Sunday, February 5, 2012

February 2012 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

February 2012 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE






February 2, 2012






To help prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) through feed in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Ruminant Feed Ban, became effective on August 4, 1997.






A second rule, Title 21 Part 589.2001 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Enhanced Feed Ban, became effective on April 27, 2009. This rule prohibits the use of certain cattle-derived materials in all animal feed. The BSE inspection report form has been revised and is being used for determining compliance with both the ruminant feed ban and the enhanced feed ban. The inspection results summarized below reflect the compliance status for both rules.






The following is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed ban. FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) has summarized results of those inspections that have been entered into FDA's inspection database as of January 28, 2012. As of January 28, 2012, FDA had received over 93,000 inspection reports since 1997. Approximately 73% of these inspections have been conducted by State feed control officials, with the remainder conducted by FDA officials.






Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).






An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.






A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. These include provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.






An NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions. A firm’s compliance status and whether the firm handles prohibited material is based on its most recent inspection.






The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually exclusive.






RENDERERS


These firms are the first to handle and process (i.e., render) animal proteins and to send these processed materials to feed mills and/or protein blenders for use as a feed ingredient.






Number of active firms inspected – 279


Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 152 (54% of those active firms inspected)


Of the 152 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


2 firms (1.3%) were classified as OAI


9 firms (5.9%) were classified as VAI




LICENSED FEED MILLS




FDA licenses these feed mills to produce medicated feed products. The license is required to manufacture and distribute feed using certain potent drug products, usually those requiring some pre-slaughter withdrawal time. This licensing has nothing to do with handling prohibited materials under the feed ban regulation. A medicated feed license from FDA is not required to handle materials prohibited under the Ruminant Feed Ban.






Number of active firms inspected – 1,046


Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 459 (44% of those active firms inspected)


Of the 459 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI


10 firms (2.2%) were classified as VAI




FEED MILLS NOT LICENSED BY FDA




These feed mills are not licensed by the FDA to produce medicated feeds.






Number of active firms inspected – 5,304


Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 2,751 (52% of those active firms inspected)


Of the 2,751 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI


30 firms (1.1%) were classified as VAI




PROTEIN BLENDERS




These firms blend rendered animal protein for the purpose of producing quality feed ingredients that will be used by feed mills.






Number of active firms inspected – 284


Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 129 (45% of those active firms inspected)


Of the 129 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI


2 firm (1.6%) was classified as VAI




RENDERERS, FEED MILLS, AND PROTEIN BLENDERS MANUFACTURING WITH PROHIBITED MATERIAL




This category includes only those firms that actually use prohibited material to manufacture, process, or blend animal feed or feed ingredients.






Total number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders inspected – 6,696


Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials – 471 (7.0%)


Of the 471 active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


2 firms (0.4%) were classified as OAI


18 firms (3.8%) were classified as VAI




OTHER FIRMS INSPECTED




Examples of such firms include ruminant feeders, on-farm mixers, pet food manufacturers, animal feed salvagers, distributors, retailers, and animal feed transporters.






Number of active firms inspected – 28,217


Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 9,293 (33% of those active firms inspected)


Of the 9,293 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI


123 firms (1.3%) were classified as VAI




TOTAL FIRMS




Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category; therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below.






Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 30,124


Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 9,819 (33% of those active firms inspected)


Of the 9,819 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


2 firms (0.02%) were classified as OAI


130 firms (1.3%) were classified as VAI








WITH the looks of things, the BSE GBR risk assessment for the USA in 2012 should be held stead fast at BSE GBR III. but as I said long ago, the BSE GBR risk assessment should be BSE GBR IV due to the terribly failed, if not fraudulent USDA FDA BSE TESTING, AND SURVEILLANCE FOR BSE, since the inception of the programs. all failed terribly. ...TSS


AN appalling amount of violations, that most likely led to a great deal of banned suspect mad cow protein in commerce. however sadly, the way the violations are now wrote up, the common layperson cannot know exact what the violations were, or how much banned suspect mad cow protein actually went out into commerce. as was the infamous decade post partial and voluntary feed ban violations, where the one in 2007 let loose 10,000,000 LBS of banned blood laced MBM into commerce ;






10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007




Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST




RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II




___________________________________




PRODUCT




Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007




CODE




Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.




Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON




Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE




42,090 lbs.




DISTRIBUTION




WI




___________________________________




PRODUCT




Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007




CODE




The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.




REASON




Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE




9,997,976 lbs.




DISTRIBUTION




ID and NV




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007










see much more tonnage of recalled prohibited banned suspect BSE contaminated feed here ;






Saturday, November 6, 2010




TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU




Berne, 2010 TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation










Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR>




Prion disease update 2010 (11) PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)










Saturday, July 23, 2011




CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE










To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.








Thursday, August 12, 2010


Seven main threats for the future linked to prions


First threat


The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...






Monday, October 10, 2011


EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story


snip...


EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.


snip...






see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;










P.9.21 Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada


Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada


Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.


Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.


Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis. Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.


Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.










Saturday, June 25, 2011


Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque


"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"






Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.


snip...


The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...








14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -


Final Abstract Number: ISE.114


Session: International Scientific Exchange


Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009


T. Singeltary


Bacliff, TX, USA


Background:


An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.


Methods:


12 years independent research of available data


Results:


I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.


Conclusion:


I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.










Sunday, January 29, 2012


Prion Disease Risks in the 21st Century 2011 PDA European Virus-TSE Safety Dr. Detwiler


Dr. Detwiler published Prion Disease Risks in the 21st Century 2011 PDA European Virus-TSE Safety Forum\Presentations TSE\ Page 33 and 34 of 44 ;








Wednesday, February 1, 2012


CJD and PLASMA / URINE PRODUCTS EMA Position Statements Alberto Ganan Jimenez, European Medicines Agency PDA TSE Safety Forum, 30 June 2011






Wednesday, February 1, 2012


Prion Disease Risks in the 21st Century 2011 PDA European Virus-TSE Safety Update on CJD and VCJD Transmission RG Will






Thursday, January 26, 2012


Facilitated Cross-Species Transmission of Prions in Extraneural Tissue


Science 27 January 2012: Vol. 335 no. 6067 pp. 472-475 DOI: 10.1126/science.1215659







Tuesday, May 27, 2008


FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008












Friday, September 4, 2009


FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009






Saturday, August 29, 2009


FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009







C O N F I R M E D




----- Original Message -----


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."


To:


Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM


Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009








PLEASE UNDERSTAND, with a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, once clinical, the disease is 100% fatal. There should be NO debate of the 'unacceptable risk factor', with any TSE. ...TSS




Sunday, June 26, 2011


Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque






Saturday, June 13, 2009


BSE FEED VIOLATIONS USA UPDATE From 01/01/2009 To 06/10/2009








Monday, April 5, 2010


Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010








Monday, January 17, 2011


MAD COW Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE January 13, 2011







Friday, January 6, 2012



OIE 2012 Training Manual on Wildlife Diseases and Surveillance and TSE Prion disease








TSS

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