House of LordsThursday, 8 September 2011
Agriculture: Animal Feed Question 11.15 am Asked by Baroness Jenkin of Kennington
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the scientific basis for continuing the ban on feeding animal by-products and catering waste to pigs and chickens.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Lord Henley): My Lords, the basis for banning the feeding of animal by-products and catering waste to
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pigs and chickens is to prevent the spread of serious animal diseases for which these materials may be a vector. The European Commission is proposing to lift the ban on feeding certain processed animal proteins to pigs and chickens in the light of scientific advice that the ban is no longer justified. The Government are considering their position.
Baroness Jenkin of Kennington: I thank my noble friend for his reply. Can he confirm that if the EC relaxes the ban on non-ruminant ABP being fed to pigs and chickens; and if, following the consultations he refers to, the Government are satisfied by the scientific evidence that there are no public health risks, they will then lift the ban in the UK?
Lord Henley: My Lords, obviously we want to take the scientific evidence into account and consider it very carefully. We also want to take into account likely consumer reaction because we want to take consumers along with us. If that were the case, yes, we would be prepared to lift the ban.
Lord May of Oxford: My Lords, does the Minister agree that although there is remaining uncertainty as to exactly the origins of the rogue prion that caused BSE and how it hopped into cattle, the balance of opinion and evidence is that it came from the unnatural practice of feeding animal by-products to cattle? In the light of that, would it not be wise to continue the current precautionary legislation?
Lord Henley: My Lords, as a very eminent scientist, the noble Lord is right to draw the attention of the House to the scientific evidence. At this stage there is no question of lifting the ban on feeding to cattle. We are talking purely about non-ruminants, such as pigs and chickens, at this stage. Obviously we will look at the evidence and at what the Food Standards Agency has to say, and then make a decision.
Lord Grantchester: We must proceed only on a risk-based approach and, as the Minister said, the other element to be considered is the acceptance by consumers of food so produced. The supermarkets are the gateway to the consumer. Can the Minister tell the House the attitude of supermarkets to reducing food waste by this change of policy? What discussion has his department had with supermarkets and the Food and Drink Federation?
Lord Henley: My Lords, we will continue to discuss these matters with the supermarkets and others. Obviously, where it is appropriate, food waste can go to feed animals-already some food waste can do so, when it has been appropriately separated from meat and other such products. However, as I made clear earlier, any loosening of what is happening will depend on scientific evidence and consideration of these matters. I also think that it is important, as the noble Lord makes clear, that we take opinion along with us on this matter.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: My Lords, would the Minister accept that traditionally fed pigs are very popular with the public in terms of the flavour of pork, and so on? They certainly were until the change in their food. Feeding pigs largely on soya
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has an unintended consequence, in that all the imports of soya are leading to the further destruction of the rainforests. We really must make clear that using our food waste as best we can to feed to pigs has important consequences much further away in the world.
Lord Henley: My noble friend is right to point to further consequences of feeding animals in this way, in terms of producing the amount of soya used. Again, I stress to her, we should not make any changes unless the scientific evidence assures us that that is right and proper.
Lord Whitty: My Lords, would the Minister accept that the Government and the European authorities are right to proceed with caution on this front? I speak both as the Minister who was allegedly in charge during the last stages of food and mouth and as a former consumer champion. The noble Lord, Lord May, has spoken about BSE and we still do not know how the foot and mouth virus entered the chain. While some relaxation may be possible, I advise extreme caution.
Lord Henley: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord was totally in charge, and not just allegedly. As he puts it, we will proceed only if the scientific evidence is right and proper.
Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, it is very important we realise that the public perception is that the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in February 2001, which had such horrific consequences for the economy and everything else, was the result of feeding animals to animals. Although there is a suggestion-or at least the Minister has stated-that that will not happen with cattle, in the minds of the Great British public it does not matter whether it is cattle, pigs or poultry; they would still have this feeling. We must be awfully careful before relaxing the ban.
Lord Henley: My Lords, the ban in 2001 that my noble friend refers to was a ban on swill. We had already banned the use of processed animal protein as a result of the BSE problems. I reiterate what I have said in answer to every question: we will proceed with extreme caution and we will base any decisions, as will the European Commission, on the scientific evidence available to us.
ARCHIVE: BSE: Disease control & eradication - The feed ban
The aim of our BSE-related feed control policy is to ensure the continued decline and eventual eradication of BSE in the UK. Effective controls on livestock feed are the key to achieving this.
The rate of BSE cases in cattle being reported now is significantly lower than in 1988, when the disease was first made notifiable, and the number of new cases continues to decline yet further. The key factor behind this success has been the very high level of compliance with BSE-related feed controls throughout the feed manufacture, supply, and livestock industries. Industry quality assurance schemes have considerably enhanced the level of compliance.
Experiments show that doses of infected tissue as low as 1 mg can infect a calf so there is a need for everyone involved in the feed chain to maintain the very high level of compliance seen to date.
In the UK, the original feed ban was introduced in 1988 to prevent ruminant protein being fed to ruminants. In addition, it has been illegal to feed ruminants with all forms of mammalian protein (with specific exceptions) since November 1994 and to feed any farmed livestock, including fish and horses, with mammalian meat and bone meal (mammalian MBM) since 04 April 1996.
EU-wide Feed Controls
Regulation (EC) No.999/2001 introduced EU controls to combat the spread of BSE. The measures included a ban on the feeding of processed animal proteins to animals which are kept, fattened or bred for the production of food. Some of these measures have been amended in line with the European Commission’s TSE Roadmap and further amendments are possible in the future. The Regulation is administered by the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Regulations.
Feed controls - At a glance
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ARCHIVE: BSE: Disease control & eradication - the feed ban - born after the July 1988 ban (BAB) cases
[back toThe feed ban]
The July 1988 ban on feeding ruminant proteins to ruminants (e.g. cattle, sheep, goats and deer) in Great Britain, significantly reduced the risk of BSE infection. There was a marked decrease in the number of confirmed BSE cases born after the July 1988 ban (BAB cases) although the long incubation period delayed the impact on BSE cases by approximately five years. Investigations of the initial BAB cases indicated that the most likely source of infection in these cases was the continued use of feed manufactured before the 1988 ban.
Reasons for BAB cases
By autumn 1994 the decline in the epidemic was occurring more slowly in the north and east of England in which the proportion of pigs relative to cattle was highest. At that time pig and poultry feed could legitimately contain ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) and there was an increased risk of cross contamination of cattle feed with MBM in these areas. Samples of cattle feed taken in August 1994 were found to contain ruminant MBM, demonstrating that such cross-contamination could occur. A 1994 case-control study looked at possible causes of BSE in BAB animals concluding that a food borne source of infection was the most likely explanation.
The continued presence of BSE infectivity in MBM suggested failings in the Specified Risk Material (formerly Specified Bovine Offals (SBO)) controls. The most likely source of this problem came from the practice of splitting bovine skulls. Brain was disposed as SBO and the skull was rendered to MBM, but brain tissue sometimes remained in the skull, allowing infectivity to enter MBM. Other SBO may have been inadequately separated from non-SBO material, providing another potential route of infection. Subsequent research has shown that some of the rendering systems in use until December 1994 had little effect on BSE.
Prevention of Cross Contamination
In August 1995, the controls on the handling of SBO were strengthened further to protect animal health. They required that the whole skull (except the tongue) be disposed of as SBO and that rendering plants use dedicated lines for processing SBO. In April 1996 the use of mammalian MBM was banned in all feed for livestock, fish and equine animals. This was not as a result of fears of BSE in non-ruminant species but to remove any possible risk of cross-contamination of cattle rations with MBM in feed intended for other species. A Voluntary Feed Recall Scheme, in June 1996, offered free collection and disposal of residual stocks of feed. From 1 August 1996 it became an offence (except in very tightly defined and controlled circumstances) to hold mammalian MBM on farms or in feed mills and premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored.
BSE: Disease Control & Eradication - The Feed Ban - Born After the Reinforced Ban (BARB) Cases
1 August 1996 is regarded as the date the reinforced feed ban became effective. BSE cases born after July 1996 are referred to as born after the reinforced ban (BARB) cases.
Details for cases in animals born after the reinforced feed ban of August 1996, that have been confirmed in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland, are available on the Veterinary Laboratories Agency website (PDF 300 KB).
Reasons for BARB Cases
Animal Health carries out a detailed epidemiological investigation into all BARB cases in Great Britain. One possible reason for BARB cases is the contamination of cattle feed ingredients with mammalian MBM handled, stored and transported outside the UK, prior to the 2001 EU-wide ban feeding of processed animal protein (PAP) to all farmed animals. Newer Member States may not have implemented full BSE controls until after January 2001.There is also evidence from epidemiological investigations into BARB cases that some cases result from the persistence of infection in feed stores.
In 2004, Professor William Hill FRS of the University of Edinburgh carried out an independent review of BARB cases in the UK. Professor Hill concluded that the UK controls in place to eliminate BSE in cattle were soundly based and confirmed that the elimination of food-borne sources was key to the eradication of BSE. He recommended that risk-based controls and monitoring should be maintained on animals and feed.
The report is available (PDF 177 KB) and the Defra response is available here (PDF 55KB).
Spontaneous occurrence (14-16) The evidence from the absence of BSE in many countries and the surveillance schemes abroad indicates that most BARBs cases cannot have arisen spontaneously, although the possibility cannot be excluded that a very few of them did so. The possibility of a very low frequency of spontaneous occurrence of BSE may be monitored from the output of surveillance in cattle populations elsewhere.
Genetic variation in susceptibility (17-21) a) Previous statistical and molecular genetic studies indicate there is little genetic variation of cattle associated with susceptibility to BSE. b) Preliminary information from the GB analysis and detailed information from the NI analyses of DNA sequence data on BARBs cases and controls as yet show no clear associations, with no genotype exclusively associated with BARBs cases whether acquired by infection or arising spontaneously.
Feed borne infection (31-34) a) Recent unpublished experiments at the VLA have shown that feeding exceptionally low doses (0.001g) of infected neural tissue can cause BSE. b) The working hypothesis of Defra that the major cause of BSE in BARBs cases has been through the ingestion of contaminated feed, most likely by young animals, is strongly supported. Thus control of the disease requires, as it has always required, completely eliminating the agent from the cattle feed chain. c) Understanding causes of variation in infectivity are important in terms of understanding the disease, but do not particularly impinge on the control of BSE, where risks have to be avoided. R: Defra continues to operate on the basis that BSE transmission via feed is the major route involved in BARB cases.
General conclusions Elimination of feed borne sources seems to be now, as before, the key to elimination of BSE. The incidence of the disease can be greatly reduced but not readily eliminated in any country by adequate imposition of controls, particularly on animal feed. As the level of incidence falls both in the UK and internationally, the risks of contamination through cattle feed, pet food, or indeed through any other source, fall whether or not controls in the UK and abroad are further tightened. With the current expertise in Defra and the VLA, GB is well placed to keep on top of and promote developments. R: It is essential that appropriate, risk based, controls and monitoring should be maintained on animals and feed until no cases of BSE are found, and controls tightened up where feasible, both in the UK and elsewhere that the UK can influence. In view of the very long incubation period of BSE in some animals, long-continued vigilance is necessary. It is not evident, however, that specific new measures are needed. Basically it is necessary to ‘keep taking the medicine’. Nevertheless, in view of new discoveries on the nature of the disease and the possibilities of new or changed TSEs arising, relevant research capacity in GB should be maintained.
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BSE SUMMARY OF PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE REPORTS IN GREAT BRITAIN
GENERAL STATISTICS ON BSE CASES IN GREAT BRITAIN
TSE EXOTIC SPECIES
Envt.11: Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation
Justin Greenlee,† Robert Kunkle and Jodi Smith
National Animal Disease Center, ARS, USDA; Ames, IA USA †Presenting author; Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs, prion diseases) are chronic neurodegenerative diseases that occur in humans, cattle, sheep, goats, cervids and a number of laboratory animal models. There is no evidence of the natural occurrence of any form of TSE in the pig, but pigs have been shown to be susceptible to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) infection by multiple-route parenteral challenge. However, pigs orally exposed at eight weeks of age to large amounts of brain from cattle clinically affected with BSE did not support infection after seven years of observation. In the US, feeding of ruminant by-products to ruminants is prohibited, but feeding of ruminant materials to swine, mink and poultry still occurs. Although unlikely, the potential for swine to have access to TSE-contaminated feedstuffs exists. The potential for swine to serve as a host for the agent of chronic wasting disease (CWD) is unknown. The purpose of this study was to perform intracerebral inoculation of the CWD agent to determine the potential of swine as a host for the CWD agent and their clinical susceptibility. This study utilized 26 swine randomly divided into controls (n = 6) and intracranial inoculates (n = 20). CWD inoculum was a pooled 10% (w/v) homogenate derived from three white-tailed deer clinically ill with CWD from three different sources (elk, white-tailed deer, mule deer) and was given by a single intracranial injection of 0.75 ml. Necropsies were done on ten animals at six months post inoculation (PI), at approximately the time the pigs were expected to reach market weight. Additional pigs have been necropsied due to intercurrent disease (primarily lameness) over the course of the study (29–64 months). Samples collected at necropsy were examined for spongiform change after routine staining (hematoxylin and eosin) and for immunoreactivity to prion protein (PrPSc) by immunohistochemistry. Further, brain samples from at least two regions were tested by western blot. No results suggestive of spongiform encephalopathy were obtained from animals necropsied at six months PI, but positive results after an incubation period of only six months would be uncharacteristic. A single animal was positive for CWD by IHC and WB at 64 months PI. Two inoculated pigs and one control pig remain alive, so it is not possible to determine the attack rate of CWD in swine at this time. However, lack of positive results in pigs necropsied at 29–56 months PI and the long incubation of the single positive case suggest that swine are unlikely to be affected by CWD if inoculated by a natural route.
7 OF 10 LITTLE PIGGIES WENT ON TO DEVELOP BSE;
1: J Comp Pathol. 2000 Feb-Apr; 122(2-3): 131-43. Related Articles,
The neuropathology of experimental bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the pig
Ryder SJ, Hawkins SA, Dawson M, Wells GA.
Veterinary Laboratories Agency Weybridge, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey, KT15 3NB, UK.
In an experimental study of the transmissibility of BSE to the pig, seven of 10 pigs, infected at 1-2 weeks of age by multiple-route parenteral inoculation with a homogenate of bovine brain from natural BSE cases developed lesions typical of spongiform encephalopathy. The lesions consisted principally of severe neuropil vacuolation affecting most areas of the brain, but mainly the forebrain. In addition, some vacuolar change was identified in the rostral colliculi and hypothalamic areas of normal control pigs. PrP accumulations were detected immunocytochemically in the brains of BSE-infected animals. PrP accumulation was sparse in many areas and its density was not obviously related to the degree of vacuolation. The patterns of PrP immunolabelling in control pigs differed strikingly from those in the infected animals.
PMID: 10684682 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
1. CMO should be aware that a pig inoculated experimentally (ic, iv, and ip) with BSE brain suspension has after 15 months developed an illness, now confirmed as a spongiform encephalopathy. This is the first ever description of such a disease in a pig, although it seems there ar no previous attempts at experimental inoculation with animal material. The Southwood group had thought igs would not be susceptible. Most pigs are slaughtered when a few weeks old but there have been no reports of relevant neurological illness in breeding sows or other elderly pigs. ...see full text ;
So it is plausible pigs could be preclinically affected with BSE but since so few are allowed to reach adulthood this has not been recognised through clinical disease. ...
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...
we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.
May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...
3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...
But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...
Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....
BSE TO PIGS NEWS RELEASE
BSE: PRESS PRESENTATION
INDUSTRY RESPONSE TYPICAL
pigs & pharmaceuticals
COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF MEDICINE NOT FOR PUBLICATION BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY WORKING GROUP
There are only two products using porcine brain and these use corticotrophin BP, made from porcine pituitary, source from outside the UK.............
It was not until . . . August 1990, that the result from the pig persuaded both SEAC and us to change our view and to take out of pig rations any residual infectivity that might have arisen from the SBOs.
4.303 The minutes of the meeting record that:
It was very difficult to draw conclusions from one experimental result for what may happen in the field. However it would be prudent to exclude specified bovine offals from the pig diet. Although any relationship between BSE and the finding of a spongiform encephalopathy in cats had yet to be demonstrated, the fact that this had occurred suggested that a cautious view should be taken of those species which might be susceptible. The 'specified offals' of bovines should therefore be excluded from the feed of all species. 17
4.308 SEAC issued formal advice on 20 September 1990, following its meeting on the previous day. The advice stated:
Since this result shows that pigs can get spongiform encephalopathy, even though there is no evidence that they have done so in the field, we believe that pigs should no longer be fed with protein derived from bovine tissues which might contain the BSE agent, ie, those 'specified' bovine offals that are already excluded from human consumption. It would make sense to extend this prohibition to feed for all species, including household pets, as other species have now developed spongiform encephalopathies. We are aware that many animal feed compounders and pet food manufacturers are already applying such a ban on a voluntary basis. 22
4.309 In a statement to the Inquiry, Dr Tyrrell said:
It was the rapid increase in the BSE epidemic, the occurrence of more cases of FSE and the results of the pig transmission experiment which led SEAC to give the advice we did on the extension of the SBO ban. Before then (September 1990), we were not asked to advise on the extension of the SBO ban. It was important to consider humans before other animals. It should be remembered that prior to the test results of the pig transmission experiment, pigs and poultry were not known to be susceptible to TSEs. Breeding pigs, in particular, were thought to have received a very high exposure to the same type of contaminated MBM as cattle but without any evidence of the occurrence of TSE. The issue of symptom-less hosts was considered very carefully because it could apply to all domestic and farmed animal species. 23
SE1805 Transmissibility of BSE to domestic fowl by injection with brain homogenate.
1 challenged bird died overnight (42 months p.i.) following a period of ataxia histopathological examination pending.
2 further challenged birds are also showing neurological signs of ataxia and tremor (43 months p.i.). All affected birds are cock birds. The remaining 4 challenged hens are clinically normal (43 months p.i.).
2 control birds were culled due to intercurrent disease (40 and 43 months p.i.) .. No significant lesions were observed in one and histopathological examination is pending on the other.
The remaining 6 control birds are clinically normal.
SEI806 Transmissibility of ESE to domestic fowl by oral exposure to brain homogenate.
1 challenged cock bird was necropsied (41 months p.i.) following a period of ataxia, tremor, limb abduction and other neurological signs. Histopathological examination failed to reveal any signi ficant lesions of the central or peripheral nervous systems.
1 other challenged cock bird is also showing ataxia (43 months p.i.). The remaining 2 challenged cocks and 5 hens are clinically normal (43 months p.i.).
Further examinations are in progress to determine the cause of morbidity in these studies (SE1805 and SE1806).
For controls see SE1805. ...
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SEE FULL TEXT ;
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEUROPATHOLOGY OF THE RED-NECKED OSTRICH (STRUTHIO CAMELUS) - SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY -
* The Red-Neck Ostrich 'THE AUTOPSY' & TSEs
Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2001 16:24:51 -0700
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Subject: The Red-Neck Ostrich & TSEs 'THE AUTOPSY'
1 The carrion birds are animals whose diet regularly or occasionally includes the consumption of carcasses, including possibly TSE infected ruminant carcasses.
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradleyâs surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background: In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims: The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods: Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results: In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions: Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Petition to Declare Poultry Litter as a Food Additive and to Ban Its Use as Cattle Feed August 12, 2009 UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
Subject: DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability
Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: email@example.com
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Mad cow disease: EU must maintain strict controls, says Parliament
but the ban on feeding animal protein to non-ruminants, such as pigs, could gradually be lifted if further safeguards are put in place, they add.
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU RENDER UNTO FEED, AND FEED EVERY LIVESTOCK SPECIES, GAME SPEICIES, ALL STRAINS OF TSE THERE FROM, AND THEN FEED THERE FROM, TO HUMANS AND ANIMALS ???
WE WILL KNOW IN DUE TIME, BECAUSE THIS IS AN ONGOING LONG TERM STUDY FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN CONSUMER $$$
BE WARNED, YOU HAVE, AND CONTINUE TO BE EXPOSED $$$
LET'S LOOK AT A FEW SPECIES THAT HAVE BEEN FED BANNED SUSPECT MAD COW FEED IN THE USA OVER THE DECADES ;
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
NOW, LET'S LOOK AT A FEW 100S OF TONS OF THESE BANNED SUSPECT MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN THE USA ;
BANNED SUSPECT MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006-2007, SOME 10 YEARS AFTER THE INFAMOUS PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN or August 4, 1997, that was nothing more than ink on paper, so really, there was no BSE triple fire wall at all, and this was improving ???
*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS
THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
see Alabama banned suspect mad cow feed in commerce ;
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,
Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 126.96.36.199
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
Saturday, November 6, 2010
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation
Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)
PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 25, AUGUST 1995
To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed compounders.
To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets through adverse publicity.
To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders, notably by maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make any changes which may be required.
MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at handling potentially explosive issues.
5. Tests _may_ show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.
6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct linkage between feed milling _practices_ and actual BSE cases, the more likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. ...
SEE full text ;
RE - "BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades" YA THINK ???
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque
"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"
Sunday, June 26, 2011
Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits
Thursday, July 21, 2011
A Second Case of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease Linked to the G131V Mutation in the Prion Protein Gene in a Dutch Patient Journal of Neuropathology & Experimental Neurology:
August 2011 - Volume 70 - Issue 8 - pp 698-702
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor
sporadic CJD accounts for over 85% plus of all human TSE prion disease.
sporadic CJD, of unknown phenotype is rising in Canada and the USA.
animal TSE are rising and spreading in the USA.
we do not know if human TSE from atypical BSE, or from CWD infected deer and elk, or from scrapie infected sheep and goats, would look like nvCJD or sporadic CJD, or this UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE that is rising in North America.
we do know now however, that some of the sporadic CJD cases have now been linked to the atypical BSE cases, which is of no surprise to me.
so in my opinion, and as i have stated before, the continued belief in the UKBSEnvCJD only theory, will only continue to help spread this disease around the globe, via multiple proven routes and sources. ...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50
When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.
The conclusions state that, at present, the only TSE agent demonstrated to be zoonotic is the classical BSE agent. Active screening has allowed the identification of 3 new forms of animal TSEs (H-type atypical BSE, L-type atypical BSE, and atypical scrapie), but the information obtained has major limitations due to the unknown sensitivity of the current monitoring system for these TSEs. There is no epidemiological evidence to suggest that classical scrapie is zoonotic. The epidemiological data are too limited to conclude whether the atypical scrapie agent has a zoonotic potential. Transmission experiments to human PrP transgenic mice or primates suggest that some TSE agents other than the classical BSE agent in cattle (namely L-type atypical BSE, classical BSE in sheep, TME, CWD agents) might have zoonotic potential and indicate that that of the L-type atypical BSE agent appears similar or even higher than that of the classical BSE agent. A single study reported efficient transmission of a natural sheep classical scrapie isolate to primates.
Commentary ---------- Following to a request from the European Commission, the Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) were asked to deliver a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in animals and humans. The opinion reviews and discusses the existing scientific evidence that links animal and human TSEs currently known.
The opinion first considers the definition of zoonoses and the principles for the identification of zoonotic diseases, which can be based on evidence gathered from both epidemiological and laboratory studies. The opinion describes the challenges involved in identifying TSEs as zoonoses, due to the specific characteristics of TSE infections/diseases, such as the nature of TSE agents, the occurrence of animal and human TSEs, and the type of monitoring applied, the long incubation period of TSEs etc. The example of the process that led to establishing a link between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) is reviewed. The epidemiological and laboratory criteria that can be used to investigate such a link are described in detail, since those criteria might be useful for the identification of links between other animal and human TSEs.
The opinion discusses the strain diversity of the TSE agents described in sheep, goats, cattle, cervids, and humans, based on the current knowledge, which highlights that multiple TSE agents exist in each species. The factors influencing the capacity of TSE agents to cross the species transmission barrier are then considered in detail, including the variability in host and donor PrP gene and protein, the TSE strain type involved and its interaction with the host PrP, and the route of infection.
The opinion critically assesses the tools and methodologies currently available to study and evaluate the possible association between animal and human TSEs. The use of epidemiology is discussed for TSEs in both animals and humans, and the possibility to compare the 2 sources of information is presented as a possible method to study the possible links.
Both in vivo and in vitro laboratory methods are considered and discussed, including neuropathology, transmission experiments involving different animal models (wild type and transgenic mice, primates and other species), biochemical methods, cell-free conversion assays, protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), and cell culture assays. Characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of the different methods are reviewed, including the opportunity to collate data from different types of experiments for the study of potential associations between animal and human TSEs.
The opinion then reviews the scientific evidence currently available for the different animal and human TSEs, including classical BSE, atypical BSE (H-type and L-type), classical scrapie, atypical scrapie, chronic wasting disease (CWD), transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME), and human TSEs. In particular, the following aspects are systematically discussed for each TSE agent: epidemiology, pathogenesis, and in vivo and in vitro transmission experiments.
The opinion concludes that, at present, the only TSE agent demonstrated to be zoonotic is the classical BSE agent. With regard to human TSEs, detected cases of sporadic CJD are randomly distributed in time and geographical location. These observations have been interpreted as a supportive argument that sporadic CJD is not environmentally acquired. However, the epidemiological evidence in relation to sporadic CJD cannot be regarded as definitive, and the possibility that a small proportion of cases are zoonotic cannot be excluded.
It also concludes that a series of uncertainties in relation to the epidemiological patterns of animal and human TSEs indicate that even a rough comparison of the present epidemiological patterns of human and animal TSEs other than classical BSE is unlikely to be informative. Because of these uncertainties, it is an imperative to continue to carry out systematic surveillance of human TSE diseases, and to continue and improve the surveillance of animal TSE diseases.
The opinion highlights that the active screening has allowed the identification of 3 new forms of animal TSEs (L-type atypical BSE, H-type atypical BSE, and atypical scrapie), but that the information obtained has major limitations due to the unknown sensitivity of the current monitoring system for these TSEs.
There is no epidemiological evidence to suggest that classical scrapie is zoonotic. The epidemiological data are too limited to conclude whether the atypical scrapie agent has a zoonotic potential.
Transmission experiments to human PrP transgenic mice suggest that some TSE agents other than the classical BSE agent in cattle (namely L-type atypical BSE and classical BSE in sheep agents) might have zoonotic potential, whereas for other agents there is no evidence provided of a zoonotic potential (H-type atypical BSE and CWD), or no published studies are available (classical and atypical scrapie). In addition, transmission experiments to primates suggest that some TSE agents other than the classical BSE agent in cattle (namely L-type atypical BSE, classical BSE in sheep, TME, CWD agents) might have zoonotic potential. In particular, primates are highly permissive to L-type atypical BSE, even by the oral route.
The opinion emphasizes that laboratory transmission experiments indicate that the L-type atypical BSE agent has a significant zoonotic potential, which appears similar or even higher than that of the classical BSE agent. While transmission data for evaluating the zoonotic potential of classical scrapie in primates and human PrP transgenic mice are extremely limited or not yet available, a single study reported efficient transmission of a natural sheep classical scrapie isolate to primates.
The opinion concludes that human PrP transgenic mice and primates are currently the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier, but the extent to which such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. It is unpredictable whether a TSE agent will transmit to a new host, and if the transmission principally occurs, what the transmission rate will be.
Based on the results obtained with in vitro conversion assays, the opinion concludes that there is probably no absolute molecular barrier to transmission of TSE agents between mammalian species. Results also suggest that these assays may be developed as a tool for quantifying the transmission barriers between species for different TSE agent strains; however, there is no means at the moment to transpose in vitro results into the likelihood of in vivo interspecies transmission.
-- Communicated by: Terry S Singeltary Sr
[ProMED-mail thanks Terry S Singeltary Sr for drawing attention to this comprehensive document which provides a current evaluation of experimental work designed to explore the zoonotic potential of the various recently recognised TSEs of domestic and other animals.
It is concluded that at present the only TSE agent demonstrated to be zoonotic is the classical BSE agent. Nor can it be entirely excluded at the present time that a small proportion of cases of sporadic CJD may be environmentally acquired. - Mod.CP]
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed
Wednesday, August 24, 2011
All Clinically-Relevant Blood Components Transmit Prion Disease following a Single Blood Transfusion: A Sheep Model of vCJD
Wednesday, August 24, 2011
There Is No Safe Dose of Prions
sporadic CJD slowly, and steadily, on the rise ;
U.K. CJD Statistics
CJD Figures These figures show the number of suspect cases referred to the NCJDRSU in Edinburgh, and the number of deaths of definite and probable cases in the UK, from 1 January 1990 up to 5th September 2011
see steady increase in sporadic CJD cases ;
Saturday, March 5, 2011
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA
SEE CANADA CJD STATS, UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE CJD ON THE RISE IN CANADA ALSO ;
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Clinical research in CJD at a U.S. clinical prion research center: CJD Quinacrine Study results and improved diagnosis of prion disease
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE
snip...SEE FULL TEXT WITH VIDEOS ;
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Terry Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis, Date aired: 27 Jun 2011
(see video here) ;
Sunday, August 21, 2011
The British disease, or a disease gone global, The TSE Prion Disease
(see video here)
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Bacliff, TX, USA
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
12 years independent research of available data
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 firstname.lastname@example.org