Bovine spongiform encephalopathy ,Norway Information received on 29/01/2015
from Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief Veterinary Officer, Norwegian Food
Safety Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Brumunddal, Norway
Summary Report type Immediate notification Date of start of the event
16/01/2015 Date of pre-confirmation of the event 20/01/2015 Report date
29/01/2015 Date submitted to OIE 29/01/2015 Reason for notification First
occurrence of a listed disease Manifestation of disease Sub-clinical infection
Causal agent Prion (atypical BSE type H) Nature of diagnosis Laboratory
(advanced) This event pertains to the whole country
New outbreaks Summary of outbreaks Total outbreaks: 1 Outbreak Location
NORD-TRONDELAG ( Verran, Tua, District office Innherred og Fosen, Region office
Trøndelag og Møre og Romdal ) Total animals affected Species Susceptible Cases
Deaths Destroyed Slaughtered Cattle 27 1 0 1 0 Outbreak statistics Species
Apparent morbidity rate Apparent mortality rate Apparent case fatality rate
Proportion susceptible animals lost* Cattle 3.70% 0.00% 0.00% 3.70%
* Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or
slaughter;
Epidemiology Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or
inconclusive Epidemiological comments Based on status on 29 January 2015: On 20
January 2015, the Norwegian Veterinary Institute reported suspicion of BSE on a
cow in Norway, based on initial test done on CNS material. Part of this material
was sent to European Union Reference Laboratory in Weybridge (21 January 2015)
for verification of diagnosis. The affected cow was a 15-year-old and born in
Norway. The dam was imported from Sweden. The cow did not show clinical signs of
neurological disease before she was killed (12 January 2015) due to old age and
injuries. The BSE test was taken as part of the BSE surveillance program. The
Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA) has put restrictions on movement on the
farm, and performed epidemiological investigations. The NFSA has identified four
risk animals, according to relevant legislation. These animals are also placed
under official movement restrictions. The four identified risk animals will be
killed and disposed by incineration according to European Union legislation. The
epidemiological investigation including tracing of risk animals from the holding
of origin as well as the present holding has identified 2 offspring borne within
two years prior to the incident in addition to 2 cattle belonging either to (1)
the cohort of animals born in the same herd as the affected animal within 12
months preceding or following the date of birth of the affected cow or (2) the
cohort of animals which at any time during the first year of their lives were
reared together with the affected cow during her first year of life. Progeny
borne within two years prior to the incident and the cohort of risk animals are
put under movement restrictions and the killing and destruction of these animals
will be carried into effect as soon as possible. The affected cow’s carcass has
been completely destroyed. The NFSA ensures that the cow’s carcass has been
processed by pressure sterilisation in a Category 1 processing plant and that
the resulting material has been sent for incineration/co-incineration in
accordance with the By-Products Regulation.
Control measures Measures applied Movement control inside the country
Screening No vaccination No treatment of affected animals Measures to be applied
Modified stamping out
Diagnostic test results Laboratory name and type Norwegian Veterinary
Institute ( National laboratory ) Tests and results Species Test Test date
Result Cattle enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) 20/01/2015 Positive
Cattle western blot 20/01/2015 Positive Laboratory name and type EU Reference
Laboratory, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge (United Kingdom) (
OIE’s Reference Laboratory ) Tests and results Species Test Test date Result
Cattle immunohistochemical test 28/01/2015 Positive Cattle western blot
28/01/2015 Positive
Future Reporting The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be
submitted.
Encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine ,Norvège Information reçue le 29/01/2015
de Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief Veterinary Officer, Norwegian Food Safety
Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Brumunddal, Norvège
Résumé Type de rapport Notification immédiate Date de début de l’événement
16/01/2015 Date de pré-confirmation de l´événement 20/01/2015 Date du rapport
29/01/2015 Date d'envoi à l'OIE 29/01/2015 Raison de notification Apparition
pour la première fois d’une maladie listée par l'OIE Manifestation de la maladie
Infection sub-clinique Agent causal Prion (EEB atypique, type H) Nature du
diagnostic Tests approfondis en laboratoire (i.e. virologie, microscopie
électronique, biologie moléculaire, immunologie) Cet événement se rapporte à
tout le pays
Nouveaux foyers Récapitulatif des foyers Nombre total de foyers : 1
Localisation du foyer NORD-TRONDELAG ( Verran, Tua, District office Innherred og
Fosen, Region office Trøndelag og Møre og Romdal ) Nombre total d'animaux
atteints Espèce(s) Sensibles Cas Morts Détruits Abattus Bovins 27 1 0 1 0
Statistiques sur le foyer Espèce(s) Taux de morbidité apparent Taux de mortalité
apparent Taux de fatalité apparent Proportion d'animaux sensibles perdus* Bovins
3.70% 0.00% 0.00% 3.70%
* Soustraits de la population sensible suite à la mort, à l´abattage et/ou
à la destruction;
Epidémiologie Source du/des foyer(s) ou origine de l´infection Inconnue ou
incertaine Autres renseignements épidémiologiques / Commentaires Situation au 29
janvier 2015 : Le 20 janvier 2015, l'Institut vétérinaire norvégien a informé
d’une suspicion d’EEB chez une vache en Norvège en se basant sur un test initial
effectué sur du matériel du SNC. Une partie de ce matériel a été envoyé au
Laboratoire de référence de l'Union européenne à Weybridge (21 janvier 2015)
pour vérification du diagnostic. La vache atteinte était âgée de 15 ans et était
née en Norvège. La mère avait été importée de Suède. La vache n'a pas montré de
signes cliniques de maladie neurologique avant d'être abattue en raison de son
âge et de lésions (12 janvier 2015). Le test pour l’EEB a été effectué dans le
cadre du programme de surveillance de l’EEB. L'Autorité norvégienne de sécurité
alimentaire (NFSA) a mis en œuvre des restrictions aux déplacements dans
l’élevage et a effectué des enquêtes épidémiologiques. La NFSA a identifié
quatre animaux à risque, conformément à la législation pertinente. Les
déplacements de ces animaux sont également soumis à des restrictions
officielles. Les quatre animaux à risque identifiés seront abattus et éliminés
par incinération conformément à la législation de l'Union européenne. Lors de
l'enquête épidémiologique y compris l’enquête en amont des animaux à risque de
l'exploitation d'origine ainsi que de l’exploitation actuelle ont été identifiés
2 descendants nés dans les deux ans précédant l'incident en plus de 2 bovins
appartenant soit à (1) la cohorte d’animaux nés dans le même troupeau que
l'animal atteint dans les 12 mois précédant ou suivant la date de naissance de
la vache atteinte soit à (2) la cohorte d’animaux qui au cours de la première
année de leur vies ont été élevés avec la vache atteinte au cours de sa première
année de vie. Les déplacements de la descendance née dans les deux années qui
ont précédé l'incident et de la cohorte d’animaux à risque sont soumis à des
restrictions et l’abattage et la destruction de ces animaux seront effectués dès
que possible. La carcasse de la vache atteinte a été complètement détruite. La
NFSA s’assure que la carcasse de la vache a été traitée par stérilisation sous
pression dans une usine de transformation de catégorie 1 et que le matériau
résultant a été envoyé à l'incinération / co-incinération conformément aux
dispositions du règlement sur les sous-produits animaux.
Mesures de lutte Mesure de lutte appliquées Restriction des déplacements à
l'intérieur du pays Dépistage Pas de vaccination Aucun traitement des animaux
atteints Mesures à appliquer Abattage sanitaire partiel
Résultats des tests de diagnostics Nom du laboratoire et type Laboratoire
de référence de l'Union européenne, Agence de la santé animale et végétale
(APHA), Weybridge (Royaume-Uni) ( Laboratoire de référence de l’OIE ) Tests et
résultats Espèce(s) Test Date du test Résultat Bovins examen immunohistochimique
28/01/2015 Positif Bovins western blot 28/01/2015 Positif Nom du laboratoire et
type Institut vétérinaire norvégien ( Laboratoire national ) Tests et résultats
Espèce(s) Test Date du test Résultat Bovins méthode de dosage immuno-enzymatique
(ELISA) 20/01/2015 Positif Nom du laboratoire et type Institut vétérinaire
norvégien ( Laboratoire national ) Tests et résultats Espèce(s) Test Date du
test Résultat Bovins western blot 20/01/2015 Positif
Rapports futurs Cet événement se poursuit. Des rapports de suivi
hebdomadaires devront être envoyés.
Encefalopatía espongiforme bovina ,Noruega Información recibida el
29/01/2015 desde Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief Veterinary Officer, Norwegian
Food Safety Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Brumunddal,
Noruega
Resumen Tipo de informe Notificación inmediata Fecha del inicio del evento
16/01/2015 Fecha de pre-confirmación del evento 20/01/2015 Fecha del informe
29/01/2015 Fecha de envio del informe a la OIE 29/01/2015 Motivo de la
notificación Aparición por primera vez de una enfermedad de la Lista de la OIE
Manifestación de la enfermedad Infección sub-clínica Agente causal Prion (EEB
atípica, tipo H) Naturaleza del diagnóstico Pruebas de diagnóstico de
laboratorio avanzadas (ej. virología, microscopía electrónica, biología
molecular e inmunología) Este evento concierne todo el país
Nuevos focos Resumen de los focos Número total de focos: 1 Localización del
foco NORD-TRONDELAG ( Verran, Tua, District office Innherred og Fosen, Region
office Trøndelag og Møre og Romdal ) Número total de animales afectados Especies
Susceptibles Casos Muertos Destruidos Sacrificados Bovinos 27 1 0 1 0
Estadística del foco Especies Tasa de morbilidad aparente Tasa de mortalidad
aparente Tasa de fatalidad aparente Proporción de animales susceptibles
perdidos* Bovinos 3.70% 0.00% 0.00% 3.70%
* Descontados de la población susceptible a raíz de su muerte, destrucción
o sacrificio;
Epidemiología Fuente del o de los focos u origen de la infección
Desconocida o no concluyente Otros detalles epidemiológicos / comentarios
Situación al 29 de enero de 2015: El 20 de enero de 2015, el Instituto de
veterinaria noruego informó de una sospecha de EEB en una vaca en Noruega basada
en una prueba inicial realizada con material del SNC. Parte de este material se
envió al Laboratorio de referencia de la Unión Europea en Weybridge (21 de enero
de 2015) para verificar el diagnóstico. La vaca afectada tenía 15 años y nació
en Noruega. La madre fue importada de Suecia. La vaca no mostró signos clínicos
de enfermedad neurológica antes de ser eliminada por su edad avanzada y lesiones
(12 de enero de 2015). La prueba para la EEB fue realizada en el marco del
programa de vigilancia para la EEB. La Autoridad noruega de seguridad
alimentaria (NFSA) ha impuesto restricciones a los desplazamientos en la
explotación y ha realizado las investigaciones epidemiológicas. La NFSA ha
identificado cuatro animales de riesgo, de acuerdo con la legislación
pertinente. Los desplazamientos de estos animales también son sometidos a las
restricciones oficiales. Los cuatro animales de riesgo identificados serán
eliminados y destruidos por incineración de acuerdo con la legislación de la
Unión Europea. En la investigación epidemiológica incluido el rastreo de los
animales de riesgo de la explotación de origen así como de la explotación actual
se han identificado 2 descendientes nacidos en los dos años anteriores al
incidente además de 2 bovinos pertenecientes a (1) la cohorte de animales
nacidos en el mismo rebaño que el animal afectado en los 12 meses anteriores o
posteriores a la fecha de nacimiento de la vaca afectada o a (2) la cohorte de
animales que en cualquier momento durante el primer año de vida fueron criados
con la vaca afectada durante su primer año de vida. Los desplazamientos de la
descendencia nacida en los dos años anteriores al incidente y de la cohorte de
animales de riesgo están sometidos a restricciones y la matanza y la destrucción
de estos animales se llevará a cabo lo antes posible. La canal de la vaca
afectada ha sido completamente destruida. La NFSA se asegura de que la canal de
la vaca ha sido procesada por esterilización a presión en una planta de
transformación de la categoría 1 y de que el material resultante ha sido enviado
para su incineración/co-incineración de conformidad con el reglamento relativo a
los subproductos de origen animal.
Medidas de Control Medidas implementadas Restricción de los movimientos en
el interior del país Tamizaje Vacunación: no Ningún tratamiento de los animales
afectados Medidas para implementar Sacrificio sanitario parcial
Resultados de las pruebas diagnósticas Nombre y tipo de laboratorio
Laboratorio de referencia de la Unión Europea, Agencia de sanidad animal y
vegetal (APHA), Weybridge (Reino Unido) ( Laboratorio de referencia de la OIE )
Pruebas y resultados Especies Prueba Fecha de la prueba Resultados Bovinos
examen inmunohistoquímico 28/01/2015 Positivo Bovinos western blot 28/01/2015
Positivo Nombre y tipo de laboratorio Instituto de veterinaria noruego (
Laboratorio nacional ) Pruebas y resultados Especies Prueba Fecha de la prueba
Resultados Bovinos prueba inmunoenzimática (ELISA) 20/01/2015 Positivo Bovinos
western blot 20/01/2015 Positivo
Informes futuros El episodio continúa. Informes de seguimiento semanales
serán enviados
<!--[endif]—>
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of NORWAY
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Atypical H-TYPE BSE Case Confirmed in Norway
Wednesday, January 21, 2015
Norway detects "probable" case of mad cow disease
UPDATE...FINAL REPORT...TSS
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Norway
Information received on 20/02/2015 from Dre Kristina Landsverk, Chief
Veterinary Officer, Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and
Food, Brumunddal, Norway
Summary
Report type Follow-up report No. 2 (Final report) Date of start of the
event 16/01/2015 Date of pre-confirmation of the event 20/01/2015 Report date
20/02/2015 Date submitted to OIE 20/02/2015 Date event resolved 03/02/2015
Reason for notification First occurrence of a listed disease Manifestation of
disease Sub-clinical infection Causal agent Prion (atypical BSE type H) Nature
of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced) This event pertains to the whole country
Related reports Immediate notification (29/01/2015) Follow-up report No. 1
(06/02/2015) Follow-up report No. 2 (20/02/2015)
Outbreaks There are no new outbreaks in this report
Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or inconclusive
Probably spontaneous Epidemiological comments Based on status on 20 February
2015: The four risk animals are killed and all of them tested negative for BSE.
The four risk animals are all incinerated (with reference to NFSA [Norwegian
Food Safety Authority] inspection-system Mats).
Control measures
Measures applied Movement control inside the country Screening Modified
stamping out No vaccination No treatment of affected animals Measures to be
applied No other measures
Future Reporting
The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.
> Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection Unknown or
inconclusive Probably spontaneous
Discussion:
The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics
similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and
Japan.
*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated
feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these
countries. ***
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
*** PLOS Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic
Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
PLOS Singeltary Comment ;
*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
Saturday, January 24, 2015
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons
Saturday, January 31, 2015
RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings
in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of
modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to BSE
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05
Study of Atypical Bse
Sunday, December 28, 2014
Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFOIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE PRION
aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST
2014
Thursday, October 02, 2014
[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
snip...see full text ;
Monday, February 23, 2015
20th BSE Case Raises New Concerns about Canada's Feeding Practices and
Voluntary Testing Program; Highlights Importance of COOL
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President
TSS
American Association of Zoo Veterinarians Infectious Disease Committee
Manual 2013
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)
Little is known about atypical BSE. The origin and natural routes of
transmission, if any, have yet to be determined. Almost all cases have been in
older cattle (usually > 8 years of age) that have shown little resemblance to
the clinic-pathological picture seen in classical disease. It has been suggested
that the disease may be sporadic or be caused by a genetic mutation, but no
convincing evidence has been found to support either of these ideas. The correct
answer will probably only come by study of the future annual incidence curves of
both types of disease. Regardless of the origin of atypical BSE, the possibility
of recycling the disease in cattle and other ruminants, as well as the potential
for transmission to humans, mandate a continuation of feed and specified-risk
materials (SRM) bans, together with diagnostic testing programs for some time to
come.
snip...
Naturally occurring cases of BSE in species other than cattle have been
very limited and have been linked to exposure to contaminated feed or infected
carcasses. The majority of cases originated in the UK and like BSE in cattle,
have declined with the implementation of feed controls. None of the exotic
animals were infected in the wild.
Experts who may be consulted: Linda A. Detwiler, DVM Clinical Professor
Department of Pathobiology and Population Medicine
College of Veterinary Medicine Mississippi State University 732-580-9391
Fax: 732-741-7751 ldetwiler@belle-terre.com
Atypical BSE: Transmissibility
BASE (L) transmitted to: cattle (IC) - inc < 20 mos and oral?)
Cynomolgus macaques (IC)
Mouse lemurs (IC and oral)
wild-type mice (IC)
bovinized transgenic mice (IC and IP)
humanized transgenic mice (IC)
H cases transmitted to:
cattle – IC incubations < 20 months
bovinized transgenic mice (IC)
ovinized transgenic mice (IC)
C57BL mice (IC)
One study did not transmit to humanized PrP Met 129 mice
Evaluation of Possibility of Atypical
BSE Transmitting to Humans
Possble interpretation:
L type seems to transmit to nonhuman primates with greater ease than
classical BSE
L type also transmitted to humanized transgenic mice with higher attack
rate and shorter incubation period than classical?
H type did not transmit to Tg Hu transgenic mice
Linda Detwiller, 5/10/2011
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM
Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE,
or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another,
but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these
data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.
Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of
Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of
more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.
P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw
Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1
1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale,
Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research
Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal
Disease Center), USA
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the
classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human
infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three
continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type,
and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP
(termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely
undefined.
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their
transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.
Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several
classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the
transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc,
symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected
with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas
only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more
than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse
brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also
detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those
infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to
a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also
transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M
transmission has been observed so far.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than
classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission
barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg
mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type
Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H.
Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany,
2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch,
Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy
Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type
and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent
distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies
of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of
L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the
brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in
L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest
levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly
involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per
group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical
BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a
free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions. At least one animal
per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining
animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were
examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment
following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis
studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical
symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture
differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss
of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb
ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples
from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot
profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being
examined in order to be able to describe the pathoge esis and agent distribution
for these novel BSE types.
Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test
ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system
for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and
infectivity is still ongoing.
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure - Final Abstract
Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North
America update October 2009
T. Singeltary Bacliff, TX, USA
Background: An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America.
Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE
have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME.
All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing
animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and
that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada
has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods: 12 years independent research of available data
Results: I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only
enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the
UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to
continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a
multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e.,
surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics
etc.
Conclusion: I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the
USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease,
in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately
without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this
agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting
the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD
knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante,
Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis,
Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science
to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move
forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly
identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
snip... see more breaches in the BSE aka mad cow Triple Firewall, that
never was here ;
Friday, January 23, 2015
*** Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein
sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $
Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products
For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Show agency attachment(s) AttachmentsView All (0) Empty
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comment View document:Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
;
I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from
the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA
and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is
any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just
saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present
mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?
North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species
(excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and
or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented
evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine
spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just
not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid
CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type
BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to
date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical
Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different
strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow
case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC.
typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al),
and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical
Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid
populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk
assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to
trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day
December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats
the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries
throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated
to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the
OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion
disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type
disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about
money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating
disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure,
sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion
disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its
all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the
infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$
the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing
but ink on paper.
for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and
that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE
GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all
TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk
assessments be made stronger than before.
lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to
America.
Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest
year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases
dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to
date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad
cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the
number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the
USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in
2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD
COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in
my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow
disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE
mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.
Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)
Country/Year
snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA
triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease.
...TSS No documents available. AttachmentsView All (1) Empty Docket No.
APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and
Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Friday, January 23, 2015
*** Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein
sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $
Saturday, January 24, 2015
*** Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons
Monday, December 1, 2014
Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review
December 1, 2014
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Identification of H-type BSE in Portugal
TSS
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.