Friday, May 4, 2012

May 2, 2012: Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States



May 2, 2012: Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States





Contact:
Lyndsay Cole (970) 494-7410
Lawrence Hawkins (916) 930-5509





Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States





On April 24, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service confirmed the nation's 4th case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in an animal that was sampled for the disease at a rendering facility in central California. This animal was never presented for slaughter for human consumption, so at no time presented a risk to the food supply, or to human health in the United States.






Through its continuing epidemiological investigation, APHIS--in collaboration with the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA)--has identified that one progeny born to the positive cow in the last 2 years was stillborn, and another has been located on a site in another state. That animal has been appraised, humanely euthanized, and sampled for BSE at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa. Test results for that animal are negative for BSE. No birth cohort cattle have been located through the investigation.





A hold order has been placed on all cattle at a second dairy (dairy 2) that is associated with the dairy of the initial positive cow (also called the index dairy). Both dairies remain under quarantine. Inventories of both the index dairy and dairy 2 have been completed by CDFA. Records are still being matched and validated to determine if any at-risk cattle may be present.




In addition, a calf ranch where the initial positive cow was raised 10 years ago is being investigated.




The Food and Drug Administration and CDFA continue the investigation of feed records at the index dairy, rendering facility and calf ranch. To date, 10 feed firms have been identified as suppliers for the index dairy during the time period of interest. At the rendering facility, feed investigators confirmed that all domestic distribution of meat and bone meal meets federal labeling requirements.




USDA will continue to work closely with CDFA and FDA to provide additional information as it is available.




The United States has a longstanding system of three interlocking safeguards against BSE that protects public and animal health in the United States, the most important of which is the removal of specified risk materials - or the parts of an animal that would contain BSE should an animal have the disease - from all animals presented for slaughter in the United States. The second safeguard is a strong feed ban that protects cattle from the disease. The third safeguard - which led to this detection - is our ongoing BSE surveillance program that allows USDA to detect the disease if it exists at very low levels in the U.S. cattle population.




#




Note to Reporters: USDA news releases, program announcements and media advisories are available on the Internet and through Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds. Go to the APHIS news release page at www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom and click on the RSS feed link.
USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer and lender. To file a complaint of discrimination, write: USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, 1400 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (800) 795-3272 (voice) or (202) 720-6382 (TDD).













The United States has a longstanding system of three interlocking safeguards against BSE that protects public and animal health in the United States, the most important of which is the removal of specified risk materials - or the parts of an animal that would contain BSE should an animal have the disease - from all animals presented for slaughter in the United States.






Thursday, July 14, 2011


Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials SRM Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/valley-farm-meats-dba-strasburg.html




YET, FSIS seems to find it important enough to list this recall from Ohio ;




Ohio Firm Recalls Various Beef Jerky Products due to Misbranding and Undeclared Allergens

Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-053-2011 HEALTH RISK: LOW

Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Adam Tarr

WASHINGTON, July 22, 2011 –





http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_053_2011_Release/index.asp






HOWEVER, look at the recalls of the past (see below), the first two were other voluntary recalls from other Companies, which i am using as an example (and see others that follow), but my question, WHY has the FSIS et al apparently chosen NOT to announce this recall on their website here ;




Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials SRM Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health




http://www.fsis.usda.gov/FSIS_Recalls/Open_Federal_Cases/index.asp







I have written both the FSIS and MEATINGPLACE.COM/, both of which have failed to report this important, life long exposure and human health risk factor for TSE from this voluntary recall, and all it got me was being banned from meatingplace.com/ again, and this time i did not even post anything, just sent them a kind note ;




see full text ;












SEE MORE SRM VIOLATIONS HERE ;






North Dakota Firm Recalls Whole Beef Head Products That Contain Prohibited Materials



Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-023-2010 HEALTH RISK: LOW


Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Catherine Cochran



WASHINGTON, April 5, 2010 - North American Bison Co-Op, a New Rockford, N.D., establishment is recalling approximately 25,000 pounds of whole beef heads containing tongues that may not have had the tonsils completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) announced today.


Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.


The product subject to recall includes: Various weight cases of "Beef Heads KEEP FROZEN." Each case bears the establishment number "EST. 18859" inside the USDA mark of inspection and a case code number "16999." "North Dakota Natural Beef" is printed in the bottom left-hand corner of each label.


The recalled products were produced between June 25, 2009, and February 19, 2010. These products were shipped to distribution centers in Md., Mich., and Minn. for further sale.


The problem was discovered during FSIS inspection activities at the establishment. FSIS routinely conducts recall effectiveness checks to verify recalling firms notify their customers of the recall and that steps are taken to make certain that the product is no longer available to consumers.


Media with questions about the recall should contact Philip Wicke, Vice President of Operations, at (701) 356-7723. Consumers with questions about the recall should contact Jeremy Anderson, Director of Customer Service, at (952) 545-2495.


Consumers with food safety questions can "Ask Karen," the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #




http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_023_2010_Release/index.asp







Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials




Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-021-2008 HEALTH RISK: LOW


Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Amanda Eamich



WASHINGTON, June 26, 2008 – Paradise Locker Meats, a Trimble, Mo., establishment, is voluntarily recalling approximately 120 pounds of fresh cattle heads with tonsils not completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service announced today.



Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with BSE, as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.



The products subject to recall include: Boxes of “BEEF HEAD, PARADISE LOCKER MEATS.” Each shipping package bears the establishment numbers “EST. 31865” inside the USDA mark of inspection.



These products were sent to retail establishments and restaurants in the Kansas City, Kansas, area.



The problem was discovered through routine FSIS inspection that verified there had been incomplete removal of the tonsils by the recalling establishment.



Media and consumers with questions about the recall should contact company Production Supervisor Louis Fantasma at (816) 370-6328.



Consumers with food safety questions can “Ask Karen,” the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_021_2008_Release/index.asp






HAS the greed and money gotten so bad that the FSIS, USDA, APHIS, OIE et al, just decided that not only to exempt the atypical Scrapies and apparently now the BSE's, exempt them all, and just agreed to choose to not even speak about it anymore. i mean...really, the USDA and OIE have systematically covered up mad cow disease i.e. they call it SSS policy. where is USA burying them all at ? i do not accept the star trek like cloaking device that appears to be the only thing left that could be protecting the USA from mad cow disease....really. sadly, Canada has now taken the same low road as the USA in regards to discussing and making public documents on there mad cow cases. all this, 2011, with the science mounting, still follow the global myth of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory, and that all the sporadic CJDs (85%+ of all human TSE) are a mear happenstance of bad luck, when North America is plum full of different strains of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in different species, all of which over a period of time, decades, were rendered and fed to food producing animals for human and animal food...really. i really just don't buy it...tss



some history on SRM's IN COMMERCE ;







SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;



Tuesday, July 1, 2008



Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/missouri-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html







Sunday, October 18, 2009



Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html






Thursday, October 15, 2009


Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009





http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html





Thursday, June 26, 2008



Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html








Friday, August 8, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/08/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html





Saturday, April 5, 2008


SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS


http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html







Wednesday, April 30, 2008


Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/consumption-of-beef-tongue-human-bse.html






Wednesday, April 30, 2008


Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings


http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/consumption-of-beef-tongue-human-bse.html





Friday, October 15, 2010


BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle


http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/10/bse-infectivity-in-absence-of.html






SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html





http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/





http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/




Saturday, November 6, 2010



TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS




INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html






Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129






Tuesday, May 3, 2011


PRION, TSE, typical, atypical BSE, aka mad cow disease, spray dried blood, feed, and a recipe for disaster

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/prion-tse-typical-atypical-bse-aka-mad.html







============================================







The second safeguard is a strong feed ban that protects cattle from the disease.









LET’S see how that mad cow triple firewall aka mad cow feed ban is working out $$$






*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS




THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$




10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007




Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST




RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II




___________________________________




PRODUCT




Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007




CODE




Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.




Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON




Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE




42,090 lbs.




DISTRIBUTION




WI




___________________________________




PRODUCT




Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007




CODE




The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.




REASON




Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE




9,997,976 lbs.




DISTRIBUTION




ID and NV




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007










Saturday, August 14, 2010




BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY






*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)




BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA




Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT




a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;




b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;




c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;




d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.




CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.




REASON




Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons




DISTRIBUTION AL




______________________________








PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,




Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons




DISTRIBUTION AL and MS




______________________________




PRODUCT




a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;




b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;




c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;




d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;




e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;




f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;




g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6




CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags




DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006




###








Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006




Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT




a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;




b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;




c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;




d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;




e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;




f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;




g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;




h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;




i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;




j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;




k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;




l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;




m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE




Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.




REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons




DISTRIBUTION AL and FL




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006




###








MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67




RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II




______________________________




PRODUCT




a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;




b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;




c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;




d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE




a) Bulk




b) None




c) Bulk




d) Bulk




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON




Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons




DISTRIBUTION Nationwide




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006




###










please see full text ;










Tuesday, March 2, 2010




Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA










Monday, March 1, 2010




ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010








Tuesday, September 14, 2010




Feed Safety and BSE/Ruminant Feed Ban Support Project (U18)








Friday, October 8, 2010




Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food














Saturday, November 6, 2010




TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU




Berne, 2010 TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation










Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR>




Prion disease update 2010 (11) PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)










Sunday, February 5, 2012




February 2012 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE









P.9.21






Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada






Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada






Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.






Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.






Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.






Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.











==============================================





The third safeguard - which led to this detection - is our ongoing BSE surveillance program that allows USDA to detect the disease if it exists at very low levels in the U.S. cattle population.





How the California cow got the disease remains unknown. Government officials

expressed confidence that contaminated food was not the source, saying the

animal had atypical L-type BSE, a rare variant not generally associated with

an animal consuming infected feed.


However, a BSE expert said that consumption of infected material is the only

known way that cattle get the disease under natural conditons.


“In view of what we know about BSE after almost 20 years experience,

contaminated feed has been the source of the epidemic,” said Paul Brown, a

scientist retired from the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and

Stroke.


BSE is not caused by a microbe. It is caused by the misfolding of the

so-called “prion protein” that is a normal constituent of brain and other

tissues. If a diseased version of the protein enters the brain somehow, it

can slowly cause all the normal versions to become misfolded.


It is possible the disease could arise spontaneously, though such an event

has never been recorded, Brown said.








counterpart: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD).


In a statement released on 24 April, Karen Ross, Secretary of the California

Department of Food and Agriculture said, “The detection of BSE shows that

the surveillance program in place in California and around the country is

working.” Food safety advocates such as Yonkers, New York, -based Consumers

Union say it’s a warning sign that surveillance is inadequate and needs to

be stepped up.


Ross’s statement also makes a point of noting a key feature of this

particular case: The infected cow carried what is known as ‘L-type’ BSE, a

version of the disease that has not been detected before in the US and has

so far not been associated with transmission through animal feed. As the

policy debate over testing rumbles on, here is a short guide to what is

known and not known about this rare strain and its unexpected appearance.







STATEMENT FROM CDFA SECRETARY KAREN ROSS ON USDA ANNOUNCEMENT OF DETECTION

OF BSE

Release #12-016

Print This Release


SACRAMENTO, April 24, 2012 – CDFA Secretary Karen Ross issued this statement

following the USDA’s announcement of the detection of atypical bovine

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a California dairy cow:


“The detection of BSE shows that the surveillance program in place in

California and around the country is working. Milk and beef remain safe to

consume. The disease is not transmitted through milk. Because of the

strength of the food protection system, the cow did not enter the food or

feed supply. There are numerous safeguards in place to prevent BSE from

entering the food chain.


“The atypical BSE designation is important because this is a very rare form

of BSE not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed. CDFA

veterinarians are working with the USDA to investigate this case and to

identify whether additional cows are at risk. Feed restrictions in place in

California and around the country for the last 15 years minimize that risk

to the greatest degree possible. We will provide additional information

about this case as it becomes available.”


The USDA announcement may be viewed at:











CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul

Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous

System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05,

...








CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006





In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve

Mitchell writes:





Analysis: What that mad cow means





By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent





WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick

to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow

disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not

acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been

circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.





The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA

officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.





These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a

picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is

thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they

consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal,

incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated

with the mad cow pathogen.





"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of

other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the

National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System

Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press

International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer

that."





Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow

cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the

United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before

one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow

that initially tested positive.





USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven

months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.





"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005

suspect," Brown said.





Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as

bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten

human or cattle health.





"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk

either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.





However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers

should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to

dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.





"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the

USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really

important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really

concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.





Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it

has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to

40,000 tests annually.





"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more

seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of

consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get

this administration to take action to protect the public."





The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow

tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal

of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord,

protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these

systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.





The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has

been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the

most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the

ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall

against BSE."





USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the

regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35

states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited

repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations

that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its

borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.





Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system.

The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency

has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult

for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.





"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without

having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status,"

Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in

Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk

to industry and governments, told UPI.





"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be

able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a

breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.





UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's

surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly

two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the

agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days.

This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the

information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized

that it cannot locate it.





Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite

low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone

undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low

prevalence," she said.





Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease

from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more

concerned," she said.





Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics,

a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that

if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or

more easily transmitted from person to person.





"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures"

and even through the blood supply, Moser said.





© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved



















PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE


Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM


"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow

issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy

detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian

Food Agency." ...END...TSS







IN A NUT SHELL ;

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate
declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.
The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease
status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status
or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central
Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf


Audit Report
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II
and
Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat
Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf


Report to Congressional Requesters:



February 2005:


Mad Cow Disease:



FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness:



[Hyperlink,

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-101]:http://www.gao.gov/htext/d05101.html

http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05101high.pdf


January 2002 MAD COW DISEASE Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and
Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts GAO-02-183
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02183.pdf


BIO-RAD BSE TEST POLITICAL REPLY TO TSS

Subject: FSIS NOTICE SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)
ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2007 17:32:58 -0600


Subject: Re: USDA/APHIS JUNE 2004 'ENHANCED' BSE/TSE COVER UP UPDATE
DECEMBER 19, 2004 USA
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 12:27:06 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


BSE-L

snip...

>
> OH, i did ask Bio-Rad about this with NO reply to date;
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com
>
>
>
> Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,
>
> Happy Holidays!
>
> I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing
> and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated,
> or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?
>
> HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with
> No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- ,
> BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?
>
> IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?
>
> What am I missing?
>
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> snip...end
>
>
> Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results

snip...END

WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this,
however it was not Susan Berg.
but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal
there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention
this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted
any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;

Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04

Finally spoke with ;


Bio-Rad Laboratories
2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
Hercules, CA 94547
Ph: 510-741-6720
Fax: 510-741-5630
Email: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant
phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA
and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem
to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak
directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB.
X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation
of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries
do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X
I understood that it was a very loaded question and X
agreed several times over and even said a political one.

my question;

Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive,
without WB, and considering the new
atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???

ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch
and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not
want any of this recorded or repeated.

again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of
retaliation, but again said X tell
me what other countries are doing and finding, and that
i should take it from there.
"very difficult to answer"

"very political"

"very loaded question"

outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in
house WB, SAF, along with
IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several
talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS
NEGATIVE. again, look what
the rest of the world is doing.
said something about Dr. Houston stating;
any screening assay, always a chance for human
error. but with so many errors (i am assuming
X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false
positives?
said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were
positive''. ...


TSS

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Your questions
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800
From: To: flounder@wt.net

Hi Terry:

............................................snip Let me know your phone
number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test.
Thank you

Regards

Bio-Rad Laboratories
2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
Hercules, CA 94547
Ph: 510-741-6720
Fax: 510-741-5630
Email: =================================


snip...end...TSS


TSS REPORT ON 2ND TEJAS MAD COW Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 (the one
that did NOT get away, thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong)


-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from
TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett
References: <[log in to unmask]>
<[log in to unmask] us>


Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;

Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething,
but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you
confirm???terry

==============================
==============================


-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from
TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: <[log in to unmask]>


The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA
web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas. CarlaAt
09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting
unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you
comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>
===================
===================


-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from
TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: <[log in to unmask]>
<[log in to unmask] us>
<[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]
us> <[log in to unmask]>


our computer department was working on a place holder we could postUSDA's
announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonightby
NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA
announcementwhen we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:>why
was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?>>Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy:>November 22: Press Release title here >>star image More BSE
information>>>>terry>>Carla Everett wrote:>>>no confirmation on the U.S.'
inconclusive test...>>no confirmation on location of
animal.>>>>>>==========================
==========================

THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$


NO, it's not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em
or leave em, however, you cannot change them.

with kindest regards,

I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004
Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow
with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the
animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That
material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as
"mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way
now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule
would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals
(e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed
only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs
have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the
material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way
through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the
feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein
out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established
its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that
the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action
specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will
not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed
rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only
one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed
rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html




Wednesday, August 20, 2008




Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?

 
 
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
 
 

MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE





***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model
 
 
 
 
 
 
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle
 
 
 
 
 
 
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
full text ;
 
 
 
atypical L-type BASE BSE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tuesday, May 1, 2012
 
 
 
BSE MAD COW LETTERS TO USDA (Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture) and FDA (Magaret Hamburg, Commissioner of FDA) May 1, 2012
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
 
 
 
 
ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH
 
 
 




Subject: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68

Comment from Terry Singeltary

Document ID: APHIS-2008-0010-0008 Document Type: Public Submission
This is comment on Proposed Rule: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products
Docket ID:
RIN:0579-AC68
Topics: No Topics associated with this document
View Document:

More

Comment:

comment submission Document ID APHIS-2008-0010-0001 Greetings USDA, OIE et al, what a difference it makes with science, from one day to the next. i.e. that mad cow gold card the USA once held. up until that fateful day in December of 2003, the science of BSE was NO IMPORTS TO USA FROM BSE COUNTRY. what a difference a day makes$ now that the shoe is on the other foot, the USDA via the OIE, wants to change science again, just for trade $ I implore the OIE decision and policy makers, for the sake of the world, to refuse any status quo of the USA BSE risk assessment. if at al, the USA BSE GBR should be raise to BSE GBR IV, for the following reasons. North America is awash with many different TSE Prion strains, in many different species, and they are mutating and spreading. IF the OIE, and whatever policy makers, do anything but raise the risk factor for BSE in North America, they I would regard that to be highly suspicious. IN fact, it would be criminal in my opinion, because the OIE knows this, and to knowingly expose the rest of the world to this dangerous pathogen, would be ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’, just for the almighty dollar, once again. I warned the OIE about all this, including the risk factors for CWD, and the fact that the zoonosis potential was great, way back in 2002. THE OIE in collaboration with the USDA, made the legal trading of the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie a legal global commodity. yes, thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al, it’s now legal to trade the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie strain all around the globe. IF you let them, they will do the same thing with atypical BSE and CWD (both strains to date). This with science showing that indeed these TSE prion strains are transmissible. I strenuously urge the OIE et al to refuse any weakening to the USA trade protocols for the BSE TSE prion disease (all strains), and urge them to reclassify the USA with BSE GBR IV risk factor. SEE REFERENCE SOURCES IN ATTACHMENTS

SEE Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Attachment WORD FILE ;

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2008-0010-0008

Sunday, March 11, 2012



APHIS Proposes New Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Import Regulations in Line with International Animal Health Standards Proposal Aims to Ensure Health of the U.S. Beef Herd, Assist in Negotiations





Wednesday, April 4, 2012






Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68









TSS

Thursday, May 3, 2012

ATYPICAL BSE IN AUSTRIA update 2011

ATYPICAL BSE IN AUSTRIA
 
 
SUMMARY
 
 
More than 10 years of extensive BSE screening in Austria resulted in a total of 8 positive cases of BSE up till August 2011. Five of these cases were classified as C-type BSE, one of them behaving peculiar. The three latest cases are of atypical BSE, being 2 L-type cases and 1 H-type case.
 
 
This fact rises the question if we now have reached the end of the C-type BSE epidemic and dip into a basic noise of spontaneously appearing prion diseases.
 
 
INTRODUCTION
 
 
Common bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) has been accounted for spread of the BSE-epidemic from UK to other countries. Rare aberrant BSE types H and L have been found in animals aging 8 years and more. In Austria only 8 cases of BSE have been detected, coded AU1 – AU8. Two were from 6 year old animals, the others were derived from animals above the age of 10. The potential presence of aberrant types was investigated.
 
 
RESULTS
 
 
The first five cases behaved as C-type, while two later cases had typical properties of L-type BSE or BASE (AU6 and AU7, Fig. 1) and the latest case turned out to be an H-type case (AU8) as quantified for PrPres aspects such as N terminus, glycoprofile, proteinase K resistance (Fig 2), and dual glycotype (Fig. 3). One of the C-type cases (AU5, age 12.5 yr) behaved peculiar, because its binding to antibodies 12B2 and P4 was unusually strong and equal compared to that of core antibody L42.
 
 
DISCUSSION
 
 
The fact that BSE types L and H are found in low BSE-incidence countries like Sweden, Denmark, USA, Japan, Canada, and now also 2 L-types and 1 H-type in Austria is indicative for natural presence of sporadic BSE in different forms. Case AU5 is peculiar (C-typeP4/12B2); no more tissue is available for further studies. Monitoring the food chain for BSE on the long term is sensible when the old age animals (> 7 years) remain the target. It might show indirectly the probable source of the BSE epidemic.
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS
 
 
 
All cases have been detected during the active screening program using all kinds of Prionics BSE rapid tests. One Austrian case was found at a German laboratory using Bio-Rad TeEsE. Confirmatory testing at the Austrian NRL for TSE at AGES IVET Mödling was done by using classical OIE Western blot or immunohistochemistry or Bio-Rad TeSeE Western blot assay (Bio- Rad Laboratories).
 
 
 
Similar methods on brain stem homogenates as published before (Jacobs et al., 2007) were used; PrPres analysis was performed on western blots using group A, B and C antibodies, including testing of the protease susceptibility.
 
 
 
H. Schildorfer1, Jo H.F. Erkens2, Jorg G. Jacobs2, Alex Bossers2, Ines Rammel1, F. Schmoll1, Jan P.M. Langeveld2 1Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety, Institute for Veterinary Disease Control, Mödling, Austria 2Central Veterinary Institute of Wageningen UR, PO Box 65, 8200 AB Lelystad, The Netherlands
 
 
 
Figure 1: Differentiation between C-type cases and atypical types H- and L-type cases by analysing the PrPres protease resistance using two different PK digestion conditions. Above the lanes the two different pH conditions are indicated: suboptimal condition at pH6.5 (50 >g PK/mL) and optimal condition at pH8 (500 >g PK/mL). Tissue equivalents applied per lane were for Scr, AU3 and AU3 (0.06 mg), AU5, AU6, L, H (0.25 mg), AU7 and AU8 (0.125 mg).
 
 
 
REFERENCE
 
 
 
Jacobs, JG, Langeveld JPM, Biacabe A-G, Acutis P-L, Polak M P, Gavier-Widen D, Buschmann A, Caramelli M, Casalone C, Mazza M, Groschup M, Erkens JHF, Davidse A, van Zijderveld FG, Baron 2007. Molecular discrimination of atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy strains from a geographical region spanning a wide area in Europe. J Clin Microbiol.45:1821-1829.
 
 
 
 
 
 




Vol. 30, No. 4, 2008
Article (References) Article (PDF 173 KB)
Original Paper
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Austria: An Autopsy-Controlled Study
Ellen Gelpia, Harald Heinzlc, Romana Höftbergera, Ursula Unterbergera, Thomas Ströbela, Till Voigtländera, Edita Drobnaa, Christa Jariusa, Susanna Langb, Thomas Waldhörd, Hanno Bernheimera, Herbert Budkaa

aInstitute of Neurology and Austrian Reference Centre for Human Prion Diseases,
bClinical Institute of Pathology,
cCore Unit for Medical Statistics and Informatics, and
dCenter of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology, Medical University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Address of Corresponding Author
Neuroepidemiology 2008;30:215-221 (DOI: 10.1159/000126915)
Key Words
  • Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
  • Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy
  • Prion protein
  • PRNP
  • 14-3-3 protein
 
 
Abstract




Background: Definite diagnosis of prion diseases or transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) requires neuropathology, usually at autopsy. Epidemiology of human TSEs has relied on definite as well as ‘probable’ cases in which neuropathological confirmation is lacking, usually because of low autopsy rates in most countries. Methods: In Austria, an active surveillance program for human prion diseases was established in 1996. Since then, more than 900 referrals were analyzed. Postmortem investigation of brain tissue is mandatory in every suspect case of TSE. Thus, epidemiological data on TSEs from Austria may serve as autopsy-controlled reference for countries with lower autopsy rates. Results: The total number of TSE cases in Austria since 1969 is 206. The average yearly mortality for the active surveillance period from 1996 to 30 June 2006 is 1.39 per million, with the highest rates for Vienna (2.37) compared with other provinces. Eighty-five percent of definite TSEs were classified as sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD). We observed a significant linear increase in the mean age at death of 0.6 years per calendar year. Clinical diagnostic surveillance criteria had a sensitivity and specificity of 82.7 and 80.0% for probable CJD, respectively, and a positive predictive value of 80.5% for probable and 38.9% for ‘possible’ CJD. Alternative neuropathological diagnoses in suspect cases included Alzheimer’s disease with or without Lewy body pathology, vascular encephalopathy, metabolic encephalopathies and viral or limbic encephalitis. Conclusion: The steady increase in mortality rates, especially in old age groups, most likely reflects improved case ascertainment due to active surveillance causing higher awareness of the medical community. In comparison with other European countries, it is reassuring to note that the overall death rate of TSEs does not differ from the Austrian autopsy-controlled data, thus confirming the value of clinical surveillance criteria.




Copyright © 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel





 
 
 
***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model
 
 
 
 
 
 
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle
 
 
 
 
 
 
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
 
 
 
 
 
 
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
 
 
 
 
 
 
full text ;
 
 
atypical L-type BASE BSE
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tuesday, May 1, 2012
 
 
BSE MAD COW LETTERS TO USDA (Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture) and FDA (Magaret Hamburg, Commissioner of FDA) May 1, 2012
 
 
 
 
 
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
 
 
ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH
 
 
 
 
 
TSS

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH

ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH




Research Project: STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE




Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit




Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05
Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement






Start Date: Sep 15, 2004
End Date: Sep 14, 2009



Objective:




The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.






Approach:




This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.






http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?accn_no=408490








Research Project: STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE




Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit


 

2010 Annual Report

1a.Objectives (from AD-416)

The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.



1b.Approach (from AD-416)

This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.



3.Progress Report

This report documents research conducted under a Specific Cooperative Agreement between ARS and the IST ZOOPROFIL SPERIMENT PIEMONTE. Additional details for the research can be found in the report for the parent project 3625-32000-086-00D, TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES


The aim of the cooperative research project was to: 1. Evaluate present diagnostic tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases. 2. Perform molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Support studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species. To complete objectives 1 and 2 (i.e., to compare Italian and U.S. BSE confirmatory protocols for detection of classical (C-) and atypical (H- and L-type) BSE cases), samples of Italian C-BSE and Italian L-type BSE (BASE), both frozen and formalin fixed, were sent to USDA laboratories in Ames, Iowa, to undergo Western blot (WB) and immunohistochemistry (IHC) comparison studies for PrPSc detection according to U.S. and Italian methods. A Western blot expert from the cooperating Italian lab assisted ARS scientists in performing the protocols from each laboratory in parallel. A comparative IHC study between U.S. and Italian BSE confirmatory protocols was also performed when the collaborator sent a scientist to Ames to assist in performing the Italian IHC protocol on BSE samples chosen for the study.




Results obtained showed the Italian and U.S. IHC procedures were alike in PrPSc detection regarding its tissue distribution, deposition pattern and intensity of staining on all the C-, L- and H-type BSE cases considered. In addition, the U.S. protocol evidenced the characteristic presence of plaques in the frontal cortex of the Italian BASE case similar to the Italian protocol. Data from studies on objectives 1 & 2 has been presented at several international meetings in 2008 and 2009, and has been finalized into manuscript form for publication in a peer-reviewed journal (Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation). In support of objective 3, the cooperators completed and published their transmissibility and tissue distribution work on BASE cases in a peer-reviewed journal in 2008 (PLoS Pathogens Volume 4, page e1000075). They reported that in all experimentally infected atypical BSE animals, no PrPSc was detected in peripheral tissues either by standard Western blot analysis or following phosphotungstic acid precipitation. Peripheral issues examined included cervical and mesenteric lymph nodes, spleen, thymus, liver, lung, peripheral nerves, and forelimb and hind limb muscles.




These findings support the conclusion there is no scientific evidence to expand the list of tissues included in the Specified Risk Material ban based on atypical BSE research data, thus confirming other studies indicating the pathogenesis of BSE in cattle is fundamentally different from that in sheep and mice, due to an exclusive intraneuronal spread of infectivity from the gut to the central nervous system. Methods used for monitoring included email, site visits, and periodic written reports.






http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2010





“ These findings support the conclusion there is no scientific evidence to expand the list of tissues included in the Specified Risk Material ban based on atypical BSE research data, thus confirming other studies indicating the pathogenesis of BSE in cattle is fundamentally different from that in sheep and mice, due to an exclusive intraneuronal spread of infectivity from the gut to the central nervous system. “







REALLY ???







October 2009 O.11.3





Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle





Silvia Suardi1, Chiara Vimercati1, Fabio Moda1, Ruggerone Margherita1, Ilaria Campagnani1, Guerino Lombardi2, Daniela Gelmetti2, Martin H. Groschup3, Anne Buschmann3, Cristina Casalone4, Maria Caramelli4, Salvatore Monaco5, Gianluigi Zanusso5, Fabrizio Tagliavini1 1Carlo Besta" Neurological Institute,Italy; 2IZS Brescia, Italy; 33FLI Insel Riems, D, Germany; 4CEA-IZS Torino, Italy; 5University of Verona, Italy




Background: BASE is an atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy caused by a prion strain distinct from that of BSE. Upon experimental transmission to cattle, BASE induces a previously unrecognized disease phenotype marked by mental dullness and progressive atrophy of hind limb musculature. Whether affected muscles contain infectivity is unknown. This is a critical issue since the BASE strain is readily transmissible to a variety of hosts including primates, suggesting that humans may be susceptible.




Objectives: To investigate the distribution of infectivity in peripheral tissues of cattle experimentally infected with BASE. Methods: Groups of Tg mice expressing bovine PrP (Tgbov XV, n= 7-15/group) were inoculated both i.c. and i.p. with 10% homogenates of a variety of tissues including brain, spleen, cervical lymph node, kidney and skeletal muscle (m. longissimus dorsi) from cattle intracerebrally infected with BASE. No PrPres was detectable in the peripheral tissues used for inoculation either by immunohistochemistry or Western blot.




Results: Mice inoculated with BASE-brain homogenates showed clinical signs of disease with incubation and survival times of 175±15 and 207±12 days. Five out of seven mice challenged with skeletal muscle developed a similar neurological disorder, with incubation and survival times of 380±11 and 410±12 days. At present (700 days after inoculation) mice challenged with the other peripheral tissues are still healthy. The neuropathological phenotype and PrPres type of the affected mice inoculated either with brain or muscle were indistinguishable and matched those of Tgbov XV mice infected with natural BASE.




Discussion: Our data indicate that the skeletal muscle of cattle experimentally infected with BASE contains significant amount of infectivity, at variance with BSE-affected cattle, raising the issue of intraspecies transmission and the potential risk for humans. Experiments are in progress to assess the presence of infectivity in skeletal muscles of natural BASE.







CDC 2012




Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model




Nadine Mestre-Francés, Simon Nicot, Sylvie Rouland, Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe, Isabelle Quadrio, Armand Perret-Liaudet, Thierry Baron, and Jean-Michel Verdier




We report transmission of atypical L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy to mouse lemurs after oral or intracerebral inoculation with infected bovine brain tissue. After neurologic symptoms appeared, transmissibility of the disease by both inoculation routes was confirmed by detection of disease-associated prion protein in samples of brain tissue.




snip...




Conclusions




We demonstrated that the agent of L-BSE can be transmitted by the oral route from cattle to mouse lemurs. As expected, orally inoculated animals survived longer than IC-inoculated animals. Orally inoculated lemurs had less severe clinical signs and symptoms, with no evidence of motor dysfunction. It was previously suggested that the agent of L-BSE might be involved in the foodborne transmission of a prion disease in mink (11,12), a species in which several outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy had been identified, notably in the United States (13).




Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.














P.9.21




Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada




Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada




Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.




Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.




Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.




Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.










Subject: Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate




Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate




Emmanuel E. Comoy1*, Cristina Casalone2, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray1, Gianluigi Zanusso3, Sophie Freire1, Dominique Marcé1, Frédéric Auvré1, Marie-Magdeleine Ruchoux1, Sergio Ferrari3, Salvatore Monaco3, Nicole Salès4, Maria Caramelli2, Philippe Leboulch1,5, Paul Brown1, Corinne I. Lasmézas4, Jean-Philippe Deslys1




1 Institute of Emerging Diseases and Innovative Therapies, CEA, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France, 2 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Turin, Italy, 3 Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Verona, Italy, 4 Scripps Florida, Jupiter, Florida, United States of America, 5 Genetics Division, Brigham & Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America




Abstract Top Background




Human variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) results from foodborne transmission of prions from slaughtered cattle with classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (cBSE). Atypical forms of BSE, which remain mostly asymptomatic in aging cattle, were recently identified at slaughterhouses throughout Europe and North America, raising a question about human susceptibility to these new prion strains.




Methodology/Principal Findings




Brain homogenates from cattle with classical BSE and atypical (BASE) infections were inoculated intracerebrally into cynomolgus monkeys (Macacca fascicularis), a non-human primate model previously demonstrated to be susceptible to the original strain of cBSE. The resulting diseases were compared in terms of clinical signs, histology and biochemistry of the abnormal prion protein (PrPres). The single monkey infected with BASE had a shorter survival, and a different clinical evolution, histopathology, and prion protein (PrPres) pattern than was observed for either classical BSE or vCJD-inoculated animals. Also, the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the infected bovine.




Conclusion/Significance




Our results point to a possibly higher degree of pathogenicity of BASE than classical BSE in primates and also raise a question about a possible link to one uncommon subset of cases of apparently sporadic CJD. Thus, despite the waning epidemic of classical BSE, the occurrence of atypical strains should temper the urge to relax measures currently in place to protect public health from accidental contamination by BSE-contaminated products.




Citation: Comoy EE, Casalone C, Lescoutra-Etchegaray N, Zanusso G, Freire S, et al. (2008) Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate. PLoS ONE 3(8): e3017. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003017




Editor: Neil Mabbott, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom




Received: April 24, 2008; Accepted: August 1, 2008; Published: August 20, 2008




Copyright: © 2008 Comoy et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.




Funding: This work has been supported by the Network of Excellence NeuroPrion.




Competing interests: CEA owns a patent covering the BSE diagnostic tests commercialized by the company Bio-Rad.




* E-mail: emmanuel.comoy@cea.fr




snip...




In summary, we have transmitted one atypical form of BSE (BASE) to a cynomolgus macaque monkey that had a shorter incubation period than monkeys infected with classical BSE, with distinctive clinical, neuropathological, and biochemical features; and have shown that the molecular biological signature resembled that seen in a comparatively uncommon subtype of sporadic CJD. We cannot yet say whether BASE is more pathogenic for primates (including humans) than cBSE, nor can we predict whether its molecular biological features represent a clue to one cause of apparently sporadic human CJD. However, the evidence presented here and by others justifies concern about a potential human health hazard from undetected atypical forms of BSE, and despite the waning epizoonosis of classical BSE, it would be premature to abandon the precautionary measures that have been so successful in reversing the impact of cBSE. We would instead urge a gradual, staged reduction that takes into account the evolving knowledge about atypical ruminant diseases, and both a permanent ban on the use of bovine central nervous system tissue for either animal or human use, and its destruction so as to eliminate any risk of environmental contamination.








Wednesday, March 31, 2010




Atypical BSE in Cattle




To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.




This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.








Thursday, August 12, 2010




Seven main threats for the future linked to prions




First threat




The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.




***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.




Second threat




snip...









full text ;




atypical L-type BASE BSE











let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.




This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$




ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama



In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.












Saturday, August 14, 2010



BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY



(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)









now, what about that mad cow feed and atypical BSE $$$





LET’S see how that mad cow triple firewall aka mad cow feed ban is working out $$$






*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS




THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$




10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007




Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST




RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II




___________________________________




PRODUCT




Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007




CODE




Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.




Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON




Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE




42,090 lbs.




DISTRIBUTION




WI




___________________________________




PRODUCT




Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007




CODE




The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.




REASON




Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE




9,997,976 lbs.




DISTRIBUTION




ID and NV




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007










Saturday, August 14, 2010




BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY






*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)




BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA




Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT




a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;




b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;




c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;




d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.




CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.




REASON




Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons




DISTRIBUTION AL




______________________________








PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,




Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons




DISTRIBUTION AL and MS




______________________________




PRODUCT




a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;




b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;




c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;




d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;




e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;




f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;




g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6




CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags




DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006




###








Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006




Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT




a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;




b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;




c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;




d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;




e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;




f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;




g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;




h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;




i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;




j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;




k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;




l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;




m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE




Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.




REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons




DISTRIBUTION AL and FL




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006




###








MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67




RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II




______________________________




PRODUCT




a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;




b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;




c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;




d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE




a) Bulk




b) None




c) Bulk




d) Bulk




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON




Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons




DISTRIBUTION Nationwide




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006




###










please see full text ;










Tuesday, March 2, 2010




Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA










Monday, March 1, 2010




ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010








Tuesday, September 14, 2010




Feed Safety and BSE/Ruminant Feed Ban Support Project (U18)








Friday, October 8, 2010




Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food














Saturday, November 6, 2010




TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU




Berne, 2010 TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation










Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR>




Prion disease update 2010 (11) PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)










Sunday, February 5, 2012




February 2012 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE








Saturday, July 23, 2011




CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE








IMPORT EXPORT BEEF, LIVE, PRODUCTS, CANADA AND USA










Saturday, June 12, 2010


PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse




Wednesday, July 28, 2010


re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010




P.9.21


Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada


Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada


Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.


Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.


Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.


Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.







CONSUMERS UNION



Tuesday, May 1, 2012


BSE MAD COW LETTERS TO USDA (Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture) and FDA (Magaret Hamburg, Commissioner of FDA) May 1, 2012










kind regards,


terry




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