NASDA BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE, PRION, Policy Statements updated with
amendments passed during the NASDA Annual Meeting Updated September 18, 2014
Greetings NASDA et al,
with regards to ;
NASDA Policy Statements
Updated September 18, 2014 Downloaded September 18, 2014 NASDA Policy
Statements updated with amendments passed during the 2014 NASDA Annual
Meeting
snip...
1.2.6 Wild and Exotic Animals
The unregulated, or inadequately regulated importation, commercialization,
interstate movement and reintroduction of wild and exotic animals, including
Cervidae and other wild and exotic ungulate species, poses a disease risk to
domestic livestock. Even the barter and sale of surplus animals from quarantined
zoos could result in the dissemination of diseases presently foreign to the
domestic livestock. There is a need within the United States to address all 11
NASDA Policy Statements
susceptible animal species in disease control regulations. USDA should
obtain authority over all animal species in order to provide for adequate
control measures. The failure to do so will jeopardize the success of national
disease eradication programs.
Non-indigenous ticks are entering the United States with imported
“wildlife” such as lizards, snakes and tortoises, which are imported for the pet
trade. These ticks threaten cattle and wildlife by possible transmission of
diseases that could cause great economic hardships to agriculture and inhibit
foreign trade. Apparently no federal agency has responsibility for the
inspection and control of these invasive pests as they arrive on “wildlife” from
countries with known infestations of dangerous foreign diseases. Few acaricides
have been approved for treatment inside the United States of these “wildlife”
for the pests. NASDA encourages the USDA and all other agencies to work closely
with foreign governments, with frequent interchanges of information and
technical assistance between countries, so that the prevention/eradication
efforts and elimination from all animals being exported can be coordinated with
prevention/eradication of these pests in the United States. NASDA urges that
APHIS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service take all necessary measures to
prevent the introduction of non-indigenous ticks into the United States.
1.2.7 Disposal of Animal Carcasses and Animal Parts
Significant animal mortalities from natural disasters as well as recent
outbreaks of infectious animal diseases such as Avian influenza demand
expeditious and appropriate disposal of animal carcasses in a manner that will
prevent disease spread, prevent excessive air emissions and prevent ground water
and environmental contamination by infectious agents or by the byproducts of
decomposition. State and federal agencies must have protocols, authorities and
approvals in place for appropriate animal carcass disposal prior to, and not
after, emergency disease or emergency mortality events. NASDA supports the
development of a national coordinated carcass and SRM disposal / utilization
plan / guidance that will enable states to be better prepared to address
emergency and routine livestock disposal while protecting both public health and
the environment.
Accurate identification of animals and products, traceability, and
documentation of events is essential to ensure appropriate measures. In
addition, adequate laboratory and diagnostic capabilities as well as essential
interagency real time communication of critical information are important
elements for animal carcass disposal. States must have necessary statutory
authorities to deal with proper disposal of affected agricultural materials from
either disease or other disaster incidences whether from imported or domestic
animal production.
NASDA will work to formulate and gain approval from all agriculture and
environmental agencies of appropriate protocols for permit sanitary carcass
disposal; to provide effective systems of identification; to promulgate needed
authority in model language; to authorize needed resources and laboratory and
diagnostics capacities; and to effectively incorporate interagency communication
agreements. 12
NASDA Policy Statements
1.2.8 Emergency Disease Preparedness/Response
Government infrastructure for emergency animal disease preparedness has
decreased significantly at both the state and national levels. This has led to
serious concerns regarding our ability to control and eradicate foreign animal
and poultry diseases in the United States. The economic and trade implications
are enormous.
Successful strategies for emergency disease preparedness will require the
combined cooperative effort of industry, government, and academia. USDA, the
states, and regional groups must work in concert to improve communications and
to prepare for dealing with emergencies involving the introduction of foreign
animal or poultry diseases. NASDA supports the Animal Health Protection Act
(AHPA) introduced in Congress in 2000. The AHPA would be a powerful tool for
safeguarding the United States from dangerous incursions by granting the USDA
broader authority. Appropriate funding must be available to carry out an
effective emergency disease response program.
The National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) provides vital support
for the animal health programs of the Animal & Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS). The NVSL plays a crucial role in safeguarding the agriculture
of the United States from harmful disease events. Because of its importance in
protecting American agriculture, NASDA supports funding for necessary upgrades
to the NVSL Ames, Iowa, facility.
The heightened awareness of foreign animal diseases due to natural events
as well as intentional introductions has been met with like attention to the
needs of appropriate funding and infrastructure to implement an effective
emergency disease response program.
Although the threat for introducing any foreign animal disease into the US
is high, the spread of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) poses the most immediate
threat in the US, as well as multifaceted challenges that impact State
Departments of Agriculture, Natural Resources, animal diagnostic laboratories,
the farmed cervid industry, deer processors and hunters:
• The health of captive herds must be carefully monitored to protect the
economic future of the captive cervid industry
• Surveillance of the free roaming cervid population must be conducted to
determine the prevalence and spread of the disease.
• Hunters must have a means of determining whether the animals they harvest
are free of disease.
• The annual deer harvest must be sufficient to control population.
• Licensed deer processors require assurance of the disease status of
hunter-killed deer in order to protect conditions in their facilities. 13
NASDA Policy Statements
Central to the challenges is the need for reliable, rapid diagnostic
testing for CWD. Current restrictions on state testing do not promote the
broad-based, rapid testing necessary to meet potential demand. USDA’s National
Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) conducts CWD surveillance, but is not
equipped to provide the fast-turn around testing service required by hunters and
processors and necessary to support programs of the Departments of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. The current timetable for CWD results at NVSL is two to
four weeks.
State laboratories must be able to provide CWD testing service.
The majority of state-run diagnostic laboratories are prohibited from
possessing reagents necessary to run the tests. A limited number of laboratories
recently authorized under contract with NVSL are required to use specific
equipment (Ventana) and protocols established by NVSL. Non-contract laboratories
that own and use quality immunohistochemistry stainers capable of producing
accurate CWD test results must purchase a $45,000 Ventana immunohistochemistry
stainer and a host of expensive commodities to be recognized by NVSL. NASDA
acknowledges that prevention, containment and eradication of foreign animal
diseases will require cooperative efforts of federal and state governments,
industry, and academia. Further, NASDA urges USDA to:
• Expand the authorities of state-run diagnostic labs to conduct tests for
foreign animal diseases, including CWD:
• Implementation of appropriate protocols to enhance the nation’s
infrastructure to address foreign animal diseases, including accepting test
results from laboratories that utilize systems other than Ventana, which produce
accurate foreign animal disease test results.
1.2.9 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in livestock has gained much of the world’s attention with its
identification in Western and Eastern Europe, Israel, Japan and North America.
BSE and other TSEs are considered serious animal health concerns. BSE has also
become a public health issue as a result of the connection that has been made
between BSE in cattle and variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease (vCJD) in humans.
Public confidence in the beef supply is potentially affected each time another
case of BSE in cattle is identified. Many questions remain that can only be
resolved through further research, on-going evaluation and assessing the risks
involved. Maintaining an adequate food safety system while additional knowledge
is obtained remains a primary objective.
NASDA supports a policy which assures that the U. S. actions are supported
by the best available science–a policy that embraces research as a method to
advance current knowledge and understanding, is based on risk analysis, is able
to assure the consuming public that the beef supply is safe because of the
actions taken by U. S. public agencies and is fair to U. S. beef producers.
Within this context, NASDA supports—
• Development of a feed ban based on the best available science and is
enforceable. 14 NASDA Policy Statements
• Increased research – especially to develop an in vitro testing procedure
that is rapid, accurate, and cost efficient, further analysis of other possible
methods of transmission of the disease in cattle (e. g., blood/tissue), other
possible avenues of transmission to humans, disposal options for SRM,
infectivity of tissue from animals under 30 months of age, develop and implement
effective methods for inactivation of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy
(TSE) agents, further determination of pathways by which the agent causes the
disease.
• Risk assessment – determine options for proper actions based on risk
assessment.
• Normalization of trade and consideration of regionalized barriers, where
appropriate, to minimize the overall effect on U. S. producers while regional
issues are worked out. Regionalization areas may be across international
borders. • An emphasis on developing whatever is needed to allow the U. S. to
qualify for better than minimal risk status with our trading partners. • The
need for an animal ID system that is operational as soon as practical. •
Harmonization of all animal health standards. Harmonization of BSE Standards
while avoiding reaching agreement on other standards is not generally recognized
as free trade in the U. S. No feeder cattle should be allowed to be imported
until agreement is reached on harmonization of other animal health standards,
especially bluetongue, anaplasmosis, brucellosis, and tuberculosis.
• NASDA realizes there is no such thing as a no cost policy-if the U. S.
needs to take actions to assure eradication in a reasonable timeframe, NASDA
believes that affected sectors of the industry (e.g., renderers, perhaps others)
should be assisted to assure compliance is reached as reasonably as possible.
• Surveillance programs that assure the U. S. is compliant with OIE
Standards and that go beyond compliance where such actions can lead to the
removal of infected animals from the U. S. herd (e.g., due diligence on
trace-forwards, trace-backs and cohorts). 1.2.10 Animal Disease Eradication and
Control The completion of several disease control programs of significance to
the economic viability of livestock production agriculture in the United States
is nearing. Bovine tuberculosis, bovine brucellosis, swine brucellosis and
pseudorabies are examples of diseases that will likely be eradicated from
domestic livestock. Funding cuts and other resource constraints threaten the
ability of USDA, specifically the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), to complete these important programs. As international trade has
increased, the threat of an outbreak of a foreign animal disease in the United
States has also increased. Such an outbreak would disrupt production of food
animals, 15 NASDA Policy Statements interrupt the domestic meat and poultry
supply, adversely affect food processing, marketing and the distribution chain,
and cause the loss of export markets for United States livestock and livestock
products. The loss to the United States would be billions of dollars in trade of
agricultural products. NASDA encourages APHIS to accept the DNA test in sheep,
proven by ARS researchers as well as scientists in Great Britain as reliable, in
determining scrapie susceptibility. NASDA believes that disease control programs
are essential if eradication of animal and poultry diseases and the prevention
of the introduction or outbreak of foreign or domestic diseases is to be
successful. Priority should be given to programs whose efforts are aimed at
preventing the outbreak of animal health diseases and protecting our nation’s
domestic livestock from foreign diseases. Valid tests should also be developed
to properly detect diseases that pose a risk to animal health. Some animal
health diseases that require specific attention are:
• Avian Influenza
• Bluetongue
• Brucellosis
• Johnes Disease
• Pseudorabies
• Raccoon Strain Rabies
• Scrapie
• Tuberculosis
• Vesicular Stomatitis
• Chronic Wasting Disease
• Anaplasmosis
• West Nile Viral Encephalitis
Sufficient resources should be made available for such programs so that the
appropriate agencies can provide indemnity to owners of diseased livestock,
which will encourage the elimination of remaining infected herds, and maintain
an adequate number of animal health professionals able to respond to animal
health issues.
NASDA believes that any comprehensive program to control or eradicate
disease from domestic livestock should include provisions for testing,
quarantining exposed animals, and indemnifying diseased animals. All susceptible
species should be included in regulations addressing disease control, including
non-livestock species that can harbor and/or transmit diseases of concern. 16
NASDA Policy Statements Historically, animal disease eradication and
control programs have been cooperative state/federal programs and should
continue to be cooperative state/federal programs. APHIS has published a
proposed rule that would codify a standardized cost sharing formula for animal
disease and plant pest and disease emergency eradication programs that are
conducted cooperatively with states. Unfortunately, expanding world trade and
the threat of bioterrorism have increased the risk of destructive pests and
diseases being introduced into the United States.
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the federal agency
statutorily charged with preventing the introduction, spread and establishment
of plant pests and diseases, noxious weeds and pests and diseases of livestock
in the United States. States are not federally mandated to partner with USDA in
this endeavor yet have historically done so with great success. Developing a
plan on how the United States Department of Agriculture should respond to
emergencies is not without merit. In fact, NASDA's Animal Health Safeguarding
Review and the Safeguarding American Plant Resources Review conducted by the
National Plant Board contain recommendations that would facilitate the kind of
out year planning envisioned in the proposed rule. Emergency programs relating
to animal and plant health by their very nature, however, do not accommodate a
"one size fits all" approach. While some suggest a cost share formula would
yield savings to the Federal Government in future years, it will actually result
in quite the opposite for states, who are already bearing significant costs
associated with plant and animal pest and diseases that are not detected at the
border. NASDA urges USDA to withdraw the proposed rule and work with states
toward the development of a joint system for the early detection and eradication
of plant and animal pests and diseases.
NASDA's Animal Health Safeguarding Review and the Safeguarding American
Plant Resources Review would provide a sound footing for the development of a
science based rule that combines the unique abilities of each partner. NASDA
discourages attempts to construct meaningful eradication programs around
budgetary decisions.
1.2.11 Homeland Security and Agriculture NASDA strongly supports the pest
exclusion mission area known as Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) at the
nation’s ports of entry that serve to protect our domestic agriculture industry
from a foreign pest or disease incursion. After the events of September 11, 2001
and the anthrax incidents that followed, AQI functions were transferred from the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the newly created Department
of Homeland Security ("DHS") in an effort to consolidate all governmental
functions that protect the nation against threats to the homeland into one
agency.
NASDA strongly supports the mission and efforts of DHS to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. While the
prevention of terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States
is vital to the security of the nation, so too, is the protection of the
nation's food supply, our agricultural economy, and animal health. Introductions
of foreign animal diseases, such as Exotic Newcastle Disease and emerging
diseases, such as West Nile Virus, Avian Influenza and Chronic Wasting 17
NASDA Policy Statements
Disease, are of great concern to the nation’s livestock and animal
producers and could cause significant impacts to the nation’s agricultural
economy. Unfortunately, since the AQI transfer, pest and disease introductions
have increased dramatically. It is clear that DHS’ administration of the AQI
program lacks efficacy and currently there are no performance measures relative
to AQI functions that DHS must meet to ensure the resources that DHS receives to
protect the U.S. domestic agriculture sector are being utilized for this
purpose. In addition, in order for AQI to remain effective while housed at DHS,
it was essential that DHS and APHIS establish a consistent and clear
communication structure that provides for problem resolution with built-in
accountability in order to provide the greatest degree of risk reduction.
Unfortunately, DHS’ mission is so broad that AQI is not viewed within the agency
as a critical function either in terms of staffing or funding. Therefore, NASDA
supports the re-assignment of the AQI mission area back to USDA APHIS given that
they have the expertise to carry out a focused, coordinated and effective
agricultural safeguarding effort and are statutorily charged with managing
exotic pests and diseases.
NASDA urges that increased emphasis be placed on the mission of
safeguarding agriculture and strongly supports the immediate adoption of
quantifiable performance measures for AQI functions to ensure the program is
meeting the statutory mission for which it was created – protecting American
agriculture from a foreign plant or animal pest or disease. These performance
measures should consider the interdiction, control, eradication and suppression
costs borne by state and local governments for foreign pests and diseases that
AQI fails to interdict at the ports of entry. These costs shall be assessed to
the budget of the parent department of AQI. In addition, NASDA urges DHS’ Office
of Domestic Preparedness to provide specific funding opportunities to state
departments of agriculture for local preparedness similar to grants provided to
state departments of health.
1.3 APHIS REORGANIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION
USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) consolidated the
following offices — Veterinary Services (VS), Plant Protection and Quarantine
(PPQ), Wildlife Services, Animal Care, and Investigations and Enforcement
Services — into two regional offices. The consolidation streamlined the
administration of programs, permitted cross utilization of personnel, and made
the agency more responsive to the needs of the states and their constituencies.
NASDA commends APHIS for its efforts to seek efficiency within the federal
government and to improve satisfaction of its constituencies. We recognize the
importance of the consolidation of APHIS programs into eastern and western
regional offices as a cost savings measure, while maintaining accessibility by
customers and partners. NASDA recommends that, to prevent negative impacts on
services, costs for future reorganizations should not be taken from operational
programs, but from agency overhead savings. Further, NASDA recognizes that plant
and animal health issues may not be similar within the consolidated regions and
that current funding levels of programs in a particular region may be diminished
due to priority setting as a result of the regional consolidation.
NASDA urges APHIS 18 NASDA Policy Statements to consider the plant and
animal health needs of the states within the current regional composition when
allocating program funding.
NASDA strongly supports increasing funding to PPQ Unit for the purpose of
interception of illegal and smuggled food products that pose a direct threat to
the food security of the United States of America and to homeland security.
NASDA also strongly supports increasing APHIS’s ability to fine and
prosecute offenders of United States’ agricultural import laws.
NASDA also recognizes that the 48 inspectors that the PPQ Smuggling and
Interdiction Program has for inspection of all imported food and agricultural
products into the United States is severely inadequate and further poses a
direct flaw in the United States’ ability to ensure food security and homeland
security.
1.4 ANIMAL DAMAGE CONTROL
I kindly submit the following scientific update on the Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease ;
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip...
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation
(21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin)
from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With
regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may
not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered
at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the
animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a
requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD
eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to
slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive
animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from
the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES.
It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin
processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible
risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk
protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data
on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these
products.
snip...
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of
deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of
Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).
The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and
behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition,
signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a
fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an
altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids
experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB,
for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate
if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the
human food-chain via affected venison.
snip...
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and
can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip...
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil
and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a
bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are
present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with
CWD prion.
snip...
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving
between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling
to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing,
footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible.
For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the
increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant
uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip...
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher
probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer
given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists
and returning GB residents.
snip...
NEW URL LINK ;
Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection
Act of 2002; Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking APHIS Posted Apr 09 2009 7:13pm
Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List
Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the
Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public
Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment
Comment DOCKET APHIS-2007-0033 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List
August, 29, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
7 CFR Part 331 9 CFR Part 121
Docket No. APHIS-2007-0033 RIN 0579-AC53
This is my second submission to APHIS about Bioterrorism and the
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE agent. My first submission was Mon,
27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600 Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism
Protection Act of 2002 (see my old submission at bottom dated Subject: Docket
No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Date: Mon, 27
Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To:
mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000328/!x-usc:mailto:reg
).
WHAT I am most concerned about is that ONLY BSE is listed as a dangerous
toxin in the family of TSE. With the ever growing list of atypical TSE like
atypical BSE BASE, and the atypical Scrapie Nor-98, and also the typical scrapie
strains, and Chronic Wasting Disease CWD, why is it only BSE is listed ?
I think that all of these TSE's should be listed with the BSE agent as a
potential Biological weapon. With these atypical TSE, even more so, due to the
fact the possibility of vertical and lateral transmission, unlike BSE (not
documented to date to transmit that way). With the atypical BSE BASE being more
virulent to humans than the typical BSE, why is it not listed ?
WHY is the atypical Scrapie Nor-98, with this being a potential threat to
not only animals, but humans as well, why is this not listed ?
WHY is Chronic Wasting Disease CWD of deer and elk not listed, especially
since CWD has transmitted to the bovine by inoculation to date, with oral
studies still ongoing, and the fact the oral route would take much longer, would
CWD wreck havoc on a countries economy too, let alone the very real potential
for CWD to transmit to humans, why is CWD not listed as a Bio-toxin ?
IF these terrorist are willing to walk into a mall and blow themselves up
as a walking bomb, what is to keep them from exposing themselves to one of these
deadly TSEs, and then going to a hospital and exposing many with CJD somehow.
This may seem far fetched, but very possible. Why is CJD not listed ?
IN short, and very simple, all you would have to do is change the BSE, to
human and animal TSE, thus all bases would be covered. but in only including the
BSE strain of TSE agent, I think you are only fooling yourselves, again. ...
SOURCES
snip....
Elsevier Editorial System(tm) for The Lancet Infectious DiseasesManuscript
DraftManuscript Number:Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad
cowdisease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theoryArticle Type: Personal
ViewCorresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary,Corresponding Author's
Institution: naFirst Author: Terry S Singeltary, noneOrder of Authors: Terry S
Singeltary, none; Terry S. SingeltaryAbstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA
for decades in manyspecies, and they all have been rendered and fed backto
animals for human/animal consumption. I propose thatthe current diagnostic
criteria for human TSEs onlyenhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from
thecontinued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.
snip...see full text 31 pages ;
Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
[TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] - TSS
1/27/03 (0)
Docket Management
Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food
Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]
Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002; Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To:
[log in to unmask] Docket No: 02-088-1
Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use,
and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
Greetings,
i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for
biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known
BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA.
please be warned;
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 -0800 Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy From: "Terry S.
Singeltary Sr." Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified
species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee
Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth
[Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]
snip...
Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine,
including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or
animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance
with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.
snip...
From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no
impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the
proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the
importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from
those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform
encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants
and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been
in Greece is prohibited.
snip...
========================
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the
country?
Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were
imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to
the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from
ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece
during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and
prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use
were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
Sources: World Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in
fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via
indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air
passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one
to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried
23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the
reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat
items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
Greetings list members,
i just cannot accept this;
23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)
The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
what kind of statement is this?
how stupid do they think we are?
it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Slovenia?
There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.
APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air
passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could
potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to
Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or
ranch in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the
Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers
originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.
As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238
air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural
interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a
total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of
the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch
while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from
Austria?
Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat,
animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified
species.
Source: World Trade Atlas
snip...
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Austria?
A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US
airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria
arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air
passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in
fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total
of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s)
that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated
reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.
Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ
Greetings FDA and public,
if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check
out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low
number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much
for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.
[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of
meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of
these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit
or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]
if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers
with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i
am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers
as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid
me.
[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was
imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS
is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]
more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of
these species are capable of carrying a TSE?
snip...
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from
Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived
in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of
meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of
these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit
or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base.
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Japan?
Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan
arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers
from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air
passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an
average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items
were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their
visit to the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from
Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in
Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring,
8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural
interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of
items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the
passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while
in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE,
FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base
search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;
more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';
To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW
CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again
References:< [log in to unmask]> Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean
Greetings again List Members,
let me kick a madcow around here a bit.
on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding
system.
the USDA/APHIS states;
During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from Poland included
non-species specific animal products used in animal feeds and non-species
specific sausage and offal products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant
product imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant material.
NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially
_cross-contamination_, it states;
ANNEX 1
Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001
EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND
STABILITY
The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable
system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from
1987 onwards.
This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and
increased over time.
The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.
Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat
treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence
provided on compliance.
Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.
BSE surveillance:
Not sufficient before 2001.
Cross-contamination:
Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in
time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and
growing.
see full text and ANNEX 1 at;
so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US
imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke
indeed.
* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT
BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING
SYSTEM $$$
Subject: BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES
CODING SYSTEM $$$ Date: November 1, 2002 at 8:03 am PST
[Federal Register: November 1, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 212)]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
9 CFR Part 94
[Docket No. 02-072-2]
Change in Disease Status of Israel Because of BSE
AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.
ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting as a final rule, without change, an interim rule
that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where
bovine spongiform encephalopathy exists because the disease had been detected in
a native-born animal in that region. The effect of the interim rule was a
restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain
other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was
necessary to help prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
into the United States.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The interim rule became effective on June 4, 2002.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Gary Colgrove, Chief Staff
Veterinarian, Sanitary Trade Issues Team, National Center for Import and Export,
VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737- 1231; (301) 734-4356.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to below as the
regulations) govern the importation of certain animals, birds, poultry, meat,
other animal products and byproducts, hay, and straw into the United States in
order to prevent the introduction of various animal diseases, including bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). In an interim rule effective June 4, 2002, and
published in the Federal Register on July 18, 2002 (67 FR 47243-47244, Docket
No. 02- 072-1), we amended the regulations in Sec. 94.18 (a)(1) by adding Israel
to the list of regions where BSE exists due to the detection of BSE in a
native-born animal in that region. Comments on the interim rule were required to
be received on or before September 16, 2002. We did not receive any comments.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the interim rule, we are adopting the
interim rule as a final rule. This action also affirms the information contained
in the interim rule concerning Executive Orders 12866 and 12988 and the
Paperwork Reduction Act. Further, for this action, the Office of Management and
Budget has waived its review under Executive Order 12866.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
This action affirms an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding
Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists. The effect of the interim rule
was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and
certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule
was necessary to help prevent the introduction of BSE into the United States.
The following analysis addresses the economic effects of the interim rule on
small entities, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The interim
rule's restrictions on the importation of ruminants and ruminant products and
byproducts from Israel are not expected to have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities due to the fact that the restricted items
are either not imported from Israel or are imported in very small amounts. There
are three categories of imports that may be affected, but Israel's share of U.S.
imports is small in each case. The first category of affected imported
commodities is ``Meat and edible meat offal, salted in brine, dried or smoked;
edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal.'' Average total yearly imports of
these products by the United States over the 3-year period 1999-2001 were valued
at $24.6 million. Imports from Israel in 1999 were valued at $26,000. No imports
of these products from Israel were reported for 2000 or 2001. The second
category of affected commodities is ``Preparations of a kind used in animal
feeding.'' Average total yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were
valued at $93.5 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over
this period of about $76,000. The final category of affected commodities is
``Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood.'' Average yearly
imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $101.2 million. Imports
from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $2.7 million.
It is apparent that Israel is a minor supplier to the United States of the
ruminant products and byproducts affected by the BSE-related restrictions
resulting from the interim rule. Therefore, we do not expect that the interim
rule's restrictions on ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from
Israel will substantially affect any U.S. importers, large or small, of those
commodities. Under these circumstances, the Administrator of the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 94
Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Meat and meat products, Milk, Poultry
and poultry products, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
PART 94--RINDERPEST, FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE, FOWL PEST (FOWL PLAGUE),
EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE, AFRICAN SWINE FEVER, HOG CHOLERA, AND BOVINE
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS
Accordingly, we are adopting as a final rule, without change, the interim
rule that amended 9 CFR part 94 and that was published at 67 FR 47243-47244 on
July 18, 2002.
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7711-7714, 7751, 7754, 8303, 8306, 8308, 8310,
8311, and 8315; 21 U.S.C 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 4331 and 4332;
7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.
Done in Washington, DC, this 28th day of October, 2002. Bobby R. Acord,
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. [FR Doc. 02-27812
Filed 10-31-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3410-34-P
greetings List members,
MORE OF THE INFAMOUS USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM.
as long as the exporting country and the importing country know not what
they are exporting (play dumb/stupid), this non-species coding system allows
potential BSE/TSE materials to be imported and exported freely and legally...
TSS
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from
Israel ?
The U.S. imported no live ruminants or ruminant meat from Israel since
1999. In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported
and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is
considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE. Other imports from
Israel during the period 1998-2001 included non-species specific preparations
used in animal feeds and other non-food products of unspecified animals. For the
category "preparations used in animal feeding, NESOI" that was imported into the
U.S., it is possible that bovine meat or bovine byproducts could have been
included in this category. However, the US Food and Drug Administration
prohibits feeding of meat-and-bone meal to ruminants in the U.S.
HS Code
Description
Unit
1998
1999
2000
2001
Feed - non species specific
Total
45,030
48,000
50,649
43,000
2309909500
Preparations Used in Animal Feedings, NESOI
KG
45,030
48,000
50,649
43,000
Meat & offal- non species specific
Total
5
0
0
0
300110
Dried Organs
KG
5
0
0
0
Other animal products - ruminants
Total
24
0
0
0
3002100040
Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS)
KG
24
0
0
0
Source: World Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Israel?
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from
Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived
in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ?s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of
meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of
these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit
or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base.
TSS
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness;
Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC -254 Accepted -
Volume 11
Infectivity surviving ashing to 600*C is (in my opinion) degradable but
infective. based on Bown & Gajdusek, (1991), landfill and burial may be
assumed to have a reduction factor of 98% (i.e. a factor of 50) over 3 years.
CJD-infected brain-tissue remained infectious after storing at room-temperature
for 22 months (Tateishi et al, 1988). Scrapie agent is known to remain viable
after at least 30 months of desiccation (Wilson et al, 1950). and pastures that
had been grazed by scrapie-infected sheep still appeared to be contaminated with
scrapie agent three years after they were last occupied by sheep (Palsson,
1979).
PAUL BROWN SCRAPIE SOIL TEST
snip...
please see full text ;
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Environmental Sources of Scrapie Prions
2014
*** We conclude that TSE infectivity is likely to survive burial for long
time periods with minimal loss of infectivity and limited movement from the
original burial site. However PMCA results have shown that there is the
potential for rainwater to elute TSE related material from soil which could lead
to the contamination of a wider area. These experiments reinforce the importance
of risk assessment when disposing of TSE risk materials.
*** The results show that even highly diluted PrPSc can bind efficiently to
polypropylene, stainless steel, glass, wood and stone and propagate the
conversion of normal prion protein. For in vivo experiments, hamsters were ic
injected with implants incubated in 1% 263K-infected brain homogenate. Hamsters,
inoculated with 263K-contaminated implants of all groups, developed typical
signs of prion disease, whereas control animals inoculated with non-contaminated
materials did not.
PRION 2014 CONFERENCE
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD
A FEW FINDINGS ;
Conclusions. To our knowledge, this is the first established experimental
model of CWD in TgSB3985. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of
two CWD strains adapted to Tga20 mice and their replication in TgSB3985 mice.
Finally, we observed phenotypic differences between cervid-derived CWD and
CWD/Tg20 strains upon propagation in TgSB3985 mice. Further studies are underway
to characterize these strains.
We conclude that TSE infectivity is likely to survive burial for long time
periods with minimal loss of infectivity and limited movement from the original
burial site. However PMCA results have shown that there is the potential for
rainwater to elute TSE related material from soil which could lead to the
contamination of a wider area. These experiments reinforce the importance of
risk assessment when disposing of TSE risk materials.
The results show that even highly diluted PrPSc can bind efficiently to
polypropylene, stainless steel, glass, wood and stone and propagate the
conversion of normal prion protein. For in vivo experiments, hamsters were ic
injected with implants incubated in 1% 263K-infected brain homogenate. Hamsters,
inoculated with 263K-contaminated implants of all groups, developed typical
signs of prion disease, whereas control animals inoculated with non-contaminated
materials did not.
Our data establish that meadow voles are permissive to CWD via peripheral
exposure route, suggesting they could serve as an environmental reservoir for
CWD. Additionally, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that at least two
strains of CWD circulate in naturally-infected cervid populations and provide
evidence that meadow voles are a useful tool for CWD strain typing.
Conclusion. CWD prions are shed in saliva and urine of infected deer as
early as 3 months post infection and throughout the subsequent >1.5 year
course of infection. In current work we are examining the relationship of
prionemia to excretion and the impact of excreted prion binding to surfaces and
particulates in the environment.
Conclusion. CWD prions (as inferred by prion seeding activity by RT-QuIC)
are shed in urine of infected deer as early as 6 months post inoculation and
throughout the subsequent disease course. Further studies are in progress
refining the real-time urinary prion assay sensitivity and we are examining more
closely the excretion time frame, magnitude, and sample variables in
relationship to inoculation route and prionemia in naturally and experimentally
CWD-infected cervids.
Conclusions. Our results suggested that the odds of infection for CWD is
likely controlled by areas that congregate deer thus increasing direct
transmission (deer-to-deer interactions) or indirect transmission
(deer-to-environment) by sharing or depositing infectious prion proteins in
these preferred habitats. Epidemiology of CWD in the eastern U.S. is likely
controlled by separate factors than found in the Midwestern and endemic areas
for CWD and can assist in performing more efficient surveillance efforts for the
region.
Conclusions. During the pre-symptomatic stage of CWD infection and
throughout the course of disease deer may be shedding multiple LD50 doses per
day in their saliva. CWD prion shedding through saliva and excreta may account
for the unprecedented spread of this prion disease in nature.
see full text and more ;
Monday, June 23, 2014
*** PRION 2014 CONFERENCE CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD
*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at
least 16 years***
Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3
*** New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent:
Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of
replication
*** Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel
Production
*** Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a
CWD-endemic area
*** A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1
Materials and Wastewater During Processing
*** Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation
by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing
process of meat and bone meals
*** Survival and Limited Spread of TSE Infectivity after Burial
Karen Fernie, Allister Smith and Robert A. Somerville The Roslin Institute
and R(D)SVS; University of Edinburgh; Roslin, Scotland UK
Scrapie and chronic wasting disease probably spread via environmental
routes, and there are also concerns about BSE infection remaining in the
environment after carcass burial or waste 3disposal. In two demonstration
experiments we are determining survival and migration of TSE infectivity when
buried for up to five years, as an uncontained point source or within bovine
heads. Firstly boluses of TSE infected mouse brain were buried in lysimeters
containing either sandy or clay soil. Migration from the boluses is being
assessed from soil cores taken over time. With the exception of a very small
amount of infectivity found 25 cm from the bolus in sandy soil after 12 months,
no other infectivity has been detected up to three years. Secondly, ten bovine
heads were spiked with TSE infected mouse brain and buried in the two soil
types. Pairs of heads have been exhumed annually and assessed for infectivity
within and around them. After one year and after two years, infectivity was
detected in most intracranial samples and in some of the soil samples taken from
immediately surrounding the heads. The infectivity assays for the samples in and
around the heads exhumed at years three and four are underway. These data show
that TSE infectivity can survive burial for long periods but migrates slowly.
Risk assessments should take into account the likely long survival rate when
infected material has been buried.
The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from DEFRA.
Sunday, November 3, 2013
Environmental Impact Statements; Availability, etc.: Animal Carcass
Management [Docket No. APHIS-2013-0044]
2012
PO-039: A comparison of scrapie and chronic wasting disease in white-tailed
deer
Justin Greenlee, Jodi Smith, Eric Nicholson US Dept. Agriculture;
Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center; Ames, IA USA
snip...
The results of this study suggest that there are many similarities in the
manifestation of CWD and scrapie in WTD after IC inoculation including early and
widespread presence of PrPSc in lymphoid tissues, clinical signs of depression
and weight loss progressing to wasting, and an incubation time of 21-23 months.
Moreover, western blots (WB) done on brain material from the obex region have a
molecular profile similar to CWD and distinct from tissues of the cerebrum or
the scrapie inoculum. However, results of microscopic and IHC examination
indicate that there are differences between the lesions expected in CWD and
those that occur in deer with scrapie: amyloid plaques were not noted in any
sections of brain examined from these deer and the pattern of immunoreactivity
by IHC was diffuse rather than plaque-like.
*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of WTD were susceptible to
scrapie.
Deer developed clinical signs of wasting and mental depression and were
necropsied from 28 to 33 months PI. Tissues from these deer were positive for
PrPSc by IHC and WB. Similar to IC inoculated deer, samples from these deer
exhibited two different molecular profiles: samples from obex resembled CWD
whereas those from cerebrum were similar to the original scrapie inoculum. On
further examination by WB using a panel of antibodies, the tissues from deer
with scrapie exhibit properties differing from tissues either from sheep with
scrapie or WTD with CWD. Samples from WTD with CWD or sheep with scrapie are
strongly immunoreactive when probed with mAb P4, however, samples from WTD with
scrapie are only weakly immunoreactive. In contrast, when probed with mAb’s 6H4
or SAF 84, samples from sheep with scrapie and WTD with CWD are weakly
immunoreactive and samples from WTD with scrapie are strongly positive. This
work demonstrates that WTD are highly susceptible to sheep scrapie, but on first
passage, scrapie in WTD is differentiable from CWD.
2011
*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of white-tailed deer were
susceptible to scrapie.
*** We hypothesize that both BSE prions and CWD prions passaged through
felines will seed human recPrP more efficiently than BSE or CWD from the
original hosts, evidence that the new host will dampen the species barrier
between humans and BSE or CWD. The new host effect is particularly relevant as
we investigate potential means of trans-species transmission of prion disease.
Veterinary Pathology Onlinevet.sagepub.com Published online before print
February 27, 2014, doi: 10.1177/0300985814524798 Veterinary Pathology February
27, 2014 0300985814524798
Lesion Profiling and Subcellular Prion Localization of Cervid Chronic
Wasting Disease in Domestic Cats
D. M. Seelig1⇑ A. V. Nalls1 M. Flasik2 V. Frank1 S. Eaton2 C. K. Mathiason1
E. A. Hoover1 1Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pathology, Colorado
State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA 2Department of Biomedical Sciences,
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA D. M. Seelig, University of
Minnesota, Department of Veterinary Clinical Sciences, Room 339 VetMedCtrS,
6192A (Campus Delivery Code), 1352 Boyd Ave, St Paul, MN 55108, USA. Email
address: dseelig@umn.edu
Abstract
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an efficiently transmitted, fatal, and
progressive prion disease of cervids with an as yet to be fully clarified host
range. While outbred domestic cats (Felis catus) have recently been shown to be
susceptible to experimental CWD infection, the neuropathologic features of the
infection are lacking. Such information is vital to provide diagnostic power in
the event of natural interspecies transmission and insights into host and strain
interactions in interspecies prion infection. Using light microscopy and
immunohistochemistry, we detail the topographic pattern of neural spongiosis
(the “lesion profile”) and the distribution of misfolded prion protein in the
primary and secondary passage of feline CWD (FelCWD). We also evaluated cellular
and subcellular associations between misfolded prion protein (PrPD) and central
nervous system neurons and glial cell populations. From these studies, we (1)
describe the novel neuropathologic profile of FelCWD, which is distinct from
either cervid CWD or feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE), and (2) provide
evidence of serial passage-associated interspecies prion adaptation. In
addition, we demonstrate through confocal analysis the successful
co-localization of PrPD with neurons, astrocytes, microglia, lysosomes, and
synaptophysin, which, in part, implicates each of these in the neuropathology of
FelCWD. In conclusion, this work illustrates the simultaneous role of both host
and strain in the development of a unique FelCWD neuropathologic profile and
that such a profile can be used to discriminate between FelCWD and FSE.
prion chronic wasting disease immunohistochemistry interspecies cat feline
spongiform encephalopathy transmissible spongiform encephalopathy adaptation
species barrier
Sunday, March 09, 2014
Lesion Profiling and Subcellular Prion Localization of Cervid Chronic
Wasting Disease in Domestic Cats
Monday, August 8, 2011
*** Susceptibility of Domestic Cats to CWD Infection ***
Oral.29: Susceptibility of Domestic Cats to CWD Infection
Amy Nalls, Nicholas J. Haley, Jeanette Hayes-Klug, Kelly Anderson, Davis M.
Seelig, Dan S. Bucy, Susan L. Kraft, Edward A. Hoover and Candace K.
Mathiason†
Colorado State University; Fort Collins, CO USA†Presenting author; Email:
ckm@lamar.colostate.edu
Domestic and non-domestic cats have been shown to be susceptible to one
prion disease, feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE), thought to be transmitted
through consumption of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated meat.
Because domestic and free ranging felids scavenge cervid carcasses, including
those in CWD affected areas, we evaluated the susceptibility of domestic cats to
CWD infection experimentally. Groups of n = 5 cats each were inoculated either
intracerebrally (IC) or orally (PO) with CWD deer brain homogenate. Between
40–43 months following IC inoculation, two cats developed mild but progressive
symptoms including weight loss, anorexia, polydipsia, patterned motor behaviors
and ataxia—ultimately mandating euthanasia. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) on
the brain of one of these animals (vs. two age-matched controls) performed just
before euthanasia revealed increased ventricular system volume, more prominent
sulci, and T2 hyperintensity deep in the white matter of the frontal hemisphere
and in cortical grey distributed through the brain, likely representing
inflammation or gliosis. PrPRES and widely distributed peri-neuronal vacuoles
were demonstrated in the brains of both animals by immunodetection assays. No
clinical signs of TSE have been detected in the remaining primary passage cats
after 80 months pi. Feline-adapted CWD was sub-passaged into groups (n=4 or 5)
of cats by IC, PO, and IP/SQ routes. Currently, at 22 months pi, all five IC
inoculated cats are demonstrating abnormal behavior including increasing
aggressiveness, pacing, and hyper responsiveness.
*** Two of these cats have developed rear limb ataxia. Although the limited
data from this ongoing study must be considered preliminary, they raise the
potential for cervid-to-feline transmission in nature.
AD.63:
Susceptibility of domestic cats to chronic wasting disease
Amy V.Nalls,1 Candace Mathiason,1 Davis Seelig,2 Susan Kraft,1 Kevin
Carnes,1 Kelly Anderson,1 Jeanette Hayes-Klug1 and Edward A. Hoover1 1Colorado
State University; Fort Collins, CO USA; 2University of Minnesota; Saint Paul, MN
USA
Domestic and nondomestic cats have been shown to be susceptible to feline
spongiform encephalopathy (FSE), almost certainly caused by consumption of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)-contaminated meat. Because domestic and
free-ranging nondomestic felids scavenge cervid carcasses, including those in
areas affected by chronic wasting disease (CWD), we evaluated the susceptibility
of the domestic cat (Felis catus) to CWD infection experimentally. Cohorts of 5
cats each were inoculated either intracerebrally (IC) or orally (PO) with
CWD-infected deer brain. At 40 and 42 mo post-inoculation, two IC-inoculated
cats developed signs consistent with prion disease, including a stilted gait,
weight loss, anorexia, polydipsia, patterned motor behaviors, head and tail
tremors, and ataxia, and progressed to terminal disease within 5 mo. Brains from
these two cats were pooled and inoculated into cohorts of cats by IC, PO, and
intraperitoneal and subcutaneous (IP/SC) routes. Upon subpassage, feline-adapted
CWD (FelCWD) was transmitted to all IC-inoculated cats with a decreased
incubation period of 23 to 27 mo. FelCWD was detected in the brains of all the
symptomatic cats by western blotting and immunohistochemistry and abnormalities
were seen in magnetic resonance imaging, including multifocal T2 fluid
attenuated inversion recovery (FLAIR) signal hyper-intensities, ventricular size
increases, prominent sulci, and white matter tract cavitation. Currently, 3 of 4
IP/SQ and 2 of 4 PO inoculared cats have developed abnormal behavior patterns
consistent with the early stage of feline CWD.
*** These results demonstrate that CWD can be transmitted and adapted to
the domestic cat, thus raising the issue of potential cervid-to- feline
transmission in nature.
www.landesbioscience.com
PO-081: Chronic wasting disease in the cat— Similarities to feline
spongiform encephalopathy (FSE)
FELINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY FSE
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.
cwd exposure, and iatrogenic CJD, what if ???
*** our results raise the possibility that CJD cases classified as VV1 may
include cases caused by iatrogenic transmission of sCJD-MM1 prions or food-borne
infection by type 1 prions from animals, e.g., chronic wasting disease prions in
cervid. In fact, two CJD-VV1 patients who hunted deer or consumed venison have
been reported (40, 41). The results of the present study emphasize the need for
traceback studies and careful re-examination of the biochemical properties of
sCJD-VV1 prions. ***
snip...see full text ;
Thursday, January 2, 2014
*** CWD TSE Prion in cervids to hTGmice, Heidenhain Variant
Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease MM1 genotype, and iatrogenic CJD ??? ***
*** We hypothesize that both BSE prions and CWD prions passaged through
felines will seed human recPrP more efficiently than BSE or CWD from the
original hosts, evidence that the new host will dampen the species barrier
between humans and BSE or CWD. The new host effect is particularly relevant as
we investigate potential means of trans-species transmission of prion disease.
>>> There is no evidence that humans or livestock can get the
disease, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
hang on now, what do you call this ;
> First transmission of CWD to transgenic mice over-expressing bovine
prion protein gene (TgSB3985)
PRION 2014 - PRIONS: EPIGENETICS and NEURODEGENERATIVE DISEASES – Shaping
up the future of prion research
Animal TSE Workshop 10.40 – 11.05 Talk Dr. L. Cervenakova First
transmission of CWD to transgenic mice over-expressing bovine prion protein gene
(TgSB3985)
FORGOT TO ADD THIS ONE...
P.126: Successful transmission of chronic wasting disease (CWD) into mice
over-expressing bovine prion protein (TgSB3985)
Larisa Cervenakova,1 Christina J Sigurdson,2 Pedro Piccardo,3 Oksana
Yakovleva,1 Irina Vasilyeva,1 Jorge de Castro,1 Paula Saá,1 and Anton Cervenak1
1American Red Cross, Holland Laboratory; Rockville, MD USA; 2University of
California; San Diego, CA USA; 3Lab TSE/OBRR /CBER/FDA; Rockville, MD USA
Keywords: chronic wasting disease, transmission, transgenic mouse, bovine
prion protein
Background. CWD is a disease affecting wild and farmraised cervids in
North America. Epidemiological studies provide no evidence of CWD transmission
to humans. Multiple attempts have failed to infect transgenic mice expressing
human PRNP gene with CWD. The extremely low efficiency of PrPCWD to convert
normal human PrPC in vitro provides additional evidence that transmission of CWD
to humans cannot be easily achieved. However, a concern about the risk of CWD
transmission to humans still exists. This study aimed to establish and
characterize an experimental model of CWD in TgSB3985 mice with the following
attempt of transmission to TgHu mice.
Materials and Methods. TgSB3985 mice and wild-type FVB/ NCrl mice were
intracranially injected with 1% brain homogenate from a CWD-infected Tga20 mouse
(CWD/Tga20). TgSB3985 and TgRM (over-expressing human PrP) were similarly
injected with 5% brain homogenates from CWD-infected white-tailed deer (CWD/WTD)
or elk (CWD/Elk). Animals were observed for clinical signs of neurological
disease and were euthanized when moribund. Brains and spleens were removed from
all mice for PrPCWD detection by Western blotting (WB). A histological analysis
of brains from selected animals was performed: brains were scored for the
severity of spongiform change, astrogliosis, and PrPCWD deposition in ten brain
regions.
Results. Clinical presentation was consistent with TSE. More than 90% of
TgSB3985 and wild-type mice infected with CWD/Tga20, tested positive for PrPres
in the brain but only mice in the latter group carried PrPCWD in their spleens.
We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of two CWD/ Tga20 strains based
on biochemical and histological profiles. In TgSB3985 mice infected with CWD-elk
or CWD-WTD, no animals tested positive for PrPCWD in the brain or in the spleen
by WB. However, on neuropathological examination we found presence of amyloid
plaques that stained positive for PrPCWD in three CWD/WTD- and two
CWD/Elk-infected TgSB3985 mice. The neuropathologic profiles in CWD/WTD- and
CWD/Elkinfected mice were similar but unique as compared to profiles of BSE,
BSE-H or CWD/Tg20 agents propagated in TgSB3985 mice. None of CWD-infected TgRM
mice tested positive for PrPCWD by WB or by immunohistochemical detection.
Conclusions. To our knowledge, this is the first established experimental
model of CWD in TgSB3985. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of
two CWD strains adapted to Tga20 mice and their replication in TgSB3985 mice.
Finally, we observed phenotypic differences between cervid-derived CWD and
CWD/Tg20 strains upon propagation in TgSB3985 mice. Further studies are underway
to characterize these strains.
TSS
UPDATED CORRESPONDENCE FROM AUTHORS OF THIS STUDY I.E. COLBY, PRUSINER ET
AL, ABOUT MY CONCERNS OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THEIR FIGURES AND MY FIGURES OF
THE STUDIES ON CWD TRANSMISSION TO CATTLE ;
CWD to cattle figures CORRECTION
Greetings,
I believe the statement and quote below is incorrect ;
"CWD has been transmitted to cattle after intracerebral inoculation,
although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001]). This
finding raised concerns that CWD prions might be transmitted to cattle grazing
in contaminated pastures."
Please see ;
Within 26 months post inoculation, 12 inoculated animals had lost weight,
revealed abnormal clinical signs, and were euthanatized. Laboratory tests
revealed the presence of a unique pattern of the disease agent in tissues of
these animals. These findings demonstrate that when CWD is directly inoculated
into the brain of cattle, 86% of inoculated cattle develop clinical signs of the
disease.
" although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al.
2001]). "
shouldn't this be corrected, 86% is NOT a low rate. ...
kindest regards,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Thank you!
Thanks so much for your updates/comments. We intend to publish as rapidly
as possible all updates/comments that contribute substantially to the topic
under discussion.
re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 + Author
Affiliations
1Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of California, San
Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 2Department of Neurology, University
of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 Correspondence:
stanley@ind.ucsf.edu
Mule deer, white-tailed deer, and elk have been reported to develop CWD.
As the only prion disease identified in free-ranging animals, CWD appears to be
far more communicable than other forms of prion disease. CWD was first described
in 1967 and was reported to be a spongiform encephalopathy in 1978 on the basis
of histopathology of the brain. Originally detected in the American West, CWD
has spread across much of North America and has been reported also in South
Korea. In captive populations, up to 90% of mule deer have been reported to be
positive for prions (Williams and Young 1980). The incidence of CWD in cervids
living in the wild has been estimated to be as high as 15% (Miller et al. 2000).
The development of transgenic (Tg) mice expressing cervid PrP, and thus
susceptible to CWD, has enhanced detection of CWD and the estimation of prion
titers (Browning et al. 2004; Tamgüney et al. 2006). Shedding of prions in the
feces, even in presymptomatic deer, has been identified as a likely source of
infection for these grazing animals (Williams and Miller 2002; Tamgüney et al.
2009b). CWD has been transmitted to cattle after intracerebral inoculation,
although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001]). This
finding raised concerns that CWD prions might be transmitted to cattle grazing
in contaminated pastures.
snip...
----- Original Message -----
From: David Colby To: flounder9@verizon.net
Cc: stanley@XXXXXXXX
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2011 8:25 AM
Subject: Re: FW: re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 +
Author Affiliations
Dear Terry Singeltary,
Thank you for your correspondence regarding the review article Stanley
Prusiner and I recently wrote for Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives. Dr. Prusiner
asked that I reply to your message due to his busy schedule. We agree that the
transmission of CWD prions to beef livestock would be a troubling development
and assessing that risk is important. In our article, we cite a peer-reviewed
publication reporting confirmed cases of laboratory transmission based on
stringent criteria. The less stringent criteria for transmission described in
the abstract you refer to lead to the discrepancy between your numbers and ours
and thus the interpretation of the transmission rate. We stand by our assessment
of the literature--namely that the transmission rate of CWD to bovines appears
relatively low, but we recognize that even a low transmission rate could have
important implications for public health and we thank you for bringing attention
to this matter. Warm Regards, David Colby -- David Colby, PhDAssistant Professor
Department of Chemical Engineering University of Delaware
===========END...TSS==============
SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;
UPDATED DATA ON 2ND CWD STRAIN Wednesday, September 08, 2010 CWD PRION
CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010
Sunday, August 19, 2012
Susceptibility of cattle to the agent of chronic wasting disease from elk
after intracranial inoculation 2012
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research
Unit
Thursday, November 21, 2013
*** Assessing the susceptibility of transgenic mice over-expressing deer
prion protein to bovine spongiform encephalopathy
The present study was designed to assess the susceptibility of the
prototypic mouse line, Tg(CerPrP)1536+/- to bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE) prions, which have the ability to overcome species barriers.
Tg(CerPrP)1536+/- mice challenged with red deer-adapted BSE resulted in a
90-100% attack rates, BSE from cattle failed to transmit, indicating agent
adaptation in the deer.
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.
NOW, what is the latest on human risk factors to CWD strains ???
*** PPo3-7: Prion Transmission from Cervids to Humans is Strain-dependent
*** Here we report that a human prion strain that had adopted the cervid
prion protein (PrP) sequence through passage in cervidized transgenic mice
efficiently infected transgenic mice expressing human PrP,
*** indicating that the species barrier from cervid to humans is prion
strain-dependent and humans can be vulnerable to novel cervid prion strains.
PPo2-27:
Generation of a Novel form of Human PrPSc by Inter-species Transmission of
Cervid Prions
*** Our findings suggest that CWD prions have the capability to infect
humans, and that this ability depends on CWD strain adaptation, implying that
the risk for human health progressively increases with the spread of CWD among
cervids.
PPo2-7:
Biochemical and Biophysical Characterization of Different CWD Isolates
*** The data presented here substantiate and expand previous reports on
the existence of different CWD strains.
Envt.07:
Pathological Prion Protein (PrPTSE) in Skeletal Muscles of Farmed and Free
Ranging White-Tailed Deer Infected with Chronic Wasting Disease
***The presence and seeding activity of PrPTSE in skeletal muscle from
CWD-infected cervids suggests prevention of such tissue in the human diet as a
precautionary measure for food safety, pending on further clarification of
whether CWD may be transmissible to humans.
>>>CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE , THERE WAS NO ABSOLUTE BARRIER TO
CONVERSION OF THE HUMAN PRION PROTEIN<<<
*** PRICE OF CWD TSE PRION POKER GOES UP 2014 ***
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE PRION update January 2, 2014
Wednesday, January 01, 2014
Molecular Barriers to Zoonotic Transmission of Prions
*** chronic wasting disease, there was no absolute barrier to conversion
of the human prion protein.
*** Furthermore, the form of human PrPres produced in this in vitro assay
when seeded with CWD, resembles that found in the most common human prion
disease, namely sCJD of the MM1 subtype.
the prion gods at the cdc state that there is ;
''no strong evidence''
but let's see exactly what the authors of this cwd to human at the cdc
state ;
now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal
communications years ago. see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does
this mean there IS casual evidence ????
“Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD
transmission to humans”
From: TSS (216-119-163-189.ipset45.wt.net)
Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???
Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST
From: "Belay, Ermias"
To:
Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM
Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
Dear Sir/Madam,
In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached
to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD.
That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article
and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone:
404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with
prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no
strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in
any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.
Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
-----Original Message-----
From:
Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM
To: rr26k@nih.gov; rrace@niaid.nih.gov; ebb8@CDC.GOV
Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM ......snip........end..............TSS
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease
2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease
Sigurdson CJ.
snip...
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported
to the Surveillance Center***,
snip...
full text ;
PRION2013 CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS CWD
Sunday, August 25, 2013
HD.13: CWD infection in the spleen of humanized transgenic mice
***These results indicate that the CWD prion may have the potential to
infect human peripheral lymphoid tissues.
Oral.15: Molecular barriers to zoonotic prion transmission: Comparison of
the ability of sheep, cattle and deer prion disease isolates to convert normal
human prion protein to its pathological isoform in a cell-free system
***However, they also show that there is no absolute barrier to conversion of
human prion protein in the case of chronic wasting disease.
PRION2013 CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS CWD
Sunday, August 25, 2013
***Chronic Wasting Disease CWD risk factors, humans, domestic cats, blood,
and mother to offspring transmission
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
*** Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated
venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes
2005–2011
Sunday, December 28, 2014
*** CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE AKA MAD DEER DISIEASE
USDA USAHA INC DECEMBER 28, 2014
Thursday, October 23, 2014
FIRST CASE OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CONFIRMED IN OHIO ON PRIVATE PRESERVE
Sunday, December 21, 2014
Mucosal immunization with an attenuated Salmonella vaccine partially
protects white-tailed deer from chronic wasting disease
Tuesday, October 21, 2014
Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture Tenth Pennsylvania Captive Deer
Tests Positive for Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PRION DISEASE
Tuesday, October 07, 2014
Wisconsin white-tailed deer tested positive for CWD on a Richland County
breeding farm, and a case of CWD has been discovered on a Marathon County
hunting preserve
Thursday, October 02, 2014
IOWA TEST RESULTS FROM CAPTIVE DEER HERD WITH CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE
RELEASED 79.8 percent of the deer tested positive for the disease
Thursday, July 03, 2014
*** How Chronic Wasting Disease is affecting deer population and what’s the
risk to humans and pets?
Tuesday, July 01, 2014
*** CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE, GAME FARMS, AND
POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS THERE FROM
another reason that not testing all deer for CWD, OF ALL AGES, risk
spreading CWD further, by ignoring the fact that young deer are susceptible to
CWD ;
Saturday, February 04, 2012
*** Wisconsin 16 age limit on testing dead deer Game Farm CWD Testing
Protocol Needs To Be Revised
Approximately 4,200 fawns, defined as deer under 1 year of age, were
sampled from the eradication zone over the last year. The majority of fawns
sampled were between the ages of 5 to 9 months, though some were as young as 1
month.
*** Two of the six fawns with CWD detected were 5 to 6 months old.
All six of the positive fawns were taken from the core area of the CWD
eradication zone where the highest numbers of positive deer have been
identified. ...
snip...
"Finding CWD prions in both lymph and brain tissues of deer this young is
slightly surprising," said Langenberg, "and provides information that CWD
infection and illness may progress more rapidly in a white-tailed deer than
previously suspected. Published literature suggests that CWD doesn't cause
illness in a deer until approximately 16 months of age. Our fawn data shows that
a few wild white-tailed deer may become sick from CWD or may transmit the
disease before they reach that age of 16 months." ... see full text and more
here ; Saturday, February 04, 2012
Wisconsin 16 MONTH age limit on testing dead deer Game Farm CWD Testing
Protocol Needs To Be Revised
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive
animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from
the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES.
It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin
processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible
risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk
protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data
on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these
products.
2003D-0186 Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In
Animal Feed
EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1
see my full text submission here ;
Conclusion
European red deer are susceptible to infection with the cattle BSE agent,
not only by the intra-cerebral but also by the oral route, and although the
clinical signs and spong- iform change are similar to those of CWD in the same
species, these two infections can be easily differentiated. The lack of lymphoid
involvement, the PrPd truncation pattern both "in vivo" and "in vitro", and the
predominantly intracellular accumulation of PrPd are features of deer BSE that
are in contrast with those of deer CWD. However, only one of six deer developed
disease after alimentary exposure to 25 g of a BSE brain pool homogenate after
an incubation period of nearly 5 years; this suggests a strong species barrier
but if a TSE in European red deer should ever be identified then BSE/CWD
discrimination would be an urgent priority. To determine whether there are
potential naturally occurring BSE-like strains and to determine the degree to
which there is strain variation, it would be necessary to examine many more
naturally occurring CWD cases. These results will support the ongoing European
surveillance for natural TSEs in red deer and the further assessment of
potential risk to human health.
Published: 27 July 2009 BMC Veterinary Research 2009, 5:26
doi:10.1186/1746-6148-5-26 Received: 12 February 2009 Accepted: 27 July 2009
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/5/26
© 2009 Martin et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
Sunday, December 15, 2013
*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
Monday, June 23, 2014
PRION 2014 CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.
>>>***>>>Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions. <<<***<<<
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves
Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle
Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia
Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1,
Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature
Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821
Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014
Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics
Abstract
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions.
Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance
see more here ;
2001
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep
infected with scrapie?
28 Mar 01
Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by
chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of
campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is
caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on
sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across
Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses,
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb...
2001
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep
infected with scrapie?
28 Mar 01
Like lambs to the slaughter
31 March 2001
by Debora MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284.
FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a
degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary
was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded
an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by
chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of
campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is
caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on
sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across
Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses,
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb. ...snip...end
see more here ;
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 4:19 PM
To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Subject: deadstock downer cows NSLP
> > > Ackerman says downed cattle are 50 times more likely to have
mad cow disease (also known as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or BSE) than
ambulatory cattle that are suspected of having BSE. Of the 20 confirmed cases of
mad cow disease in North America since 1993, at least 16 have involved downer
cattle, he said. < < <
don’t forget the children...
PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the
Nation (including TEXAS) dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for
BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens.
who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???
WAS your child exposed to mad cow disease via the NSLP ???
Thursday, November 28, 2013
Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch
Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows
seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our
children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high
risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they
did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a
recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked
the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse),
not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type
disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can
lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE
NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???
Saturday, September 21, 2013
Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry
Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH
RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ??? this recall was not for the welfare of the animals.
...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)
try this link ;
Saturday, August 30, 2014
Maine Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified
Risk Materials SRM TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease
Friday, December 19, 2014
Rancho Alleged Cancerous Eyeball Case Going To Trial
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Thursday, June 6, 2013
BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI
ratings as at June 5, 2013
Sunday, November 13, 2011
*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer
livestock
Thursday, February 13, 2014
HSUS VS USDA ET AL BAN DOWNER CALVES FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (*veal) and
potential BSE risk factor there from
Saturday, November 10, 2012
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk
Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK
MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
SRMs
Friday, August 8, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
Saturday, April 5, 2008
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS
KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the
tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
Tuesday, December 30, 2014
*** TSEAC USA Reason For Recalls Blood products, collected from a donors
considered to be at increased risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were
distributed END OF YEAR REPORT 2014
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***
BAD BLOOD AND TSE PRION DISEASE
atypical BSE a spontaneous event ???
if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of
atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE $$$
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical
BSE investigations
>>> The generally older age of the identified H-BSE and L-BSE
cases, and their apparently low prevalence in the population, suggest that these
Atypical BSE forms could be arising spontaneously.
if that is the case, then FRANCE has an exceedingly high rate of
spontaneous atypical BSE cases.
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
Monday, December 1, 2014
Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review
December 1, 2014
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
CASE INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 CALIFORNIA
Summary Report BSE 2012
Executive Summary
Saturday, August 4, 2012
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California atypical L-type BSE Case -
July 2012
Saturday, August 4, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Scrapie from sheep could infect humans with 'mad cow disease', study finds
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion
aka Mad Cow Disease
USA, NORTH AMERICA, MBM (or any potential TSE prion disease) EXPORTS TO THE
WORLD (?) [protected by the BSE MRR policy] $$$
Sunday, December 28, 2014
*** Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFOIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE
PRION aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014
2014
>>> The generally older age of the identified H-BSE and L-BSE
cases, and their apparently low prevalence in the population, suggest that these
Atypical BSE forms could be arising spontaneously.
if that is the case, then FRANCE has an exceedingly high rate of
spontaneous atypical BSE cases.
snip...
see full text ;
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
Thursday, November 18, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92
BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS
Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent
application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas
represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA
provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various
injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation
revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a
computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the
service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was
placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in
restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports
to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska
cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska
ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle
including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow
Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections
of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about
feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for
laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to
the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation
by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE
inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his
reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he
submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year
term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in
restitution.
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical
BSE investigations ***
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Thursday, June 6, 2013
BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI
ratings as at June 5, 2013
Saturday, December 6, 2014
Detection of Bovine Central Nervous System Tissues in Rendered Animal
By-Products by One-Step Real-Time Reverse Transcription PCR Assay
Friday, December 5, 2014
SPECIAL ALERT The OIE recommends strengthening animal disease surveillance
worldwide
OIE BSE TSE PRION AKA MAD COW DISEASE ?
‘’the silence was deafening’’ ...tss
Tuesday, December 30, 2014
TSEAC USA Reason For Recalls Blood products, collected from a donors
considered to be at increased risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were
distributed END OF YEAR REPORT 2014
UPDATE* NOVEMBER 16, 2014 vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product
of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???
Friday, January 10, 2014
Greetings again Friends, Neighbors, and Colleagues,
I would kindly like to follow up on ‘vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic
by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???’ ran across an
old paper from 1984, that some might find interest in, and I will update the
link with this old science paper from 1984, a 2010 paper from Japan, and some
information on scrapie transmission. The paper from Japan first, then the 1984
paper, and then the scrapie transmission studies.
***The occurrence of contact cases raises the possibility that transmission
in families may be effected by an unusually virulent strain of the agent.
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 9:29 PM
To: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Subject: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE R. G. WILL
1984
THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE
R. G. WILL
1984
snip...
Friday, January 10, 2014
vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type
prion disease, what it ???
Sunday, April 06, 2014
SPORADIC CJD and the potential for zoonotic transmission there from, either
directly or indirectly via friendly fire iatrogenic mode, evidence to date
Sunday, November 23, 2014
Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas in
June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European
‘’The specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is
less clear largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a
country where other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.’’
Sunday, December 14, 2014
ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America
2014
maybe it's time to start taking seriously about food production and the
potential environmental contamination therefrom, in terms of the TSE prion
disease.
what about the environment and tse prion, and using bovine blood, and or
any animal blood, to spread across the land, and the potential risk factors
therefrom for the environment.
how can practices such as this still be applied today, with what we now
know about the TSE prion and blood with nvCJD, atypical TSE prion disease and
infectivity therefrom, such as CWD, and or the atypical TSE prion disease in
different species, and what we don't know yet, and the environment therefrom,
and how long the tse prion can persist in the environment, and still practice
such practices in 2015 and beyond?
environmental risk factors for the TSE prion disease
Cornell Waste Management Institute
Appendix A Characteristics of Raw Materials Table A.1
% N C:N ratio Moisture Bulk density
Material Type of value (dry weight) (weight to weight) content % (wet
weight) (pounds per cubic yard)
Fish and meat processing
Blood wastes (slaughterhouse waste and dried blood)
Typical 13-14 3-3.5 10-78 -
snip...
Mixed slaughterhouse waste Typical 7-10 2-4 - -
Poultry carcasses Typical 2.4 b 5 65 -
see ;
The paunch contents, ‘paunch manure’ (partially digested feed), is
estimated to range from 27 to 40 kg. The paunch can be handled in four ways:
1: Total dumping. All of the paunch contents is flushed away into the
sewer. 2: Wet dumping. The paunch contents are washed out and the wet slurry is
screened on the presence of gross solids, which are subsequently removed.
3: Dry dumping. The paunch contents are dumped for subsequent rendering or
for disposal as solid waste without needless water flushing.
4: Whole paunch handling. The entire paunch may be removed, intact, for
rendering or for disposal as solid waste.
2. SLAUGHTERHOUSES
Produced by: Agriculture and Consumer Protection Title: Management of Waste
from Animal Product Processing...
2.1.1. Description of the slaughter process.
Figure 1 presents a flow diagram of a red meat slaughterhouse.
Slaughtering
In slaughterhouses animals are received and kept around in stockyards and
pens for 1 day. The animals are watered, but in most cases not fed unless they
are kept more than 1 day.
The animals are then driven from the holding pens to the slaughtering area
where the following activities take place:
- Stunning;
- Suspension from an overhead rail by the hind legs;
*** - Sticking and bleeding over a collecting trough. The collected blood
may be sewered or processed;
Cattle Pigs
Denmark England U.S. Denmark Sweden U.S.* U.S.*
The percentages of by-products in some western countries are presented in
Table 3.
Blood 3-4 3 4 3 4 3
snip...
2.3.2.1. Wastewater by red meat slaughtering
Major contribution to the total waste load.
Production of blood: Of all waste products, the waste in the form of blood
has the highest polluting value. Blood itself has a high BOD: 150,000 - 200,000
mg/l, the extreme value being 405,000 mg/l. (Domestic wastewater has a BOD of
300 mg/l). In the killing, bleeding and skinning phases, blood is produced
which, when completely sewered, leads to a total waste load of 10 kg BOD per ton
of LWK. A waste load of up to 3.0 kg BOD per ton of LWK may occur in wastewater
flowing out of the killing-area and the hide-removal-area.
In order to reduce the waste load, attempts should be made to collect and
process blood (= drying). Drying of blood can be done by direct heating which
produces large quantities of bloodwater (corresponding waste load approximately
1.3 kg BODper ton of LWK) but preferably it is done by indirect (external)
heating (corresponding waste load approximately 0.3 kg BOD per ton of
LWK).
Paunch: Paunch manure is the second most important source of pollution. It
may substantially contribute to the total waste load if not properly handled.
Dumping (sewering) of the entire paunch content gives a BOD of 2.5 kg per ton of
LWK. There are several ways to handle paunch (see 2.1.1)
Minor contributions to the total waste load.
Stockyards and pens: Waste results from manure and urine, feed, livestock
dirt, sanitizers and cleaning agents. The waste will reach the sewer by means of
water overflowing from water troughs, by rain and snowwater and pen washdown
water. The sewered raw waste, assuming that solid contaminants have been
removed, has been estimated at 0.25 kg BOD per ton of LWK.
Slaughtering: During the slaughtering the following wastes are produced
(Edible offals are excluded because these are considered as meat (by-products)):
- Blood and tissue produced during hide removal fall on the floor. External
contamination of the hide with dirt and manure is a secondary source of
pollutants. The waste load is also increased as a result of cleaning-up
operations in this area. - Wastewater is produced from intentional overflow from
scalding tanks that contain blood, dirt, manure and hair (0.15 kg BOD per ton of
LWK). The fluming of the mechanically removed hair also results in wastewater
containing residual hair, blood and dirt after recovery of the bulk of the hair
(0.4 kg BOD per ton of LWK). Recovered hog hair may be be dumped as solid waste,
washed and baled for marketing (0.7 kg BOD per ton of LWK) or it may be
hydrolysed by pressure cooking (1 kg BOD per of LWK).
- Slime and casings from intestines. De-sliming and casing washing add 0.6
kg BOD per ton of LWK to the raw waste load;
- Inedible offals that are produced are hair, recovered from fluming water,
heads and carcass trimmings, lungs and paunch. They also contribute to the
amount of wastewater.
Meatpacking: Cutting and deboning operations produce trimmings, blood,
bones and bone dust. The total of raw waste loads for meat processing plants
(including cutting and deboning) has been estimated at 5.7 - 6.7 kg BOD per ton
of product. Meatprocessing operations produce a raw waste load from:
- Blood, tissues and fat that reach the sewer during cleaning activities; -
The curing of solutions containing sugar and salt. Pickling can cause a high
chloride waste, only 25% of the curing brine remains in the product.
- Baking, smoking etc. and energy use (contributing to air
pollution).
Edible Rendering: Both wet-rendering and continuous rendering at low
temperatures produce polluted tank water containing residues of fat and protein
(2 kg BOD per ton of LWK).
Table 9 summarizes the potential wastewater emissions of red meat
slaughterhouses (no water prevention).
snip...
4. PROPERTIES OF WASTES RELEVANT TO AGRICULTURAL BENEFIT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
4.2.2 Background
Wastes from abattoirs include blood, gut contents, wash waters and sludge
from dissolved air flotation treatment where this process has been used to
separate solids from liquid waste materials of the abattoir. Some wastes such as
hoof parts and bone meal are recycled in other industries (e.g. fertiliser and
glue). Landspreading of abattoir wastes is probably the best practicable
environmental option for small-scale abattoirs but it is likely to be much less
appropriate for modern large-scale abattoir operations.
Landspreading of blood and gut contents from abattoirs is liable to cause
public nuisance due to odours and environmental concerns. If spread on the soil
surface it is unsightly and there is potential for disease transmission. The
material should be dealt with as for untreated sewage sludge and applied to the
land by subsurface soil injection or else incorporated as soon as possible after
spreading on the surface of the arable land. The land-use restrictions as for
untreated sewage sludge should apply. The rate of application of the waste
should be in accordance with crop requirements for nutrients.
4.2.3 Key Properties
Waste blood is produced in large quantities from abattoirs and has various
uses including landspreading. Its high fertiliser value has been known for a
long time, and it is one of the more traditional materials spread on land. Its
nitrogen content is extremely high and its levels of potassium and phosphorus
make it a good source of plant nutrients. Nutrients are also found to be more
available than those found in other organic wastes.
Waste stomach contents consist predominantly of partially digested feed or
vegetable matter. As with the blood waste, stomach contents usually contain high
levels of nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus. These nutrients are generally in
well balanced proportions with an N:P:K ratio of around 5:1:1. Moderately high
ammonium nitrogen content is an added benefit.
As with many other food processing industries, large volumes of wash waters
are produced, and the term is often used to describe a wide range of low solid
waste materials. This category can contain dung and urine from animal holding
areas and washings from distribution vehicles. As for the other abattoir wastes,
the wash waters contain a mixture of nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus but at
lower concentrations.
4.2.4 Potential Problems
From the data above, it is seen that abattoir wastes contain high levels of
nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus. If applied in excess to plant requirements,
these elements can cause potential water pollution problems, and may also pose a
danger to plant health. These wastes also have a tendency to have a high BOD
which makes the waste readily degradable by soil micro-organisms ; this can
rapidly result in anaerobic soil conditions if over applied.
In general, slaughterhouse wastes are a recognised source of environmental
contamination by Salmonella and other zoonotic pathogens (Wray and Sojka 1977,
Edel et al. 1978) Cryptosporidium may occur in gut contents although not
necessarily in infective form. Veterinary ante-mortem inspection at
slaughterhouses ensures that no animal suffering from European
Commission-Directorate-General for Environment
WRc Ref: CO 4953-2/11768-1 July 2001 50
notifiable disease or any other disease likely to affect the fitness of
meat is slaughtered for human consumption. However, slaughtered animals may be
symptomless carriers of pathogenic bacteria and therefore slaughterhouse wastes
should be used with caution and with restrictions on land for rearing livestock
or grazing after application.
Strict statutory procedures are now enforced at abattoirs and renderers
with the intention of removing, for separate disposal, components of cattle
carcasses which might contain BSE.
snip...
Final report April 11
3.5.6. Abattoir wastes
3.5.6.1. Introduction
In this section, wastes from abattoirs include blood, gut contents, wash
waters, and sludge from dissolved air flotation (DAF) treatment where this
process has been used for the separation solids from any liquid waste materials
of the abattoir (Davis and Rudd, 1999).
It has been reported that 21% of an animal is waste when processed
(Gendebien et al., 2001). Some of the abattoir wastes, such as bones and hoof
parts are recycled in other industries (e.g. fertiliser and gelatine). In the
EU, between 5 to 10 % of abattoir waste is applied to land following composting
or without any further treatment. This waste mainly consists of gut contents,
wash waters and blood (Gendebien et al., 2001). For small-scale abattoirs,
landspreading of the waste is probably the best environmental option but likely
to be much less appropriate for large-scale operations (Mittal, 2007).
Whereas waste blood and stomach contents have a high fertilizer value due
to their high nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium content, which makes them a
good source of plants nutrients, wash waters contain lower levels of nutrients
(Mittal, 2007). Abattoir wastes may also have a high conductivity and fat
content (Davis and Rudd, 1999). Blood and gut content from abattoirs are
included in the exempt industrial wastes for land application. Since most of the
exempt wastes are not pre-treated or stored at the point of source, it can cause
public nuisance due to odours, environmental concerns and if spread on the soil
surface it is unsightly and may have the potential for disease transmission
(Mittal, 2007). It is recommended that these wastes should be immediately
incorporated into arable land, or applied to grassland by sub-surface injection
following a 3 week period to allow the injection slots to close before the use
of the grass for grazing or conservation (Davis and Rudd, 1999).
Blood
Waste blood is produced in large quantities from abattoirs and used to be
applied onto land without further treatment as a source of nutrients. Nitrogen
content in waste blood is extremely high, typically exceeding 15 kg/m3 total
nitrogen and 2 kg/m3 of ammonium nitrogen. The high nitrogen content combined
with potassium and phosphorus contents of 1 to 2 kg/m3, waste blood provides a
good source of plant nutrients, which are in a more available form when compared
to other organic wastes (Davis and Rudd, 1999). Potential disadvantages are if
applied in excess to plant requirements, these high levels of elements might
cause water pollution and pose a danger to plant health (Gendebien et al.,
2001). Abattoir wastes also have a
The Food and Environment Research Agency 83
high biological oxygen demand (BOD) that makes it readily degradable by
soil microorganisms and thus over application can result in anaerobic soil
conditions (Davis and Rudd, 1999).
In the EU, however, from the 1st May 2003, the EU Animal By-products
Regulations require that certain by-products need to be treated before disposal
(Defra, 2003). Therefore, it is no longer permitted the disposal of untreated
blood to sewers or landfill or to recover untreated blood via application on
land.
Other abattoir wastes
Other abattoir wastes include waste from where animals are temporarily kept
(also known as lairage), wastes from biological treatment plants and fat (Davis
and Rudd, 1999; WRc, 2009). Due to the amount of blood in wastes for treatment
and disposal, the nitrogen content can be very high, in excess of 8 kg/m3 and
ammonium nitrogen typically exceeding 1 kg/m3. Potassium, phosphorus and
magnesium can be in excess of 1 to 2 kg/m3. Different types of abattoirs produce
different types and amounts of fat, but chicken processing plants are sources of
high fat materials. Adverse effects on plant growth following application of
animal fat have been observed at relatively low fat percentages when compared to
wastes containing other fats and oils (Davis and Rudd, 1999). These wastes
should also be incorporated into the soil.
snip...
5.3.3. Pathogens
5.3.3.1. Sources
Animal manures contain pathogenic elements in variable quantities depending
on the animal health. Pathogenic microorganisms such as Esherichia c. O157,
Salmonella, Listeria, Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium and Giardia have all been
isolated from cattle, pig and sheep manures (ADAS, Imperial College, JBA
Consulting, 2005).
5.3.3.2. Upstream control measures
Veterinary medicines are administered to reduce certain harmful pathogens
and diseases. Waste from infected animals with high risk diseases such as BSE
should be disposed of separately and not spread on land. However, most pathogens
of concern to human health do not affect animals and so are not treated with
medicines.
Upstream measures to reduce pathogens in manures are presented below.
snip...
*** COMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
SPREADING OF UNPROCESSED BLOOD ON LAND
*** The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 19B (supplementary) Dr Alan Colchester
Issued 06/08/1999 (not scheduled to give oral evidence) SECOND STATEMENT TO THE
BSE INQUIRY Dr A Colchester BA BM BCh PhD FRCP Reader in Neurosciences &
Computing, University of Kent at Canterbury; Consultant Neurologist, Guy’s
Hospital London and William Harvey Hospital Ashford April 1999
snip...
88. Natural decay: Infectivity persists for a long time in the environment.
A study by Palsson in 1979 showed how scrapie was contracted by healthy sheep,
after they had grazed on land which had previously been grazed by
scrapie-infected sheep, even though the land had lain fallow for three years
before the healthy sheep were introduced. Brown also quoted an early experiment
of his own (1991), where he had buried scrapie-infected hamster brain and found
that he could still detect substantial infectivity three years later near where
the material had been placed. 89. Potential environmental routes of infection:
Brown discusses the various possible scenarios, including surface or subsurface
deposits of TSE-contaminated material, which would lead to a build-up of
long-lasting infectivity. Birds feeding on animal remains (such as gulls
visiting landfill sites) could disperse infectivity. Other animals could become
vectors if they later grazed on contaminated land. "A further question concerns
the risk of contamination of the surrounding water table or even surface water
channels, by effluents and discarded solid wastes from treatment plants. A
reasonable conclusion is that there is a potential for human infection to result
from environmental contamination by BSE-infected tissue residues. The potential
cannot be quantified because of the huge numbers of uncertainties and
assumptions that attend each stage of the disposal process". These comments,
from a long established authority on TSEs, closely echo my own statements which
were based on a recent examination of all the evidence. 90. Susceptibility: It
is likely that transmissibility of the disease to humans in vivo is probably
low, because sheep that die from scrapie and cattle that die from BSE are
probably a small fraction of the exposed population. However, no definitive data
are available.
91. Recommendations for disposal procedures: Brown recommends that material
which is actually or potentially contaminated by BSE should be: 1) exposed to
caustic soda; 2) thoroughly incinerated under carefully inspected conditions;
and 3) that any residue should be buried in landfill, to a depth which would
minimise any subsequent animal or human exposure, in areas that would not
intersect with any potable water-table source.
92. This review and recommendations from Brown have particular importance.
Brown is one of the world's foremost authorities on TSEs and is a senior
researcher in the US National Institutes of Health (NIH). It is notable that
such a respected authority is forthright in acknowledging the existence of
potential risks, and in identifying the appropriate measures necessary to
safeguard public health. Paper by SM Cousens, L Linsell, PG Smith, Dr M
Chandrakumar, JW Wilesmith, RSG Knight, M Zeidler, G Stewart, RG Will,
"Geographical distribution of variant CJD in the UK (excluding Northern
Ireland)". Lancet 353:18-21, 2 nd January 1999 93. The above paper {Appendix 41
(02/01/99)} (J/L/353/18) examined the possibility that patients with vCJD
(variant CJD) might live closer to rendering factories than would be expected by
chance. All 26 cases of vCJD in the UK with onset up to 31 st August 1998 were
studied. The incubation period of vCJD is not known but by analogy with other
human TSEs could lie within the range 5-25 years. If vCJD had arisen by exposure
to rendering products, such exposure might plausibly have occurred 8-10 years
before the onset of symptoms. The authors were able to obtain the addresses of
all rendering plants in the UK which were in production in 1988. For each case
of vCJD, the distance from the place of residence on 1st January 1998 to the
nearest rendering plant was calculated
snip...
Sunday, December 28, 2014
*** Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFOIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE
PRION aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014
good luck, good health to all, respectfully,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
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