Saturday, June 21, 2025

Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Singeltary Comment Submission Mon, 27 Jan 2003

 Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
To: regulations@aphis.usda.gov

Docket No: 02-088-1

Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid;=fr13de02-15.pdf


Greetings,

i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA.

please be warned;

Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 -0800 
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 
Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee

Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth

[Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]

snip...

Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine, including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.

snip...

From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been in Greece is prohibited.

snip...

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid;=02-6837-filed


========================

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the country?

Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

Sources: World Trade Atlas

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_greece0701.htm


Greetings list members,

i just cannot accept this;

> 23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)

> The data do not provide a species of origin code for these > products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

what kind of statement is this?

how stupid do they think we are?

it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?

There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.

APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_slovenia1101.htm


What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.

As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_cz0601.htm


What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria?

Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species.

Source: World Trade Atlas

snip...

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?

A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_austria1201.htm


Greetings FDA and public,

if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.

[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]

if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.

[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]

more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?

snip...

A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_israel0602.htm


Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?

Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_japan0901.htm


What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_germany1200e.htm


search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/iw_archive.htm


more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again 
References: <3DC198E3.8090704@wt.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean

Greetings again List Members,

let me kick a madcow around here a bit.

on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system.

the USDA/APHIS states;

> During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from 
> Poland included non-species specific animal products 
> used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal 
> products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product 
> imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant 
> material.

NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;

ANNEX 1

Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001

EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY

The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards.

This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time.

The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.

Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance.

Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.

BSE surveillance:

Not sufficient before 2001.

Cross-contamination:

Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.

see full text and ANNEX 1 at;

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf


so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke indeed.

* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf


BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from Israel ?

The U.S. imported no live ruminants or ruminant meat from Israel since 1999. In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE. Other imports from Israel during the period 1998-2001 included non-species specific preparations used in animal feeds and other non-food products of unspecified animals. For the category "preparations used in animal feeding, NESOI" that was imported into the U.S., it is possible that bovine meat or bovine byproducts could have been included in this category. However, the US Food and Drug Administration prohibits feeding of meat-and-bone meal to ruminants in the U.S.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_israel0602.htm

http://web.archive.org/web/20021231085700/http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_israel0602.htm

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

CJD WATCH

http://www.fortunecity.com/healthclub/cpr/349/part1cjd.htm


CJD Watch/NEWS

http://disc.server.com/Indices/167318.html


TSS

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Saturday, March 29, 2025

Statistics on the surveillance of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in cattle in the United Kingdom updated 16 January 2025


Statistics on the surveillance of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in cattle in the United Kingdom updated 16 January 2025

Research and analysis

Cattle: TSE surveillance statistics

Statistics on the surveillance of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in cattle in the United Kingdom.

From: Animal and Plant Health Agency

Published 11 February 2015

Last updated
16 January 2025

Documents

Overview of Great Britain statistics

MS Excel Spreadsheet, 33.9 KB

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General statistics

MS Excel Spreadsheet, 144 KB

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Age and related statistics

MS Excel Spreadsheet, 55.9 KB

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BSE cases born after the reinforced feed ban (BARB) in the UK

MS Excel Spreadsheet, 29.5 KB

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Details

These documents provide statistics on the number of cases of TSE disease found through the active and passive disease surveillance of cattle in the United Kingdom.

Cases of TSE disease identified in cattle from passive surveillance in United Kingdom have been recorded since 1986. The UK carried out limited active surveillance in cattle from 1999 to 2001. The European Union active surveillance programme started in July 2001.

The UK carries out active disease surveillance for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle. The testing programme includes cattle over 48 months of age which:

die or are killed other than for human consumption (fallen cattle)

are emergency slaughtered or show certain abnormalities at ante-mortem inspection

These age thresholds apply to cattle born in the United Kingdom or in other EU member states except Bulgaria and Romania. For cattle born elsewhere the age thresholds are 24 months for fallen cattle or emergency slaughtered cattle, and 30 months for healthy fallen cattle.

Passive disease surveillance takes place when an animal with clinical signs suspicious of a TSE disease is reported to Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), and further investigation determines whether the animal was affected by BSE or scrapie.

Published 11 February 2015

Last updated 16 January 2025


Report on the epidemiological investigation of a BSE case in Scotland (RBSE24_00003) United Kingdom October 2024



Scotland Single case of disease confirmed in Dumfries and Galloway

Published 06 December 2024 12:45

Topic Farming and rural

Single case of disease confirmed in Dumfries and Galloway.

A case of atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) has been confirmed in a cow on a farm in Dumfries and Galloway.

Precautionary movement restrictions have been put in place at impacted premises and cover animals which have been in contact with the case. Further investigations to identify the origin of the disease are ongoing. This is standard procedure for a confirmed case of atypical BSE.

The case was identified as a result of our routine yet intensive BSE surveillance and stringent control measures are in place. Atypical BSE is not known to be a risk to public health and the animal did not enter the human food chain. Food Standards Scotland have confirmed there is no risk to human health as a result of this isolated case.

The owners of the affected animals are working with authorities on next steps.

Agriculture Minister Jim Fairlie said:

“Following confirmation of a case of atypical BSE in Dumfries and Galloway, the Scottish Government and other agencies took swift and robust action to protect the agriculture sector.

“The fact we identified this isolated case so quickly is proof that our surveillance system for detecting this type of disease is working effectively.

“I want to thank the animal’s owner for their diligence. Their decisive action has allowed us to identify and isolate the case at speed which has minimised its impact on the wider industry."

Chief Veterinary Officer Sheila Voas said:

“The fast detection of this case is proof that our surveillance system is doing its job.

“We are working closely with the Animal and Plant Health Agency, and other partners to identify where the disease came from.

“I want to reassure both farmers and the public that this is an isolated case and of the aytypical strain of BSE which is not transmissible and not connected to contaminated feed. But, if any farmers are concerned, I would urge them to seek veterinary advice."

Ian McWatt, Deputy Chief Executive of Food Standards Scotland said:

“There are strict controls in place to protect consumers from the risk of BSE and consumers can be reassured that these important protection measures remain in place and that Food Standards Scotland Official Veterinarians and Meat Hygiene Inspectors working in all abattoirs in Scotland will continue to ensure that in respect of BSE controls, the safety of consumers remains a priority.

“We will continue to work closely with Scottish Government, other agencies and industry at this time.”

Background

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE): how to spot and report the disease - gov.scot

The Animal Plant and Health Agency (APHA) is investigating the source of the disease.

All animals over four years of age that die on farm are routinely tested for BSE under our comprehensive surveillance system. Whilst the disease is not directly transmitted from animal to animal, its cohorts, including offspring, have been traced and isolated, and will be destroyed in line with our legal requirements.

In addition to the measures we have in place for fallen stock and animal feed, there is a strict control regime to protect consumers. This includes the removal of specified risk material such as the spinal column, brain and skull from carcasses destined for human consumption.



News BSE Published 10 May 2024 10:30 Topic Farming and rural Disease confirmed in Ayrshire.

A case of classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) has been confirmed on a farm in Ayrshire.

Precautionary movement restrictions have been put in place at impacted premises and cover animals which have been in contact with the case. Further investigations to identify the origin of the disease are ongoing. This is standard procedure for a confirmed case of classical BSE.

The case was identified as a result of routine surveillance and stringent control measures. The animal did not enter the human food chain. Food Standards Scotland have confirmed there is no risk to human health as a result of this isolated case.

The owners of the affected animals are working with authorities on next steps.

Read more: BSE: how to spot and report the disease. Agriculture Minister Jim Fairlie said:

“Following confirmation of a case of classical BSE in Ayrshire, the Scottish Government and other agencies took swift and robust action to protect the agriculture sector. This included establishing a precautionary movement ban on the farm.

“The fact we identified this isolated case so quickly is proof that our surveillance system for detecting this type of disease is working effectively.

“I want to thank the animal’s owner for their diligence. Their decisive action has allowed us to identify and isolate the case at speed which has minimised its impact on the wider industry."

Chief Veterinary Officer Sheila Voas said:

“The fast detection of this case is proof that our surveillance system is doing its job.

“We are working closely with the Animal and Plant Health Agency, and other partners to identify where the disease came from.

“I want to reassure both farmers and the public that the risk associated with this isolated case is minimal. But, if any farmers are concerned, I would urge them to seek veterinary advice."

Ian McWatt, Deputy Chief Executive of Food Standards Scotland said:

“There are strict controls in place to protect consumers from the risk of BSE, including controls on animal feed, and removal of the parts of cattle most likely to carry BSE infectivity.

“Consumers can be reassured that these important protection measures remain in place and that Food Standards Scotland Official Veterinarians and Meat Hygiene Inspectors working in all abattoirs in Scotland will continue to ensure that in respect of BSE controls, the safety of consumers remains a priority.

“We will continue to work closely with Scottish Government, other agencies and industry at this time.”

Background

The Animal Plant and Health Agency (APHA) is investigating the source of the outbreak.

All animals over four years of age that die on farm are routinely tested for BSE under our comprehensive surveillance system. Whilst the disease is not directly transmitted from animal to animal, its cohorts, including offspring, have been traced and isolated, and will be destroyed in line with our legal requirements.

In addition to the measures we have in place for fallen stock and animal feed, there is a strict control regime to protect consumers. This includes the removal of specified risk material such as the spinal column, brain and skull from carcasses destined for human consumption.

Movement restrictions have also been put in place at three further farms – the farm of the animal’s origin and two more holdings where animals that have had access to the same feed are.


Friday, October 4, 2024

another atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Ireland


WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 08, 2023

Ireland Atypical BSE confirmed November 3 2023


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2023

Ireland Atypical BSE case, 3 progeny of case cow to be culled


SUNDAY, JULY 16, 2023

Switzerland Atypical BSE detected in a cow in the canton of St. Gallen


WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type

Switzerland Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical L-Type

Switzerland - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy - Immediate notification



Monday, March 20, 2023

WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, REPORT United Kingdom Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Atypical H-Type




BRAZIL BSE START DATE 2023/01/18

BRAZIL BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/22

BRAZIL BSE END DATE 2023/03/03



SPAIN BSE START DATE 2023/01/21

SPAIN BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/03

SPAIN BSE END DATE 2023/02/06



NETHERLANDS BSE START DATE 2023/02/01

NETHERLANDS BSE CONFIRMATION DATE 2023/02/01

NETHERLANDS BSE END DATE 2023/03/13



PLEASE NOTE, USDA ET AL ONLY TESTING <25k CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE, woefully inadequate, yet USDA just documented a case Atypical L-Type BSE, the most virulent strain to date...

Wednesday, May 24, 2023

***> WAHIS, WOAH, OIE, United States of America Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Immediate notification




SATURDAY, MAY 20, 2023

***> Tennessee State Veterinarian Alerts Cattle Owners to Disease Detection Mad Cow atypical L-Type BSE



MAY 19, 2023



2 weeks before the announcement of this recent mad cow case in the USA, i submitted this to the APHIS et al;

***> APPRX. 2 weeks before the recent mad cow case was confirmed in the USA, in Tennessee, atypical L-Type BSE, I submitted this to the APHIS et al;

Document APHIS-2023-0027-0001 BSE Singeltary Comment Submission May 2, 2023

''said 'burden' cost, will be a heavy burden to bear, if we fail with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion disease, that is why this information collection is so critical''...



Transmission of atypical BSE: a possible origin of Classical BSE in cattle

Results: After 6 years of incubation, 3/4 animals (2/2 steers IC challenged with brain from P1 L-BSE oral challenge and 1/2 steer IC challenged with brain from P1 H-BSE oral challenge) developed clinical disease. Analysis of these animals revealed high levels of PrPSc in their brains, having biochemical properties similar to that of PrPSc in C-BSE.


Conclusion: These results demonstrate the oral transmission potential of atypical BSE in cattle. Surprisingly, regardless of which atypical type of BSE was used for P1 oral challenge, PrPSc in the P2 animals acquired biochemical characteristics similar to that of PrPSc in C-BSE, suggesting atypical BSE as a possible origin of C-BSE in UK.


OIE Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle

Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.


Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 2019

34 Scientific Commission/September 2019

3. Atypical BSE

The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.

The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.

4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greaves

snip...

REFERENCES

SNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;


Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.


Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.


We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold longe incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.


'H-TYPE BSE AGENT IS TRANSMISSIBLE BY THE ORONASAL ROUTE''

This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.


2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author:

‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).

In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.


***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.


***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.


Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.


Sunday, January 10, 2021

APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission June 17, 2019



APHIS Indemnity Regulations [Docket No. APHIS-2021-0010] RIN 0579-AE65 Singeltary Comment Submission

Comment from Singeltary Sr., Terry

Posted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on Sep 8, 2022




SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NO. FSIS-2022-0027 SINGELTARY SUBMISSION ATTACHMENT



WOAH


The European Union summary report on surveillance for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in 2023

Published: 28 November 2024

Adopted: 29 October 2024


KEYWORDS atypical, BSE, classical, CWD, scrapie, surveillance, TSE

CONTACT biohaw@efsa.europa.eu

Abstract

This report presents the results of surveillance on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in cattle, sheep, goats, cervids and other species, and genotyping in sheep and goats, carried out in 2023 by 27 Member States (MS, EU27), the United Kingdom (in respect of Northern Ireland, (XI)) and other eight non‐EU reporting countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland (the data reported by Switzerland include those of Liechtenstein) and Türkiye. In total, 948,165 cattle were tested by EU27 and XI (−3%, compared with 2022), with five atypical BSE cases reported (four H‐type: two in Spain, one in France and one in Ireland; one L‐type in the Netherlands); and 46,096 cattle by eight non‐EU reporting countries with two atypical BSE cases reported by Switzerland. Three additional atypical BSE cases were reported by UK (1), USA (1) and Brazil (1). In total, 284,686 sheep and 102,646 goats were tested in the EU27 and XI (−3.5% and −5.9%, respectively, compared to 2022). In the other non‐EU reporting countries 26,047 sheep and 589 goats were tested. In sheep, 538 cases of scrapie were reported by 14 MS and XI: 462 classical scrapie (CS) by 4 MS (104 index cases (IC) with genotypes of susceptible groups in 93.4% of the cases), 76 atypical scrapie (AS) (76 IC) by 12 MS. In the other non‐EU reporting countries, Iceland reported 70 cases of CS while Norway reported 7 cases of ovine AS. Ovine random genotyping was reported by six MS and genotypes of susceptible groups accounted for 6.9%. In goats, 183 cases of scrapie were reported, all from EU MS: 176 CS (47 IC) by seven MS and 7 AS (7 IC) by five MS. Three cases in Cyprus and one in Spain were reported in goats carrying heterozygous alleles at codon 146 and 222, respectively. In total, 2096 cervids were tested for chronic wasting disease by ten MS, none tested positive. Norway tested 14,224 cervids with one European moose positive.

© European Food Safety Authority


See full report;


The European Union summary report on surveillance for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in 2022

European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)

First published: 28 November 2023


Approved: 19 October 2023 Abstract

This report presents the results of surveillance on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in cattle, sheep, goats, cervids and other species, and genotyping in sheep and goats, carried out in 2022 by 27 Member States (MS, EU27), the United Kingdom (in respect of Northern Ireland [XI]) and other eight non-EU reporting countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Türkiye. In total, 977,008 cattle were tested by EU27 and XI (−4.3%, compared with 2021), and 52,395 cattle by eight non-EU reporting countries, with one case of H-BSE in France. In total, 295,145 sheep and 109,074 goats were tested in the EU27 and XI (−5.2% and −7.9%, respectively, compared to 2021). In the other non-EU reporting countries, 25,535 sheep and 633 goats were tested. In sheep, 557 cases of scrapie were reported by 17 MS and XI: 480 classical scrapie (CS) by five MS (93 index cases [IC] with genotypes of susceptible groups in 97.6% of the cases), 77 atypical scrapie (AS) (76 IC) by 14 MS and XI. In the other non-EU reporting countries, Norway reported 16 cases of ovine AS. Ovine random genotyping was reported by eight MS and genotypes of susceptible groups accounted for 7.3%. In goats, 224 cases of scrapie were reported, all from EU MS: 216 CS (42 IC) by six MS, and 8 AS (8 IC) by four MS. In Cyprus, two cases of CS were reported in goats carrying the heterozygous DN146 allele. In total, 3202 cervids were tested for chronic wasting disease by 10 MS. One wild European moose tested positive in Finland. Norway tested 17,583 cervids with two European moose, one reindeer and one red deer positive. In total, 154 animals from four other species tested negative in Finland.



***> Price of TSE Prion Poker goes up substantially, all you cattle ranchers and such, better pay close attention here...terry <***

Transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent from elk to cattle after oronasal exposure

Justin Greenlee, Jifeng Bian, Zoe Lambert, Alexis Frese, and Eric Cassmann Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, USDA-ARS, Ames, IA, USA 

Aims: The purpose of this study was to determine the susceptibility of cattle to chronic wasting disease agent from elk. 

Materials and Methods: Initial studies were conducted in bovinized mice using inoculum derived from elk with various genotypes at codon 132 (MM, LM, LL). Based upon attack rates, inoculum (10% w/v brain homogenate) from an LM132 elk was selected for transmission studies in cattle. At approximately 2 weeks of age, one wild type steer (EE211) and one steer with the E211K polymorphism (EK211) were fed 1 mL of brain homogenate in a quart of milk replacer while another 1 mL was instilled intranasally. The cattle were examined daily for clinical signs for the duration of the experiment. One steer is still under observation at 71 months post-inoculation (mpi). 

Results: Inoculum derived from MM132 elk resulted in similar attack rates and incubation periods in mice expressing wild type or K211 bovine PRNP, 35% at 531 days post inoculation (dpi) and 27% at 448 dpi, respectively. Inoculum from LM132 elk had a slightly higher attack rates in mice: 45% (693 dpi) in wild type cattle PRNP and 33% (468) in K211 mice. Inoculum from LL132 elk resulted in the highest attack rate in wild type bovinized mice (53% at 625 dpi), but no K211 mice were affected at >700 days. At approximately 70 mpi, the EK211 genotype steer developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease, depression, low head carriage, hypersalivation, and ataxia, and was necropsied. Enzyme immunoassay (IDEXX) was positive in brainstem (OD=4.00, but non-detect in retropharyngeal lymph nodes and palatine tonsil. Immunoreactivity was largely limited to the brainstem, midbrain, and cervical spinal cord with a pattern that was primarily glia-associated. 

Conclusions: Cattle with the E211K polymorphism are susceptible to the CWD agent after oronasal exposure of 0.2 g of infectious material. 

Funded by: This research was funded in its entirety by congressionally appropriated funds to the United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service. The funders of the work did not influence study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

"Cattle with the E211K polymorphism are susceptible to the CWD agent after oronasal exposure of 0.2 g of infectious material."

=====end

Strain characterization of chronic wasting disease in bovine-PrP transgenic mice 

Nuria Jerez-Garrido1, Sara Canoyra1, Natalia Fernández-Borges1, Alba Marín Moreno1, Sylvie L. Benestad2, Olivier Andreoletti3, Gordon Mitchell4, Aru Balachandran4, Juan María Torres1 and Juan Carlos Espinosa1. 1 Centro de Investigación en Sanidad Animal, CISA-INIA-CSIC, Madrid, Spain. 2 Norwegian Veterinary Institute, Ås, Norway. 3 UMR Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)/École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), Interactions Hôtes Agents Pathogènes, Toulouse, France. 4 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Ottawa, Canada. 

Aims: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an infectious prion disease that affects cervids. Various CWD prion strains have been identified in different cervid species from North America and Europe. The properties of the infectious prion strains are influenced by amino acid changes and polymorphisms in the PrP sequences of different cervid species. This study, aimed to assess the ability of a panel of CWD prion isolates from diverse cervid species from North America and Europe to infect bovine species, as well as to investigate the properties of the prion strains following the adaptation to the bovine-PrP context. 

Materials and Methods: BoPrP-Tg110 mice overexpressing the bovine-PrP sequence were inoculated by intracranial route with a panel of CWD prion isolates from both North America (two white-tailed deer and two elk) and Europe (one reindeer, one moose and one red deer). 

Results: Our results show distinct behaviours in the transmission of the CWD isolates to the BoPrP-Tg110 mouse model. Some of these isolates did not transmit even after the second passage. Those able to transmit displayed differences in terms of attack rate, survival times, biochemical properties of brain PrPres, and histopathology. 

Conclusions: Altogether, these results exhibit the diversity of CWD strains present in the panel of CWD isolates and the ability of at least some CWD isolates to infect bovine species. Cattle being one of the most important farming species, this ability represents a potential threat to both animal and human health, and consequently deserves further study. 

Funded by: MCIN/AEI /10.13039/501100011033 and by European Union NextGeneration EU/PRTR 

Grant number: PCI2020-120680-2 ICRAD

"Altogether, these results exhibit the diversity of CWD strains present in the panel of CWD isolates and the ability of at least some CWD isolates to infect bovine species. Cattle being one of the most important farming species, this ability represents a potential threat to both animal and human health, and consequently deserves further study."

=====end

https://prion2023.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Meeting-book-final-version2.pdf

MONDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2023 

Transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent from elk to cattle after oronasal exposure 

Price of TSE Prion Poker goes up substantially, all you cattle ranchers and such, better pay close attention here...

https://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2023/10/transmission-of-chronic-wasting-disease.html

PRION 2023 CONTINUED;  

https://prion2023.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Meeting-book-final-version2.pdf

Monday, November 13, 2023

Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) Singeltary Another Request for Update 2023

https://fdabse589.blogspot.com/2023/11/food-and-drug-administrations-bse-feed.html

NOW, BE AWARE, OIE AND USDA HAVE NOW MADE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL BSE A LEGAL TRADING COMMODITY, WITH NO REPORTING OF SAID ATYPICAL CASES, EXCEPT FOR A VOLUNTARY NOTE ON ANNUAL REPORT...i don't make this stuff up...terry

cwd scrapie pigs oral routes

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***

*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <***

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18(44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.

https://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publication/?seqNo115=353091

https://www.ars.usda.gov/research/project/?accnNo=432011&fy=2017

https://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publication/?seqNo115=337105

Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.

https://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publication/?seqNo115=337105

THURSDAY, JANUARY 9, 2025

UK ministers may lift BSE-era ban on animal remains in chicken and pig feed


SUNDAY, JANUARY 19, 2025

ON THE ORIGIN OF TME AND BSE, WHAT IF?


Monday, May 22, 2023

***> BSE TSE Prion MAD COW TESTING IN THE USA COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES?


SUNDAY, MARCH 23, 2025

Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease TSE Prion Increasing 2025 Update


WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 2025

UK Health Security Agency Expansion of Disease Reporting Requirements


End of year CJD, BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, REPORT 2024



Wednesday, May 19, 2010

Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada

No competing interests declared.


terry
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