IN REPLY TO ;
Needless conflict NatureVolume: 485 Pages: 279–280 Date published: (17 May
2012)
Needless conflict Nature 485,279–280(17 May
2012)doi:10.1038/485279bPublished online 16 May 2012
Independent experts should be kept from undue suspicion as well as undue
influence.
Subject terms: Health and medicine Ethics
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We are what we eat. So it should come as no surprise that food-related
issues such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), bisphenol A
contamination, foot-and-mouth disease, Escherichia coli outbreaks and genetic
modification resonate with the public. It is unfortunate, then, that discussion
of them is often clouded by controversies over the impartiality of scientific
advice and whether government regulations are truly unaffected by industry
interests.
Questions of food safety, nutrition and agriculture elicit more emotion and
public mistrust than almost any other science-based issue. The firestorm over
obesity, for example, ignited once again in the United States last week, when
the Institute of Medicine issued a report of nearly 500 pages that makes a
compelling case that individual choice is not sufficient to prevent obesity in
the current environment of inexpensive high-calorie foods and drinks. The report
recommends that industry and government take action to get cheap healthy foods
into supermarkets and schools, and that the government intervene to ensure that
the right dietary messages get through the flood of advertising. The report, of
course, was criticized by the industry forces that would have the most to lose
if such changes were implemented.
In this highly charged environment, a controversy over alleged conflicts of
interest at the top of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has led to
media headlines, criticisms from the European Parliament and a feeding frenzy by
some non-governmental organizations critical of EFSA (see page 294). Some of
those rushing to judge EFSA might do well to remember, however, that whatever
the body's shortcomings, it represents a marked improvement on what went
before.
EFSA, which is based in Parma, Italy, was created in 2002 in the wake of
the BSE scandal and other food crises. Public confidence in experts and
governments had evaporated after it emerged that contaminated beef could cause
new variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease in humans. At fault was a system in which
economic imperatives too often blinkered experts and government ministries — not
least departments of agriculture — in their assessment of risks and precautions.
EFSA was created to change all that, as an independent agency that would provide
scientific advice to the European Union and its member states, entirely separate
from those responsible for making decisions. Not even the US Food and Drug
Administration enjoys that degree of potential freedom from interference: it
uses advisory panels of outside experts, but is ultimately part of a government
department. This was made clear last year, when President Barack Obama's
administration overruled the agency's decision to make the contraceptive Plan B
One-Step (levonorgestrel) available to girls under 17 without a prescription
(see Nature 480, 413; 2011).
The powerful agrofood industry will always seek to influence policy,
whether within EFSA, or in the European Commission, the European Parliament and
national ministries that actually make the decisions. As in other technological
industries, many experts have industry links, and scientists' own perceptions of
risk can be biased by a pro-technology outlook that might, for example, lead
them to be too enthusiastic about certain transgenic crops.
“Overseers must take care not to unfairly tar the reputations of
scientific experts.”
The safeguards against influence and bias should be the same everywhere:
comprehensive and timely declaration of potential competing interests,
transparency in decision-making, open airing of dissenting opinions and credible
independent oversight. EFSA has taken many steps to implement such safeguards,
and there seems to be little evidence that it is more affected than any other
food-safety body by undue interest.
The media, non-governmental organizations and elected representatives and
their institutions all have important oversight roles. But they also have a
responsibility to keep concerns in perspective, and to avoid using them to
further personal agendas. Overseers must take care not to unfairly tar the
reputations of the many scientific experts who give their time generously and in
complete independence to further public-health and science-based
decision-making.
The public response to the 2009 swine-flu pandemic points to the risks of
unsubstantiated suspicion of scientific advice. There were many wild claims that
the medical response to the pandemic was being promoted by industry and
industry-influenced experts to sell flu drugs and vaccines. This not only helped
to fuel conspiracy theories that the pandemic was a hoax, but also diminished
public confidence in health authorities at a time when it was sorely
needed.
Advisory bodies must not tolerate shortcomings in procedures to disclose
conflicts of interest, but they must defend themselves against any unfair
tarnishing of scientific experts. Damage to reputation is extremely dangerous in
a society in which the Internet can quickly convert exaggerated claims into
supposed facts, and in a political climate in which 'elites' are often suspect.
There is more to responsible oversight than just pointing out the problems —
real or perceived.
Independent experts should be kept from undue suspicion as well as undue
influence.
I kindly wish to submit the following please ;
ONE need not look any further than the USDA et al, when it comes to ‘undue
influence’. I have followed the mad cow USDA debacle ever since the first mad
cow was covered up in Texas, let alone the second one that finally took and act
of congress and the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG. if not for that, that
second mad cow in Texas would have never been confirmed either. then you can
move on to the Alabama, and Washington mad cow, and not much has changed since.
Still the same old USDA et al. just look at the atypical L-type BASE BSE case in
California recently, and the false and misleading statements there from by the
USDA et al. NOTHING has changed, except their stories, time and time again.
They claim of all those firewalls in place, BSE surviellance, BSE testing,
BSE feed ban, all three of those firewalls have failed terribly in the USA, but
yet to hear the USDA et al tell it, everything is O.K., no problem, feed ban in
place since August 4, 1997, BUT YET, the USDA et al fail to tell you, this mad
cow firewall was nothing than ink on paper, it was a PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY feed
ban to begin with, that up until 2006, the amounts of banned suspect mad cow
protein that was going into commerce, was measured in TONNAGE, 2007, the
measurements were measured in POUNDS, where in 2007, 10 years, one decade, post
partial, and voluntary BSE feed ban, there were 10,000,000 MILLION POUNDS, of
banned, suspect mad cow protein, mixed with blood, that went out into commerce.
AFTER that mad cow warning letter, the warning letters ceased to exist. they
never published anymore that I could find.
They claim the BSE testing was doing it’s job, until they found out that
not only their testing techniques were wrong, but they were TESTING HEALTHY
CATTLE, THEY NEW DID NOT HAVE BSE. all this again proven by the OIG and the GAO.
They claim the BSE surveillance program worked, again, a lie. Just look at
the GAO and OIG reports about that ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM to test
only healthy cows, OR, the OBEX ONLY DIAGNOSTIC criteria that was used.
They claim NO link to sporadic CJD, and this is false as well.
IN my opinion, until we get corporate industry out of policy decision
making for the USDA, APHIS, FSIS, FDA et al, until that is changed, you will
never have any sound science policy making for consumer safety.
they call it GREED $$$
SOURCE REFERENCES
MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...
***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate
Model
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE
in these countries.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
Friday, May 11, 2012
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by
plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits ***In addition, the
present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived
from cattle affected with H-type BSE.
Re: [BSE-L] Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits
“Unfortunately, a detailed and all-encompassing analysis of neuropathology and
topographical distribution of immunolabeled PrPSc in H-type BSE-affected cattle
could not be performed, since only the obex region is routinely sampled for BSE
surveillance testing and the remaining brain as well as the carcasses are not
available in most countries [3,10,12,13,24-27]. Recently, clinical signs and
biochemical properties of experimental German H-type BSE cases have been
reported [20]. The primary objective of this study was to investigate the
transmissibility of H-type BSE, using a field isolate detected in the active
surveillance program in Canada [12]. The secondary objective was to extend the
knowledge of the topographical distribution and deposition patterns of
immunolabeled PrPSc in H-type BSE.”
UPDATED...PLEASE SEE ;
Tuesday, November 02, 2010
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only)
diagnostic criteria CVL 1992
SEE FULL TEXT ;
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
MAD COW DISEASE USA 4TH CASE DOCUMENTED ATYPICAL BSE CALIFORNIA
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
4th MAD COW DISEASE U.S.A. CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE 2012
Sunday, May 6, 2012
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease, BSE May 2, 2012 IOWA
State University OIE
SPONTANEOUS ??? NOT...
How the California cow got the disease remains unknown. Government
officials expressed confidence that contaminated food was not the source, saying
the animal had atypical L-type BSE, a rare variant not generally associated with
an animal consuming infected feed.
However, a BSE expert said that consumption of infected material is the
only known way that cattle get the disease under natural conditons. “In view of
what we know about BSE after almost 20 years experience, contaminated feed has
been the source of the epidemic,” said Paul Brown, a scientist retired from the
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke.
BSE is not caused by a microbe. It is caused by the misfolding of the
so-called “prion protein” that is a normal constituent of brain and other
tissues. If a diseased version of the protein enters the brain somehow, it can
slowly cause all the normal versions to become misfolded. It is possible the
disease could arise spontaneously, though such an event has never been recorded,
Brown said.
Tuesday, January 17, 2012
Annual report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE EFSA-Q-2011-01110
Issued: 20 December 2011
Friday, January 6, 2012
OIE 2012 Training Manual on Wildlife Diseases and Surveillance and TSE
Prion disease
Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October
31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in
Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on
the FSIS website:
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted
to FSIS.
Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns
Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S.
Singeltary.
This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on
the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points
in mind:
Monday, January 2, 2012
EFSA Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the EFSA Scientific Network on BSE-TSE
Brussels, 29-30 November 2011
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine
Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68
Comment from Terry Singeltary Document ID: APHIS-2008-0010-0008 Document
Type: Public Submission This is comment on Proposed Rule: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products Docket ID:
APHIS-2008-0010 RIN:0579-AC68
Topics: No Topics associated with this document View Document: More
Document Subtype: Public Comment Status: Posted Received Date: March 22
2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Date Posted: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM
Eastern Daylight Time Comment Start Date: March 16 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern
Daylight Time Comment Due Date: May 15 2012, at 11:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time
Tracking Number: 80fdd617 First Name: Terry Middle Name: S. Last Name:
Singeltary City: Bacliff Country: United States State or Province: TX
Organization Name: CJD TSE PRION Submitter's Representative: CONSUMERS
Comment: comment submission Document ID APHIS-2008-0010-0001 Greetings
USDA, OIE et al, what a difference it makes with science, from one day to the
next. i.e. that mad cow gold card the USA once held. up until that fateful day
in December of 2003, the science of BSE was NO IMPORTS TO USA FROM BSE COUNTRY.
what a difference a day makes$ now that the shoe is on the other foot, the USDA
via the OIE, wants to change science again, just for trade $ I implore the OIE
decision and policy makers, for the sake of the world, to refuse any status quo
of the USA BSE risk assessment. if at al, the USA BSE GBR should be raise to BSE
GBR IV, for the following reasons. North America is awash with many different
TSE Prion strains, in many different species, and they are mutating and
spreading. IF the OIE, and whatever policy makers, do anything but raise the
risk factor for BSE in North America, they I would regard that to be highly
suspicious. IN fact, it would be criminal in my opinion, because the OIE knows
this, and to knowingly expose the rest of the world to this dangerous pathogen,
would be ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’, just for the almighty dollar, once again.
I warned the OIE about all this, including the risk factors for CWD, and the
fact that the zoonosis potential was great, way back in 2002. THE OIE in
collaboration with the USDA, made the legal trading of the atypical Nor-98
Scrapie a legal global commodity. yes, thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al,
it’s now legal to trade the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie strain all around the globe.
IF you let them, they will do the same thing with atypical BSE and CWD (both
strains to date). This with science showing that indeed these TSE prion strains
are transmissible. I strenuously urge the OIE et al to refuse any weakening to
the USA trade protocols for the BSE TSE prion disease (all strains), and urge
them to reclassify the USA with BSE GBR IV risk factor. SEE REFERENCE SOURCES IN
ATTACHMENTS
SEE Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Attachment WORD FILE ;
Sunday, March 11, 2012
APHIS Proposes New Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Import Regulations in
Line with International Animal Health Standards Proposal Aims to Ensure Health
of the U.S. Beef Herd, Assist in Negotiations
L-BSE, TME, AND SPORADIC CJD aka mad cow disease in North America
Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some
TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical
BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic
wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases
constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European
approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus
Macaque
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus
Macaque
Emmanuel Comoy,1,† Valérie Durand,1 Evelyne Correia,1 Sophie Freire,1
Jürgen Richt,2 Justin Greenlee,3 Juan-Maria Torres,4 Paul Brown,1 Bob Hills5 and
Jean-Philippe Deslys1
1Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France; 2Kansas State
University; Manhattan, KS USA; 3USDA; Ames, IA USA; 4INIA; Madrid, Spain;
5Health Canada; Ottawa, ON Canada†Presenting author; Email:
emmanuel.comoy@cea.fr
The epidemiology of Transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) indicates an
alimentary origin. Several inter-species transmission experiments have not
succeeded in establishing with certainty any natural reservoir of this prion
strain, although both ovine and bovine sources have been suspected. Cattle
exposed to TME develop a spongiform encephalopathy that is distinct from
classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (c-BSE).
Inoculation of c-BSE to cynomolgus macaque provided early evidence of a
possible risk to humans, and remains an important model to define the risk of
both primary (oral transmission from cattle to primate) and secondary
(intravenous intra-species transmission) exposures. We have also evaluated the
transmissibility of other cattle prion strains to macaques, including L- and H-
atypical forms of BSE, namely BSE-L and BSE-H, and cattle-adapted TME.
BSE-L induced a neurological disease distinct from c-BSE. Peripheral
exposures demonstrate the transmissibility of BSE-L by oral, intravenous, and
intra-cerebral routes, with incubation periods similar to c-BSE. Cattle-adapted
TME also induced a rapid disease in cynomolgus macaque. The clinical features,
lesion profile, and biochemical signature of the induced disease was similar to
the features observed in animals exposed to BSE-L, suggesting a link between the
two prion strains. Secondary transmissions to a common host (transgenic mouse
overexpressing bovine PrP) of cattle-TME and BSE-L before or after passage in
primates induced diseases with similar incubation periods: like the c-BSE
strain, these cattle strains maintained their distinctive features regardless of
the donor species and passages.
If the link between TME and BSE-L is confirmed, our results would suggest
that BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades, and highlight a
possible preferential transmission of animal prion strains to primates after
passage in cattle.
=====================end...tss====================
link url not available, please see PRION 2011 ;
Volume 13, Number 12–December 2007 Research
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and
L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model
Thierry Baron,* Anna Bencsik,* Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe,* Eric Morignat,*
andRichard A. Bessen†*Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments–Lyon,
Lyon, France; and†Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana, USA
Abstract
Transmissible mink encepholapathy (TME) is a foodborne transmissible
spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) of ranch-raised mink; infection with a ruminant
TSE has been proposed as the cause, but the precise origin of TME is unknown. To
compare the phenotypes of each TSE, bovine-passaged TME isolate and 3 distinct
natural bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agents (typical BSE, H-type BSE,
and L-type BSE) were inoculated into an ovine transgenic mouse line (TgOvPrP4).
Transgenic mice were susceptible to infection with bovine-passaged TME, typical
BSE, and L-type BSE but not to H-type BSE. Based on survival periods, brain
lesions profiles, disease-associated prion protein brain distribution, and
biochemical properties of protease-resistant prion protein, typical BSE had a
distint phenotype in ovine transgenic mice compared to L-type BSE and bovine
TME.The similar phenotypic properties of L-type BSE and bovine TME in TgOvPrP4
mice suggest that L-type BSE is a much more likely candidate for the origin of
TME than is typical BSE.
snip...
Conclusion
These studies provide experimental evidence that the Stetsonville TME agent
is distinct from typical BSE but has phenotypic similarities to L-type BSE in
TgOvPrP4 mice. Our conclusion is that L-type BSE is a more likely candidate for
a bovine source of TME infection than typical BSE. In the scenario that a
ruminant TSE is the source for TME infection in mink, this would be a second
example of transmission of a TSE from ruminants to non-ruminants under natural
conditions or farming practices in addition to transmission of typical BSE to
humans, domestic cats, and exotic zoo animals(37). The potential importance of
this finding is relevant to L-type BSE, which based on experimental transmission
into humanized PrP transgenic mice and macaques, suggests that L-type BSE is
more pathogenic for humans than typical BSE (24,38).
PLEASE NOTE *
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the
farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or
dead dairy cattle...
Thursday, March 29, 2012
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012
NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas
LET’S look at that mad cow feed firewall the USDA and FDA et al speak so
highly of. now remember, .005 grams is lethal. ...
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-
025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
2006 HOW ABOUT THAT ALABAMA MAD COW FEED THAT WAS FED TO THE ALABAMA MAD
COW ???
P.9.21
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim
McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre,
Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of
Calgary, Canada
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been
identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein
associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been
detected in Canadian cattle.
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16
Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated
PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and
relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed
Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type
and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and
changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under
mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the
atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies
bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific
antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth
band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular
characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases
from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE
contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also
suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
what about that ALABAMA MAD COW, AND MAD COW FEED THERE FROM IN THAT STATE
???
2006 was a banner year for banned suspect mad cow protein in commerce. in
2006, it was measured in TONNAGE...
*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R
Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter
dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,
Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc.,
Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb.
bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags,
Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall #
V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50
lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall #
V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall #
V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall #
V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by
telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall
is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with
ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125
TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall #
V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50
lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%,
Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to
20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall #
108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL,
by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is
complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant
based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006
09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),
Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED,
Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL,
by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone
meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK
MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Saturday, November 6, 2010
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the
EU Berne, 2010 TAFS
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a
non-profit Swiss Foundation
NOW, what about that mad cow BSE surveillance and testing program ???
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food
Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Audit Report
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase
II
and
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat
Recovery Products - Phase III
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain
""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were
preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of
test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in
the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the
ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
USDA 2003
We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that
we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem
and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and
looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions
or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the
cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the
procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked
at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently
gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue
provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only
at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to
one area.
snip.............
Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another
important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not
guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and
the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not
collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting
lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area
with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form
of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't
get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging
variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our
systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In
Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they
found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They
found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had
to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away
from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only
at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to
one area.
snip...
FULL TEXT;
Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE
Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
2005
FINAL REPORT 2ND TEXAS MAD COW
Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus
BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE) Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for
specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over
SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are
completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN
HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD
COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of
Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail
fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel
Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease
relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without
that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at
risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their
continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm
Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government
funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004,
Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from
cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The
Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty
months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous
system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle.
Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per
obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle
Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow
disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the
sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm
Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that
Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted
Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or
caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in
order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified
corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the
extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have
jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its
place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to
effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect,
obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not
subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests
to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not
subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;
(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s
testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA
that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify,
internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats
was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from
cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to
fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads
prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds
carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud
convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for
the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence,
Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide
appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those
guidelines in determining a sentence.
Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The
investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE
NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls
In November 2004, USDA announced that its rapid screening test, Bio-Rad
Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), produced an inconclusive BSE test
result as part of its enhanced BSE surveillance program. The ELISA rapid
screening test performed at a BSE contract laboratory produced three high
positive reactive results.40 As required,41 the contract laboratory forwarded
the inconclusive sample to the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories
(NVSL) for confirmatory testing. NVSL repeated the ELISA testing and again
produced three high positive reactive results.42 In accordance with its
established protocol, NVSL ran its confirmatory test, an immunohistochemistry
(IHC) test, which was interpreted as negative for BSE. In addition, NVSL
performed a histological43 examination of the tissue and did not detect
lesions44 consistent with BSE.
Faced with conflicting results, NVSL scientists recommended additional
testing to resolve the discrepancy but APHIS headquarters officials concluded no
further testing was necessary because testing protocols were followed. In our
discussions with APHIS officials, they justified their decision not to do
additional testing because the IHC is internationally recognized as the "gold
standard." Also, they believed that conducting additional tests would undermine
confidence in USDA’s established testing protocols.
FDA STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries:
301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow
with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor
for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If
it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been
shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for
swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply
chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly
monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K.
showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to
cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying
that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to
poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule
provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of
several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make
this strong system even stronger.
#
SEE FULL TEXT OF ALL THIS HERE ;
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
ALABAMA MAD COW CASE
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY
(see COPIOUS AMOUNTS OF mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
Texas BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report August 2005
State-Federal Team Responds to Texas BSE Case
JUNE 30, 2005
(please note 7+ month delay in final confirmation so the BSE MRR policy
could be set in stone first. $$$...tss)
SEE ATTEMPTED COVER-UP BEFORE THE END AROUND BY FONG ET AL OF THE O.I.G
The U.S. Department of Agriculture confirmed June 29 that genetic testing
had verified bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease) in a 12-year-old
cow that was born and raised in a Texas beef cattle herd.
Subsequent epidemiological investigations resulted in the culling and
testing of 67 adult animals from the index herd. Bio-Rad tests for BSE were
conducted on all 67 animals by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory
(NVSL) in Ames, Iowa. All tests were negative.
On July 12, Texas officials lifted the quarantine on the source herd. At
press time, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service was tracing
animals of the same age that had left the ranch.
Timeline
The BSE-positive animal was a Brahman-cross cow born and raised in a single
Texas herd. The location of the ranch was not disclosed.
On Nov. 11, 2004, the 12-year-old cow was taken to a Texas auction market.
Because of its condition, the cow was sent to Champion Pet Foods in Waco, Texas.
The company produces several blends of dog food, primarily for the greyhound
industry.
On Nov. 15, the animal arrived dead at Champion. Under procedures
established by USDA's intensive surveillance program, a sample was sent to the
USDA-approved Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Testing Laboratory (TVMDL) at
Texas A&M University.
Between June 1, 2004, and June 1, 2005, TVMDL tested nearly 34,000 samples
from Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas and Louisiana. They tested the sample from
Champion on Nov. 19 using a Bio-Rad ELISA rapid test for BSE. Initial results
were inconclusive.
Because of the inconclusive results, a representative from USDA took the
entire carcass to TVMDL where it was incinerated. USDA's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) began tracing the animal and herd.
The sample was then sent to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory for
further testing. Two Immunohistochemistry (IHC) tests were conducted and both
were negative for BSE. At that point APHIS stopped their trace.
USDA scientists also ran an additional, experimental IHC "rapid" tissue
fixation test for academic purposes. This test has not been approved
internationally.
Some abnormalities were noted in the experimental test, but because the two
approved tests came back negative, the results were not reported beyond the
laboratory.
Monitoring by OIG
USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been monitoring implementation
of the BSE expanded surveillance program and evaluating the following:
* Effectiveness of the surveillance program;
* Performance of BSE laboratories in complying with policies and procedures
for conducting tests and reporting results;
* Enforcement of the ban on specified risk materials in meat
products;
* Controls to prevent central nervous system tissue in advanced meat
recovery products;
* Ante mortem condemnation procedures; and
* Procedures for obtaining brain tissue samples from condemned
cattle.
While reviewing voluminous records, OIG auditors noticed conflicting test
results on one sample-rapid inconclusive, IHC negative, experimental
reactive.
Sample retested
At the recommendation of the Inspector General, the sample was retested
during the week of June 5 with a second confirmatory test, the Western Blot. The
results were reactive.
USDA scientists then conducted an additional IHC confirmatory test, using
different antibodies from the November 2004 test. On Friday, June 10, Secretary
of Agriculture Mike Johanns publicly announced the results as a "weak
positive."
On June 16 an official with USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratory
hand-carried samples for further testing to the Veterinary Laboratory Agency
(VLA) in Weybridge, England. Since 1991, the VLA has been a BSE reference
laboratory for the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).
Experts from the Weybridge lab confirmed the accuracy of the results of
USDA's November confirmatory IHC test, concurring that the case could not have
been confirmed on the basis of this sample. They also examined the November
experimental IHC test and interpreted the results to be positive.
Weybridge also conducted additional tests, including IHC, OIE-prescribed
Western Blot, NaTTA Western Blot and Prionics Western Blot tests.
To better understand the conflicting results, USDA also conducted Bio-Rad
and IDEXX rapid screening tests, IHC and OIE-prescribed Western Blot. USDA also
used DNA sequencing to determine the prion protein gene sequence of the
animal.
Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive;
experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure,
and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not
considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported
beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005,
returned positive for BSE.
48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so
the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease
Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov,
contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us
Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at
OIG, ...............
snip...
There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully
request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America
over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...
Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff,
Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx
Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST
In Reply to:
Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding
further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results
posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:
Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days
later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary
for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow
found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected.
just pondering... TSS
MAD COW IN TEXAS NOVEMBER 2004. ...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla EverettReferences: [log in to unmask]; [log in to unmask] ;
Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food
chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for
something, but they forgot a url for update?
I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...
can you confirm??? terry
============================================================
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References;[log in to unmask];
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA
web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.
Carla
At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:
Greetings Carla,
i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is
from
TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?
thank you,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr
======================================
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]><[log
in to unmask] us><[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]us>
<[log in to unmask]>
our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's
announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by
NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when
we hear something.
At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,
you wrote:
why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:
November 22: Press Release title here
star image More BSE information
terry
Carla Everett wrote:
no confirmation on the U.S.'inconclusive test...
no confirmation on location of animal. ;
FROM HERE, IT TOOK 7 MONTHS TO CONFIRM THIS MAD COW, while the BSE MRR
policy was being bought and sold...(in my opinion...tss)
Saturday, August 16, 2008
Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13,
2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)
TEXAS OFFICIALS DEAD WRONG ON AMOUNT OF INFECTIVITY TO CAUSE A TSE PRION
DISEASE ;
"FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in
total, five-and-one-half grams – approximately a quarter ounce — of prohibited
material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds."
5.5 GRAMS OF INFECTIOUS PROHIBITED MAD COW FEED FOR EACH OF THE 1,222
ANIMALS (5.5 GRAMS X 1,222 ANIMALS) IS ENOUGH INFECTIOUS MAD COW FEED TO KILL A
SMALL HERD OF COWS...TSS
U.S. Food and Drug Administration FDA News | Today the Food and Drug
Administ…U.S. Food and Drug Administration FDA News
Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken
on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone
meal from other domestic cattle — a violation of FDA’s 1997 prohibition on using
ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low
level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in
total, five-and-one-half grams – approximately a quarter ounce — of prohibited
material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.
It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin
(therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence
of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the
feed were contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA’s Acting Principal Deputy
Commissioner, “The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease
out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any
ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with
other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) ban on the importation
of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series
of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE.”
Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing
that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and
mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore,
meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any
cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are
unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance
process as usual.
FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting
the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed
supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.
This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into
place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance
needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed
routinely.
FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to
ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations
designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT
Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken
on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone
meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on
using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a
very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in
total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited
material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.
It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin
(therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence
of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the
feed were contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy
Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease
out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any
ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with
other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation
of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series
of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."
Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing
that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and
mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore,
meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any
cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are
unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance
process as usual.
FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting
the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed
supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.
This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into
place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance
needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed
routinely.
FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to
ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations
designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
PRION 2009 CONGRESS BOOK OF ABSTRACTS
O.4.3
Spread of BSE prions in cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) after oral
transmission
Edgar Holznagel1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Barbara Yutzy1, Gerhard
Hunsmann3, Johannes Loewer1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Federal Institute for Sera
and Vaccines, Germany; 2Department of Neuropathology, Georg-August University,
Göttingen, Germany, 3Department of Virology and Immunology, German Primate
Centre, Göttingen, Germany
Background: BSE-infected cynomolgus monkeys represent a relevant animal
model to study the pathogenesis of variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease
(vCJD).
Objectives: To study the spread of BSE prions during the asymptomatic phase
of infection in a simian animal model.
Methods: Orally BSE-dosed macaques (n=10) were sacrificed at defined time
points during the incubation period and 7 orally BSE-dosed macaques were
sacrificed after the onset of clinical signs. Neuronal and non-neuronal tissues
were tested for the presence of proteinase-K-resistant prion protein (PrPres) by
western immunoblot and by paraffin-embedded tissue (PET) blot technique.
Results: In clinically diseased macaques (5 years p.i. + 6 mo.), PrPres
deposits were widely spread in neuronal tissues (including the peripheral
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system) and in lymphoid tissues
including tonsils. In asymptomatic disease carriers, PrPres deposits could be
detected in intestinal lymph nodes as early as 1 year p.i., but CNS tissues were
negative until 3 – 4 years p.i. Lumbal/sacral segments of the spinal cord and
medulla oblongata were PrPres positive as early as 4.1 years p.i., whereas
sympathetic trunk and all thoracic/cervical segments of the spinal cord were
still negative for PrPres. However, tonsil samples were negative in all
asymptomatic cases.
Discussion: There is evidence for an early spread of BSE to the CNS via
autonomic fibres of the splanchnic and vagus nerves indicating that
trans-synaptical spread may be a time-limiting factor for neuroinvasion. Tonsils
were predominantly negative during the main part of the incubation period
indicating that epidemiological vCJD screening results based on the detection of
PrPres in tonsil biopsies may mostly tend to underestimate the prevalence of
vCJD among humans.
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral
Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3;
Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6;
Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique,
France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious
Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate
Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to
contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated
in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose
(MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to
assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the
disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE
brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals
were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already
developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of
the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course
between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the
detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route
using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation
period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years).
However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop
simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study “BSE
in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route
using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human
primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a
BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months
after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the
basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary
estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance
that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to
man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)
1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar
PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals
positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in
the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases
of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were
then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that
they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups
developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some
of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most
closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments
in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as
low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr
Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1
gram triggered infection.
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less
than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight;
particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses
his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the
oral route within the same species. This information did not become available
until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a
titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of
dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an
upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have
expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the
most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one
hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared
Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1
gram triggered infection.
The beef import forecast for the second quarter was unchanged from last
month’s, despite pressure from higher-than-expected domestic cow slaughter that
has remained high through most of this period. Beef imports into the United
States from Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay provide additional processing
beef that, along with domestic cow and bull beef, is mixed with 50-percent trim
from fed cattle to make ground beef. Forecast beef exports were raised slightly,
mainly on continued (though gradual) improvements in sales to major Asian
markets. In late May the World Animal Health Organization – known by its French
acronym, OIE – designated the United States as having “controlled risk status”
for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE. This designation reflects the
OIE’s view that beef produced in the United States is safe for export, since BSE
control measures such as feed bans and removal of specified risk materials
result in negligible risk to consumers. However, the OIE standards are only
guidelines. Individual countries may adopt differing standards, and those
countries that do accept OIE standards must still undertake the bureaucratic
processes to revise their rules and procedures.
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
USA MAD COW DISEASE AND CJD THERE FROM SINGELTARY ET AL 1999 – 2012
TSS
