BIOIBERICA
SCIENCE BOARD TO THE FDA June 4, 2014 FDA White Oak Campus Bldg 31 Rm 1503 
10903 New Hampshire Ave Silver Spring, MD 20993 Barcelona, May 27th 2014
POSITION STATEMENT ON THE REINTRODUCTION OF BOVINE HEPARIN
Commercial heparin drug products were introduced into clinical use more 
than 70 years ago. Heparin sodium was first approved by the FDA on February 9th, 
1939(1). The first commercial heparin preparations were derived from bovine 
tissues (lung or intestinal mucosa). Since most of unfractionated heparin 
applications were approved decades ago, there was little or no pharmaceutical 
development reported in the applications(2) . In fact, even today unfractionated 
heparin is defined as a "natural product that is poorly defined chemically"(2) 
or "a substance that is of biological origin and, due to its complexity, a 
combination of physico-chemical-biological testing together with testing and 
control of the manufacturing process is needed for its characterization and 
determination of quality"(3). For this reason, and due to the significant 
molecular differences between heparins of different origins that we have 
observed in our own studies or that are described in published literature, we 
consider that the benefit-risk assessment of the reintroduction of bovine 
heparin may be a risky challenge. Since the outbreak of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), only heparin derived from pig intestinal mucosa is found 
in Europe and USA, because the sourcing of heparin from bovine tissues could 
pose a risk to human health after description of the variant of Creutzfeld‐Jacob 
encephalopathy (vCJ) as a prion disease transmitted by cows suffering from 
BSE.
Though we are sure that the FDA has taken into consideration the scientific 
knowledge available on heparin sourced from different species/tissues, we would 
like to share our point of view with regards to the reintroduction of bovine 
heparin in commercial preparations. In particular, we believe there are two 
aspects of utmost importance: 
1) the differences in the structural characteristics of heparin from 
different origins and 
2) the increase of the BSE agent transmission risk via bovine heparin 
preparations.
1. Differences in the structural characteristics of heparin from different 
origins
Today there are analytical techniques that are able to discern relevant 
differences between complex products due to their molecular heterogeneity. 
Bioibérica has been studying the Heparin molecule and has found significant 
differences between heparins derived from different tissues.
Page 1 of 4
Oficina Comercial: Plaza Francesc Macià, 7, 8º-B. 08029 Barcelona - España. 
Tel. (34) 93 490 49 08. Fax (34) 93 490 97 11
Complejo Industrial Bioibérica: Ctra. Nacional II, Km. 680,6. 08389 
Palafolls. Barcelona - España. Tel. (34) 93 765 03 90. Fax (34) 93 765 01 
02
Our findings are aligned with the data published in the available 
literature, which also describes differences between heparins extracted from 
different tissues and species. E.g. "Heparins obtained from different tissues 
and different species also differ structurally. The most widely used tissue for 
the preparation of pharmaceutical grade heparin is porcine intestine. Heparin 
prepared from bovine lung differs substantially from porcine intestinal heparin. 
Bovine lung heparin has a higher sulfation level and slightly higher molecular 
weight than porcine intestinal heparin, increasing its affinity for thrombin 
(factor IIa). Porcine intestinal heparin contains an AT binding site primarily 
having N-acetyl group in residue A, while bovine lung heparin primarily has an 
N-sulfo group residue A, resulting in their slightly different affinities for 
AT" (4) .
Particularly important is the fact that these structural differences may 
lead to different efficacy or safety profiles: "Pharmaceutical grade heparins 
obtained from porcine and bovine intestinal mucosa differ significantly in their 
preponderant disaccharide compositions, anticoagulant activities, bleeding 
tendencies, doses required to inhibit experimental thrombosis and protamine 
neutralization curves. It is possible to obtain a heparin fraction from bovine 
mucosa with the typical disaccharide composition, but at a lower yield when 
compared with that from porcine source. Even possessing the typical disaccharide 
composition this bovine heparin fraction still shows a lower antithrombotic 
activity than porcine heparin"(5) . These observations may explain the 
increasing reports of bleeding and peri-or post-operative blood dyscrasias 
observed in Brazilian patients in 2008, "though it was not possible to correlate 
clinical events with specific heparin batches"(6). The heparin preparations from 
bovine and porcine origins were interchanged by health professionals in 
Brazil.
Also according to the regulatory authorities in Argentina (ANMAT), where 
bovine heparin is clinically in use, there were outstanding issues with specific 
activities of bovine heparin in the Inspection and Quality Control Program of 
2012 (7).
2) Increase of the BSE agent transmission risk via bovine heparin 
preparations
The potential for contamination of heparin with the BSE agent has been a 
concern of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA): "FDA is also concerned 
about the potential for contamination of heparin with the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) agent derived from ruminant materials"(8). Therefore, FDA 
Guidance for Industry Heparin for Drug and Medical Device Use: Monitoring Crude 
Heparin for Quality recommends testing and confirming the species origin of 
crude heparin in each lot of every shipment before use in the manufacture or 
preparation of a drug, to ensure the safety of drugs and devices that contain 
heparin and to protect public health.
Heparin sourced from bovine species is extracted either from the intestines 
or from the lungs. The intestines, from the duodenum to the rectum, of bovine 
animals of all ages are currently included in the list of Specified Risk 
Material (SRM) in the European Union (Regulation (EC) No 999/2001, as
Page 2 of 4
amended). The distal ileum of the small intestine is also considered as SRM 
in U.S.A (§310.22). As far as the lungs are concerned, they are classified in 
"Table IB lower-infectivity tissues" (peripheral tissues that have tested 
positive for infectivity and/or PrPTSE in at least one form of TSE) according to 
WHO Tables on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathies (2010), though no detectable infectivity or PrPTSE is observed 
in cattle.
If materials from bovine species are allowed to be used in the manufacture 
of Heparin, all the necessary complementary measures to minimize the risk of 
transmission of BSE should be considered. E.g.:
- the source animals and their geographical origin (animals should be 
sourced from countries with an active BSE surveillance and never from countries 
with undetermined BSE risk status),
- the nature of animal material and procedures in place to avoid 
cross-contamination with higher risk materials, and
- the production process validated for the clearance of BSE agents. To sum 
up, the reintroduction of bovine heparin in commercial heparin preparations 
would need to be thoroughly justified based on overwhelming evidences that the 
benefits outweigh the risks, in particular for:
- Differences in the structural characteristics may lead to different 
clinical efficacy and safety profile. Clinical and safety data of bovine heparin 
should be available according to current non-clinical and clinical guidelines. 
If different bovine tissues were used in addition to the current porcine 
material, the heterogeneity of the heparin preparations in the market would 
increase significantly, and health professionals would need to be warned about 
this.
- There should be a scientifically grounded evidence to justify that the 
benefits of having commercially available bovine heparin outweigh the increase 
of the risk of the BSE agent to be transmitted via bovine heparin. Stringent 
measures should be put in place for the sourcing and production of bovine 
heparin, which should require dedicated manufacturing facilities to avoid 
cross-contamination of the porcine heparin (that could be detected by the 
current FDA requirement to test porcine heparin for the absence of ruminant 
species contamination by PCR technique).
Sincerely yours, Irene Bartolí Regulatory Affairs BIOIBERICA, S.A.
Page 3 of 4
REFERENCES
(1) Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. Application Number 
201370Orig1s000. Summary Review. Ann. T. Farrel, M.D. Acting Division Director. 
Heparin sodium, Vials for Injection.
(2) Regulatory Requirements and Recommendations for Heparin Application. 
Arthur B. Shaw, Ph.D. Product Quality Reviewer US Food and Drug Administration. 
5th Workshop on the Characterization of Heparin Products August 14-15, 
2012.
(3) EMA/CHMP/BWP/429241/2013, Guideline on the use of starting materials 
and intermediates collected from different sources in the manufacturing of 
non-recombinant biological medicinal products (June 2013).
(4) Production and Chemical Processing of Low Molecular Weight Heparins. 
Seminars in Thrombosis and Hemostasis, Vol. 25, Suppl. 3, 1999. Robert J. 
Linhard, Ph.D and Nur Sibel Gunay, M.S.
(5) Structural and functional differences between bovine and porcine 
mucosal heparins. Paulo A. S. Mourão, Laboratório de Tecido Conjuntivo Hospital 
Universitário Clementino Fraga Filho Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. 4th 
Workshop on the characterization of heparin products 8-9 July, 2010 
London.
(6) Heparin: shortage and high selling prices. Should beef mucosa heparin 
be reconsidered? Giuseppe Mascellani. 4th Workshop on the characterization of 
heparin products 8-9 July, 2010 London.
(7) Regulatory and Dossier Requirements for Heparin in Argentina. 
Biochemist M. Verónica López Cepero Division of Identification and 
Quantification Department of Biologic Products National Administration of Drugs, 
Food and Medical Devices. 5th Workshop on the Characterization of Heparin 
Products August 14-15, 2012.
(8) Federal Register Volume 77, Number 29 (Monday, February 13, 2012). 
Draft Guidance for Industry on Heparin for Drug and Medical Device Use; 
Monitoring Crude Heparin for Quality; Availability.
Page 4 of 4 
snip...see full text ;
Monday, October 31, 2011 
Getting the Farm Out of Pharma for Heparin Production 
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/getting-farm-out-of-pharma-for-heparin.html 
Wednesday, July 06, 2011
Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation
(see tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce USA...tss)
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/swine-are-susceptible-to-chronic.html
In an experimental study of the transmissibility of BSE to the pig, seven of 10 pigs, infected at 1-2 weeks of age by multiple-route parenteral inoculation with a homogenate of bovine brain from natural BSE cases developed lesions typical of spongiform encephalopathy.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10684682&dopt=Abstract
PLEASE NOTE, these old BSE Inquiry links take a while to open with the wayback machine, so be patient. ...tss
Title: Experimental Intracerebral and Oral Inoculation of Scrapie to Swine: Preliminary Report
In the United States, feeding of ruminant by-products to ruminants is prohibited, but feeding of ruminant materials to swine and poultry still occurs. The potential for swine to have access to scrapie-contaminated feedstuffs exists, but the potential for swine to serve as a host for replication/accumulation of the agent of scrapie is unknown. The purpose of this study was to perform oral and intracerebral inoculation of the U.S. scrapie agent to determine the potential of swine as a host for the scrapie agent and their clinical susceptibility.
snip...
IN CONFIDENCE
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
1. CMO should be aware that a pig inoculated experimentally (ic, iv, and ip) with BSE brain suspension has after 15 months developed an illness, now confirmed as a spongiform encephalopathy. This is the first ever description of such a disease in a pig, although it seems there ar no previous attempts at experimental inoculation with animal material. The Southwood group had thought igs would not be susceptible. Most pigs are slaughtered when a few weeks old but there have been no reports of relevant neurological illness in breeding sows or other elderly pigs. ...see full text ;
http://web.archive.org/web/20040302031004/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/08/23001001.pdf
IN CONFIDENCE
So it is plausible pigs could be preclinically affected with BSE but since so few are allowed to reach adulthood this has not been recognised through clinical disease. ...
http://web.archive.org/web/20040904150118/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/08/23002001.pdf
snip...
CONFIDENTIAL
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
snip... see full text ;
Thursday, November 10, 2011
National Meat Association v. Harris Docket No., 10-224
DEADSTOCK DOWNER PIGS AND PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY PSE
Court Likely to Overturn Calif. Law on Livestock
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/national-meat-association-v-harris.html
 
Wednesday, July 06, 2011
Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation
(see tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce USA...tss)
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/swine-are-susceptible-to-chronic.html
In an experimental study of the transmissibility of BSE to the pig, seven of 10 pigs, infected at 1-2 weeks of age by multiple-route parenteral inoculation with a homogenate of bovine brain from natural BSE cases developed lesions typical of spongiform encephalopathy.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10684682&dopt=Abstract
PLEASE NOTE, these old BSE Inquiry links take a while to open with the wayback machine, so be patient. ...tss
Title: Experimental Intracerebral and Oral Inoculation of Scrapie to Swine: Preliminary Report
In the United States, feeding of ruminant by-products to ruminants is prohibited, but feeding of ruminant materials to swine and poultry still occurs. The potential for swine to have access to scrapie-contaminated feedstuffs exists, but the potential for swine to serve as a host for replication/accumulation of the agent of scrapie is unknown. The purpose of this study was to perform oral and intracerebral inoculation of the U.S. scrapie agent to determine the potential of swine as a host for the scrapie agent and their clinical susceptibility.
snip...
IN CONFIDENCE
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
1. CMO should be aware that a pig inoculated experimentally (ic, iv, and ip) with BSE brain suspension has after 15 months developed an illness, now confirmed as a spongiform encephalopathy. This is the first ever description of such a disease in a pig, although it seems there ar no previous attempts at experimental inoculation with animal material. The Southwood group had thought igs would not be susceptible. Most pigs are slaughtered when a few weeks old but there have been no reports of relevant neurological illness in breeding sows or other elderly pigs. ...see full text ;
http://web.archive.org/web/20040302031004/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/08/23001001.pdf
IN CONFIDENCE
So it is plausible pigs could be preclinically affected with BSE but since so few are allowed to reach adulthood this has not been recognised through clinical disease. ...
http://web.archive.org/web/20040904150118/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/08/23002001.pdf
snip...
CONFIDENTIAL
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
snip... see full text ;
Thursday, November 10, 2011
National Meat Association v. Harris Docket No., 10-224
DEADSTOCK DOWNER PIGS AND PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY PSE
Court Likely to Overturn Calif. Law on Livestock
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/national-meat-association-v-harris.html
Friday, April 20, 2012 
Ultrastructural findings in pigs experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent
http://madporcinedisease.blogspot.com/2012/04/ultrastructural-findings-in-pigs.html
"The fact that certain medicinal products could be injected directly into the body (most commonly intramuscularly) meant that in theory they would pose a greater risk than beef products in food."
Ultrastructural findings in pigs experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent
http://madporcinedisease.blogspot.com/2012/04/ultrastructural-findings-in-pigs.html
"The fact that certain medicinal products could be injected directly into the body (most commonly intramuscularly) meant that in theory they would pose a greater risk than beef products in food."
 Infectivity of bovine materials used in medicinal products and the 
importance of inoculation route 
3.221 The risk from infectivity present in medicinal products was 
considered by the Southwood Working Party. They noted that ‘the greatest risk . 
. . would be from the parenteral injection of material derived from bovine brain 
or lymphoid tissue’.538 (As described previously, it was generally accepted that 
the oral route was considerably less efficient than the parenteral 
route.539)
3.222 In reality, different routes exist within the parenteral category – 
intracerebral, intraperitoneal, intramuscular, intravenous, intraspinal and 
subcutaneous. Experiments in 1978 looking at several of these routes found the 
efficiency between them to vary. Intracerebral and intraspinal were generally 
the most efficient, followed by intravenous, intraperitoneal and then 
subcutaneous.540 The fact that certain medicinal products could be injected 
directly into the body (most commonly intramuscularly) meant that in theory they 
would pose a greater risk than beef products in food.
3.223 Various cattle tissues were of relevance to medicinal products, 
including insulin, heparin, surgical catgut sutures and serum. The consideration 
given to these materials prior to March 1996 is addressed in vol. 7: Medicines 
and Cosmetics.
533 SEAC 22/5 534 Wells, G. (1998) Preliminary Observations on the 
Pathogenesis of Experimental Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE): An Update, 
Veterinary Record, 142, 103 535 Wells, G., Hawkins, S., Green, P., Spencer, Y., 
Dexter, I. and Dawson, D. (1999) Limited Detection of Sternal Bone Marrow 
Infectivity in the Clinical Phase of Experimental Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE), Veterinary Record, 144, 292–4 536 Scott, M.R., Will, R., 
Ironside, J., Nguyen, H.-O., Tremblay, P., DeArmond, S.J. and Prusiner, S.B. 
(1999) Compelling Transgenetic Evidence for Transmission of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Prions to Humans, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the USA, 96, 15137–42 537 Scott, M.R., Safar, J., Telling, G., Nguyen, H.-O., 
Groth, D., Torchia, M., Kochler, R., Tremblay, P., Walther, D., Cohen, F., 
DeArmond, S. and Prusiner, S. (1997) Identification of a Prion Protein Epitope 
Modulating Transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prions to Transgenic 
Mice, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 94, 14279–84 538 IBD1 tab 2 para. 5.3.3 539 Kimberlin, R. and Walker, 
C. (1989) Pathogenesis of Scrapie in Mice after Intragastric Infection, Virus 
Research, 12, 213–20; Diringer, H., Beekes, M. and Oberdieck, U. (1994) The 
Nature of the Scrapie Agent: The Virus Theory, Annals of The New York Academy of 
Science, 724, 246–58; Prusiner, S., Cochran, S. and Alpers, S. (1985) 
Transmission of Scrapie in Hamsters, Journal of Infectious Diseases, 152, 971–8 
540 Kimberlin, R.H. and Walker, C.A. (1978) Pathogenesis of Mouse Scrapie: 
Effect of Route of Inoculation on Infectivity Titres and Dose-Response Curves, 
Journal of Comparative Pathology, 88, 39–47 
COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF MEDICINES
WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
3. Products for injection using bovine tissue
This category includes tissue derived products, other than from brain or 
lymphoid tissue and excludes bovine blood.
3.1 Bovine Pancreas
3.1.1 Insulin
The following companies hold licences for bovine insulin.
Source Country
Denmark
USA
USA
Denmark, Sweden, USA, Italy, Canada, Portugal, Netherlands
In 1988 a sample consignment from UK was used. UK source material is no 
longer used.
Comment
There are no bovine insulins manufctured from UK sourced material.
Bovine insulin is not widely prescribed, but has a niche in the market for 
diabetics unable to tolerate other products.
3.1.2 Glucagon
bovine pancreas from USA.
as for insulin - Scandinavia, USA, Italy, Canada, Portugal and 
Netherlands.
3.1.3
Miscellaneous products containing Bovine Pancreas
3.1.3.1 Zonulysin (Chymotrypsin) - sourced from Canada
3.1.3.2 Streptokinase - culture medium, containing bovine muscle and 
pancreas are used in process - all sourced from Germany
3.1.3.3 Fibrinogen + Desoxyribonuclease - bovine pancreas sourced from 
Canada and S Africa.
3.2. Vaccines using Bovine Products in process
snip...see full text ; 
Subject: Louping-ill vaccine documents from November 23rd, 1946 
Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2000 17:44:57 –0700 
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de 
######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ######### 
THE VETERINARY RECORD 516 No 47. Vol. 58 November 23rd, 1946 
NATIONAL VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 
ANNUAL CONGRESS, 1946 
The annual Congress, 1946, was held at the Royal Veterinary College, Royal 
College Street, London, N.W.I. from September 22nd to September 27th. 
Opening Meeting 
[skip to scrapie vaccine issue...tss] 
Papers Presented to Congress 
The papers presented to this year's Congress had as their general theme the 
progressive work of the profession during the war years. Their appeal was 
clearly demonstrated by the large and remarkably uniform attendance in the Grand 
Hall of the Royal Veterinary College throughout the series; between 200 and 250 
members were present and they showed a keen interest in every paper, which was 
reflected in the expression of some disappointment that the time available for 
discussion did not permit of the participation of more than a small proportion 
of would-be contributors. 
In this issue we publish (below) the first to be read and discussed, that 
by Dr. W. S. Gordon, M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E., "Advances in Veterinary Research." 
Next week's issue will contain the paper on "Some Recent Advances in Veterinary 
Medicine and Surgery in Large-Animal Practice" by Mr. T. Norman Gold, M.R.C.V.S. 
In succeeding numbers of the Record will be reproduced, also with reports of 
discussions, that by Mr. W. L. Weipers, M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., on the same 
subject as relating to small-animal practice, and the papers by Mr. J. N. 
Ritchie, B.SC., M.R.C.V.S., D.V.S.M., and Mr. H.W. Steele-Bodger, M.R.C.V.S., on 
"War-time Achievements of the British Home Veterinary Services." 
The first scientific paper of Congress was read by Dr. W. S. Gordon, 
M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E. on Monday, September 23rd, 1946, when Professor J. Basil 
Buxton, M.A., F.R.C.V.S, D.V.H., Prinicipal of the Royal Veterinary College, 
presided. 
Advances in Veterinary Research 
by 
W.S. GORDON, PH.D., M.R.C.V.S., F.R.S.E. 
Agriculteral Research Council, Field Station, Compton, Berks. 
Louping-ill, Tick-borne Fever and Scrapie 
In 1930 Pool, Browniee & Wilson recorded that louping-ill was a 
transmissible disease. Greig et al, (1931) showed that the infective agent was a 
filter-passing virus with neurotropic characters and Browniee & Wilson 
(1932) that the essential pathology was that of an encephalomyelitis. Gordon, 
Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod (1932) and MacLeod & Gordon (1932) confirmed 
and extended this work. It was shown that on louping-ill farms the virus was 
present in the blood of many sheep which did not show clinical symptoms 
indicating involvement of the central nervous system and that for the 
perpetuation and spread of the disease these subclinical cases were probably of 
greater importance that the frank clinical cases because, in Nature, the disease 
was spread by the tick, lxodes ricinus L. More recently Wilson (1945, 1946) has 
described the cultivation of the virus in a chick embryo medium, the pathogenic 
properties of this culture virus and the preparation of louping-ill antiserum. 
Between 1931 and 1934 I carried out experiments which resulted in the 
development of an effective vaccine for the prevention of louping-ill.* This 
vaccine has been in general use since 1935 and in his annual report to the 
Animal Diseases Research Association this year, Dr. Greig stated that about 
227,000 doses of vaccine had been issued from Moredun alone. 
Dr. Gordon illustrated this portion of his paper by means of graphs and 
diagrams projected by the epidiascope. 
This investigation, however, did not begin and end with the study of 
louping-ill; it had, by good fortune, a more romantic turn and less fortunately 
a final dramatic twist which led almost to catastrope. After it had been 
established that a solid immunity to louping-ill could be induced in sheep, a 
group of immunized and a group of susceptible animals were placed together on 
the tick-infected pasture of a louping-ill farm. Each day all the animals were 
gathered and their temperatures were recorded. It was anticipated that febrile 
reactions with some fatalities would develop in the controls while the 
louping-ill immunes would remain normal. Contrary to expectation, however, every 
sheep, both immune and control, developed a febrile reaction. This unexpected 
result made necessary further investigation which showed that the febrile 
reaction in the louping-ill immunes was due to a hitherto undescribed infective 
agent, a Rickettsia-like organism which could be observed in the cytoplasm of 
the grannular leucocytes, especially the neutrophil polymorphs (MacLeod (1932), 
Gordon, Browniee, Wilson & MacLeod. MacLeod & Gordon (1933). MacLeod 
(1936). MacLeod collected ticks over many widely separated parts of Scotland and 
all were found to harbour the infective agent of tick-borne fever, and it is 
probable that all sheep on tick-infested farms develop this disease, at least on 
the first occasion that they become infested with ticks. When the infection is 
passed in series through susceptible adult sheep it causes a sever, febrile 
reaction, dullness and loss of bodily condition but it rarely, if ever, proves 
fatal. It is clear, however, that it aggravates the harmful effects of a 
louping-ill infection and it is a serious additional complication to such 
infections as pyaemia and the anacrobic infections which beset lambs on the hill 
farms of Northern Britain. 
Studying the epidemiology of louping-ill on hill farms it became obvious 
that the pyaemic condition of lambs described by M'Fadyean (1894) was very 
prevalent on tick infested farms Pyaemia is a crippling condition of lambs 
associated with tick-bite and is often confused with louping-ill. It is caused 
by infection with Staphylococcus aureus and affected animals may show abscess 
formation on the skin, in the joints, viscera, meninges and elsewhere in the 
body. It was thought that tick-borne fever might have ben a predisposing factor 
in this disease and unsuccessful attempts were made by Taylor, Holman & 
Gordon (1941) to reproduce the condition by infecting lambs subcutaneously with 
the staphylococcus and concurrently producing infections with tickborne fever 
and louping-ill in the same lambs. Work on pyaemia was then continued by 
McDiarmid (1946a, 1946b, 1946c), who succeeded in reproducing a pyaemic disease 
in mice, guinea-pigs and lambs similar to the naturally occurring condition by 
intravenous inoculation of Staphylococcus aureus. He also found a bacteraemic 
form of the disease in which no gross pyaemic lesions were observed. The 
prevention or treatment of this condition presents a formidable problem. It is 
unlikely that staphylococcal ???oid will provide an effective immunity and even 
if penicillin proved to be a successful treatment, the difficulty of applying it 
in adequate and sustained dosage to young lambs on hill farms would be almost 
insurmountable. 
>From 1931 to 1934 field trials to test the immunizing value and 
harmlessness of the loup-ill vaccine were carried out on a gradually increasing 
scale. Many thousands of sheep were vaccinated and similar numbers, living under 
identical conditions were left as controls. The end result showed that an 
average mortability of about 9 percent in the controls was reduced to less than 
1 percent in the vaccinated animals. While the efficiency of the vaccine was 
obvious after the second year of work, previous bitter experience had shown the 
wisdom of withholding a biological product from widespread use until it had been 
successfully produced in bulk, as opposed to small-scale experimental production 
and until it had been thoroughly tested for immunizing efficiency and freedom 
from harmful effects. It was thought that after four years testing this stage 
had been reached in 1935, and in the spring of that year the vaccine was issued 
for general use. It comprised a 10 percent saline suspension of brain, spinal 
cord and spleen tissues taken from sheep five days after infection with 
louping-ill virus by intracerebral inoculation. To this suspension 0-35 percent 
of formalin was added to inactivate the virus and its safety for use as a 
vaccine was checked by intracerbral inoculation of mice and sheep and by the 
inoculation of culture medium. Its protective power was proved by vaccination 
sheep and later subjecting them, along with controls, to a test dose of living 
virus. 
Vaccine for issue had to be free from detectable, living virus and capable 
of protecting sheep against a test dose of virus applied subcutaneously. The 
1935 vaccine conformed to these standards and was issued for inoculation in 
March as three separate batches labeled 1, 2, and 3. The tissues of 140 sheep 
were employed to make batch 1 of which 22,270 doses were used; 114 to make batch 
2 of which 18,000 doses were used and 44 to make batch 3 of which 4,360 doses 
were used. All the sheep tissues incorporated in the vaccine were obtained from 
yearling sheep. During 1935 and 1936 the vaccine proved highly efficient in the 
prevention of loup-ill and no user observed an ill-effect in the inoculated 
animals. In September, 1937, two and a half years after vaccinating the sheep, 
two owners complained that scrapie, a disease which had not before been observed 
in the Blackface breed, was appearing in their stock of Blackface sheep and 
further that it was confined to animals vaccinated with louping-ill vaccine in 
1935. At that stage it was difficult to conceive that the occurrence could be 
associated with the injection of the vaccine but in view of the implications, I 
visited most of the farms on which sheep had been vaccinated in 1935. It was at 
this point that the investigation reached its dramatic phase; I shall not forget 
the profound effect on my emotions when I visited these farms and was warmly 
welcomed because of the great benefits resulting from the application of 
louping-ill vaccine, wheras the chief purpose of my visit was to determine if 
scrapie was appearing in the inoculated sheep. The enquiry made the position 
clear. Scrapie was developing in the sheep vaccinated in 1935 and it was only in 
a few instances that the owner was associating the occurrence with louping-ill 
vaccination. The disease was affecting all breeds and it was confined to the 
animals vaccinated with batch 2. This was clearly demonstrated on a number of 
farms on which batch 1 had been used to inoculate the hoggs in 1935 and batch 2 
to inoculate the ewes. None of the hoggs, which at this time were three- 
year-old ewes. At this time it was difficult to forecast whether all of the 
18,000 sheep which had received batch 2 vaccine would develop scrapie. It was 
fortunate, however, that the majority of the sheep vaccinated with batch 2 were 
ewes and therfore all that were four years old and upwards at the time of 
vaccination had already been disposed of and there only remained the ewes which 
had been two to three years old at the time of vaccination, consequently no 
accurate assessment of the incidence of scrapie could be made. On a few farms, 
however, where vaccination was confined to hoggs, the incidence ranged from 1 
percent, to 35 percent, with an average of about 5 percent. Since batch 2 
vaccine had been incriminated as a probable source of scrapie infection, an 
attempt was made to trace the origin of the 112 sheep whose tissues had been 
included in the vaccine. It was found that they had been supplied by three 
owners and that all were of the Blackface or Greyface breed with the exception 
of eight which were Cheviot lambs born in 1935 from ewes which had been in 
contact with scrapie infection. Some of these contact ewes developed scrapie in 
1936-37 and three surviving fellow lambs to the eight included in the batch 2 
vaccine of 1935 developed scrapie, one in September, 1936, one in February, 
1937, and one in November, 1937. There was, therefore, strong presumptive 
evidence that the eight Cheviot lambs included in the vaccine although 
apparently healthy were, in fact, in the incubative stage of a scrapie infection 
and that in their tissues there was an infective agent which had contaminated 
the batch 2 vaccine, rendering it liable to set up scrapie. If that assumption 
was correct then the evidence indicated that:- 
(1) the infective agent of scrapie was present in the brain, spinal cord 
and or spleen of infected sheep: (2) it could withstand a concentration of 
formalin of 0-35 percent, which inactivated the virus of louping-ill: (3) it 
could be transmitted by subcutaneous inoculation; (4) it had an incubative 
period of two years and longer. 
Two Frenchmen, Cuille & Chelle (1939) as the result of experiments 
commenced in 1932, reported the successful infection of sheep by inoculation of 
emulsions of spinal cord or brain material by the intracerebral, epidural, 
intraocular and subcutaneous routes The incubation period varied according to 
the route employed, being one year intracerebrally, 15 months intraocularly and 
20 months subcutaneously. They failed to infect rabbits but succeeded in 
infecting goats. Another important part of their work showed that the infective 
agent could pass through a chamberland 1.3 filter, thus demonstrating that the 
infective agent was a filtrable virus. It was a curious coincidence that while 
they were doing their transmission experiments their work was being confirmed by 
the unforeseeable infectivity of a formalinized tissue vaccine. 
As a result of this experience a large-scale transmission experiment 
involving the use of 788 sheep was commenced in 1938 on a farm specially taken 
for the purpose by the Animal Diseases Research Association with funds provided 
by the Agricultural Research Council. The experiment was designed to determine 
the nature of the infective agent and the pathogenesis of the disease. It is 
only possible here to give a summary of the result which showed that (1) saline 
suspensions of brain and spinal cord tissue of sheep affected with scrapie were 
infective to normal sheep when inoculatted intracerebrally or subcutaneously; 
(2) the incubation period after intracerebral inoculation was seven months and 
upwards and only 60 percent of the inoculated sheep developed scrapie during a 
period of four and a half years; (3) the incubation period after subcutaneous 
inoculation was 15 months and upwards and only about 30 percent of the 
inoculated sheep developed the disease during the four and a half years: (4) the 
infective agent was of small size and probably a filtrable virus. 
The prolonged incubative period of the disease and the remarkable 
resistance of the causal agent to formalin are features of distinct interest. It 
still remains to determine if a biological test can be devised to detect 
infected animals so that they can be killed for food before they develop 
clinical symptoms and to explore the possibilities of producing an immunity to 
the disease. 
================================================================== 
Greetings List Members, 
pretty disturbing document. now, what would stop this from happening with 
the vaccineCJD in children??? 
kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA 
2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions 
Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves 
Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle 
Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia 
Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, 
Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature 
Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 
Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 
Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics 
Abstract 
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant 
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie 
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human 
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the 
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human 
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to 
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie 
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to 
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in 
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to 
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that 
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the 
possible link between animal and human prions.
Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep 
infected with scrapie?
28 Mar 01 Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein 
deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of 
a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to 
BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have 
focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in 
flocks across Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight 
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found 
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by 
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French 
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses, 
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who 
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he 
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been 
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb...
2001
Suspect symptoms 
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep 
infected with scrapie? 
28 Mar 01 
Like lambs to the slaughter 
31 March 2001 
by Debora MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284. 
FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a 
degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary 
was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded 
an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by 
chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of 
campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is 
caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on 
sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across 
Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight 
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found 
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by 
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French 
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses, 
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who 
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he 
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been 
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb.
Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no 
evidence that it poses a risk to human health. But if the French finding means 
that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have 
overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.
Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD. They 
injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from 
French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the 
monkeys were the same for all three. Mice injected with the original sets of 
brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same 
symptoms.
As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from 
people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French 
patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French 
strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie 
strain. As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and 
vCJD. But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from 
sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology.
"The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been 
epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute 
for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys. 
"You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not 
there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie." In 
the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were 
dissimilar.
But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD. "You would 
not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only 
some strains affect only some people," says Deslys. Bruce is cautious about the 
mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation. Other trials of 
scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.
People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion 
protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways. Kretschmar has 
found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each 
type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously 
deforms to produce sCJD.
But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing 
prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as 
it is in vCJD. "If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find 
some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, "that could mean they were 
caused by infection."
There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US, and a similar incidence 
elsewhere. Singeltary and other US activists think that some of these people 
died after eating contaminated meat or "nutritional" pills containing dried 
animal brain. Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singeltary 
if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have 
insisted.
Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human 
disease vCJD is caused by BSE. And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more 
virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather 
than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than 
we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through 
contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $ 
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely 
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for 
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large 
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. 
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might 
be best to retain that hypothesis. 
snip... 
R. BRADLEY 
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8 
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to 
nonhuman primates. 
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC. 
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep 
and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were 
exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known 
infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed 
to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus 
of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the 
two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. 
Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed 
to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru 
has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under 
observation. 
snip... 
The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie 
by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further 
grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in 
humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 
PMID: 6997404 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract 
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is 
transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been 
transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) 
conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and 
transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit 
scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human 
or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is 
emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical 
to the once which characterise the human dementias" 
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be 
transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory 
personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" 
policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep 
industry is not to suffer grievously. 
snip... 
76/10.12/4.6 
Sunday, May 18, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE BSE CJD CHILDREN VACCINES 
Sunday, May 1, 2011
W.H.O. T.S.E. PRION Blood products and related biologicals May 2011 
The pharmaceutical industry
146 Bovine materials were, and are, also used in pharmaceutical, medical 
and veterinary medical products (see Annex 1 to Chapter 2 in vol. 7: Medicines 
and Cosmetics). The UK pharmaceuticals industry is one of the largest in the 
world. In 1997, for example, UK exports were worth over £5 billion and accounted 
for around 12 per cent of the world market. There were over 400 pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and research organisations in the UK, although the market was 
dominated by multinationals such as Glaxo Wellcome, SmithKline Beecham and 
Zeneca.9
147 Bovine materials from the slaughterhouse are used directly in 
pharmaceuticals. Several injectable medicines are derived directly from bovine 
sources. Hormones such as insulin and glucagon may be derived from bovine 
pancreases, and protein products such as aprotonin and heparin are derived from 
bovine lungs and intestinal mucous respectively. Sutures and some medical 
devices such as heart valves and pericardium patches are also derived directly 
from bovine materials, in this case the intestines, heart and serous 
membranes.
148 Bovine materials are also used indirectly in the manufacture of certain 
types of vaccine. Cells which are used to grow these vaccines are nourished in 
nutrientrich cultures that contain serum from the blood of foetal or new-born 
calves, or bovine serum albumin, which derives from the blood of older cattle. 
Bacterial cells are grown in nutrient-rich broths containing peptone derived 
from bovine meat, and some allergens are produced in special culture media which 
contain digests of calf brain and ox liver. In all these cases the bovine 
materials are not a constituent of the final product, but they are used in an 
ancillary way in the manufacturing process.
149 Tallow and gelatine are also used in several pharmaceutical and medical 
products. Gelatine is widely used as a pill coating and tallow is a constituent 
of most creams and ointments. Other uses of bovine products
150 Bovine materials are used in a wide range of processes and products in 
many different industries. They are used in toothpaste, chewing gum and pet 
food; in fertilisers and cosmetics; and in such varied products as fire 
extinguisher foam, buttons, handles, lubricants and racquet strings. Bovine 
materials are used in the manufacture of paint. Cattle skins are used for hides, 
and other bovine materials are included in cleaning agents used in leather 
processing.
9 Britain 1999: The Official Yearbook of the United Kingdom, London, The 
Stationery Office, 1998, p. 475 
Sunday, December 15, 2013 
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED 
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Thursday, July 24, 2014
Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of 
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular 
characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases 
from Europe and Japan. 
*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated 
feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. 
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these 
countries. *** 
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss 
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics 
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ; 
2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST 
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT 
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, 
Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation 
on February 5, 2007. 
Firm initiated recall is ongoing. 
REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was 
cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been 
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE 
statement. 
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI 
___________________________________ 
PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL 
Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, 
TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY 
Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST 
POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY 
Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC 
MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, 
V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML 
W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007 CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only 
shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified. RECALLING 
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. 
Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Products manufactured from bulk 
feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and 
bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. 
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV 
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007 
Newberry Feed & Farm, Inc. 2/14/14 
Department of Health and Human Services logo Department of Health and Human 
Services Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration Atlanta District 
Office 60 8th St., NE Atlanta, GA 30309 
February 14, 2014
VIA UPS 
J. Clint Layne, President/Co-owner Rhett Baker, 
Secretary-Treasurer/Co-owner Newberry Feed & Farm Center, Inc. 131 Giff 
Street Newberry, SC 29108
WARNING LETTER (14-ATL-04)
Dear Messrs. Layne and Baker,
An inspection of your feed mill located at 2431 Vincent Street, Newberry, 
SC 29108 conducted by Investigators from the U.S. Food & Drug Administration 
(FDA) and South Carolina Department of Agriculture on September 5-9, 2013 
revealed significant violations of Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) 
regulations for Medicated Feeds found in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, 
Part 225 (21 C.F.R. 225). Such violations cause the medicated feeds manufactured 
at your facility to be adulterated within the meaning of Section 501(a)(2)(B) of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)] in 
that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for the 
manufacture, processing, packing, or holding of the medicated feeds do not 
conform to or are not operated or administered in conformity with current good 
manufacturing practices. 
The inspection also revealed significant violations of the requirements set 
forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 589.2000 (21 C.F.R. 
589.2000), Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is 
intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE). Animal feeds and feed ingredients containing prohibited 
mammalian proteins are considered potentially injurious to ruminant and public 
health. Because you failed to comply with the requirements set forth in 21 
C.F.R. 589.2000, the feed products manufactured and distributed by your facility 
are adulterated within the meaning of Section 402(a)(4) of the Act [21 U.S.C. 
342(a)(4)] in that they have been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary 
conditions whereby they may have become contaminated with filth or rendered 
injurious to health. The adulterated feed was subsequently misbranded within the 
meaning of Section 403(a)(1) of the Act [21 U.S.C. 343(a)(1)] because it was not 
properly labeled with the required BSE cautionary statement.
Medicated Feed CGMP violations observed during the inspection include, but 
are not limited to, the following:
1. You failed to ensure that all equipment that comes in contact with the 
active drug component, feeds in process or finished medicated feed is subject to 
reasonable and effective procedures to prevent unsafe contamination of feeds 
with drugs. [21 C.F.R. 225.65(b)]
Your written equipment cleaning procedure that requires flushing with a 
minimum of (b)(4) does not appear to be effective to prevent unsafe 
contamination of your manufactured feed. During the inspection, our 
Investigators observed a build-up of feed residue on surfaces inside the mixer 
that was approximately three inches thick in accumulation. This build-up was 
observed on the equipment throughout the inspection, including after flushing 
had been performed. In addition, the cleaning procedure does not include 
cleaning of the hand-add chute or scoops/buckets used to handle ingredients that 
are then used to manufacture medicated feed. During the inspection, our 
Investigators observed a build-up of feed residues approximately four inches 
thick on the inside of the chute used to add the drug ingredients and other 
“hand-adds”. Considering the extent of residue accumulation—some of which would 
include the drug sources used in your medicated feeds—on surfaces in the mixer 
and the hand-add chute, it is likely that chunks of this material break off 
periodically, and may sometimes end up in feeds not intended to contain that 
drug. 
This is a repeat observation from the July 24-26, 2012 inspection. Your 
response to the Form FDA 483, Inspectional Observations, issued to you following 
the 2012 inspection stated the buckets and scoops would be replaced, and you 
would schedule a regular cleaning of the equipment every (b)(4). Based on the 
accumulation of residual feed observed on manufacturing equipment during the 
inspection and which remained following flushing, you have either failed to 
implement the promised corrective action or you have failed to ensure that the 
corrective action was lasting and effective in preventing the violation from 
recurring.
On October 3, 2013, we received your response to the Form FDA 483 issued to 
you following the September 2013 inspection. You state in your response that you 
have posted signs, added cleaning of the dump chute to the (b)(4) cleaning 
procedure, and increased the physical cleaning of the mixer to (b)(4). You also 
state that dedicated scoops will be used for each component or drug and have 
ordered disposable liners for the buckets that will be discarded following each 
dumping of product. However, you did not provide any documentation to 
demonstrate these changes have been made, such as photos of the new sign or 
newly cleaned equipment, or copies of the revised cleaning procedure. 
2. You failed to investigate and implement corrective action where the 
results of assays indicated that the level of drug in medicated feed was not in 
accord with label specifications or not within permissible assay limits. An 
original or copy of the record of such action must be maintained on the 
premises. [21 C.F.R. 225.58(d)]
Your firm failed to adequately investigate and implement corrective action 
when you received an assay result on 6/21/13 for a Type C medicated feed 
containing Amprolium, showing the drug present at 73% of the concentration 
stated on the label. This assay result is outside of the assay limits of 80-120% 
established in 21 C.F.R. 558.4. The subsequent review of production and 
inventory records conducted by your firm revealed these records were “OK”, and 
it was determined the feed sample was taken incorrectly. Your firm’s 
“\investigation sheet” dated 6/21/13 states the corrective action as “[t]rying 
to make sure the samples are taken correctly.” No technique or procedural 
changes were made in response to the described corrective action, however. Thus, 
your firm failed to implement any corrective action in response to the out of 
specification assay result.
Your firm also received assay results for a Type C medicated broiler feed 
containing a Salinomycin concentration of 75% on 7/7/12 and 78% on 8/3/12. These 
assay results are outside the specification tolerance of 80-120% of the 
concentration stated on the label. [21 C.F.R. 558.4]. Your firm did not initiate 
any investigation or corrective action after receiving these results. Failure to 
investigate and implement corrective action following an out-of-limits assay is 
a repeat observation from the July 24-26, 2012 inspection.
In your response to the Form FDA 483 issued to you following the September 
2013 inspection, you state that you have instructed personnel further on 
completing the investigation form and have also added sampling instructions to 
the procedures manual. However, you did not provide copies of the new/revised 
investigation form or the revisions to the procedures manual discussing 
sampling. 
3. Your daily inventory records fail to record the batches or production 
runs (or lots) of medicated feed in which each drug was used. [21 C.F.R. 
225.42(b)(6)(iii)] Although your daily inventory records appear to contain all 
of the other required information, due to the way the form is designed, there is 
only space to record one batch per day per drug and no space to record the name 
of the product, lot number, or other identifier for that batch. Your daily 
inventory record must reflect every batch or lot of medicated feed manufactured 
each day.
4. You failed to document in the daily inventory record actions taken to 
reconcile any discrepancies in the daily inventory record. [21 C.F.R. 
225.42(b)(6)(v)] For example, the drug inventory conducted on 8/30/13 revealed a 
discrepancy with respect to one fifty pound bag of (b)(4)(a Type A medicated 
article). It does not appear that your firm took any action to reconcile this 
discrepancy.
You state in your response to both #3 and #4 above that you have added an 
area to the inventory control sheet to report any drugs that do not reconcile, 
and that there is a space to make notes and/or adjustments to inventory to 
ensure they reconcile. However, you did not indicate that the inventory control 
sheet had been adjusted to provide for the possibility that any single drug may 
be used more than once a day, and you did not provide any documentation—such as 
a copy of the revised form—to demonstrate that these changes have been made. 
5. You have failed to properly identify, store, handle, and control drugs 
in your mixing areas to maintain their integrity and identity [21 C.F.R. 
225.42(b)(4)]. Our inspection found that your firm was storing bags of Type A 
Medicated Articles in a manner and location that allowed them to be covered in 
bird droppings.
This finding also relates to your obligations under 21 C.F.R. 225.20(b)(2) 
and (3), which requires the facility to be maintained in a reasonably clean and 
orderly manner, and for access by birds and other pests to be minimized. During 
the September 5-6, 2013 inspection, our Investigators observed birds (greater 
than ten) nesting, flying, perched and foraging in the mill. Your response 
indicated that you are investigating ways to keep birds out of the mill, but 
that you did not yet have a plan at that time. You indicated that you would have 
a plan in place by November 1, 2013, but did not provide further information 
regarding any plan.
In addition, the following violations of the Animal Proteins Prohibited in 
Ruminant Feed regulation [21 C.F.R. 589.2000] were observed during the 
inspection:
1. You failed to use clean out procedures or other means adequate to 
prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds that may be 
used for ruminants [21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B)]. Your feed is therefore 
adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)] of the Act.
Because your firm uses animal proteins prohibited from use in ruminant 
feeds, and also makes feeds for ruminants, you are required to have a cleanout 
procedure adequate to prevent carryover into ruminant feeds. As noted above, our 
Investigators observed a significant build-up of feed residues inside the feed 
mixer and the hand-add chute, which remained following your cleanout procedure. 
This equipment is used for processing both proteins derived from mammalian 
tissues and feeds for ruminants. Since flushing was ineffective in removing the 
accumulated feed from the equipment, your clean out procedure was inadequate to 
prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds intended 
for ruminant animals.
Your response indicates that your corrective actions for this item are the 
same as for Item 1 above. However, as noted above, you did not provide any 
documentation to demonstrate that the changes you discussed have been made, or 
that they were adequate to address this issue.
2. You failed to label all products which contained or may have contained 
prohibited materials and that are intended for use in animal feed with the BSE 
cautionary statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." [21 C.F.R. 
589.2000(e)(1)(i).]
As discussed above, your clean out procedure is inadequate to prevent 
carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds intended for 
ruminant animals. Thus, all feeds manufactured using your mixer and hand-add 
chute that did not contain the BSE cautionary statement “Do not feed to cattle 
or other ruminants,” are misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 U.S.C. 
343(a)(1)] of the Act. For example, a batch of Carolina Choice Beef Conditioner 
Custom Mix (b)(4), manufactured on September 6, 2013, while there was a 
significant build-up of feed residues in the feed mixer, was misbranded as its 
label did not contain the required BSE cautionary statement. 
The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations at your 
facility. As a medicated and non-medicated feed manufacturer, you are 
responsible for assuring that your overall operation and the products you 
manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take 
prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish procedures 
whereby such violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these 
violations may result in regulatory and/or administrative sanctions. These 
sanctions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and/or notice of 
opportunity for a hearing on a proposal to withdraw approval of your Medicated 
Feed Mill License under Section 512(m)(4)(B)(ii) of the Act and 21 C.F.R. 
515.22(c)(2).
Based on the results of the September 5-9, 2013 inspection, evaluated 
together with the evidence before FDA when the Medicated Feed Mill License was 
approved, the methods used in, or the facilities and controls used for, the 
manufacture, processing, and packing of medicated feeds are inadequate to assure 
and preserve the identity, strength, quality, and purity of the new animal drugs 
therein. This letter constitutes official notification under the law and 
provides you an opportunity to correct the above described violations.
You should notify this office, in writing, within fifteen (15) working days 
of the receipt of this letter of the steps you have taken to bring your firm 
into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of 
each step being taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. In 
your response, please include the timeframe in which the corrections will be 
completed and provide any documentation that will effectively assist us in 
evaluating whether the corrective actions have been made and the adequacy of 
such. If you are unable to complete the corrective actions within fifteen (15) 
working days, identify the reason for the delay and the time within which you 
will complete the corrections. Include copies of any available documentation 
demonstrating that corrections have been made.
Your written response should be sent to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, Attn: Janice L. King, Compliance Officer, at the address noted 
in the letterhead. If you have questions, please contact Mrs. King at 
843-746-2990 or write her at the noted address. 
Sincerely, /S/ Philip S. Campbell Acting District Director Atlanta District 
Office 
cc: South Carolina Department of Agriculture, Phillip C. Trefsgar 
Tuesday, December 23, 2014 
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED 
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION 
Sunday, December 15, 2013 
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED 
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Friday, April 19, 2013 
FDA BSE TSE PRION NEWS FEED AND ANNUAL INSPECTION OF FEED MILLS REPORTS HAS 
CEASED TO EXIST 
American Association of Zoo Veterinarians Infectious Disease Committee 
Manual 2013
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)
Little is known about atypical BSE. The origin and natural routes of 
transmission, if any, have yet to be determined. Almost all cases have been in 
older cattle (usually > 8 years of age) that have shown little resemblance to 
the clinic-pathological picture seen in classical disease. It has been suggested 
that the disease may be sporadic or be caused by a genetic mutation, but no 
convincing evidence has been found to support either of these ideas. The correct 
answer will probably only come by study of the future annual incidence curves of 
both types of disease. Regardless of the origin of atypical BSE, the possibility 
of recycling the disease in cattle and other ruminants, as well as the potential 
for transmission to humans, mandate a continuation of feed and specified-risk 
materials (SRM) bans, together with diagnostic testing programs for some time to 
come.
snip...
Naturally occurring cases of BSE in species other than cattle have been 
very limited and have been linked to exposure to contaminated feed or infected 
carcasses. The majority of cases originated in the UK and like BSE in cattle, 
have declined with the implementation of feed controls. None of the exotic 
animals were infected in the wild. 
Experts who may be consulted: Linda A. Detwiler, DVM Clinical Professor 
Department of Pathobiology and Population Medicine
College of Veterinary Medicine Mississippi State University 732-580-9391 
Fax: 732-741-7751 ldetwiler@belle-terre.com
Atypical BSE: Transmissibility
 BASE (L) transmitted to:  cattle (IC) - inc < 20 mos and oral?)
 Cynomolgus macaques (IC)
 Mouse lemurs (IC and oral)
 wild-type mice (IC)
 bovinized transgenic mice (IC and IP)
 humanized transgenic mice (IC) 
 H cases transmitted to:
 cattle – IC incubations < 20 months
 bovinized transgenic mice (IC)
 ovinized transgenic mice (IC)
 C57BL mice (IC)
 One study did not transmit to humanized PrP Met 129 mice
Evaluation of Possibility of Atypical
BSE Transmitting to Humans
 Possble interpretation:
 L type seems to transmit to nonhuman primates with greater ease than 
classical BSE
 L type also transmitted to humanized transgenic mice with higher attack 
rate and shorter incubation period than classical?
 H type did not transmit to Tg Hu transgenic mice 
Linda Detwiller, 5/10/2011
I ask Professor Kong ; 
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM 
Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment 
IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, 
or less virulent than cBSE? just curious..... 
Professor Kong reply ; 
.....snip 
As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, 
but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these 
data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest. 
Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of 
Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA 
BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of 
more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed. 
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774. 
P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models 
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw 
Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 
1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 
Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research 
Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal 
Disease Center), USA 
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the 
classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human 
infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three 
continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, 
and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP 
(termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely 
undefined. 
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their 
transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. 
Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several 
classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the 
transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, 
symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared. 
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected 
with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas 
only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more 
than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse 
brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also 
detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those 
infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to 
a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also 
transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M 
transmission has been observed so far. 
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than 
classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission 
barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg 
mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed. 
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774. 
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type 
Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition) 
18.173 page 189 
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE 
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. 
Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 
2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, 
Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy 
Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada 
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type 
and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent 
distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies 
of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of 
L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the 
brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in 
L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest 
levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly 
involved. 
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per 
group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical 
BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a 
free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions. At least one animal 
per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining 
animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were 
examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment 
following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis 
studies with classical BSE. 
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical 
symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture 
differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss 
of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb 
ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples 
from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot 
profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being 
examined in order to be able to describe the pathoge esis and agent distribution 
for these novel BSE types. 
Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test 
ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system 
for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and 
infectivity is still ongoing. 
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure - Final Abstract 
Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange 
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North 
America update October 2009 
T. Singeltary Bacliff, TX, USA 
Background: An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. 
Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE 
have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and 
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. 
All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing 
animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and 
that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada 
has been immense over the years, decades. 
Methods: 12 years independent research of available data 
Results: I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only 
enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the 
UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to 
continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a 
multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., 
surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics 
etc. 
Conclusion: I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the 
USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, 
in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately 
without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this 
agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting 
the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD 
knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, 
Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, 
Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science 
to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move 
forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly 
identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route. 
snip... see more breaches in the BSE aka mad cow Triple Firewall, that 
never was here ;
Friday, January 23, 2015 
*** Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein 
sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $
To date, 27 cases of L-BSE and 24 cases of H-BSE have been reported 
worldwide (16), thus meaning that the prevalence of atypical BSE is considerably 
lower than that of C-BSE. However, recent studies showed that L-BSE is easily 
transmissible to transgenic mice expressing human (17,18) or bovine (19,20) 
prion protein, as well as to non-human primates (21), with shorter incubation 
periods than for the transmission of C-BSE to these animals. 
***The virulent nature of L-BSE has stimulated new concern for human public 
health since the transmission of C-BSE to humans resulted in variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) (4-7), a new emergent prion disease. 
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle 
***The present data offer novel information on the tropism of the BASE 
agent and highlight relevant public health issues. While the transmission 
barrier for classical BSE is high in most species, BASE prions are readily 
transmissible to a variety of mammals including non-human primates [11–13,35]. 
Accordingly, the possibility of spreading of BASE prions through skeletal muscle 
to other species should be taken into account and evaluated in risk analysis 
studies.
P.4.23
Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw 
Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 
1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 
Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research 
Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal 
Disease Center), USA
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the 
classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human 
infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three 
continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, 
and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP 
(termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were largely 
undefined.
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their 
transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. Methods: Transgenic mice 
expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and 
atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation 
time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology 
were or will be examined and compared.
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected 
with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas 
only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more 
than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse 
brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also 
detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those 
infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to 
a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also 
transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M 
transmission has been observed so far.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than 
classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission 
barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg 
mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be 
discussed.
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774. 
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY 
CASE INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 CALIFORNIA
Summary Report BSE 2012
Executive Summary 
Saturday, August 4, 2012 
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California atypical L-type BSE Case - 
July 2012 
Saturday, August 4, 2012 
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE 
Epidemiological Investigation 
Wednesday, December 31, 2014 
NASDA BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE, PRION, Policy Statements updated with 
amendments passed during the NASDA Annual Meeting Updated September 18, 2014 
Sunday, January 11, 2015 
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of 
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission 
2001
Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD 
Watch.
[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for 
serum or tissue donor herds?
[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have 
him ask the question again.]
[host Richard] could you repeat the question?
[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue 
donor herds?
[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?
[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD 
world-wide.
[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary
[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?
[not sure whom speaking] NO
from this point, i was still connected, got to listen and tape the whole 
conference. at one point someone came on, a woman, and ask again;
[unknown woman] what group are you with?
[TSS] CJD Watch and my Mom died from hvCJD we are trying to tract down CJD 
and other human TSE's world wide. i was invited to sit in on this from someone 
inside the USDA/APHIS and that is why i am here. do you intend on banning me 
from this conference now?
at this point the conference was turned back up, and i got to finish 
listening. They never answered or even addressed my one question, or even 
addressed the issue. BUT, i will try and give you a run-down for now, of the 
conference.
snip...full text ; 
Thursday, January 15, 2015 
41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE 
Prion: Case Report 
Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies 
diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type 
disease
what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the 
public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old. 
why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping 
everything the USDA inc says.
sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and 
there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans. 
My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky 
Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this. 
with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you 
Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the 
Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am 
seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years 
and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or 
what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other 
meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how 
many bodies is this market worth?
Saturday, January 17, 2015 
*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed 
with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
 who’s kidding whom $$$ i.e. USDA INC AND THE OIE 
2014 
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice 
overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE. 
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may 
result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent. 
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical 
similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype 
at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and 
another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15]. 
snip... 
Monday, October 10, 2011 
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story 
snip... 
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or 
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on 
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical 
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far 
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far 
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. 
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that 
some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type 
Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) 
and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential. 
snip... 
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection 
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which 
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in 
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus 
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a 
sporadic origin is confirmed. 
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently 
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. 
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that 
could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip... 
*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL 
CDC ***
Sunday, November 23, 2014 
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas 
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European *** 
the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed 
investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to 
European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The 
specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear 
largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where 
other known vCJD cases likely had been infected. 
Sunday, December 14, 2014 
*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD 
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 
14, 2014 Report ***
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2014/12/alert-new-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html 
J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 2002;72:792-793 doi:10.1136/jnnp.72.6.792 Short report
 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 38 years after diagnostic use of human growth 
hormone
 
E A Croes1, G Roks1,*, G H Jansen3, P C G Nijssen2, C M van Duijn1 
 
+ Author Affiliations 1Genetic Epidemiology Unit, Department of 
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Erasmus University Medical Centre Rotterdam, PO 
Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands 2Department of Neurology, St Elisabeth 
Hospital, PO Box 90151, 5000 LC Tilburg, Netherlands 3Department of Pathology, 
University Medical Centre Utrecht, Heidelberglaan 100, 3584 CX Utrecht, 
Netherlands 
 
Correspondence to: Professor C M van Duijn, Genetic Epidemiology Unit, 
Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Erasmus University Medical Centre 
Rotterdam, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands; vanduijn@epib.fgg.eur.nl 
Received 27 December 2001 Accepted 12 March 2002 Revised 1 March 2002 
 
Abstract
 
A 47 year old man is described who developed pathology proven 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) 38 years after receiving a low dose of human 
derived growth hormone (hGH) as part of a diagnostic procedure. The patient 
presented with a cerebellar syndrome, which is compatible with iatrogenic CJD. 
This is the longest incubation period described so far for iatrogenic CJD. 
Furthermore, this is the first report of CJD after diagnostic use of hGH. Since 
the patient was one of the first in the world to receive hGH, other cases of 
iatrogenic CJD can be expected in the coming years. 
 
snip...
 
An incubation period as long as 38 years had never been reported for 
iatrogenic CJD. Huillard d'Aignaux et al7 studied the incubation period in 55 
patients with hGH related CJD in a cohort of 1361 French hGH recipients. The 
median incubation period was between 9 and 10 years. Under the most pessimistic 
model, the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval varied between 17 and 20 
years. Although the infecting dose cannot be quantified, it can be speculated 
that the long incubation period in our patient is partly explained by the 
administration of a limited amount of hGH. This hypothesis is supported by 
experimental models, in which higher infecting doses usually produce shorter 
incubation periods.6 Since our patient was one of the first in the world to 
receive hGH, this case indicates that still more patients with iatrogenic CJD 
can be expected in the coming years. Another implication of our study is that 
CJD can develop even after a low dose of hGH. This case once more testifies that 
worldwide close monitoring of any form of iatrogenic CJD is mandatory. 
 
http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/72/6/792.long
Saturday, December 13, 2014
 
*** Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease Peer Review 
***
 
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
 
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 
2001 JAMA
 
snip...
 
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2014/12/terry-s-singeltary-sr-publications-tse.html 
J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 2002;72:792-793 doi:10.1136/jnnp.72.6.792 Short report
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to 
disease etiology?
Tuesday, December 30, 2014
TSEAC USA Reason For Recalls Blood products, collected from a donors 
considered to be at increased risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were 
distributed END OF YEAR REPORT 2014
TSS
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