapie by intracerebral inoculation






Saturday, December 18, 2010


OIE Global Conference on Wildlife Animal Health and Biodiversity – Preparing for the Future (TSE AND PRIONS) Paris (France), 23-25 February 2011


I see again that the OIE has done little to help eradicate all animal TSE from the globe, and in fact in my opinion, have help enhance the spread of BSE and other animal TSE globally by their industry friendly regulations. I tried to warn the OIE in 2002 about CWD and the potential, but very real threat of CWD to humans. I was told that they were seriously considering this. what happened ? NOW, the OIE and the USDA collaborate to make legal the trading of all strains of atypical BSE legal, and in fact have done so with the atypical scrapie, when science has made perfectly clear the risk factors to humans and other species. I have said it once (see below), and i will say again ;


"THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization."


JUST about every country that went by the infamous O.I.E. B.S.E. guidelines, most all came down with B.S.E. ...TSS


NOW, some history on the failed OIE BSE/TSE policy, and why the OIE allowed BSE and other TSE to spread around the globe $$$


SNIP...


i proposed to OIE years ago to include CWD. but with these new atypical case of TSE showing up in cattle and sheep, it will be interesting to see how the OIE handles the USA demands on weakening the BSE/TSE regs for exporting countries;


Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 16:11:42 –0700


Reply-To: B S E-l


Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


From: TSS


Subject: CWD/USA — CWD/OIE?


snip...


Greetings List Members,


speaking with someone at the OIE about my concerns with CWD and the non-testing for TSEs in USA cattle, i find it very sad that the OIE does not follow CWD related issues. BUT, they voice my same concerns and said changes are in the makings. sadly, the changes will take about 2 years?


snip...


''I agree with you Dr Terry. The OIE, namely the International Animal Health Code Commission is working on making proposals to Member Countries to change the OIE lists so to avoid some the problems mentioned in you e-mail. This will take at least two years before adoption by the International Committee.''


snip...


two years is a very long time, on an issue of such importance to both humans and animals...


kind regards, terry




snip...




PAGE 25 Transmission Studies Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculam (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in all of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret...






Clearly, it is premature to draw firm conclusions about CWD passing naturally into humans, cattle and sheep, but the present results suggest that CWD transmissions to humans would be as limited by PrP incompatibility as transmissions of BSE or sheep scrapie to humans. Although there is no evidence that sheep scrapie has affected humans, it is likely that BSE has caused variant CJD in 74 people (definite and probable variant CJD cases to date according to the UK CJD Surveillance Unit). Given the presumably large number of people exposed to BSE infectivity, the susceptibility of humans may still be very low compared with cattle, which would be consistent with the relatively inefficient conversion of human PrP-sen by PrPBSE. Nonetheless, since humans have apparently been infected by BSE, it would seem prudent to take reasonable measures to limit exposure of humans (as well as sheep and cattle) to CWD infectivity as has been recommended for other animal TSEs.


snip...






and why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $




snip...


5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.


snip...


R. BRADLEY






same reason CJD/TSE is not reportable Nationally in the USA. same reason no CJD questionnaire exists in the USA that is issued to all victims and families of victims asking real questions pertaining to route and source of agent. no autopies for all demented of young AND OLD! same reason the USA is steadfast refusing to this day to rapid TSE test all cattle for human/animal consumption. the USA simply does not want to know$


hell, we should just retain it all, and just play like it has not happened for the next 40 years as well. hmm, something else to ponder ;


5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man


so, when/where is our first case transmission study of TSE on man going to be? i wish to witness this and have a few suggestions for our first human guinea-pigs ;-)


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, TEXAS USA 77518




END...TSS


C H A P T E R 2 . 3 . 1 3 .


BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY


Article 2.3.13.1.


SNIP...please see full text ;






putting the cart before the horse OIE TSE policy. ...TSS




Monday, November 30, 2009


USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE






Friday, February 11, 2011


Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie Infectivity in Sheep Peripheral Tissues






Sunday, December 12, 2010


EFSA reviews BSE/TSE infectivity in small ruminant tissues News Story 2 December 2010






Thursday, December 23, 2010


Molecular Typing of Protease-Resistant Prion Protein in Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies of Small Ruminants, France, 2002–2009 Volume 17, Number 1–January 2011






Thursday, November 18, 2010


Increased susceptibility of human-PrP transgenic mice to bovine spongiform encephalopathy following passage in sheep






Sunday, October 3, 2010


Scrapie, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, and BSE in sheep and goats North America, who's looking ?










Saturday, January 29, 2011


Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate


Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011






Thursday, February 10, 2011


Chronic Wasting Disease Found In A White-Tailed Deer In Maryland










CWD Maryland Emergency Response Plan 2011












Thursday, February 10, 2011


CWD ILLINOIS UPDATE FEBRUARY 2011 Locations of CWD-Positive Deer – Updated 2/07/2011






Wednesday, February 09, 2011


CWD Minnesota deer feeding ban covering Dodge, Goodhue, Olmsted, and Wabasha counties will become effective Feb. 14, 2011






Tuesday, January 25, 2011


Minnesota, National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa, has confirmed CWD case near Pine Island






UPDATED DATA ON 2ND CWD STRAIN


Wednesday, September 08, 2010


CWD PRION CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010






Tuesday, January 25, 2011


Generation of a new form of human PrPSc in vitro by inter-species transmission from cervids prions


Our results have far-reaching implications for human health, since they indicate that cervid PrPSc can trigger the conversion of human PrPC into PrPSc, suggesting that CWD might be infectious to humans. Interestingly our findings suggest that unstable strains from CWD affected animals might not be a problem for humans, but upon strain stabilization by successive passages in the wild, this disease might become progressively more transmissible to man.


Reference List


snip...


please see full text and many thanks to the Professor Soto and the other Authors of this study AND to The Journal Of Biological Chemistry for the free full text !!!






Tuesday, January 25, 2011


Generation of a new form of human PrPSc in vitro by inter-species transmission from cervids prions






PLEASE NOTE ;


there are now two documented strains of CWD, and science is showing that indeed CWD could transmit to humans via transmission studies ;


P35


ADAPTATION OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE (CWD) INTO HAMSTERS, EVIDENCE OF A WISCONSIN STRAIN OF CWD


Chad Johnson1, Judd Aiken2,3,4 and Debbie McKenzie4,5 1 Department of Comparative Biosciences, University of Wisconsin, Madison WI, USA 53706 2 Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutritional Sciences, 3 Alberta Veterinary Research Institute, 4.Center for Prions and Protein Folding Diseases, 5 Department of Biological Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton AB, Canada T6G 2P5


The identification and characterization of prion strains is increasingly important for the diagnosis and biological definition of these infectious pathogens. Although well-established in scrapie and, more recently, in BSE, comparatively little is known about the possibility of prion strains in chronic wasting disease (CWD), a disease affecting free ranging and captive cervids, primarily in North America. We have identified prion protein variants in the white-tailed deer population and demonstrated that Prnp genotype affects the susceptibility/disease progression of white-tailed deer to CWD agent. The existence of cervid prion protein variants raises the likelihood of distinct CWD strains. Small rodent models are a useful means of identifying prion strains. We intracerebrally inoculated hamsters with brain homogenates and phosphotungstate concentrated preparations from CWD positive hunter-harvested (Wisconsin CWD endemic area) and experimentally infected deer of known Prnp genotypes. These transmission studies resulted in clinical presentation in primary passage of concentrated CWD prions. Subclinical infection was established with the other primary passages based on the detection of PrPCWD in the brains of hamsters and the successful disease transmission upon second passage. Second and third passage data, when compared to transmission studies using different CWD inocula (Raymond et al., 2007) indicate that the CWD agent present in the Wisconsin white-tailed deer population is different than the strain(s) present in elk, mule-deer and white-tailed deer from the western United States endemic region.






PPo3-7:


Prion Transmission from Cervids to Humans is Strain-dependent


Qingzhong Kong, Shenghai Huang,*Fusong Chen, Michael Payne, Pierluigi Gambetti and Liuting Qing Department of Pathology; Case western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA *Current address: Nursing Informatics; Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center; New York, NY USA


Key words: CWD, strain, human transmission


Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a widespread prion disease in cervids (deer and elk) in North America where significant human exposure to CWD is likely and zoonotic transmission of CWD is a concern. Current evidence indicates a strong barrier for transmission of the classical CWD strain to humans with the PrP-129MM genotype. A few recent reports suggest the presence of two or more CWD strains. What remain unknown is whether individuals with the PrP-129VV/MV genotypes are also resistant to the classical CWD strain and whether humans are resistant to all natural or adapted cervid prion strains. Here we report that a human prion strain that had adopted the cervid prion protein (PrP) sequence through passage in cervidized transgenic mice efficiently infected transgenic mice expressing human PrP, indicating that the species barrier from cervid to humans is prion strain-dependent and humans can be vulnerable to novel cervid prion strains. Preliminary results on CWD transmission in transgenic mice expressing human PrP-129V will also be discussed.


Acknowledgement Supported by NINDS NS052319 and NIA AG14359.




PPo2-27:


Generation of a Novel form of Human PrPSc by Inter-species Transmission of Cervid Prions


Marcelo A. Barria,1 Glenn C. Telling,2 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 James A. Mastrianni4 and Claudio Soto1 1Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's disease and related Brain disorders; Dept of Neurology; University of Texas Houston Medical School; Houston, TX USA; 2Dept of Microbiology, Immunology & Molecular Genetics and Neurology; Sanders Brown Center on Aging; University of Kentucky Medical Center; Lexington, KY USA; 3Institute of Pathology; Case western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA; 4Dept of Neurology; University of Chicago; Chicago, IL USA


Prion diseases are infectious neurodegenerative disorders affecting humans and animals that result from the conversion of normal prion protein (PrPC) into the misfolded and infectious prion (PrPSc). Chronic wasting disease (CWD) of cervids is a prion disorder of increasing prevalence within the United States that affects a large population of wild and captive deer and elk. CWD is highly contagious and its origin, mechanism of transmission and exact prevalence are currently unclear. The risk of transmission of CWD to humans is unknown. Defining that risk is of utmost importance, considering that people have been infected by animal prions, resulting in new fatal diseases. To study the possibility that human PrPC can be converted into the infectious form by CWD PrPSc we performed experiments using the Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) technique, which mimic in vitro the process of prion replication. Our results show that cervid PrPSc can induce the pathological conversion of human PrPC, but only after the CWD prion strain has been stabilized by successive passages in vitro or in vivo. Interestingly, this newly generated human PrPSc exhibits a distinct biochemical pattern that differs from any of the currently known forms of human PrPSc, indicating that it corresponds to a novel human prion strain. Our findings suggest that CWD prions have the capability to infect humans, and that this ability depends on CWD strain adaptation, implying that the risk for human health progressively increases with the spread of CWD among cervids.




PPo2-7:


Biochemical and Biophysical Characterization of Different CWD Isolates


Martin L. Daus and Michael Beekes Robert Koch Institute; Berlin, Germany


Key words: CWD, strains, FT-IR, AFM


Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is one of three naturally occurring forms of prion disease. The other two are Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans and scrapie in sheep. CWD is contagious and affects captive as well as free ranging cervids. As long as there is no definite answer of whether CWD can breach the species barrier to humans precautionary measures especially for the protection of consumers need to be considered. In principle, different strains of CWD may be associated with different risks of transmission to humans. Sophisticated strain differentiation as accomplished for other prion diseases has not yet been established for CWD. However, several different findings indicate that there exists more than one strain of CWD agent in cervids. We have analysed a set of CWD isolates from white-tailed deer and could detect at least two biochemically different forms of disease-associated prion protein PrPTSE. Limited proteolysis with different concentrations of proteinase K and/or after exposure of PrPTSE to different pH-values or concentrations of Guanidinium hydrochloride resulted in distinct isolate-specific digestion patterns. Our CWD isolates were also examined in protein misfolding cyclic amplification studies. This showed different conversion activities for those isolates that had displayed significantly different sensitivities to limited proteolysis by PK in the biochemical experiments described above. We further applied Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy in combination with atomic force microscopy. This confirmed structural differences in the PrPTSE of at least two disinct CWD isolates. The data presented here substantiate and expand previous reports on the existence of different CWD strains.








CJD9/10022


October 1994


Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ


Dear Mr Elmhirst,


CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT


Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.


The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.


The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.


The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.


I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all. ...end






UPDATED DATA ON 2ND CWD STRAIN


Wednesday, September 08, 2010


CWD PRION CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010






snip... see full text ;


Tuesday, January 25, 2011


Generation of a new form of human PrPSc in vitro by inter-species transmission from cervids prions






2011-2012


EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story


This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;


Monday, October 10, 2011


EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story


snip...


EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.


snip...









see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;






Thursday, December 29, 2011


Aerosols An underestimated vehicle for transmission of prion diseases?


PRION www.landesbioscience.com


please see more on Aerosols and TSE prion disease here ;






Saturday, December 31, 2011


Depopulation Plan Being Developed for Captive Deer Facility in Macon County after second CWD positive confirmation






please see this game farm that was shut down, and the incredible infection rate ;



Tuesday, December 20, 2011


CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD WISCONSIN Almond Deer (Buckhorn Flats) Farm Update DECEMBER 2011






Wednesday, December 21, 2011


CWD UTAH San Juan deer hunting unit






Monday, November 14, 2011


WYOMING Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, CWD, TSE, PRION REPORTING 2011






Wednesday, November 16, 2011


Wisconsin Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, CWD, TSE, PRION REPORTING 2011






Sunday, November 13, 2011


COLORADO CWD CJD TSE PRION REPORTING 2011






Monday, June 27, 2011


Zoonotic Potential of CWD: Experimental Transmissions to Non-Human Primates






Friday, December 23, 2011


Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model


Volume 18, Number 1—January 2012 Dispatch






Saturday, December 3, 2011 Isolation of Prion with BSE Properties from Farmed Goat


Volume 17, Number 12—December 2011






COLLINGE THREATENS TO GO TO MEDIA







Wednesday, August 20, 2008


Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ? SNIP...


IN CONFIDENCE


This is a highly competitive field and it really will be a pity if we allow many of the key findings to be published by overseas groups while we are unable to pursue our research findings because of this disagreement, which I hope we can make every effort to solve.








COLLINGE THREATENS TO GO TO MEDIA







2. The discovery might indicate the existence of a different strain of BSE from that present in the general epidemic or an unusual response by an individual host.


3. If further atypical lesion distribution cases are revealed in this herd then implications of misdiagnosis of 'negative' cases in other herds may not be insignificant.


snip...


This minute is re-issued with a wider distribution. The information contained herein should NOT be disseminated further except on the basis of ''NEED TO KNOW''.


R Bradley








IN CONFIDENCE


BSE ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION








1983


BSE CONSULTANT


APPROVAL OF MATERIAL FOR PUBLICATIONS


All material for publication including written works to be published in scientific journals, books, proceedings of scientific meetings, abstracts of verbally delivered papers and the like should be scrutinized for risk to the Ministry before dispatch to the publishers.............


full text;






- 10 -


19. On 18th February, 1987 (YB87/2.18/1.1) I reported to Dr Watson and Dr Shreeve on a further case which we had received from Truro VIC. The brain had shown neuronal vacuolation and in brain extracts there were fibrils that were similar in size and appearance to SAFs from sheep with scrapie. The Virology Department was studying the brain further and considering a transmission study. A few weeks before this, I had discussed the possibility of a transmission study with Michael Dawson, a research officer in the Virology Department and an expert in viral diseases in sheep, and we were considering carefully the safety aspects. In my note I raised the question of whether we should disclose the information we had more widely to the VIS because this may assist in getting any other cases referred to CVL but there was the difficulty that we knew very little about the disorder and would be unable to deal with queries that might be raised.


20. On 23rd February, 1987 (YB87/2.23/1.1) I sent Mr Wells a note asking him to prepare a statement for publication in Vision, the in-house newsheet prepared by the VIS for the SVS, setting out details of what we had discovered. On 24th February, 1987 (YB87/2.25/2.1) Gerald Wells indicated in a note to me that he had discussed the proposed article with Mr Dawson and they both believed that it could be damaging to publish anything at that stage. They believed cases would be referred to CVL in any event because they were unusual and they did not feel "Vision" was an appropriate publication because its confidentiality was questionable and might lead to referrals to veterinary schools rather than CVL. Gerald Wells was also concerned about the resources available in his section to deal with referred cases. I replied (YB87/2.25/2.1) indicating a draft statement was needed by the Director before a decision on publication could be made. Gerald Wells prepared a draft statement (YB87/3.2/2.1) and sent it to me on 2nd March, 1987. In his cover note (YB87/3.2/1.1) he commented that he believed the distribution of any statement about the new disease outside of CVL to be premature because there was so little information available about the new disease. I passed on a copy of Gerald Wells' note to Dr Watson (YB87/3.2/3.1). I discussed the matter of publication with Dr Watson. No decision had been taken to publish any material at that stage and I sent a note to Gerald Wells letting him know the position and confirming that his views and those of Michael Dawson would be taken into account when a decision was taken.


- 11 -


21. In March, 1987 serious consideration was given to possible transmission (e.g. to hamsters) and other experiments (other than the collection of epidemiological data by the VIS and clinicopathology which had been in progress since the first cases were recognised in November, 1986).


22. On 23rd April, 1987 I sent a report (YB87/4.23/1.1) to Dr Watson and Dr Shreeve informing them that nine control brains were being examined for SAFs and a cow which appeared to be affected with BSE had been purchased for observation. The cow had come from the farm where the original cases had developed and had arrived at CVL on 22nd April, 1987.


23. On 15th May, 1987 Dr Watson informed me that the proposed "Vision" draft would be circulated to VICs in England and Wales if it was approved by management. On 22nd May, 1987 I was copied in on a note (YB87/5.22/2.1) from B.M Williams, (who I believe was Head of the VIS at this time but retired shortly after this), to Dr Watson. This confirmed that the draft prepared for publication in Vision was approved but that the final paragraph should be amended to make it clear that knowledge of the new disease should not be communicated to other research institutes or university departments. At a meeting with Dr Watson on 2nd June, 1987 he informed me that no communication should be made with NPU until after the meeting with the CVO on 5th June, 1987 (see my note of 3rd June, 1987 – YB87/6.3/1.1). We needed much more data and information to answer inevitable queries. ...












*This case study accompanies the IRGC report “Risk Governance Deficits: An analysis and illustration of the most common deficits in risk governance”. The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Epidemic in the United Kingdom


By Belinda Cleeland1


SNIP...


A6 Misrepresenting information about risk


From the very beginning of the BSE outbreak, not only was knowledge misrepresented by the British government, but in some cases it was even withheld. For example, after the initial diagnosis of BSE by the SVS in late 1986, there was an embargo placed on the sharing, or making public, of any BSE-related information that ran until mid-1987. Also, up until at least 1990, outside scientists that requested access to BSE data to conduct further studies were denied, despite the fact the improved scientific understanding of the disease had the greatest potential to minimise the impact of the epidemic. Even government scientists within the CVL have acknowledged that there was a culture of suppressing information, to the point that studies revealing damaging evidence (e.g. that there was a causal link between BSE and the new encephalopathy found in cats) were denied publication permission [Ashraf, 2000]. The withholding of such information allowed the government to publicly assert that BSE was just like another version of scrapie – not transmissible to humans – and that there was “clear scientific evidence that British beef is perfectly safe” [UK House of Commons, 1990].2 This was certainly a misrepresentation of the knowledge held at the time, and one that was only possible due to the suppression of some scientific findings and recommendations. Of course, the main reason for this misrepresentation of knowledge was the protection of agricultural and industrial interests – the specific stakeholder favoured in this case was the British beef industry, which stood to lose billions of pounds if a large number of its animals had to be slaughtered, if export bans were put in place, or if costly regulations were implemented. To protect the interests of the beef industry, the government would assert on many occasions that British beef was safe to eat and that regulatory controls already implemented would prevent any 2 This comment was made by the Agriculture Minister to the House of Commons.


contaminated material from entering the food chain. This was also a misrepresentation of knowledge, as the government was fully aware that their measures were not designed to eliminate exposure, but only to diminish the risk [van Zwanenberg & Millstone, 2002:161].


What’s more, many uncertainties relating to the transmissibility of the disease were either down-played or ignored, resulting in an overstatement of certainty that British beef was completely safe to eat and that BSE was not transmissible to humans. The way uncertainty was dealt with in this case was the result of a number of factors, including the desire to protect specific stakeholder interests. One crucial factor was the underlying element of risk political culture in the UK that linked the identity of the actor to the consistency of his policy positions. This led to consistency of position being prioritised over accuracy [Dressel, 2000], and resulted in the government insisting on the absence of risk to the population, maintaining this public position despite mounting evidence to the contrary. Although aware of them, policy-makers chose not to overtly acknowledge the levels of uncertainty and the complexity of the risks involved with BSE and its spread because the ramifications of these were too great for the interests they were trying to safeguard.


B1 Responding to early warnings


The incorporation of rendered meat and bone meal into animal feed creates a number of risks related to the transmission, recycling and amplification of pathogens. Such risks were recognised well before the emergence of BSE. In the US in the mid-1970s, concerns that scrapie may be linked to CJD (although there is no evidence that scrapie is transmissible to humans) led to some regulations being placed on the incorporation of sheep or goat carcasses into human and animal foods [van Zwanenberg & Millstone, 2002:158]. In the UK, too, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution recommended in 1979 that minimum processing standards be implemented by the rendering industries in order to minimise the potential for disease spread [RCEP, 1979]. The incoming Thatcher government withdrew these proposed regulations, preferring to let industry decide for itself what standards to use. In retrospect, the failure to act at this point to mitigate the general risk of disease transmission may have had a crucial impact on the later outbreak of BSE, given that the disease “probably originated from a novel source in the early 1970s” [BSE Inquiry, 2000b]. Early warnings that BSE might be transmissible to humans were, in fact, observed by scientists and government officials throughout the period from 1986 (the time of first diagnosis in cattle) to 1995 (when vCJD was first observed in humans). Such observations are noted in, for example, the minutes of a meeting of the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control in May 1988, where the probability of transmission of BSE to humans is assessed as more than remote. The diagnosis in 1990 of a domestic cat with a previously unknown spongiform encephalopathy resembling BSE indicated that the disease could infect a wider range of hosts. Responses to such early warnings of potential dangers to human health were either too weak or came too late. This may have been partly a result of an ‘unwillingness to know’ due to the economic harm this knowledge would cause the UK beef industry (related to deficit A6); and partly due to institutional capacities and procedures (related to deficits B5, 9 and 10).







Tuesday, July 14, 2009


U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST


WHERE did we go wrong $$$









Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment


snip...


MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???


go figure....


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518










Monday, January 2, 2012


EFSA Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the EFSA Scientific Network on BSE-TSE Brussels, 29-30 November 2011






Thursday, January 05, 2012


Comparative analysis of Japanese and foreign L-type BSE prions






Friday, December 23, 2011


Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model


Volume 18, Number 1—January 2012 Dispatch




Wednesday, May 25, 2011


O.I.E. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and prion (TSE) disease reporting 2011


----- Original Message -----


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


To: BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG


Cc: trade@oie.int ; oie@oie.int ; f.diaz@oie.int ; scientific.dept@oie.int ; cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com ; BLOODCJD@YAHOOGROUPS.COM


Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 2:24 PM


Subject: O.I.E. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and prion (TSE) disease reporting 2011






Saturday, June 25, 2011


Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque


"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"






Saturday, November 19, 2011


Novel Prion Protein in BSE-affected Cattle, Switzerland






Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.


snip...


The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...






2011 Monday, September 26, 2011


L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD






Wednesday, March 31, 2010


Atypical BSE in Cattle


To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE.


In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.


This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.




Thursday, August 12, 2010


Seven main threats for the future linked to prions


First threat


The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.


***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...






Owens, Julie


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]


Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM


To: FSIS RegulationsComments


Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)


Page 1 of 98






FSIS RFEPLY TO TSS ;


Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website:




Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:






Saturday, June 19, 2010


U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE




Friday, August 20, 2010


USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010




Friday, November 18, 2011


country-of-origin labeling law (COOL) violates U.S. obligations under WTO rules WT/DS384/R WT/DS386/R






Saturday, July 23, 2011


CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE




Saturday, November 6, 2010


TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU


Berne, 2010 TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation




Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR>


Prion disease update 2010 (11) PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)






Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis








full text with source references ;




TSS

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