Saturday, January 31, 2015

European red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) are susceptible to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE by Oral Alimentary route

Susceptibility of European Red Deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) to Alimentary Challenge with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

Mark P. Dagleish , * E-mail: mark.dagleish@moredun.ac.uk

 

Affiliation: Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Stuart Martin, Affiliation: Animal Health & Veterinary Laboratories Agency Lasswade, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Philip Steele, Affiliation: Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Jeanie Finlayson, Affiliation: Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Samantha L. Eaton, Affiliation: Neurobiology Division, The Roslin Institute at, Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies, University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush Campus, Midlothian, EH25 9RG, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Sílvia Sisó, Affiliation: Animal Health & Veterinary Laboratories Agency Lasswade, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Paula Stewart, Affiliation: Neurobiology Division, The Roslin Institute at, Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies, University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush Campus, Midlothian, EH25 9RG, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Natalia Fernández-Borges, Affiliation: CIC bioGUNE, Parque tecnológico de Bizkaia, Derio 48160, Spain

 

⨯ Scott Hamilton, Affiliation: Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Yvonne Pang, Affiliation: Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Francesca Chianini, Affiliation: Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Hugh W. Reid, Affiliation: Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Wilfred Goldmann, Affiliation: Neurobiology Division, The Roslin Institute at, Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies, University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush Campus, Midlothian, EH25 9RG, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Lorenzo González, Affiliation: Animal Health & Veterinary Laboratories Agency Lasswade, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ Joaquín Castilla, Affiliations: CIC bioGUNE, Parque tecnológico de Bizkaia, Derio 48160, Spain, IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao 48013, Bizkaia, Spain

 

⨯ [ ... ], Martin Jeffrey Affiliation: Animal Health & Veterinary Laboratories Agency Lasswade, Pentlands Science Park, Bush Loan, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, United Kingdom

 

⨯ [ view all ] [ view less ] Susceptibility of European Red Deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) to Alimentary Challenge with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mark P. Dagleish, Stuart Martin, Philip Steele, Jeanie Finlayson, Samantha L. Eaton, Sílvia Sisó, Paula Stewart, Natalia Fernández-Borges, … Scott Hamilton, Yvonne Pang PLOS x Published: January 23, 2015 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0116094

 

Abstract

 

European red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) are susceptible to the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, one of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, when challenged intracerebrally but their susceptibility to alimentary challenge, the presumed natural route of transmission, is unknown. To determine this, eighteen deer were challenged via stomach tube with a large dose of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent and clinical signs, gross and histological lesions, presence and distribution of abnormal prion protein and the attack rate recorded. Only a single animal developed clinical disease, and this was acute with both neurological and respiratory signs, at 1726 days post challenge although there was significant (27.6%) weight loss in the preceding 141 days. The clinically affected animal had histological lesions of vacuolation in the neuronal perikaryon and neuropil, typical of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Abnormal prion protein, the diagnostic marker of transmissible encephalopathies, was primarily restricted to the central and peripheral nervous systems although a very small amount was present in tingible body macrophages in the lymphoid patches of the caecum and colon. Serial protein misfolding cyclical amplification, an in vitro ultra-sensitive diagnostic technique, was positive for neurological tissue from the single clinically diseased deer. All other alimentary challenged deer failed to develop clinical disease and were negative for all other investigations. These findings show that transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to European red deer via the alimentary route is possible but the transmission rate is low. Additionally, when deer carcases are subjected to the same regulations that ruminants in Europe with respect to the removal of specified offal from the human food chain, the zoonotic risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, the cause of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, from consumption of venison is probably very low.

 

snip...

 

Discussion
 
 
This investigation resulted in the first and only known case, to date, of clinical disease or accumulation of abnormal PrPd in any cervid species due to oral challenge with BSE. The increase in incubation period compared to European red deer challenged with BSE intra-cerebrally (1060 days) [33] compared to oral challenge (1727 days) is approximately 60% and similar to the differences observed in incubation periods for sheep or goats when challenged with TSE agents by these two routes [40,41]. The neurological clinical signs observed could be broadly related to the spongiform encephalopathy and the accumulation of PrPd in that the restlessness, stereotypic head movements and pacing may be due to compromise of the nucleus accumbens [42], found in the striatum, and the laboured breathing due to the lesions in the medulla, where the respiratory centre is located [43]. Alternatively, the laboured and audible mouth breathing may have been due to, or contributed to by, compromise of either of the recurrent laryngeal nerves resulting in some degree of laryngeal paralysis but we were unable to determine this. Apart from the gradual loss of body weight, the speed of onset of clinical signs and progression was very rapid but animal welfare requirements precluded any further longitudinal study of these. The clinical signs described for this animal are broadly similar to those reported for clinical BSE in European red deer challenged via the intracerebral route [33], clinical cases of CWD in deer [44] and clinical cases of BSE in cattle [45].

 

snip...see full text ; 

 


 

 

MANY THANKS TO THE AUTHORS FOR THEIR WORK ON THE TSE PRION DISEASE, AND TO THEM AND PLOS FOR OPEN ACCESS, THANK YOU!...TSS

 

2008-05-28

 

***Therefore, although BSE has never been diagnosed in any deer species, a possible risk to human health remains via ingestion of cervine products. Chronic wasting disease (CWD), also a TSE, naturally infects several cervid species in North America and is spreading rapidly in both captive and free-ranging populations.

 

Conclusions: This study shows that deer are susceptible to BSE by intracerebral inoculation and display clinical signs and vacuolar pathology that are similar to those of CWD. ***These findings highlight the importance of preventing the spread to Europe of CWD from North America as this may necessitate even more extensive testing of animal tissues destined for human consumption within the EU.

 

***Although the absence of PrPd in lymphoid and other non-neurological tissues potentially limits the risk of transmission to humans, the replication of TSE agents in peripheral tissues following intra-cerebral challenge is often limited. Thus the assessment of risk posed by cervine BSE as a human pathogen or for environmental contamination should await the outcome of ongoing oral challenge experiments.

 

2008-05-28

 

From: TSS

 

Subject: EXPERIMENTAL TRANSMISSION OF BSE TO EUROPEAN RED DEER

 

Date: May 29, 2008 at 11:30 am PST

 

Experimental transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to European red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus)

 

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a member of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), primarily affects cattle. Transmission is via concentrate feed rations contaminated with infected meat and bone meal (MBM).

 

In addition to cattle, other food animal species are susceptible to BSE and also pose a potential threat to human health as consumption of infected meat products is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans, which is invariably fatal. In the UK, farmed and free ranging deer were almost certainly exposed to BSE infected MBM in proprietary feeds prior to legislation banning its inclusion.

 

***Therefore, although BSE has never been diagnosed in any deer species, a possible risk to human health remains via ingestion of cervine products. Chronic wasting disease (CWD), also a TSE, naturally infects several cervid species in North America and is spreading rapidly in both captive and free-ranging populations.

 

Results: Here we show that European red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) are susceptible to intra-cerebral (i/c) challenge with BSE positive cattle brain pool material resulting in clinical neurological disease and weight loss by 794-1290 days and the clinical signs are indistinguishable to those reported in deer with CWD.

 

Spongiform changes typical of TSE infections were present in brain and accumulation of the disease-associated abnormal prion protein (PrPd) was present in the central and peripheral nervous systems, but not in lymphoid or other tissues. Western immunoblot analysis of brain material showed a similar glycosylation pattern to that of BSE derived from infected cattle and experimentally infected sheep with respect to protease-resistant PrP isoforms.

 

However, the di-, mono- and unglycosylated bands migrated significantly (p <0 .001="" affected="" and="" brains="" bse="" cattle="" clinically="" compared="" deer="" div="" from="" further="" in="" infected="" of="" samples="" sheep.="" the="" to="" when="">
 

Conclusions: This study shows that deer are susceptible to BSE by intracerebral inoculation and display clinical signs and vacuolar pathology that are similar to those of CWD. ***These findings highlight the importance of preventing the spread to Europe of CWD from North America as this may necessitate even more extensive testing of animal tissues destined for human consumption within the EU.

 

***Although the absence of PrPd in lymphoid and other non-neurological tissues potentially limits the risk of transmission to humans, the replication of TSE agents in peripheral tissues following intra-cerebral challenge is often limited. Thus the assessment of risk posed by cervine BSE as a human pathogen or for environmental contamination should await the outcome of ongoing oral challenge experiments.

 

Author: Mark P Dagleish, Stuart Martin, Philip Steele, Jeanie Finlayson, Silvia Siso, Scott Hamilton, Francesca Chianini, Hugh W Reid, Lorenzo Gonzalez and Martin Jeffrey Credits/Source: BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:17

 

Published on: 2008-05-28

 


 

FDA WARNING LETTER (14-ATL-04) adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)] of the Act, protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds that may be used for ruminants [21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B)]

 

Newberry Feed & Farm, Inc. 2/14/14 Department of Health and Human Services logoDepartment of Health and Human Services Public Health Service

 

Food and Drug Administration Atlanta District Office 60 8th St., NE Atlanta, GA 30309

 

February 14, 2014

 

VIA UPS

 

J. Clint Layne, President/Co-owner Rhett Baker, Secretary-Treasurer/Co-owner Newberry Feed & Farm Center, Inc. 131 Giff Street Newberry, SC 29108

 

WARNING LETTER (14-ATL-04)

 

Dear Messrs. Layne and Baker,

 

An inspection of your feed mill located at 2431 Vincent Street, Newberry, SC 29108 conducted by Investigators from the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) and South Carolina Department of Agriculture on September 5-9, 2013 revealed significant violations of Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) regulations for Medicated Feeds found in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 225 (21 C.F.R. 225). Such violations cause the medicated feeds manufactured at your facility to be adulterated within the meaning of Section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)] in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for the manufacture, processing, packing, or holding of the medicated feeds do not conform to or are not operated or administered in conformity with current good manufacturing practices.

 

The inspection also revealed significant violations of the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 589.2000 (21 C.F.R. 589.2000), Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Animal feeds and feed ingredients containing prohibited mammalian proteins are considered potentially injurious to ruminant and public health. Because you failed to comply with the requirements set forth in 21 C.F.R. 589.2000, the feed products manufactured and distributed by your facility are adulterated within the meaning of Section 402(a)(4) of the Act [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)] in that they have been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby they may have become contaminated with filth or rendered injurious to health. The adulterated feed was subsequently misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) of the Act [21 U.S.C. 343(a)(1)] because it was not properly labeled with the required BSE cautionary statement.

 

Medicated Feed CGMP violations observed during the inspection include, but are not limited to, the following:

 

1. You failed to ensure that all equipment that comes in contact with the active drug component, feeds in process or finished medicated feed is subject to reasonable and effective procedures to prevent unsafe contamination of feeds with drugs. [21 C.F.R. 225.65(b)]

 

Your written equipment cleaning procedure that requires flushing with a minimum of (b)(4) does not appear to be effective to prevent unsafe contamination of your manufactured feed. During the inspection, our Investigators observed a build-up of feed residue on surfaces inside the mixer that was approximately three inches thick in accumulation. This build-up was observed on the equipment throughout the inspection, including after flushing had been performed. In addition, the cleaning procedure does not include cleaning of the hand-add chute or scoops/buckets used to handle ingredients that are then used to manufacture medicated feed. During the inspection, our Investigators observed a build-up of feed residues approximately four inches thick on the inside of the chute used to add the drug ingredients and other “hand-adds”. Considering the extent of residue accumulation—some of which would include the drug sources used in your medicated feeds—on surfaces in the mixer and the hand-add chute, it is likely that chunks of this material break off periodically, and may sometimes end up in feeds not intended to contain that drug.

 

This is a repeat observation from the July 24-26, 2012 inspection. Your response to the Form FDA 483, Inspectional Observations, issued to you following the 2012 inspection stated the buckets and scoops would be replaced, and you would schedule a regular cleaning of the equipment every (b)(4). Based on the accumulation of residual feed observed on manufacturing equipment during the inspection and which remained following flushing, you have either failed to implement the promised corrective action or you have failed to ensure that the corrective action was lasting and effective in preventing the violation from recurring.

 

On October 3, 2013, we received your response to the Form FDA 483 issued to you following the September 2013 inspection. You state in your response that you have posted signs, added cleaning of the dump chute to the (b)(4) cleaning procedure, and increased the physical cleaning of the mixer to (b)(4). You also state that dedicated scoops will be used for each component or drug and have ordered disposable liners for the buckets that will be discarded following each dumping of product. However, you did not provide any documentation to demonstrate these changes have been made, such as photos of the new sign or newly cleaned equipment, or copies of the revised cleaning procedure.

 

2. You failed to investigate and implement corrective action where the results of assays indicated that the level of drug in medicated feed was not in accord with label specifications or not within permissible assay limits. An original or copy of the record of such action must be maintained on the premises. [21 C.F.R. 225.58(d)]

 

Your firm failed to adequately investigate and implement corrective action when you received an assay result on 6/21/13 for a Type C medicated feed containing Amprolium, showing the drug present at 73% of the concentration stated on the label. This assay result is outside of the assay limits of 80-120% established in 21 C.F.R. 558.4. The subsequent review of production and inventory records conducted by your firm revealed these records were “OK”, and it was determined the feed sample was taken incorrectly. Your firm’s “\investigation sheet” dated 6/21/13 states the corrective action as “[t]rying to make sure the samples are taken correctly.” No technique or procedural changes were made in response to the described corrective action, however. Thus, your firm failed to implement any corrective action in response to the out of specification assay result.

 

Your firm also received assay results for a Type C medicated broiler feed containing a Salinomycin concentration of 75% on 7/7/12 and 78% on 8/3/12. These assay results are outside the specification tolerance of 80-120% of the concentration stated on the label. [21 C.F.R. 558.4]. Your firm did not initiate any investigation or corrective action after receiving these results. Failure to investigate and implement corrective action following an out-of-limits assay is a repeat observation from the July 24-26, 2012 inspection.

 

In your response to the Form FDA 483 issued to you following the September 2013 inspection, you state that you have instructed personnel further on completing the investigation form and have also added sampling instructions to the procedures manual. However, you did not provide copies of the new/revised investigation form or the revisions to the procedures manual discussing sampling.

 

3. Your daily inventory records fail to record the batches or production runs (or lots) of medicated feed in which each drug was used. [21 C.F.R. 225.42(b)(6)(iii)] Although your daily inventory records appear to contain all of the other required information, due to the way the form is designed, there is only space to record one batch per day per drug and no space to record the name of the product, lot number, or other identifier for that batch. Your daily inventory record must reflect every batch or lot of medicated feed manufactured each day.

 

4. You failed to document in the daily inventory record actions taken to reconcile any discrepancies in the daily inventory record. [21 C.F.R. 225.42(b)(6)(v)] For example, the drug inventory conducted on 8/30/13 revealed a discrepancy with respect to one fifty pound bag of (b)(4)(a Type A medicated article). It does not appear that your firm took any action to reconcile this discrepancy.

 

You state in your response to both #3 and #4 above that you have added an area to the inventory control sheet to report any drugs that do not reconcile, and that there is a space to make notes and/or adjustments to inventory to ensure they reconcile. However, you did not indicate that the inventory control sheet had been adjusted to provide for the possibility that any single drug may be used more than once a day, and you did not provide any documentation—such as a copy of the revised form—to demonstrate that these changes have been made.

 

5. You have failed to properly identify, store, handle, and control drugs in your mixing areas to maintain their integrity and identity [21 C.F.R. 225.42(b)(4)]. Our inspection found that your firm was storing bags of Type A Medicated Articles in a manner and location that allowed them to be covered in bird droppings.

 

This finding also relates to your obligations under 21 C.F.R. 225.20(b)(2) and (3), which requires the facility to be maintained in a reasonably clean and orderly manner, and for access by birds and other pests to be minimized. During the September 5-6, 2013 inspection, our Investigators observed birds (greater than ten) nesting, flying, perched and foraging in the mill. Your response indicated that you are investigating ways to keep birds out of the mill, but that you did not yet have a plan at that time. You indicated that you would have a plan in place by November 1, 2013, but did not provide further information regarding any plan.

 

In addition, the following violations of the Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed regulation [21 C.F.R. 589.2000] were observed during the inspection:

 

1. You failed to use clean out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds that may be used for ruminants [21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B)]. Your feed is therefore adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)] of the Act.

 

Because your firm uses animal proteins prohibited from use in ruminant feeds, and also makes feeds for ruminants, you are required to have a cleanout procedure adequate to prevent carryover into ruminant feeds. As noted above, our Investigators observed a significant build-up of feed residues inside the feed mixer and the hand-add chute, which remained following your cleanout procedure. This equipment is used for processing both proteins derived from mammalian tissues and feeds for ruminants. Since flushing was ineffective in removing the accumulated feed from the equipment, your clean out procedure was inadequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds intended for ruminant animals.

 

Your response indicates that your corrective actions for this item are the same as for Item 1 above. However, as noted above, you did not provide any documentation to demonstrate that the changes you discussed have been made, or that they were adequate to address this issue.

 

2. You failed to label all products which contained or may have contained prohibited materials and that are intended for use in animal feed with the BSE cautionary statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." [21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(i).]

 

As discussed above, your clean out procedure is inadequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds intended for ruminant animals. Thus, all feeds manufactured using your mixer and hand-add chute that did not contain the BSE cautionary statement “Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants,” are misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 U.S.C. 343(a)(1)] of the Act. For example, a batch of Carolina Choice Beef Conditioner Custom Mix (b)(4), manufactured on September 6, 2013, while there was a significant build-up of feed residues in the feed mixer, was misbranded as its label did not contain the required BSE cautionary statement.

 

The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a medicated and non-medicated feed manufacturer, you are responsible for assuring that your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish procedures whereby such violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory and/or administrative sanctions. These sanctions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and/or notice of opportunity for a hearing on a proposal to withdraw approval of your Medicated Feed Mill License under Section 512(m)(4)(B)(ii) of the Act and 21 C.F.R. 515.22(c)(2).

 

Based on the results of the September 5-9, 2013 inspection, evaluated together with the evidence before FDA when the Medicated Feed Mill License was approved, the methods used in, or the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of medicated feeds are inadequate to assure and preserve the identity, strength, quality, and purity of the new animal drugs therein. This letter constitutes official notification under the law and provides you an opportunity to correct the above described violations.

 

You should notify this office, in writing, within fifteen (15) working days of the receipt of this letter of the steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step being taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. In your response, please include the timeframe in which the corrections will be completed and provide any documentation that will effectively assist us in evaluating whether the corrective actions have been made and the adequacy of such. If you are unable to complete the corrective actions within fifteen (15) working days, identify the reason for the delay and the time within which you will complete the corrections. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating that corrections have been made.

 

Your written response should be sent to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Attn: Janice L. King, Compliance Officer, at the address noted in the letterhead. If you have questions, please contact Mrs. King at 843-746-2990 or write her at the noted address.

 

Sincerely, /S/ Philip S. Campbell Acting District Director Atlanta District Office

 

cc: South Carolina Department of Agriculture, Phillip C. Trefsgar

 


 

 

HOLY MAD COW BATMAN, how much went out into commerce, how much was recovered, what species are consuming these adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)] of the Act, protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds that may be used for ruminants [21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B)] ???

 

 

1. You failed to use clean out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds that may be used for ruminants [21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B)]. Your feed is therefore adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)] of the Act.

 

Because your firm uses animal proteins prohibited from use in ruminant feeds, and also makes feeds for ruminants, you are required to have a cleanout procedure adequate to prevent carryover into ruminant feeds. As noted above, our Investigators observed a significant build-up of feed residues inside the feed mixer and the hand-add chute, which remained following your cleanout procedure. This equipment is used for processing both proteins derived from mammalian tissues and feeds for ruminants. Since flushing was ineffective in removing the accumulated feed from the equipment, your clean out procedure was inadequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds intended for ruminant animals.

 

Your response indicates that your corrective actions for this item are the same as for Item 1 above. However, as noted above, you did not provide any documentation to demonstrate that the changes you discussed have been made, or that they were adequate to address this issue.

 

2. You failed to label all products which contained or may have contained prohibited materials and that are intended for use in animal feed with the BSE cautionary statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." [21 C.F.R. 589.2000(e)(1)(i).]

 

As discussed above, your clean out procedure is inadequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to feeds intended for ruminant animals. Thus, all feeds manufactured using your mixer and hand-add chute that did not contain the BSE cautionary statement “Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants,” are misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 U.S.C. 343(a)(1)] of the Act. For example, a batch of Carolina Choice Beef Conditioner Custom Mix (b)(4), manufactured on September 6, 2013, while there was a significant build-up of feed residues in the feed mixer, was misbranded as its label did not contain the required BSE cautionary statement...end...TSS

 


 

Rocky Ford Pet Foods 8/27/13

   

Department of Health and Human Services logoDepartment of Health and Human Services Public Health Service

Food and Drug Administration

  Denver District Office

Bldg. 20-Denver Federal Center

P.O. Box 25087

6th Avenue & Kipling Street

Denver, Colorado 80225-0087

Telephone: 303-236-3000

FAX:              303-236-3100 

 

 

 

August 27, 2013

 

 WARNING LETTER

 

 

VIA UPS Overnight

 

 

Mr. Juan Manuel Villegas

Owner

Rocky Ford Pet Foods

21693 Highway 50 East

Rocky Ford, CO 81067

Ref. #: DEN-13-20-WL

 

Dear Mr. Villegas:

 

On February 25-27, 2013, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) conducted an inspection of your rendering facility located at 21693 Highway 50 East, Rocky Ford, Colorado. This inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in FDA regulations intended to reduce the risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) within the United States. These regulations are found in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Section 589.2000 (21 CFR 589.2000), Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, and Section 589.2001 (21 CFR 589.2001), Cattle Materials Prohibited in Animal Food or Feed to Prevent the Transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. These regulations address how renderers process (1) mammalian proteins prohibited from use in ruminant food or feed and (2) materials designated as “cattle materials prohibited in animal food or feed” (CMPAF) which are prohibited from use in animal food or feed. CMPAF include, but are not limited to:

 

The brain and spinal cord of cattle 30 months of age or older;

The entire carcass of cattle infected with BSE; and

The entire carcass of cattle 30 months of age or older that have not been inspected and passed for human consumption if the brains and spinal cords were not removed or otherwise effectively excluded from animal feed.

 

Your facility processes CMPAF.

 

Your failure to follow certain requirements of these regulations, as described below, resulted in products manufactured and distributed by your facilities being adulterated within the meaning of Section 402(a)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), [21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4)] and misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(f) of the Act, [21 U.S.C. 343(f)].  You can find the Act, and its implementing regulations on the Internet through links on the FDA’s web page at www.fda.gov1.

 

Our inspection revealed the following serious deviations from the regulations at your rendering facility:

 

Failure to prevent the inclusion of cattle materials prohibited in animal feed (CMPAF) in animal feed or feed ingredients, as required by 21 CFR 589.2001(c)(1). Specifically, on February 25, 2013, our investigator observed that the unmarked CMPAF posterior sections of vertebral columns for two cows, identified by your firm as older than 30 months of age, were separated from the rest of the marked CMPAF material from those animals. The unmarked CMPAF material was then commingled with 18 additional posterior vertebral columns and placed in a trailer for shipment to another renderer for further processing and possible use in animal feed.

 

You removed all 20 posterior vertebral columns from the trailer during the inspection and stated that you would dispose of them in a landfill.

 

Failure to maintain adequate written procedures specifying how the process of removing the brain and spinal cord from cattle not inspected and passed for human consumption or 30 months of age or older is carried out, as required by 21 CFR 589.2001(c)(2)(ii).  Specifically, your written procedure “Rocky Ford Ped [sic] Food Standard Operating Procedure for handling 30 month and older Beef and CMPAF Products” indicates that the head, vertebral column, and rib cage for cattle 30 months of age and older are kept in one piece. This written procedure is not consistent with actual operations observed at your firm on February 26, 2013. Our investigator observed that posterior vertebral columns from two cows 30 months of age or older were separated from the animals’ heads and anterior vertebral columns; the posterior sections were not marked as CMPAF material. Your written procedures fail to specify how, for animals 30 months of age or older, posterior vertebral columns separated from marked anterior vertebral columns would themselves be marked as CMPAF material.  

 

Failure to mark the CMPAF and products that contain or may contain CMPAF with an agent that can be readily detected on visual inspection, as required by 21 CFR 589.2001(c)(2)(v). Specifically, the posterior sections of vertebra columns from cattle identified by your firm as 30 months of age or older were separated from the head and anterior vertebral columns but then were not identified as CMPAF with an agent readily detectable on visual examination. Therefore, the CMPAF posterior vertebral columns were indistinguishable from the non-CMPAF posterior vertebral columns.

 

Failure to label containers, including vehicles when used as containers, which contain CMPAF with the required statement, “Do not feed to animals,” as required by 21 CFR 589.2001(c)(2)(iv). Specifically, the dump truck and trailer used for storage and transport of CMPAF materials did not bear the statement “Do not feed to animals.”

 

Failure to avoid cross-contamination once CMPAF have been separated from other cattle materials as required by 21 CFR 589.2001(c)(2)(iii). Specifically, both marked and unmarked CMPAF were observed to be stored on the floor of the processing area rather than in separate containers that adequately prevent contact with animal feed, animal feed ingredients, or equipment surfaces, 21 CFR 589.2001(c)(2)(iii)(B). As described in item #1 above, the unmarked materials were indistinguishable from non-CMPAF materials and could result in cross-contamination.

 

 

This letter is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

 

You should notify this office in writing of the steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law within fifteen (15) working days of receiving this letter. Your response should include each step that has been taken or will be taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within fifteen (15) working days, state the reason for the delay and the timeframe within which the corrections will be completed. Please include copies of supporting documentation demonstrating that corrections have been made.

 

Your written response should be sent to: U.S. Food and Drug Administration, P.O. Box 25087, 6th Ave. and Kipling St., DFC, Bldg 20, Denver, CO 80225-0087, Attn: Sarah A. Della Fave, Compliance Officer. If you have any questions about this letter, please contact Ms. Della Fave at (303) 236-3006.         

 

Sincerely,

/S/

LaTonya Mitchell

District Director

 

 

 

cc:    Ronald K. Jones, D.V.M.

         Denver District Manager

         USDA/FSIS

         PO Box 25387

         DFC, Bldg 45

         Denver, CO 80225

 

        Laurel Hamling

        Colorado Department of Agriculture

        Feed Program

        2331 W. 31st Avenue

        Denver, CO 80211

-

Close Out Letter

Rocky Ford Pet Foods - Close Out Letter 4/16/142

 

 


 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

 


 

*** Singeltary reply ;

 

Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada

 


 

*** Singeltary reply ;

 


 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 





Friday, December 14, 2012

 

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

 

snip...

 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

 

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

 

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

 

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

 

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

 

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

 

snip...

 

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

 

snip...

 

The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

 

snip...

 

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

 

snip...

 

In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

 

snip...

 

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

 

snip...

 


 

Friday, December 14, 2012

 

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

 


 

*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.

 


 

==================================

 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system.

 

***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

=================================

 

Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; CVM Updates on Deer and Elk Withdrawn FDA Veterinarian Newsletter July/August 2003 Volume XVIII, No 4

 

FDA has announced the availability of a draft guidance for industry entitled “Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed.” This draft guidance document (GFI #158), when finalized, will describe FDA’s current thinking regarding the use in animal feed of material from deer and elk that are positive for Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) or that are at high risk for CWD.

 

CWD is a neurological (brain) disease of farmed and wild deer and elk that belong in the cervidae animal family (cervids). Only deer and elk are known to be susceptible to CWD by natural transmission. The disease has been found in farmed and wild mule deer, white-tailed deer, North American elk, and farmed black-tailed deer. CWD belongs to a family of animal and human diseases called transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). TSEs are very rare, but are always fatal.

 

This draft Level 1 guidance, when finalized, will represent the Agency’s current thinking on the topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or the public. An alternate method may be used as long as it satisfies the requirements of applicable statutes and regulations.

 

Draft guidance #158 is posted on the FDA/Center for Veterinary Medicine Home Page. Single copies of the draft guidance may be obtained from the FDA Veterinarian.

 

- - Page Last Updated: 04/16/2013

 


 

CONTAINS NON-BINDING RECOMMENDATIONS

 

158

 

Guidance for Industry

 

Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed

 

Comments and suggestions regarding the document should be submitted to Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305), Food and Drug Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, Rm. 1061, Rockville, MD 20852. Submit electronic comments to http://www.regulations.gov. All comments should be identified with the Docket No. 03D-0186.

 

For questions regarding this guidance, contact Burt Pritchett, Center for Veterinary Medicine (HFV- 222), Food and Drug Administration, 7519 Standish Place, Rockville, MD 20855, 240-453-6860, E-mail: burt.pritchett@fda.hhs.gov. Additional copies of this guidance document may be requested from the Communications Staff (HFV-12), Center for Veterinary Medicine, Food and Drug Administration, 7519 Standish Place, Rockville, MD 20855, and may be viewed on the Internet at http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/default.htm.

 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

 

Food and Drug Administration Center for Veterinary Medicine September 15, 2003

 

CONTAINS NON-BINDING RECOMMENDATIONS

 

158

 

Guidance for Industry1

 

Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed

 

This guidance represents the Food and Drug Administration’s current thinking on the use of material from deer and elk in animal feed. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or the public. You can use an alternative approach if the approach satisfies the requirements of applicable statutes or regulations. If you want to discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff responsible for implementing this guidance. If you cannot identify the appropriate FDA staff, call the appropriate number listed on the title page of this guidance.

 

I. Introduction

 

FDA’s guidance documents, including this guidance, do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. Instead, guidances describe the Agency’s current thinking on a topic and should be viewed only as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited. The use of the word “should” in Agency guidances means that something is suggested or recommended, but not required.

 

Under FDA’s BSE feed regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. This guidance document describes FDA’s recommendations regarding the use in all animal feed of all material from deer and elk that are positive for Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) or are considered at high risk for CWD. The potential risks from CWD to humans or non-cervid animals such as poultry and swine are not well understood. However, because of recent recognition that CWD is spreading rapidly in white-tailed deer, and because CWD’s route of transmission is poorly understood, FDA is making recommendations regarding the use in animal feed of rendered materials from deer and elk that are CWD-positive or that are at high risk for CWD.

 

II. Background

 

CWD is a neurological (brain) disease of farmed and wild deer and elk that belong in the animal family cervidae (cervids). Only deer and elk are known to be susceptible to CWD by natural transmission. The disease has been found in farmed and wild mule deer,

 

1 This guidance has been prepared by the Division of Animal Feeds in the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) at the Food and Drug Administration.

 

1

 

CONTAINS NON-BINDING RECOMMENDATIONS

 

2

 

white-tailed deer, North American elk, and in farmed black-tailed deer. CWD belongs to a family of animal and human diseases called transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). These include bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow” disease) in cattle; scrapie in sheep and goats; and classical and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob diseases (CJD and vCJD) in humans. There is no known treatment for these diseases, and there is no vaccine to prevent them. In addition, although validated postmortem diagnostic tests are available, there are no validated diagnostic tests for CWD that can be used to test for the disease in live animals.

 

III.

 

Use in animal feed of material from CWD-positive deer and elk

 

Material from CWD-positive animals may not be used in any animal feed or feed ingredients. Pursuant to Sec. 402(a)(5) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, animal feed and feed ingredients containing material from a CWD-positive animal would be considered adulterated. FDA recommends that any such adulterated feed or feed ingredients be recalled or otherwise removed from the marketplace.

 

IV.

 

Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD

 

Deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD include: (1) animals from areas declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and (2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 

FDA recommends that materials from deer and elk considered at high risk for CWD no longer be entered into the animal feed system. Under present circumstances, FDA is not recommending that feed made from deer and elk from a non-endemic area be recalled if a State later declares the area endemic for CWD or a CWD eradication zone. In addition, at this time, FDA is not recommending that feed made from deer and elk believed to be from a captive herd that contained no CWD-positive animals be recalled if that herd is subsequently found to contain a CWD-positive animal. V. Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD

 

FDA continues to consider materials from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD to be acceptable for use in NON-RUMINANT animal feeds in accordance with current agency regulations, 21 CFR 589.2000. Deer and elk not considered at high risk include: (1) deer and elk from areas not declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and (2) deer and elk that were not at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 


 

that voluntary mad cow feed ban that became law, how did that work out for us $

 

***e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; ***

 

ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

 

please note, considering .005 grams is lethal, I do not know how much of this 125 TONS of banned mad cow protein was part of the ;

 

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

 

bbbut, this was about 10 years post mad cow feed ban from 1997. 10 years later, and still feeding banned mad cow protein to cervids???

 

considering that .005 gram is lethal to several bovines, and we know that the oral consumption of CWD tainted products is very efficient mode of transmission of CWD.

 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

 

PRODUCT

 

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

 

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

 

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

 

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

 

***e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; ***

 

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

 

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

 

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

 

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

 

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

 

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

 

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

 

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6

 

CODE

 

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

125 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

AL and FL

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

 

###

 


 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss

 


 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

 

CODE

 

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

42,090 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

WI

 

___________________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

 

CODE

 

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

2013

 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

 DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 -0500 EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1 http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm

 


 


 

> First transmission of CWD to transgenic mice over-expressing bovine prion protein gene (TgSB3985)

 

PRION 2014 - PRIONS: EPIGENETICS and NEURODEGENERATIVE DISEASES – Shaping up the future of prion research

 

Animal TSE Workshop 10.40 – 11.05 Talk Dr. L. Cervenakova First transmission of CWD to transgenic mice over-expressing bovine prion protein gene (TgSB3985)

 


 

P.126: Successful transmission of chronic wasting disease (CWD) into mice over-expressing bovine prion protein (TgSB3985)

 

Larisa Cervenakova,1 Christina J Sigurdson,2 Pedro Piccardo,3 Oksana Yakovleva,1 Irina Vasilyeva,1 Jorge de Castro,1 Paula Saá,1 and Anton Cervenak1 1American Red Cross, Holland Laboratory; Rockville, MD USA; 2University of California; San Diego, CA USA; 3Lab TSE/OBRR /CBER/FDA; Rockville, MD USA

 

Keywords: chronic wasting disease, transmission, transgenic mouse, bovine prion protein

 

Background. CWD is a disease affecting wild and farmraised cervids in North America. Epidemiological studies provide no evidence of CWD transmission to humans. Multiple attempts have failed to infect transgenic mice expressing human PRNP gene with CWD. The extremely low efficiency of PrPCWD to convert normal human PrPC in vitro provides additional evidence that transmission of CWD to humans cannot be easily achieved. However, a concern about the risk of CWD transmission to humans still exists. This study aimed to establish and characterize an experimental model of CWD in TgSB3985 mice with the following attempt of transmission to TgHu mice.

 

Materials and Methods. TgSB3985 mice and wild-type FVB/ NCrl mice were intracranially injected with 1% brain homogenate from a CWD-infected Tga20 mouse (CWD/Tga20). TgSB3985 and TgRM (over-expressing human PrP) were similarly injected with 5% brain homogenates from CWD-infected white-tailed deer (CWD/WTD) or elk (CWD/Elk). Animals were observed for clinical signs of neurological disease and were euthanized when moribund. Brains and spleens were removed from all mice for PrPCWD detection by Western blotting (WB). A histological analysis of brains from selected animals was performed: brains were scored for the severity of spongiform change, astrogliosis, and PrPCWD deposition in ten brain regions.

 

Results. Clinical presentation was consistent with TSE. More than 90% of TgSB3985 and wild-type mice infected with CWD/Tga20, tested positive for PrPres in the brain but only mice in the latter group carried PrPCWD in their spleens. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of two CWD/ Tga20 strains based on biochemical and histological profiles. In TgSB3985 mice infected with CWD-elk or CWD-WTD, no animals tested positive for PrPCWD in the brain or in the spleen by WB. However, on neuropathological examination we found presence of amyloid plaques that stained positive for PrPCWD in three CWD/WTD- and two CWD/Elk-infected TgSB3985 mice. The neuropathologic profiles in CWD/WTD- and CWD/Elkinfected mice were similar but unique as compared to profiles of BSE, BSE-H or CWD/Tg20 agents propagated in TgSB3985 mice. None of CWD-infected TgRM mice tested positive for PrPCWD by WB or by immunohistochemical detection.

 

Conclusions. To our knowledge, this is the first established experimental model of CWD in TgSB3985. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of two CWD strains adapted to Tga20 mice and their replication in TgSB3985 mice. Finally, we observed phenotypic differences between cervid-derived CWD and CWD/Tg20 strains upon propagation in TgSB3985 mice. Further studies are underway to characterize these strains.

 

Thursday, November 21, 2013

 

*** Assessing the susceptibility of transgenic mice over-expressing deer prion protein to bovine spongiform encephalopathy

 

The present study was designed to assess the susceptibility of the prototypic mouse line, Tg(CerPrP)1536+/- to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) prions, which have the ability to overcome species barriers. Tg(CerPrP)1536+/- mice challenged with red deer-adapted BSE resulted in a 90-100% attack rates, BSE from cattle failed to transmit, indicating agent adaptation in the deer.

 


 

TSS

 

UPDATED CORRESPONDENCE FROM AUTHORS OF THIS STUDY I.E. COLBY, PRUSINER ET AL, ABOUT MY CONCERNS OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THEIR FIGURES AND MY FIGURES OF THE STUDIES ON CWD TRANSMISSION TO CATTLE ;

 

CWD to cattle figures CORRECTION

 

Greetings,

 

I believe the statement and quote below is incorrect ;

 

"CWD has been transmitted to cattle after intracerebral inoculation, although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001]). This finding raised concerns that CWD prions might be transmitted to cattle grazing in contaminated pastures."

 

Please see ;

 

Within 26 months post inoculation, 12 inoculated animals had lost weight, revealed abnormal clinical signs, and were euthanatized. Laboratory tests revealed the presence of a unique pattern of the disease agent in tissues of these animals. These findings demonstrate that when CWD is directly inoculated into the brain of cattle, 86% of inoculated cattle develop clinical signs of the disease.

 


 

" although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001]). "

 

shouldn't this be corrected, 86% is NOT a low rate. ...

 

kindest regards,

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

 

Thank you!

 

Thanks so much for your updates/comments. We intend to publish as rapidly as possible all updates/comments that contribute substantially to the topic under discussion.

 


 

re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 + Author Affiliations

 

1Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 2Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94143 Correspondence: stanley@ind.ucsf.edu

 


 

Mule deer, white-tailed deer, and elk have been reported to develop CWD. As the only prion disease identified in free-ranging animals, CWD appears to be far more communicable than other forms of prion disease. CWD was first described in 1967 and was reported to be a spongiform encephalopathy in 1978 on the basis of histopathology of the brain. Originally detected in the American West, CWD has spread across much of North America and has been reported also in South Korea. In captive populations, up to 90% of mule deer have been reported to be positive for prions (Williams and Young 1980). The incidence of CWD in cervids living in the wild has been estimated to be as high as 15% (Miller et al. 2000). The development of transgenic (Tg) mice expressing cervid PrP, and thus susceptible to CWD, has enhanced detection of CWD and the estimation of prion titers (Browning et al. 2004; Tamgüney et al. 2006). Shedding of prions in the feces, even in presymptomatic deer, has been identified as a likely source of infection for these grazing animals (Williams and Miller 2002; Tamgüney et al. 2009b). CWD has been transmitted to cattle after intracerebral inoculation, although the infection rate was low (4 of 13 animals [Hamir et al. 2001]). This finding raised concerns that CWD prions might be transmitted to cattle grazing in contaminated pastures.

 

snip...

 


 

----- Original Message -----

 

From: David Colby To: flounder9@verizon.net

 

Cc: stanley@XXXXXXXX

 

Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2011 8:25 AM

 

Subject: Re: FW: re-Prions David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2 + Author Affiliations

 

Dear Terry Singeltary,

 

Thank you for your correspondence regarding the review article Stanley Prusiner and I recently wrote for Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives. Dr. Prusiner asked that I reply to your message due to his busy schedule. We agree that the transmission of CWD prions to beef livestock would be a troubling development and assessing that risk is important. In our article, we cite a peer-reviewed publication reporting confirmed cases of laboratory transmission based on stringent criteria. The less stringent criteria for transmission described in the abstract you refer to lead to the discrepancy between your numbers and ours and thus the interpretation of the transmission rate. We stand by our assessment of the literature--namely that the transmission rate of CWD to bovines appears relatively low, but we recognize that even a low transmission rate could have important implications for public health and we thank you for bringing attention to this matter. Warm Regards, David Colby -- David Colby, PhDAssistant Professor Department of Chemical Engineering University of Delaware

 

===========END...TSS==============

 

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

 


 

UPDATED DATA ON 2ND CWD STRAIN Wednesday, September 08, 2010 CWD PRION CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010

 


 

Sunday, August 19, 2012

 

Susceptibility of cattle to the agent of chronic wasting disease from elk after intracranial inoculation 2012

 

Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit

 


 

these cattle ranchers supporting these shooting pens, if there are any, could be in terrible shape if a strain of cwd was to jump to cattle...just saying.

 

Title: Transmission of chronic wasting disease of mule deer to Suffolk sheep following intracerebral inoculation

 

Authors

 

item Hamir, Amirali item Kunkle, Robert item Cutlip, Randall - ARS RETIRED item Miller, Janice - ARS RETIRED item Williams, Elizabeth - UNIV OF WYOMING, LARAMIE item Richt, Juergen

 

Submitted to: Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: June 20, 2006 Publication Date: November 1, 2006 Citation: Hamir, A.N., Kunkle, R.A., Cutlip, R.C., Miller, J.M., Williams, E.S., Richt, J.A. 2006. Transmission of chronic wasting disease of mule deer to Suffolk sheep following intracerebral inoculation. Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation. 18(6):558-565.

 

Interpretive Summary: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has been identified in captive and free ranging deer and elk since 1967. To determine the transmissibility of CWD to sheep and to provide information about the disease and tests for detection of CWD in sheep, 8 lambs were inoculated with brain suspension from mule deer naturally affected with CWD. Two other lambs were kept as controls. Only 1 sheep developed clinical disease at 35 months after inoculation. The study was terminated at 72 months after the inoculation. At that time one other sheep was found to be positive for the disease. It is proposed that the host's genetic makeup may play a role in transmission of the disease to domestic sheep. Impact. This is the first study which shows that it is possible to transmit CWD to a small number of sheep. Technical Abstract: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has been identified in captive and free-ranging cervids since 1967. To determine the transmissibility of CWD to sheep and to provide information about clinical course, lesions, and suitability of currently used diagnostic procedures for detection of CWD in sheep, 8 Suffolk lambs (4 QQ and 4 QR at codon 171 of prion protein (PRNP) gene) were inoculated intracerebrally with brain suspension from mule deer naturally affected with CWD (CWD**md). Two other lambs (1 QQ and 1 QR at codon 171 of PRNP gene) were kept as non-inoculated controls. Within 36 months post inoculation (MPI), 2 animals became recumbent and were euthanized. However, only 1 sheep (euthanized at 35 MPI) had shown clinical signs that were consistent with those of scrapie. Microscopic lesions of spongiform encephalopathy (SE) were seen in this sheep and its tissues were positive for the abnormal prion protein (PrPres) by immunohistochemistry and Western blot. Retrospective examination of the PRNP genotype of this animal revealed that it was heterozygous (AV) at codon 136. In the next 24 months, 3 other sheep were euthanized because of conditions unrelated to TSE. The remaining 3 sheep remained non-clinical at the termination of the study (72 MPI) and were euthanized at that time. One of these 3 revealed SE and its tissues were positive for PrPres. These findings demonstrate that it is possible to transmit CWD**md agent to sheep via the intracerebral route. However, the host genotype may play a significant part in successful transmission and incubation period of this agent.

 


 

Thus far, among domestic animals, CWDmd has been transmitted by the intracerebral route to a goat18 and cattle.5–7 The present findings demonstrate that it is also possible to transmit CWDmd agent to sheep via the intracerebral route. However, the only sheep to develop clinical TSE within 35 MPI was genotypically AV at PRNP codon 136, suggesting that host genotype may play a notable part in successful transmission of the disease in this species. Although in Suffolk sheep the AV variant at codon 136 is very rare,17 selective breeding of Suffolk sheep with this codon has begun in the hope of testing this differential susceptibility hypothesis in a future study of CWDmd transmission to sheep.

 


 

2012

 

PO-039: A comparison of scrapie and chronic wasting disease in white-tailed deer

 

Justin Greenlee, Jodi Smith, Eric Nicholson US Dept. Agriculture; Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center; Ames, IA USA

 

snip...

 

The results of this study suggest that there are many similarities in the manifestation of CWD and scrapie in WTD after IC inoculation including early and widespread presence of PrPSc in lymphoid tissues, clinical signs of depression and weight loss progressing to wasting, and an incubation time of 21-23 months. Moreover, western blots (WB) done on brain material from the obex region have a molecular profile similar to CWD and distinct from tissues of the cerebrum or the scrapie inoculum. However, results of microscopic and IHC examination indicate that there are differences between the lesions expected in CWD and those that occur in deer with scrapie: amyloid plaques were not noted in any sections of brain examined from these deer and the pattern of immunoreactivity by IHC was diffuse rather than plaque-like.

 

*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of WTD were susceptible to scrapie.

 

Deer developed clinical signs of wasting and mental depression and were necropsied from 28 to 33 months PI. Tissues from these deer were positive for PrPSc by IHC and WB. Similar to IC inoculated deer, samples from these deer exhibited two different molecular profiles: samples from obex resembled CWD whereas those from cerebrum were similar to the original scrapie inoculum. On further examination by WB using a panel of antibodies, the tissues from deer with scrapie exhibit properties differing from tissues either from sheep with scrapie or WTD with CWD. Samples from WTD with CWD or sheep with scrapie are strongly immunoreactive when probed with mAb P4, however, samples from WTD with scrapie are only weakly immunoreactive. In contrast, when probed with mAb’s 6H4 or SAF 84, samples from sheep with scrapie and WTD with CWD are weakly immunoreactive and samples from WTD with scrapie are strongly positive. This work demonstrates that WTD are highly susceptible to sheep scrapie, but on first passage, scrapie in WTD is differentiable from CWD.

 


 

2011

 

*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of white-tailed deer were susceptible to scrapie.

 


 

***please read this***

 

98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 

EDITORIAL

 

Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen

 

Cristina Acín

 

Resistant prions in the environment have been the sword of Damocles for scrapie control and eradication. Attempts to establish which physical and chemical agents could be applied to inactivate or moderate scrapie infectivity were initiated in the 1960s and 1970s,with the first study of this type focusing on the effect of heat treatment in reducing prion infectivity (Hunter and Millson 1964). Nowadays, most of the chemical procedures that aim to inactivate the prion protein are based on the method developed by Kimberlin and collaborators (1983). This procedure consists of treatment with 20,000 parts per million free chlorine solution, for a minimum of one hour, of all surfaces that need to be sterilised (in laboratories, lambing pens, slaughterhouses, and so on). Despite this, veterinarians and farmers may still ask a range of questions, such as ‘Is there an official procedure published somewhere?’ and ‘Is there an international organisation which recommends and defines the exact method of scrapie decontamination that must be applied?’

 

From a European perspective, it is difficult to find a treatment that could be applied, especially in relation to the disinfection of surfaces in lambing pens of affected flocks. A 999/2001 EU regulation on controlling spongiform encephalopathies (European Parliament and Council 2001) did not specify a particular decontamination measure to be used when an outbreak of scrapie is diagnosed. There is only a brief recommendation in Annex VII concerning the control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE s).

 

Chapter B of the regulation explains the measures that must be applied if new caprine animals are to be introduced to a holding where a scrapie outbreak has previously been diagnosed. In that case, the statement indicates that caprine animals can be introduced ‘provided that a cleaning and disinfection of all animal housing on the premises has been carried out following destocking’.

 

Issues around cleaning and disinfection are common in prion prevention recommendations, but relevant authorities, veterinarians and farmers may have difficulties in finding the specific protocol which applies. The European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA ) published a detailed report about the efficacy of certain biocides, such as sodium hydroxide, sodium hypochlorite, guanidine and even a formulation of copper or iron metal ions in combination with hydrogen peroxide, against prions (EFSA 2009). The report was based on scientific evidence (Fichet and others 2004, Lemmer and others 2004, Gao and others 2006, Solassol and others 2006) but unfortunately the decontamination measures were not assessed under outbreak conditions.

 

The EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards recently published its conclusions on the scrapie situation in the EU after 10 years of monitoring and control of the disease in sheep and goats (EFSA 2014), and one of the most interesting findings was the Icelandic experience regarding the effect of disinfection in scrapie control. The Icelandic plan consisted of: culling scrapie-affected sheep or the whole flock in newly diagnosed outbreaks; deep cleaning and disinfection of stables, sheds, barns and equipment with high pressure washing followed by cleaning with 500 parts per million of hypochlorite; drying and treatment with 300 ppm of iodophor; and restocking was not permitted for at least two years. Even when all of these measures were implemented, scrapie recurred on several farms, indicating that the infectious agent survived for years in the environment, even as many as 16 years after restocking (Georgsson and others 2006).

 

In the rest of the countries considered in the EFSA (2014) report, recommendations for disinfection measures were not specifically defined at the government level. In the report, the only recommendation that is made for sheep is repopulation with sheep with scrapie-resistant genotypes. This reduces the risk of scrapie recurrence but it is difficult to know its effect on the infection.

 

Until the EFSA was established (in May 2003), scientific opinions about TSE s were provided by the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of the EC, whose advice regarding inactivation procedures focused on treating animal waste at high temperatures (150°C for three hours) and high pressure alkaline hydrolysis (SSC 2003). At the same time, the TSE Risk Management Subgroup of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) in the UK published guidance on safe working and the prevention of TSE infection. Annex C of the ACDP report established that sodium hypochlorite was considered to be effective, but only if 20,000 ppm of available chlorine was present for at least one hour, which has practical limitations such as the release of chlorine gas, corrosion, incompatibility with formaldehyde, alcohols and acids, rapid inactivation of its active chemicals and the stability of dilutions (ACDP 2009).

 

In an international context, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not recommend a specific disinfection protocol for prion agents in its Terrestrial Code or Manual. Chapter 4.13 of the Terrestrial Code, General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection (OIE 2014), focuses on foot-and-mouth disease virus, mycobacteria and Bacillus anthracis, but not on prion disinfection. Nevertheless, the last update published by the OIE on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (OIE 2012) indicates that few effective decontamination techniques are available to inactivate the agent on surfaces, and recommends the removal of all organic material and the use of sodium hydroxide, or a sodium hypochlorite solution containing 2 per cent available chlorine, for more than one hour at 20ºC.

 

The World Health Organization outlines guidelines for the control of TSE s, and also emphasises the importance of mechanically cleaning surfaces before disinfection with sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite for one hour (WHO 1999).

 

Finally, the relevant agencies in both Canada and the USA suggest that the best treatments for surfaces potentially contaminated with prions are sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite at 20,000 ppm. This is a 2 per cent solution, while most commercial household bleaches contain 5.25 per cent sodium hypochlorite. It is therefore recommended to dilute one part 5.25 per cent bleach with 1.5 parts water (CDC 2009, Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2013).

 

So what should we do about disinfection against prions? First, it is suggested that a single protocol be created by international authorities to homogenise inactivation procedures and enable their application in all scrapie-affected countries. Sodium hypochlorite with 20,000 ppm of available chlorine seems to be the procedure used in most countries, as noted in a paper summarised on p 99 of this issue of Veterinary Record (Hawkins and others 2015). But are we totally sure of its effectiveness as a preventive measure in a scrapie outbreak? Would an in-depth study of the recurrence of scrapie disease be needed?

 

What we can conclude is that, if we want to fight prion diseases, and specifically classical scrapie, we must focus on the accuracy of diagnosis, monitoring and surveillance; appropriate animal identification and control of movements; and, in the end, have homogeneous and suitable protocols to decontaminate and disinfect lambing barns, sheds and equipment available to veterinarians and farmers. Finally, further investigations into the resistance of prion proteins in the diversity of environmental surfaces are required.

 

References

 

snip...

 

98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 


 

Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following cleaning and decontamination

 

Steve A. C. Hawkins, MIBiol, Pathology Department1, Hugh A. Simmons, BVSc MRCVS, MBA, MA Animal Services Unit1, Kevin C. Gough, BSc, PhD2 and Ben C. Maddison, BSc, PhD3 + Author Affiliations

 

1Animal and Plant Health Agency, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK 2School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK 3ADAS UK, School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK E-mail for correspondence: ben.maddison@adas.co.uk Abstract Scrapie of sheep/goats and chronic wasting disease of deer/elk are contagious prion diseases where environmental reservoirs are directly implicated in the transmission of disease. In this study, the effectiveness of recommended scrapie farm decontamination regimens was evaluated by a sheep bioassay using buildings naturally contaminated with scrapie. Pens within a farm building were treated with either 20,000 parts per million free chorine solution for one hour or were treated with the same but were followed by painting and full re-galvanisation or replacement of metalwork within the pen. Scrapie susceptible lambs of the PRNP genotype VRQ/VRQ were reared within these pens and their scrapie status was monitored by recto-anal mucosa-associated lymphoid tissue. All animals became infected over an 18-month period, even in the pen that had been subject to the most stringent decontamination process. These data suggest that recommended current guidelines for the decontamination of farm buildings following outbreaks of scrapie do little to reduce the titre of infectious scrapie material and that environmental recontamination could also be an issue associated with these premises.

 

SNIP...

 

Discussion

 

Thorough pressure washing of a pen had no effect on the amount of bioavailable scrapie infectivity (pen B). The routine removal of prions from surfaces within a laboratory setting is treatment for a minimum of one hour with 20,000 ppm free chlorine, a method originally based on the use of brain macerates from infected rodents to evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination (Kimberlin and others 1983). Further studies have also investigated the effectiveness of hypochlorite disinfection of metal surfaces to simulate the decontamination of surgical devices within a hospital setting. Such treatments with hypochlorite solution were able to reduce infectivity by 5.5 logs to lower than the sensitivity of the bioassay used (Lemmer and others 2004). Analogous treatment of the pen surfaces did not effectively remove the levels of scrapie infectivity over that of the control pens, indicating that this method of decontamination is not effective within a farm setting. This may be due to the high level of biological matrix that is present upon surfaces within the farm environment, which may reduce the amount of free chlorine available to inactivate any infectious prion. Remarkably 1/5 sheep introduced into pen D had also became scrapie positive within nine months, with all animals in this pen being RAMALT positive by 18 months of age. Pen D was no further away from the control pen (pen A) than any of the other pens within this barn. Localised hot spots of infectivity may be present within scrapie-contaminated environments, but it is unlikely that pen D area had an amount of scrapie contamination that was significantly different than the other areas within this building. Similarly, there were no differences in how the biosecurity of pen D was maintained, or how this pen was ventilated compared with the other pens. This observation, perhaps, indicates the slower kinetics of disease uptake within this pen and is consistent with a more thorough prion removal and recontamination. These observations may also account for the presence of inadvertent scrapie cases within other studies, where despite stringent biosecurity, control animals have become scrapie positive during challenge studies using barns that also housed scrapie-affected animals (Ryder and others 2009). The bioassay data indicate that the exposure of the sheep to a farm environment after decontamination efforts thought to be effective in removing scrapie is sufficient for the animals to become infected with scrapie. The main exposure routes within this scenario are likely to be via the oral route, during feeding and drinking, and respiratory and conjunctival routes. It has been demonstrated that scrapie infectivity can be efficiently transmitted via the nasal route in sheep (Hamir and others 2008), as is the case for CWD in both murine models and in white-tailed deer (Denkers and others 2010, 2013). Recently, it has also been demonstrated that CWD prions presented as dust when bound to the soil mineral montmorillonite can be infectious via the nasal route (Nichols and others 2013). When considering pens C and D, the actual source of the infectious agent in the pens is not known, it is possible that biologically relevant levels of prion survive on surfaces during the decontamination regimen (pen C). With the use of galvanising and painting (pen D) covering and sealing the surface of the pen, it is possible that scrapie material recontaminated the pens by the movement of infectious prions contained within dusts originating from other parts of the barn that were not decontaminated or from other areas of the farm.

 

Given that scrapie prions are widespread on the surfaces of affected farms (Maddison and others 2010a), irrespective of the source of the infectious prions in the pens, this study clearly highlights the difficulties that are faced with the effective removal of environmentally associated scrapie infectivity. This is likely to be paralleled in CWD which shows strong similarities to scrapie in terms of both the dissemination of prions into the environment and the facile mode of disease transmission. These data further contribute to the understanding that prion diseases can be highly transmissible between susceptible individuals not just by direct contact but through highly stable environmental reservoirs that are refractory to decontamination.

 

The presence of these environmentally associated prions in farm buildings make the control of these diseases a considerable challenge, especially in animal species such as goats where there is lack of genetic resistance to scrapie and, therefore, no scope to re-stock farms with animals that are resistant to scrapie.

 

Scrapie Sheep Goats Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) Accepted October 12, 2014. Published Online First 31 October 2014

 


 

Monday, November 3, 2014

 

Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following cleaning and decontamination

 


 

PPo3-22:

 

Detection of Environmentally Associated PrPSc on a Farm with Endemic Scrapie

 

Ben C. Maddison,1 Claire A. Baker,1 Helen C. Rees,1 Linda A. Terry,2 Leigh Thorne,2 Susan J. Belworthy2 and Kevin C. Gough3 1ADAS-UK LTD; Department of Biology; University of Leicester; Leicester, UK; 2Veterinary Laboratories Agency; Surry, KT UK; 3Department of Veterinary Medicine and Science; University of Nottingham; Sutton Bonington, Loughborough UK

 

Key words: scrapie, evironmental persistence, sPMCA

 

Ovine scrapie shows considerable horizontal transmission, yet the routes of transmission and specifically the role of fomites in transmission remain poorly defined. Here we present biochemical data demonstrating that on a scrapie-affected sheep farm, scrapie prion contamination is widespread. It was anticipated at the outset that if prions contaminate the environment that they would be there at extremely low levels, as such the most sensitive method available for the detection of PrPSc, serial Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (sPMCA), was used in this study. We investigated the distribution of environmental scrapie prions by applying ovine sPMCA to samples taken from a range of surfaces that were accessible to animals and could be collected by use of a wetted foam swab. Prion was amplified by sPMCA from a number of these environmental swab samples including those taken from metal, plastic and wooden surfaces, both in the indoor and outdoor environment. At the time of sampling there had been no sheep contact with these areas for at least 20 days prior to sampling indicating that prions persist for at least this duration in the environment. These data implicate inanimate objects as environmental reservoirs of prion infectivity which are likely to contribute to disease transmission.

 


 

*** We conclude that TSE infectivity is likely to survive burial for long time periods with minimal loss of infectivity and limited movement from the original burial site. However PMCA results have shown that there is the potential for rainwater to elute TSE related material from soil which could lead to the contamination of a wider area. These experiments reinforce the importance of risk assessment when disposing of TSE risk materials.

 

*** The results show that even highly diluted PrPSc can bind efficiently to polypropylene, stainless steel, glass, wood and stone and propagate the conversion of normal prion protein. For in vivo experiments, hamsters were ic injected with implants incubated in 1% 263K-infected brain homogenate. Hamsters, inoculated with 263K-contaminated implants of all groups, developed typical signs of prion disease, whereas control animals inoculated with non-contaminated materials did not.

 

PRION 2014 CONFERENCE

 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD

 

A FEW FINDINGS ;

 

Conclusions. To our knowledge, this is the first established experimental model of CWD in TgSB3985. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of two CWD strains adapted to Tga20 mice and their replication in TgSB3985 mice. Finally, we observed phenotypic differences between cervid-derived CWD and CWD/Tg20 strains upon propagation in TgSB3985 mice. Further studies are underway to characterize these strains.

 

We conclude that TSE infectivity is likely to survive burial for long time periods with minimal loss of infectivity and limited movement from the original burial site. However PMCA results have shown that there is the potential for rainwater to elute TSE related material from soil which could lead to the contamination of a wider area. These experiments reinforce the importance of risk assessment when disposing of TSE risk materials.

 

The results show that even highly diluted PrPSc can bind efficiently to polypropylene, stainless steel, glass, wood and stone and propagate the conversion of normal prion protein. For in vivo experiments, hamsters were ic injected with implants incubated in 1% 263K-infected brain homogenate. Hamsters, inoculated with 263K-contaminated implants of all groups, developed typical signs of prion disease, whereas control animals inoculated with non-contaminated materials did not.

 

Our data establish that meadow voles are permissive to CWD via peripheral exposure route, suggesting they could serve as an environmental reservoir for CWD. Additionally, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that at least two strains of CWD circulate in naturally-infected cervid populations and provide evidence that meadow voles are a useful tool for CWD strain typing.

 

Conclusion. CWD prions are shed in saliva and urine of infected deer as early as 3 months post infection and throughout the subsequent >1.5 year course of infection. In current work we are examining the relationship of prionemia to excretion and the impact of excreted prion binding to surfaces and particulates in the environment.

 

Conclusion. CWD prions (as inferred by prion seeding activity by RT-QuIC) are shed in urine of infected deer as early as 6 months post inoculation and throughout the subsequent disease course. Further studies are in progress refining the real-time urinary prion assay sensitivity and we are examining more closely the excretion time frame, magnitude, and sample variables in relationship to inoculation route and prionemia in naturally and experimentally CWD-infected cervids.

 

Conclusions. Our results suggested that the odds of infection for CWD is likely controlled by areas that congregate deer thus increasing direct transmission (deer-to-deer interactions) or indirect transmission (deer-to-environment) by sharing or depositing infectious prion proteins in these preferred habitats. Epidemiology of CWD in the eastern U.S. is likely controlled by separate factors than found in the Midwestern and endemic areas for CWD and can assist in performing more efficient surveillance efforts for the region.

 

Conclusions. During the pre-symptomatic stage of CWD infection and throughout the course of disease deer may be shedding multiple LD50 doses per day in their saliva. CWD prion shedding through saliva and excreta may account for the unprecedented spread of this prion disease in nature.

 

see full text and more ;

 

Monday, June 23, 2014

 

*** PRION 2014 CONFERENCE CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD

 


 


 

*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years***

 

Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3

 


 

New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication

 


 

Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production

 


 

Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area

 


 

A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing

 


 

Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing process of meat and bone meals

 


 

Sunday, December 21, 2014

 

Mucosal immunization with an attenuated Salmonella vaccine partially protects white-tailed deer from chronic wasting disease

 


 

Friday, December 19, 2014

 

Pan-Provincial Vaccine Enterprise Inc. (PREVENT) Conducting a Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Vaccine Efficacy Trial in Elk

 


 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION, how much does it pay to find CWD $$$

 

CWD, spreading it around...

 

for the game farm industry, and their constituents, to continue to believe that they are _NOT_, and or insinuate that they have _NEVER_ been part of the problem, will only continue to help spread cwd. the game farming industry, from the shooting pens, to the urine mills, the antler mills, the sperm mills, velvet mills, shooting pens, to large ranches, are not the only problem, but it is painfully obvious that they have been part of the problem for decades and decades, just spreading it around, as with transportation and or exportation and or importation of cervids from game farming industry, and have been proven to spread cwd. no one need to look any further than South Korea blunder ;

 

===========================================

 

spreading cwd around...

 

Between 1996 and 2002, chronic wasting disease was diagnosed in 39 herds of farmed elk in Saskatchewan in a single epidemic. All of these herds were depopulated as part of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s (CFIA) disease eradication program. Animals, primarily over 12 mo of age, were tested for the presence CWD prions following euthanasia. Twenty-one of the herds were linked through movements of live animals with latent CWD from a single infected source herd in Saskatchewan, 17 through movements of animals from 7 of the secondarily infected herds.

 

***The source herd is believed to have become infected via importation of animals from a game farm in South Dakota where CWD was subsequently diagnosed (7,4). A wide range in herd prevalence of CWD at the time of herd depopulation of these herds was observed. Within-herd transmission was observed on some farms, while the disease remained confined to the introduced animals on other farms.

 


 

spreading cwd around...

 

Friday, May 13, 2011

 

Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) outbreaks and surveillance program in the Republic of Korea

 

Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) outbreaks and surveillance program in the Republic of Korea

 

Hyun-Joo Sohn, Yoon-Hee Lee, Min-jeong Kim, Eun-Im Yun, Hyo-Jin Kim, Won-Yong Lee, Dong-Seob Tark, In- Soo Cho, Foreign Animal Disease Research Division, National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, Republic of Korea

 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has been recognized as an important prion disease in native North America deer and Rocky mountain elks. The disease is a unique member of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), which naturally affects only a few species. CWD had been limited to USA and Canada until 2000.

 

On 28 December 2000, information from the Canadian government showed that a total of 95 elk had been exported from farms with CWD to Korea. These consisted of 23 elk in 1994 originating from the so-called “source farm” in Canada, and 72 elk in 1997, which had been held in pre export quarantine at the “source farm”.Based on export information of CWD suspected elk from Canada to Korea, CWD surveillance program was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) in 2001.

 

All elks imported in 1997 were traced back, however elks imported in 1994 were impossible to identify. CWD control measures included stamping out of all animals in the affected farm, and thorough cleaning and disinfection of the premises. In addition, nationwide clinical surveillance of Korean native cervids, and improved measures to ensure reporting of CWD suspect cases were implemented.

 

Total of 9 elks were found to be affected. CWD was designated as a notifiable disease under the Act for Prevention of Livestock Epidemics in 2002.

 

Additional CWD cases - 12 elks and 2 elks - were diagnosed in 2004 and 2005.

 

Since February of 2005, when slaughtered elks were found to be positive, all slaughtered cervid for human consumption at abattoirs were designated as target of the CWD surveillance program. Currently, CWD laboratory testing is only conducted by National Reference Laboratory on CWD, which is the Foreign Animal Disease Division (FADD) of National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service (NVRQS).

 

In July 2010, one out of 3 elks from Farm 1 which were slaughtered for the human consumption was confirmed as positive. Consequently, all cervid – 54 elks, 41 Sika deer and 5 Albino deer – were culled and one elk was found to be positive. Epidemiological investigations were conducted by Veterinary Epidemiology Division (VED) of NVRQS in collaboration with provincial veterinary services.

 

Epidemiologically related farms were found as 3 farms and all cervid at these farms were culled and subjected to CWD diagnosis. Three elks and 5 crossbreeds (Red deer and Sika deer) were confirmed as positive at farm 2.

 

All cervids at Farm 3 and Farm 4 – 15 elks and 47 elks – were culled and confirmed as negative.

 

Further epidemiological investigations showed that these CWD outbreaks were linked to the importation of elks from Canada in 1994 based on circumstantial evidences.

 

In December 2010, one elk was confirmed as positive at Farm 5. Consequently, all cervid – 3 elks, 11 Manchurian Sika deer and 20 Sika deer – were culled and one Manchurian Sika deer and seven Sika deer were found to be positive. This is the first report of CWD in these sub-species of deer. Epidemiological investigations found that the owner of the Farm 2 in CWD outbreaks in July 2010 had co-owned the Farm 5.

 

In addition, it was newly revealed that one positive elk was introduced from Farm 6 of Jinju-si Gyeongsang Namdo. All cervid – 19 elks, 15 crossbreed (species unknown) and 64 Sika deer – of Farm 6 were culled, but all confirmed as negative.

 


 


 


 


 

Thursday, July 03, 2014

 

How Chronic Wasting Disease is affecting deer population and what’s the risk to humans and pets?

 


 

CWD, spreading it around...

 

Tuesday, January 06, 2015

 

APHIS Provides Additional Information on Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Indemnity Requests January 5, 2015 05:26 PM EST

 


 

CWD TO HUMANS, AND RISK FACTORS THERE FROM (see latest science)

 

Tuesday, November 04, 2014

 

*** Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes 2005–2011

 


 


 

Saturday, January 31, 2015

 

RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to BSE

 


 

 Friday, January 23, 2015

 

*** Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $

 


 

Saturday, January 24, 2015

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons

 


 

 

 

 Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products

 

 For related information, Open Docket Folder

 

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 Comment View document:Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;

 

 I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

 

 North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

 

 typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$

 

 the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.

 

 for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

 

 lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.

 

 Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

 

 Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

 

 Country/Year

 

 snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS No documents available. AttachmentsView All (1) Empty Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:

 


 

 Sunday, January 11, 2015

 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 


 


 

 *** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC ***

 

Sunday, November 23, 2014

 

*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***

 

the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.

 


 

Sunday, December 14, 2014

 

*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report ***

 


 

Thursday, January 15, 2015

 

41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE Prion: Case Report

 


 

Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type disease

 

what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.

 

why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping everything the USDA inc says.

 

sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.

 

My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.

 

with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how many bodies is this market worth?

 

Saturday, January 17, 2015

 

*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

 


 


 

Thursday, January 22, 2015

 

Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to disease etiology?

 


 

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

 

TSEAC USA Reason For Recalls Blood products, collected from a donors considered to be at increased risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were distributed END OF YEAR REPORT 2014

 


 

who’s kidding whom $$$ i.e. USDA INC AND THE OIE

 

2014

 

***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.

 

***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.

 

*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].

 

snip...

 


 

Monday, October 10, 2011

 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

snip...

 

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far

 

*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.

 

*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

snip...

 


 


 

Thursday, August 12, 2010

 

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

 

First threat

 

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

 

*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

 

*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

 

Second threat

 

snip...

 


 

Saturday, December 13, 2014

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

 

snip...

 


 

 

 

TSS

Friday, January 30, 2015

Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen

98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 

EDITORIAL

 

Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen

 

Cristina Acín

 

Resistant prions in the environment have been the sword of Damocles for scrapie control and eradication. Attempts to establish which physical and chemical agents could be applied to inactivate or moderate scrapie infectivity were initiated in the 1960s and 1970s,with the first study of this type focusing on the effect of heat treatment in reducing prion infectivity (Hunter and Millson 1964). Nowadays, most of the chemical procedures that aim to inactivate the prion protein are based on the method developed by Kimberlin and collaborators (1983). This procedure consists of treatment with 20,000 parts per million free chlorine solution, for a minimum of one hour, of all surfaces that need to be sterilised (in laboratories, lambing pens, slaughterhouses, and so on). Despite this, veterinarians and farmers may still ask a range of questions, such as ‘Is there an official procedure published somewhere?’ and ‘Is there an international organisation which recommends and defines the exact method of scrapie decontamination that must be applied?’

 

From a European perspective, it is difficult to find a treatment that could be applied, especially in relation to the disinfection of surfaces in lambing pens of affected flocks. A 999/2001 EU regulation on controlling spongiform encephalopathies (European Parliament and Council 2001) did not specify a particular decontamination measure to be used when an outbreak of scrapie is diagnosed. There is only a brief recommendation in Annex VII concerning the control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE s).

 

Chapter B of the regulation explains the measures that must be applied if new caprine animals are to be introduced to a holding where a scrapie outbreak has previously been diagnosed. In that case, the statement indicates that caprine animals can be introduced ‘provided that a cleaning and disinfection of all animal housing on the premises has been carried out following destocking’.

 

Issues around cleaning and disinfection are common in prion prevention recommendations, but relevant authorities, veterinarians and farmers may have difficulties in finding the specific protocol which applies. The European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA ) published a detailed report about the efficacy of certain biocides, such as sodium hydroxide, sodium hypochlorite, guanidine and even a formulation of copper or iron metal ions in combination with hydrogen peroxide, against prions (EFSA 2009). The report was based on scientific evidence (Fichet and others 2004, Lemmer and others 2004, Gao and others 2006, Solassol and others 2006) but unfortunately the decontamination measures were not assessed under outbreak conditions.

 

The EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards recently published its conclusions on the scrapie situation in the EU after 10 years of monitoring and control of the disease in sheep and goats (EFSA 2014), and one of the most interesting findings was the Icelandic experience regarding the effect of disinfection in scrapie control. The Icelandic plan consisted of: culling scrapie-affected sheep or the whole flock in newly diagnosed outbreaks; deep cleaning and disinfection of stables, sheds, barns and equipment with high pressure washing followed by cleaning with 500 parts per million of hypochlorite; drying and treatment with 300 ppm of iodophor; and restocking was not permitted for at least two years. Even when all of these measures were implemented, scrapie recurred on several farms, indicating that the infectious agent survived for years in the environment, even as many as 16 years after restocking (Georgsson and others 2006).

 

In the rest of the countries considered in the EFSA (2014) report, recommendations for disinfection measures were not specifically defined at the government level. In the report, the only recommendation that is made for sheep is repopulation with sheep with scrapie-resistant genotypes. This reduces the risk of scrapie recurrence but it is difficult to know its effect on the infection.

 

Until the EFSA was established (in May 2003), scientific opinions about TSE s were provided by the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of the EC, whose advice regarding inactivation procedures focused on treating animal waste at high temperatures (150°C for three hours) and high pressure alkaline hydrolysis (SSC 2003). At the same time, the TSE Risk Management Subgroup of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) in the UK published guidance on safe working and the prevention of TSE infection. Annex C of the ACDP report established that sodium hypochlorite was considered to be effective, but only if 20,000 ppm of available chlorine was present for at least one hour, which has practical limitations such as the release of chlorine gas, corrosion, incompatibility with formaldehyde, alcohols and acids, rapid inactivation of its active chemicals and the stability of dilutions (ACDP 2009).

 

In an international context, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not recommend a specific disinfection protocol for prion agents in its Terrestrial Code or Manual. Chapter 4.13 of the Terrestrial Code, General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection (OIE 2014), focuses on foot-and-mouth disease virus, mycobacteria and Bacillus anthracis, but not on prion disinfection. Nevertheless, the last update published by the OIE on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (OIE 2012) indicates that few effective decontamination techniques are available to inactivate the agent on surfaces, and recommends the removal of all organic material and the use of sodium hydroxide, or a sodium hypochlorite solution containing 2 per cent available chlorine, for more than one hour at 20ºC.

 

The World Health Organization outlines guidelines for the control of TSE s, and also emphasises the importance of mechanically cleaning surfaces before disinfection with sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite for one hour (WHO 1999).

 

Finally, the relevant agencies in both Canada and the USA suggest that the best treatments for surfaces potentially contaminated with prions are sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite at 20,000 ppm. This is a 2 per cent solution, while most commercial household bleaches contain 5.25 per cent sodium hypochlorite. It is therefore recommended to dilute one part 5.25 per cent bleach with 1.5 parts water (CDC 2009, Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2013).

 

So what should we do about disinfection against prions? First, it is suggested that a single protocol be created by international authorities to homogenise inactivation procedures and enable their application in all scrapie-affected countries. Sodium hypochlorite with 20,000 ppm of available chlorine seems to be the procedure used in most countries, as noted in a paper summarised on p 99 of this issue of Veterinary Record (Hawkins and others 2015). But are we totally sure of its effectiveness as a preventive measure in a scrapie outbreak? Would an in-depth study of the recurrence of scrapie disease be needed?

 

What we can conclude is that, if we want to fight prion diseases, and specifically classical scrapie, we must focus on the accuracy of diagnosis, monitoring and surveillance; appropriate animal identification and control of movements; and, in the end, have homogeneous and suitable protocols to decontaminate and disinfect lambing barns, sheds and equipment available to veterinarians and farmers. Finally, further investigations into the resistance of prion proteins in the diversity of environmental surfaces are required.

 

References

 

snip...

 

98 | Veterinary Record | January 24, 2015

 


 

Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following cleaning and decontamination

 

Steve A. C. Hawkins, MIBiol, Pathology Department1, Hugh A. Simmons, BVSc MRCVS, MBA, MA Animal Services Unit1, Kevin C. Gough, BSc, PhD2 and Ben C. Maddison, BSc, PhD3 + Author Affiliations

 

1Animal and Plant Health Agency, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK 2School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK 3ADAS UK, School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, The University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE12 5RD, UK E-mail for correspondence: ben.maddison@adas.co.uk Abstract Scrapie of sheep/goats and chronic wasting disease of deer/elk are contagious prion diseases where environmental reservoirs are directly implicated in the transmission of disease. In this study, the effectiveness of recommended scrapie farm decontamination regimens was evaluated by a sheep bioassay using buildings naturally contaminated with scrapie. Pens within a farm building were treated with either 20,000 parts per million free chorine solution for one hour or were treated with the same but were followed by painting and full re-galvanisation or replacement of metalwork within the pen. Scrapie susceptible lambs of the PRNP genotype VRQ/VRQ were reared within these pens and their scrapie status was monitored by recto-anal mucosa-associated lymphoid tissue. All animals became infected over an 18-month period, even in the pen that had been subject to the most stringent decontamination process. These data suggest that recommended current guidelines for the decontamination of farm buildings following outbreaks of scrapie do little to reduce the titre of infectious scrapie material and that environmental recontamination could also be an issue associated with these premises.

 

SNIP...

 

Discussion

 

Thorough pressure washing of a pen had no effect on the amount of bioavailable scrapie infectivity (pen B). The routine removal of prions from surfaces within a laboratory setting is treatment for a minimum of one hour with 20,000 ppm free chlorine, a method originally based on the use of brain macerates from infected rodents to evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination (Kimberlin and others 1983). Further studies have also investigated the effectiveness of hypochlorite disinfection of metal surfaces to simulate the decontamination of surgical devices within a hospital setting. Such treatments with hypochlorite solution were able to reduce infectivity by 5.5 logs to lower than the sensitivity of the bioassay used (Lemmer and others 2004). Analogous treatment of the pen surfaces did not effectively remove the levels of scrapie infectivity over that of the control pens, indicating that this method of decontamination is not effective within a farm setting. This may be due to the high level of biological matrix that is present upon surfaces within the farm environment, which may reduce the amount of free chlorine available to inactivate any infectious prion. Remarkably 1/5 sheep introduced into pen D had also became scrapie positive within nine months, with all animals in this pen being RAMALT positive by 18 months of age. Pen D was no further away from the control pen (pen A) than any of the other pens within this barn. Localised hot spots of infectivity may be present within scrapie-contaminated environments, but it is unlikely that pen D area had an amount of scrapie contamination that was significantly different than the other areas within this building. Similarly, there were no differences in how the biosecurity of pen D was maintained, or how this pen was ventilated compared with the other pens. This observation, perhaps, indicates the slower kinetics of disease uptake within this pen and is consistent with a more thorough prion removal and recontamination. These observations may also account for the presence of inadvertent scrapie cases within other studies, where despite stringent biosecurity, control animals have become scrapie positive during challenge studies using barns that also housed scrapie-affected animals (Ryder and others 2009). The bioassay data indicate that the exposure of the sheep to a farm environment after decontamination efforts thought to be effective in removing scrapie is sufficient for the animals to become infected with scrapie. The main exposure routes within this scenario are likely to be via the oral route, during feeding and drinking, and respiratory and conjunctival routes. It has been demonstrated that scrapie infectivity can be efficiently transmitted via the nasal route in sheep (Hamir and others 2008), as is the case for CWD in both murine models and in white-tailed deer (Denkers and others 2010, 2013). Recently, it has also been demonstrated that CWD prions presented as dust when bound to the soil mineral montmorillonite can be infectious via the nasal route (Nichols and others 2013). When considering pens C and D, the actual source of the infectious agent in the pens is not known, it is possible that biologically relevant levels of prion survive on surfaces during the decontamination regimen (pen C). With the use of galvanising and painting (pen D) covering and sealing the surface of the pen, it is possible that scrapie material recontaminated the pens by the movement of infectious prions contained within dusts originating from other parts of the barn that were not decontaminated or from other areas of the farm.

 

Given that scrapie prions are widespread on the surfaces of affected farms (Maddison and others 2010a), irrespective of the source of the infectious prions in the pens, this study clearly highlights the difficulties that are faced with the effective removal of environmentally associated scrapie infectivity. This is likely to be paralleled in CWD which shows strong similarities to scrapie in terms of both the dissemination of prions into the environment and the facile mode of disease transmission. These data further contribute to the understanding that prion diseases can be highly transmissible between susceptible individuals not just by direct contact but through highly stable environmental reservoirs that are refractory to decontamination.

 

The presence of these environmentally associated prions in farm buildings make the control of these diseases a considerable challenge, especially in animal species such as goats where there is lack of genetic resistance to scrapie and, therefore, no scope to re-stock farms with animals that are resistant to scrapie.

 

Scrapie Sheep Goats Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) Accepted October 12, 2014. Published Online First 31 October 2014

 


 

Monday, November 3, 2014

 

Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following cleaning and decontamination

 


 

PPo3-22:

 

Detection of Environmentally Associated PrPSc on a Farm with Endemic Scrapie

 

Ben C. Maddison,1 Claire A. Baker,1 Helen C. Rees,1 Linda A. Terry,2 Leigh Thorne,2 Susan J. Belworthy2 and Kevin C. Gough3 1ADAS-UK LTD; Department of Biology; University of Leicester; Leicester, UK; 2Veterinary Laboratories Agency; Surry, KT UK; 3Department of Veterinary Medicine and Science; University of Nottingham; Sutton Bonington, Loughborough UK

 

Key words: scrapie, evironmental persistence, sPMCA

 

Ovine scrapie shows considerable horizontal transmission, yet the routes of transmission and specifically the role of fomites in transmission remain poorly defined. Here we present biochemical data demonstrating that on a scrapie-affected sheep farm, scrapie prion contamination is widespread. It was anticipated at the outset that if prions contaminate the environment that they would be there at extremely low levels, as such the most sensitive method available for the detection of PrPSc, serial Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (sPMCA), was used in this study. We investigated the distribution of environmental scrapie prions by applying ovine sPMCA to samples taken from a range of surfaces that were accessible to animals and could be collected by use of a wetted foam swab. Prion was amplified by sPMCA from a number of these environmental swab samples including those taken from metal, plastic and wooden surfaces, both in the indoor and outdoor environment. At the time of sampling there had been no sheep contact with these areas for at least 20 days prior to sampling indicating that prions persist for at least this duration in the environment. These data implicate inanimate objects as environmental reservoirs of prion infectivity which are likely to contribute to disease transmission.

 


 

2012

 

PO-039: A comparison of scrapie and chronic wasting disease in white-tailed deer

 

Justin Greenlee, Jodi Smith, Eric Nicholson US Dept. Agriculture; Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center; Ames, IA USA

 

snip...

 

The results of this study suggest that there are many similarities in the manifestation of CWD and scrapie in WTD after IC inoculation including early and widespread presence of PrPSc in lymphoid tissues, clinical signs of depression and weight loss progressing to wasting, and an incubation time of 21-23 months. Moreover, western blots (WB) done on brain material from the obex region have a molecular profile similar to CWD and distinct from tissues of the cerebrum or the scrapie inoculum. However, results of microscopic and IHC examination indicate that there are differences between the lesions expected in CWD and those that occur in deer with scrapie: amyloid plaques were not noted in any sections of brain examined from these deer and the pattern of immunoreactivity by IHC was diffuse rather than plaque-like.

 

*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of WTD were susceptible to scrapie.

 

Deer developed clinical signs of wasting and mental depression and were necropsied from 28 to 33 months PI. Tissues from these deer were positive for PrPSc by IHC and WB. Similar to IC inoculated deer, samples from these deer exhibited two different molecular profiles: samples from obex resembled CWD whereas those from cerebrum were similar to the original scrapie inoculum. On further examination by WB using a panel of antibodies, the tissues from deer with scrapie exhibit properties differing from tissues either from sheep with scrapie or WTD with CWD. Samples from WTD with CWD or sheep with scrapie are strongly immunoreactive when probed with mAb P4, however, samples from WTD with scrapie are only weakly immunoreactive. In contrast, when probed with mAb’s 6H4 or SAF 84, samples from sheep with scrapie and WTD with CWD are weakly immunoreactive and samples from WTD with scrapie are strongly positive. This work demonstrates that WTD are highly susceptible to sheep scrapie, but on first passage, scrapie in WTD is differentiable from CWD.

 


 

2011

 

*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of white-tailed deer were susceptible to scrapie.

 


 

*** We conclude that TSE infectivity is likely to survive burial for long time periods with minimal loss of infectivity and limited movement from the original burial site. However PMCA results have shown that there is the potential for rainwater to elute TSE related material from soil which could lead to the contamination of a wider area. These experiments reinforce the importance of risk assessment when disposing of TSE risk materials.

 

*** The results show that even highly diluted PrPSc can bind efficiently to polypropylene, stainless steel, glass, wood and stone and propagate the conversion of normal prion protein. For in vivo experiments, hamsters were ic injected with implants incubated in 1% 263K-infected brain homogenate. Hamsters, inoculated with 263K-contaminated implants of all groups, developed typical signs of prion disease, whereas control animals inoculated with non-contaminated materials did not.

 

PRION 2014 CONFERENCE

 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD

 

A FEW FINDINGS ;

 

Conclusions. To our knowledge, this is the first established experimental model of CWD in TgSB3985. We found evidence for co-existence or divergence of two CWD strains adapted to Tga20 mice and their replication in TgSB3985 mice. Finally, we observed phenotypic differences between cervid-derived CWD and CWD/Tg20 strains upon propagation in TgSB3985 mice. Further studies are underway to characterize these strains.

 

We conclude that TSE infectivity is likely to survive burial for long time periods with minimal loss of infectivity and limited movement from the original burial site. However PMCA results have shown that there is the potential for rainwater to elute TSE related material from soil which could lead to the contamination of a wider area. These experiments reinforce the importance of risk assessment when disposing of TSE risk materials.

 

The results show that even highly diluted PrPSc can bind efficiently to polypropylene, stainless steel, glass, wood and stone and propagate the conversion of normal prion protein. For in vivo experiments, hamsters were ic injected with implants incubated in 1% 263K-infected brain homogenate. Hamsters, inoculated with 263K-contaminated implants of all groups, developed typical signs of prion disease, whereas control animals inoculated with non-contaminated materials did not.

 

Our data establish that meadow voles are permissive to CWD via peripheral exposure route, suggesting they could serve as an environmental reservoir for CWD. Additionally, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that at least two strains of CWD circulate in naturally-infected cervid populations and provide evidence that meadow voles are a useful tool for CWD strain typing.

 

Conclusion. CWD prions are shed in saliva and urine of infected deer as early as 3 months post infection and throughout the subsequent >1.5 year course of infection. In current work we are examining the relationship of prionemia to excretion and the impact of excreted prion binding to surfaces and particulates in the environment.

 

Conclusion. CWD prions (as inferred by prion seeding activity by RT-QuIC) are shed in urine of infected deer as early as 6 months post inoculation and throughout the subsequent disease course. Further studies are in progress refining the real-time urinary prion assay sensitivity and we are examining more closely the excretion time frame, magnitude, and sample variables in relationship to inoculation route and prionemia in naturally and experimentally CWD-infected cervids.

 

Conclusions. Our results suggested that the odds of infection for CWD is likely controlled by areas that congregate deer thus increasing direct transmission (deer-to-deer interactions) or indirect transmission (deer-to-environment) by sharing or depositing infectious prion proteins in these preferred habitats. Epidemiology of CWD in the eastern U.S. is likely controlled by separate factors than found in the Midwestern and endemic areas for CWD and can assist in performing more efficient surveillance efforts for the region.

 

Conclusions. During the pre-symptomatic stage of CWD infection and throughout the course of disease deer may be shedding multiple LD50 doses per day in their saliva. CWD prion shedding through saliva and excreta may account for the unprecedented spread of this prion disease in nature.

 

see full text and more ;

 

Monday, June 23, 2014

 

*** PRION 2014 CONFERENCE CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD

 


 


 

*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years***

 

Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3

 


 

New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication

 


 

Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production

 


 

Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area

 


 

A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing

 


 

Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing process of meat and bone meals

 


 

Sunday, December 21, 2014

 

Mucosal immunization with an attenuated Salmonella vaccine partially protects white-tailed deer from chronic wasting disease

 


 

Friday, December 19, 2014

 

Pan-Provincial Vaccine Enterprise Inc. (PREVENT) Conducting a Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Vaccine Efficacy Trial in Elk

 


 

Friday, January 16, 2015

 

Indiana SENATE BILL No. 442 Miller Pete Hunting wildlife Removes exotic mammals from the animals that may be propagated or offered for hunting at a shooting preserve Makes it a Class C misdemeanor

 


 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION, how much does it pay to find CWD $$$

 

CWD, spreading it around...

 

Tuesday, January 06, 2015

 

APHIS Provides Additional Information on Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Indemnity Requests January 5, 2015 05:26 PM EST

 


 

when an industry is catering to the public, with products which can risk human and animal health, in my opinion, you should have NO property rights. you should not be able to hide behind property rights when you are clearly risking human and animal health from your product, or the way you handle that product. if you are going to raise, grow, produce a product for the consumer, you have an obligation NOT to risk the public domain, public property, and or the wild animal populations. just my opinion. ...

 

 

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

 

Another new prion disease: relationship with central and peripheral amyloidoses

 

here we go again...

 


 

spontaneous atypical BSE ???

 

if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$

 

As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.

 


 

so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

 

Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

Monday, December 1, 2014

 

Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review December 1, 2014

 


 

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

 

BOVINE HEPARIN POSITION STATEMENT ON THE REINTRODUCTION and POTENTIAL BSE TSE PRION RISK FACTORS THEREFROM

 


 

Thursday, January 29, 2015

 

Identification of H-type BSE in Portugal

 


 

Thursday, January 29, 2015

 

OIE REPORT Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Prion (atypical BSE type H), Norway Information received on 29/01/2015

 


 

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

 

Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions

 

Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics

 

Abstract

 

Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human ​prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 

Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance

 


 

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

 

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

 

snip...

 

R. BRADLEY

 


 

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

 

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

 

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

 

snip...

 

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

 

PMID: 6997404

 


 

Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

 

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

 

snip...

 

76/10.12/4.6

 


 

Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

 

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).

 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

 

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

 

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

 

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

 

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

 

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).

 


 


 


 


 

2001

 

Suspect symptoms

 

What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep infected with scrapie?

 

28 Mar 01

 

Like lambs to the slaughter

 

31 March 2001

 

by Debora MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284.

 

FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

 

Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across Europe and North America.

 

Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.

 

"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses, south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been caused by eating infected mutton or lamb.

 

Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no evidence that it poses a risk to human health. But if the French finding means that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.

 

Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD. They injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the monkeys were the same for all three. Mice injected with the original sets of brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same symptoms.

 

As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie strain. As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and vCJD. But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology.

 

"The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys. "You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie." In the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were dissimilar.

 

But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD. "You would not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only some strains affect only some people," says Deslys. Bruce is cautious about the mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation. Other trials of scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.

 

People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways. Kretschmar has found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously deforms to produce sCJD.

 

But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as it is in vCJD. "If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, "that could mean they were caused by infection."

 

There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US, and a similar incidence elsewhere. Singeltary and other US activists think that some of these people died after eating contaminated meat or "nutritional" pills containing dried animal brain. Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singeltary if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have insisted.

 

Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human disease vCJD is caused by BSE. And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.

 


 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 


 

 

CWD TO HUMANS, AND RISK FACTORS THERE FROM (see latest science)

 

Tuesday, November 04, 2014

 

*** Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes 2005–2011

 


 


 

Friday, December 5, 2014

 

*** SPECIAL ALERT The OIE recommends strengthening animal disease surveillance worldwide OIE

 

BSE TSE PRION AKA MAD COW DISEASE ? ‘’the silence was deafening’’ ...tss

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr.


Comment

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;

I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$

the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.

for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.

Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

Country/Year

snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS

Attachments

 (1)

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

View Attachment:


 

 

Sunday, January 11, 2015

 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 


 


 

 

 

 

 

*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC ***

 

Sunday, November 23, 2014

 

*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European

 

the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.

 


 

Sunday, December 14, 2014

 

*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report

 


 

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

 

Another new prion disease: relationship with central and peripheral amyloidoses here we go again...

 


 

 

Thursday, January 15, 2015

 

41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE Prion: Case Report

 


 

Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type disease

 

what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.

 

why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping everything the USDA inc says.

 

sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.

 

My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.

 

with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how many bodies is this market worth?

 

Saturday, January 17, 2015

 

*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

 


 


 

Thursday, January 22, 2015

 

Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to disease etiology?

 


 

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

 

TSEAC USA Reason For Recalls Blood products, collected from a donors considered to be at increased risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were distributed END OF YEAR REPORT 2014

 


 

who’s kidding whom $$$ i.e. USDA INC AND THE OIE

 

2014

 

***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.

 

***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.

 

*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].

 

snip...

 


 

Monday, October 10, 2011

 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

snip...

 

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far

 

*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.

 

*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

snip...

 


 


 

Thursday, August 12, 2010

 

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

 

First threat

 

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

 

*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

 

*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

 

Second threat

 

snip...

 


 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

P.O. Box 42

Bacliff, Texas USA 77518